

SOPhiA

11th Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy

2021



Programme and Abstracts

Location: Department of Philosophy (Humanities)
University of Salzburg

Date: September 9–11, 2021

Language: English

Website: <http://www.sophia-conference.org/>

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Preface



In recent years the opportunities for keeping track of science-business for students of philosophy has increased. The raising number of essay competitions and graduate conferences support this claim.



In 2021, the Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy is, once again, joining the midst of these events. The title of the conference already reveals some details about the organizers, the contributors and the conference's guiding principles. To avoid misunderstandings we want to add the following remarks: (i) Because of the high number of international participants, Salzburg stands for the location of the conference only, not for the nationality of its participants. (ii) One of the conference's distinctive feature compared to similar events is that we do not make any constraints regarding the topic of presentations. (iii) On the contrary, every philosophical discipline – as long as it is carried out in an analytic way – has its place at SOPhiA.



By combining (ii) and (iii) we want to demonstrate, in contrast to some voices which claim that Analytic Philosophy constrains our intellectual life, that all traditional topics can be advantageously examined in the framework of Analytic Philosophy. It is our utmost concern to unite analytic philosophers from all around the world (cf. (i)). This is also in the sense of Carnap, who claims in his early work *The Logical Structure of the World*:

“The new type of philosophy has arisen in close contact with the work of the special sciences, especially mathematics and physics. Consequently they have taken the strict and responsible orientation of the scientific investigator as their guideline for philosophical work, while the attitude of the traditional philosopher is more like that of a poet. This new attitude not only changes the style of thinking but also the type of problem that is posed. The individual no longer undertakes to erect in one bold stroke an entire system of philosophy. Rather, each works at his special place within the one unified science.”



In spirit of this motto, we wish you an interesting conference, fruitfull discussions and stimulating thoughts.

The Organization Committee



Figures and Facts

TIMEFRAME AND GENERAL INFORMATION. From September 9th-11th 2021 the eleventh Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy (SOPhiA 2021) will be held at the University of Salzburg's Department of Philosophy (Humanities). The conference is public and attending it is free of charge. The official language of the conference is English. Contributed talks will be given by philosophy students (pre-doc). The conference is hosted by members of the University of Salzburg's Department of Philosophy (Humanities) and former affiliates. The organizers can be contacted via organization@sophia-conference.org.



MISSION STATEMENT. Within the conference, problems of all areas of philosophy should be discussed. A thematical focus is not intended. The conference therefore has no specific theme. The presentations should rather set themselves apart by a methodological limitation to the tradition of Analytic Philosophy by usage of clear language and comprehensible arguments. The conference is meant to be a common effort to clearly formulate some of the problems of philosophy and to provide critical assessments of them. No individual is expected to construct "a whole building of philosophy" all by himself; rather, the conference hosts expect everyone, as Carnap proposes, to bring the undertaking forward "at his specific place within" philosophy.



PROCEDURE. SOPhiA 2021 will be a hybrid event with presentations by speakers who will be in person in Salzburg (offline) and speakers who will present online. As of now, about one third of our speakers intend to present in person. In order to guarantee a maximum degree of accessibility and flexibility, we will assign to each offline conference room of our venue at the University of Salzburg an online room. All presentations will be held/broadcasted in both types of rooms in parallel. This way all forms of combination of offline/online presentation and offline/online audience will be possible. In toto, about 130 participants are expected. There will be 124 contributed talks, 4 workshops, and 3 plenary talks.

Legend of Programmes

Time	Location					
	HS E.002	SR E.003	SR E.004	SR E.005	SR E.006	SR E.007
10:00-10:15	Opening & SOPHA Best Paper Award					
10:15-11:45	Plenary Lecture Maria Schrenk <i>What is Preperceptual Asym?</i> Chair: Alexander Gebharter (English, Location: HS E.002)					
11:45-12:00	Coffeebreak					
12:00-12:30	De Grooter Session: Get Your First Book or Article Published (Christoph Schuster) (English, Location: Location: HS E.002)					
12:30-14:00	Lunch Break					
14:00-14:30	Epistemology Mary Peterson <i>Robt. Pyrenard and Mirrors in the Theory of Knowledge</i> Chair: Santiago Veitch (English) <i>CHANGE: The talk @ zoomchat</i>	Metaphysics and Ontology Christina Fritz <i>Grounding Relations in the Matter of Five Will</i> Chair: Andrea Pozzosa (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Ethics Nolan Camron <i>Is the Supererogatory Argument Farside?</i> Chair: Glenn Anderson (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Mind Sebastian Drosselmeier <i>Can the Intentional States Theory Help an Older Sense of Intentional Causation via Neural Interfaces?</i> Chair: Maria Drazul (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Science Marianne von Plattsberg <i>Epistemic risks and computer simulation: a case study from particle physics</i> Chair: Anselm Mike (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Language Pablo Rivas-Rodrigo <i>Transfers, the nature and logic of coercive proposals</i> Chair: Narsus Calk (Online Talk)
14:30-15:10	Epistemology Krzysztof Szkolard <i>Semantic relations of extension, epistemic relations of intension and their logic puzzle</i> Chair: Santiago Veitch (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Metaphysics and Ontology Tom Ripstein <i>Metaphysical Expressions</i> Chair: Andrea Pozzosa (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Ethics Damiano Ranzaglia <i>Practical Identity, Contingency and Humanity</i> Chair: Glenn Anderson (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Mind Erikhan Ortiz <i>Physicoanalysis and the Laws of Metaphysics</i> Chair: Maria Drazul (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Science Andrea Lickinger <i>Searching for Probabilistic Difference-Making Within Specificity</i> Chair: Anselm Mike (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Language Gabriel Lave <i>Discriminatory complements, scales and the common ground</i> Chair: Narsus Calk
15:20-15:50	Epistemology Simon Graf <i>Epistemic Overlap and True Sky Rationality</i> Chair: Santiago Veitch (English)	Metaphysics and Ontology Hans Morik <i>Fact and Fiction concepts of truthmaking</i> Chair: Andrea Pozzosa (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Ethics Lorenz Teufel <i>What is Wrong with Deontic Wrongdoing</i> Chair: Glenn Anderson (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Mind Maria Neeff <i>Actions, Reasons, and Aesthetics</i> Chair: Maria Drazul (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Science Gregor Dappal-McDonald <i>Epistemic causality in international migration with a complex-systems approach</i> Chair: Anselm Mike (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Language Anna Ucker <i>How to Explain (and Contrast) Silence</i> Chair: Narsus Calk (Online Talk)
16:00-16:30	Epistemology Ryan Mike <i>Inevitable Knowledge</i> Chair: Santiago Veitch (English)	Metaphysics and Ontology Francisco Franco <i>Getting Real About Antirealist</i> Chair: Andrea Pozzosa (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Ethics Adam Eastman <i>Hope and Honor in Hard Cases</i> Chair: Glenn Anderson (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Mind Fabio Tomai <i>Multisensory Perception and Multisensory Mental Imagery</i> Chair: Maria Drazul (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Science Giuliano Binetti <i>Expanding Causal Modeling Semantics</i> Chair: Anselm Mike (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Language Marika Innes <i>Counter Authority: On Power and Expressive Speech</i> Chair: Narsus Calk (Online Talk)
16:30-16:50	Coffee break					
16:50-17:20	Epistemology Michael Valder <i>The Credit you Deserve, On the Basis of Testimonial Epistemic</i> Chair: Simon Graf (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Metaphysics and Ontology Nicola Kleinhammer <i>How to Create an Abstract Artifact Collectively Over Time, Or: Successfully Collective Authorship</i> Chair: Hans Morik (English) <i>CHANGE: The talk @ zoomchat</i> <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Ethics Leah Garber <i>Intentional and Responsibility</i> Chair: Damiano Ranzaglia (English) <i>CHANGE: The talk @ zoomchat</i> <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Mind Vikki Kase <i>Unconscious Interaction as a Necessary Condition for Belief</i> Chair: Maria Neeff (English)	Philosophy of Science Martina Valente <i>Cultural evolution of human cooperation</i> Chair: Daniela Schuster (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Language Narsus Calk <i>Does Fictional Speech Have an Epistemic Value?</i> Chair: Gabriel Lave
17:30-18:00	Epistemology Paul Ehrlich <i>The epistemology of inquiry</i> Chair: Simon Graf (English) <i>CHANGE: The talk @ zoomchat</i>	Metaphysics and Ontology Andrea Pozzosa <i>Easy Ontology for Group Agency</i> Chair: Hans Morik (English)	Ethics Yanis Zang <i>Rational value, intrinsic value and instrumental value</i> Chair: Damiano Ranzaglia (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Mind Sarah Stammers <i>Representation as representation-as</i> Chair: Maria Neeff (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Science Anselm Mike <i>Expert patient intuition – between experience and expertise</i> Chair: Daniela Schuster (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Language Niklas Strömer <i>As (possibility of) pragmatic immutability</i> Chair: Gabriel Lave
18:30-18:40	Epistemology Oksana Nuth <i>Act of Willing</i> Chair: Simon Graf (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Metaphysics and Ontology Emma Jara <i>Metaphysical Coherence and Vicious Regress</i> Chair: Hans Morik (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Ethics Louis Garber <i>The Feeding of Categorical Normative Force Is Just a Feeding</i> Chair: Damiano Ranzaglia (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Mind Giulia Loretti <i>Listening to music – a unique active experience</i> Chair: Maria Neeff (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Science Kabir Bakshi <i>Dualistic and Epistemic Equivalence</i> Chair: Daniela Schuster (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Language Zuzanna Janiszka <i>A Pragmatic Account of Misgendering</i> Chair: Gabriel Lave (Online Talk)
18:50-19:20	Epistemology Santiago Veitch <i>Philosophy without thought experiments: A critique of the method of cases</i> Chair: Simon Graf (English)	Metaphysics and Ontology Eugenio Asano <i>Existence</i> Chair: Hans Morik (English)	Ethics Jordan Myers <i>Revisiting the Restraint Attitude: A Critique of Ripstein's Moral Responsibility</i> Chair: Damiano Ranzaglia (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Mind David Wager <i>Can the Tracking Theory Account for Phenomenal Content?</i> Chair: Maria Neeff (English)	Philosophy of Science Inso Jang <i>How to determine the optimal decidability of probabilistic explanations: a defense of propensity</i> Chair: Daniela Schuster (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Language Arantxa Joverola <i>An Aquinas Approach to Anaphoric Reference</i> Chair: Gabriel Lave (Online Talk)
19:30-20:00	Epistemology Hany Maki <i>An epistemic related approach to the Deep Disagreement</i> Chair: Simon Graf (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Metaphysics and Ontology Marco Marcolini <i>Intrinsic Modality and the Modalist Skeptic Strategy</i> Chair: Hans Morik (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Ethics Standard Spinoza <i>Utilitarianism as a Pragmatic Choice in Joshua Greene's</i> Chair: Hans Morik (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Mind Just Carlo Cantù <i>Epistemic Memory and Probabilistic Causation</i> Chair: Maria Neeff (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Science Nino Visconti <i>Spatial Separation of Holographic Moment and Location as an Argument for a Deep-Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Field Theory</i> Chair: Daniela Schuster (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Language Katerina Bura <i>Understanding click-evoked chirality in visual arguments</i> Chair: Gabriel Lave (Online Talk)
20:00-21:30	Warm Evening Buffet					

10 September 2021 (Friday)

Time	Location					
	HS E.002	SR 1.003	SR 1.004	SR 1.005	SR 1.006	SR 1.007
10:00-10:30	Epistemology Nina Absardt <i>The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism and the Expected Utility Objection</i> Chair: Kimon Sourlas-Kotzamanis (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Metaphysics and Ontology Karol Lenart <i>Existentialism about singular propositions and truth in truth at distinction</i> Chair: Nikolai Shurakov (English)	Ethics Vítor de Almeida <i>Truths of the past: would we have a duty to remember?</i> Chair: Markus Fuchsberger (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Mind Eduardo Vaccarju <i>Two perspectives on Theory of Mind and Pragmatics</i> Chair: Daniel Weger (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Science Wojciech Graboń <i>Models, Signs and Metaphors and the Law: an Outline of a Peircean Framework</i> Chair: Ina Jäntgen	Political Philosophy Lukas Fuchs <i>Spontaneous Order and Market Shaping</i> Chair: Marlene Malsinger <i>(Online Talk)</i>
10:40-11:10	Epistemology Pak-Him Lui <i>The preface paradox and higher-order belief</i> Chair: Kimon Sourlas-Kotzamanis (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Metaphysics and Ontology Kain Pak <i>Resisting Relativism: A Realist Defense of Universals in Feminist Metaphysics</i> Chair: Nikolai Shurakov (English) <i>CHANGE: The talk is cancelled!</i>	Ethics Dominik Boll <i>Blame It on Me - Is Blame Ever Morally Required?</i> Chair: Markus Fuchsberger (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Mind Adrianna Smurzynska <i>When do we attribute mental states to others and to oneself adequately?</i> Chair: Daniel Weger (English)	Philosophy of Science Dáian Bica <i>Natural Properties at the Heart of Scientific Practice</i> Chair: Ina Jäntgen <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Political Philosophy Francesca Miccoli <i>Legal recognition of unconventional families in a liberal state</i> Chair: Marlene Malsinger
11:20-11:50	Epistemology Benoit Guillard <i>Two Modes of Suspension of Judgement</i> Chair: Kimon Sourlas-Kotzamanis (English)	Metaphysics and Ontology Alexander Michael Wilkamp <i>On the Relevance of Ontological Categories</i> Chair: Nikolai Shurakov (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Ethics Sherwin Mirzaeizhaji <i>Blame, but not merely as a means</i> Chair: Markus Fuchsberger (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Mind Michael Huemer <i>Mental Files Theory of Mind: How children represent identity and belief</i> Chair: Daniel Weger (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Religion Marco Hausmann <i>How to Get Past the Problem of God's Omnipotence</i> Chair: Ina Jäntgen <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Political Philosophy Lena Könenmann <i>Ideal Theory for Feminists</i> Chair: Marlene Malsinger <i>(Online Talk)</i>
12:00-12:30	Epistemology Lena Mudry <i>Suspension of judgment has its own standard of correctness</i> Chair: Kimon Sourlas-Kotzamanis (English)	Metaphysics and Ontology Marta Emilia Bielinska <i>Are the Bundle Theorists committed to constituent ontologies?</i> Chair: Nikolai Shurakov (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Ethics Alexander Edlich <i>Excuses and their Role in our Responsibility Practices</i> Chair: Markus Fuchsberger (English) <i>CHANGE: The talk is cancelled!</i>	Philosophy of Mind Giorgio Mazzallo <i>Visibility</i> Chair: Daniel Weger (English) <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Philosophy of Religion Bogdana Slamenović <i>Hume's Dialogues and Theological Argument</i> Chair: Ina Jäntgen <i>(Online Talk)</i>	Political Philosophy Sudhaisatva GuhaRoy <i>Trust and Roles</i> Chair: Marlene Malsinger <i>(Online Talk)</i>
12:30-14:00	Lunch Break					
14:00-15:30	Metzler Lecture Herlinde Pauer-Studer <i>A Normative Argument for the Separation of Law and Morals</i> Chair: Stephen Müller (English, Location: HS E.002)					
15:30-16:00	Publishing Workshop with the Synthese Editor in Chief: Do's and Don'ts (Otavio Bueno) (English, Location: HS E.002)					
16:00-16:30	Coffee Break					
18:30-20:00	Workshop 1 (online) Sophie Naeff & Hannah Pillin & Deniz Sarikaya <i>Scientific Impartiality and Marginalized Groups</i> (English)	Workshop 2 (online) Alexander Christen & Julia Mirkin <i>Moral and Scientific Expertise</i> (English)	Workshop 3 (Hybrid) Thorben Petersen <i>Social Ontology of Bands and Other Musical Groups</i> (English)	Workshop 4 (Hybrid) Maria Sektakaya <i>Realities of Free Will</i> (English)		

Time	Location						
	ISE.002	SR.1003	SR.1004	SR.1.005	SR.1.006	SR.1.007	
10:00-10:30	<p>Epistemology Svetla Savoca <i>Understanding ourselves: understanding</i> Chair: Lena Mully (English)</p>	<p>Metaphysics and Ontology Alexandru Căciulă <i>Entanglement and Composition</i> Chair: Bogdan Dumbrăvescu (English) (Aldine Zăk)</p>	<p>Ethics Robert Ted Wollin <i>Agentive Affective Views of Moral Responsibility</i> Chair: Maliki Geris (English) (Aldine Zăk)</p>	<p>Philosophy of Mind Maliki Geris <i>On what planning intentions are made of: the role of inner speech in goal attainment?</i> Chair: Ada Stenurzonka (English)</p>	<p>Logic Larissa Balbe <i>How do we understand <i>pro</i>(each) a <i>quare</i>-semantic approach?</i> Chair: Yarek Kold</p>	<p>Political Philosophy Hugo Mercurio <i>Enacting the Social Contract: Civil Disobedience in Argentina</i> (Ondrej Táb)</p>	
10:40-11:10	<p>Epistemology Oliver Andreas <i>How Big Should Talk About Fair: News</i> Chair: Lena Mully (English)</p>	<p>Metaphysics and Ontology Anghel Bărbulescu <i>The metaphysical aspects of Substances</i> Chair: Bogdan Dumbrăvescu (English) (Ondrej Táb)</p>	<p>Ethics Theodor Viker <i>The Argument of Desire</i> Chair: Bogdan Dumbrăvescu (English) (Ondrej Táb)</p>	<p>Philosophy of Mind Danica Costi <i>Reconciling Motivational Strength and Objective Probabilities of Action</i> Chair: Ada Stenurzonka (English) (Aldine Zăk)</p>	<p>Logic Mara Beatrice Bănușcă <i>More Compositionism in PD?E</i> Chair: Yarek Kold (Ondrej Táb)</p>	<p>Political Philosophy Georgios Karagiannopoulos <i>An absent ontology or a hidden compositionism?</i> <i>Revisiting Wittgenstein's interpretation of Rawls's political ontology</i> (Ondrej Táb)</p>	
11:20-11:50	<p>Epistemology Daniela Mărușter <i>Epistemic Corruption and the Media</i> Chair: Lena Mully (English) (Ondrej Táb)</p>	<p>Metaphysics and Ontology Marta Predoni <i>Can there be vague quantum objects?</i> Chair: Bogdan Dumbrăvescu (English) (Aldine Zăk)</p>	<p>Ethics Alexander Viehöver <i>The Natural Emotional Basis of Free Will Skepticism and Compatibilism: Reframing the Free Will Debate</i> Chair: Maliki Geris (English) (Aldine Zăk)</p>	<p>Ethics Kathrin von Almen <i>Reconceptualizing climate-change responsibility</i> Chair: Ada Stenurzonka (English) (Aldine Zăk)</p>	<p>Logic Dimitrie Sarbușcu <i>How do we understand <i>pro</i>(each) a <i>quare</i>-semantic approach?</i> Chair: Yarek Kold (Ondrej Táb)</p>	<p>History of Philosophy Keylisa Băgușcu <i>The early Wittgenstein's view of nonsense reconsidered</i> (Ondrej Táb)</p>	
12:00-12:30	<p>Epistemology Kimen Ștefan-Ștefan <i>A Cartesian Epistemic Apologetic?</i> Chair: Lena Mully (English)</p>	<p>Metaphysics and Ontology Agnetașca Proșoveanu <i>Goals shape reason: A pluralist response to the problem of formal representation in axiomatic structural realism</i> Chair: Bogdan Dumbrăvescu (English)</p>	<p>Ethics Jon Banta <i>Genetic Enhancement, Human Extinction, and the First Interest of Posthumanity</i> Chair: Maliki Geris (English) (Aldine Zăk)</p>	<p>Ethics Marion Fuchsberger <i>Har Without Death: A Critical Perspective on Nussbaum's Illusions</i> Chair: Ada Stenurzonka (English)</p>	<p>Logic Felixon Hămănuș <i>A decision-free inspired semantics of a logic of conditional imperatives and permissions</i> Chair: Yarek Kold (Ondrej Táb)</p>	<p>History of Philosophy Joy Bhat <i>Arbitrary vs. Moral Agency: "Is Could Have Not Done Otherwise?"</i> (Ondrej Táb)</p>	
12:30-14:00	Lunch Break						
14:00-14:30	<p>Epistemology Leonida Târziu <i>What are epistemic?</i> Chair: Svetlana Skovrova (English) (Ondrej Táb)</p>	<p>Metaphysics and Ontology Marina Mărușter <i>Collapsing study of Ludwig's account of institutional agency</i> Chair: Agnetașca Proșoveanu (English)</p>	<p>Ethics Kareem Lassarier <i>Altruistic deception and betrayal</i> Chair: Jon Banta (English)</p>	<p>Ethics Chris Zuehlke <i>The Herms of Construction & The Moral Permissibility of Abortion</i> Chair: Francesca Micoșcu (English) (Aldine Zăk)</p>	<p>Logic Zecheng Chen <i>A note on the formalism-freedom of Gödel's L</i> Chair: Larissa Balbe (Ondrej Táb)</p>	<p>History of Philosophy Jordi Vallarín <i>Wittgenstein, Truth-Dialecticism and Meta-Ethics</i> Chair: Karol Lertat (Ondrej Táb)</p>	
14:40-15:10	<p>Epistemology Rosa Tău <i>Epistemology of Social Objectification</i> Chair: Svetlana Skovrova (English) (Ondrej Táb)</p>	<p>Philosophy of Mind Răzvan Mărușter <i>Responsibility for the response: the self-knowledge debate</i> Chair: Svetlana Skovrova (English) (Aldine Zăk)</p>	<p>Ethics Sylvia Marini <i>How Do We Perceive Artificial Moral Cognitives?</i> Chair: Jon Banta (English) (Aldine Zăk)</p>	<p>Ethics Benedek Nemler <i>Artificial, Embodied Ethical Perspectives, and Moral Theories</i> Chair: Larissa Balbe (English) <i>CHANGE: The task is circular!</i></p>	<p>Logic Paul Hămănuș <i>The Epistemic Role of Social Media in Mathematics</i> Chair: Larissa Balbe (Ondrej Táb)</p>	<p>History of Philosophy Ginger Ilie <i>How useful is Husserl's notion of truth?</i> Chair: Karol Lertat (Ondrej Táb)</p>	
15:20-15:50	<p>Epistemology Daniela Schuster <i>Suspension of Judgment and AI</i> Chair: Svetlana Skovrova (English)</p>	<p>Philosophy of Mind Yarek Kold <i>AI/Big Data/informative rationality</i> Chair: Agnetașca Proșoveanu (English)</p>	<p>Ethics Marlene Mullinger <i>Open and Its Epiphanies: A Conceptual Analysis</i> Chair: Jon Banta (English)</p>	<p>Ethics Abdulkhalid Shalabi <i>Models and Analogies</i> Chair: Francesca Micoșcu (English) (Ondrej Táb)</p>	<p>Logic Antonio Predoi <i>Primo-System and Internal Relations</i> Chair: Larissa Balbe (Ondrej Táb)</p>	<p>History of Philosophy Alex Ștefan <i>Cracking off the Head of a Hydra: Plato on the Immutability of Cause</i> Chair: Karol Lertat (Ondrej Táb)</p>	
16:00-16:30	<p>Philosophy of Mind Mădălin Drăgul <i>Cognitive Ontologies and the Status of FDR Psychology</i> Chair: Agnetașca Proșoveanu (English)</p>	<p>Ethics Emilia Dăscăleșcu <i>Do Criminal Offenders Have a Right to Neurorehabilitation?</i> Chair: Jon Banta (English) (Aldine Zăk)</p>	<p>Ethics Mubarak Hussain <i>On the Possibility of Assigning the FDR Moral Status (FDRS) to the Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) Systems</i> Chair: Francesca Micoșcu (English) (Aldine Zăk)</p>	<p>Philosophy of Mind Max Theodor <i>On the Possibility of Assigning the FDR Moral Status (FDRS) to the Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) Systems</i> Chair: Larissa Balbe (English) (Aldine Zăk)</p>	<p>History of Philosophy Max Theodor <i>On the Possibility of Assigning the FDR Moral Status (FDRS) to the Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) Systems</i> Chair: Larissa Balbe (English) (Aldine Zăk)</p>	<p>History of Philosophy Max Theodor <i>On the Possibility of Assigning the FDR Moral Status (FDRS) to the Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) Systems</i> Chair: Larissa Balbe (English) (Aldine Zăk)</p>	
16:30-16:45	Coffee Break						
16:45-18:15	<p>Plenary Lecture Marina David <i>Truth - Why Do Intelligent People See So Many Odd Things about It?</i> Chair: Răzvan Păuș (English, Location: ISE.002)</p>						
18:15-20:00	Closing Dinner (Restaurant)						

Plenary Talks

Truth – Why Do Intelligent People Say So Many Odd Things about It?

Marian David

Section: Plenary Talk: Closing
Language: English
Chair: Raimund Pils
Date: 16:45-18:15, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: HS E.002



A Normative Argument for the Separation of Law and Morals

Herlinde Pauer-Studer

The issue of how to understand the relation between law and morality has divided legal theorists: Legal positivists hold that there is no necessary connection between law and morality. The validity of legal norms and statutes does not depend on their fulfilling standards of morality. Proponents of a natural law theory, however, claim that legal systems which violate basic demands of morality and justice cannot qualify as genuine law. They are, as John Finnis puts it, "peripheral" and "watered-down versions" of the central cases of law. According to natural lawyers, proper law exceeds at meeting standards of justice and is oriented towards realizing the common good. While legal positivists consider law and morality as distinct normative spheres (the so-called separability-thesis), natural law theorists think it essential that law and morality are internally connected. A test case for these divergent approaches to law has been the existence of evil legal systems. Positivism, as critics maintain, cannot say more about such systems except that they disqualify morally. Since positivists read "legal validity" in a descriptive sense (legally valid norms are actually given legal norms, i.e., norms that are *de facto* in force), they seem to lack the resources for criticizing wicked law on legal grounds. Natural law theorists, on the other hand, assuming that viable law is internally linked to morality, tend to question the validity of wicked legal systems altogether. However, as their positivist opponents object (rightfully in my mind), such a critique can merely probe the legitimacy of wicked law, but not its being actually in force, exercising authority over its

subjects. In my talk I am going to assess this controversy by taking a closer look on one notorious evil legal system: National Socialist law. I will focus particularly on how legal theorists who aligned with the Nazi regime conceived the relation between law and morality. My thesis is that the call for a unification of law and morality, as it is common in NS legal theory, supports a separation of law and morality on normative grounds. To draw a line between law and morality is, as the experience with National Socialism vividly shows, indispensable for setting limits to state power. However, such a normative argument for keeping law and morality apart does not deny any connection between the two spheres. Rather, the example of National Socialist law invites us to find a way of translating our historical and moral insights about the structure and working of an evil legal system into normative requirements concerning the form of law. Such formal requirements, which are situated between law and morality and constitute a crucial part of the rule of law, allow us to criticize and reject bad and wicked law not only on moral, but also on legal grounds. One particular focus of my talk will be to explicate in more detail how to understand the suggested "translation" of moral insights about failed legal systems into normative requirements of a "thin" conception of the rule of law, explaining also why in the case of an ideological moralization of law a normatively "thin" rather than a "thick" account of the rule of law seems appropriate.

Section: Plenary Talk: Metzler Lecture
Language: English
Chair: Stephen Müller
Date: 14:00-15:30, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002



What is Proprioceptive Art?

Markus Schrenk

Many works of art are predominantly visual or auditory in nature (visual arts such as drawing, painting, photography or performing arts like music). Mixed forms are also common (again performing arts, here opera, theatre, dance, etc.). The so-called chemical senses (smelling or tasting) are rarely addressed and only some art works (happenings, fluxus, performance) might also crucially involve the audience's own physicality and thereby intentionally provoke the recipients' perception of their own body (proprioception). This talk poses an even more radical question: Could there be works of art that are primarily proprioceptive in nature, i.e. that have the perception of one's own body movement and position in space, balance, muscle tension, stretching, pain, temperature, energy and stress levels, etc., at their core. Is proprioceptive art possible? In addition to theoretical considerations which show the plausibility of a positive answer, potential examples for this art form will be given.

Section: Plenary Talk: Opening
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Gebharter
Date: 10:15-11:45, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002



Workshops

Workshop: Scientific Impartiality and Marginalized Groups

Organisation: Sophie Nagler & Hannah Pillin & Deniz Sarikaya

his workshop aims to address traditional topics in the (feminist) philosophy of science, such as impartiality and objectivity in science, the value-free ideal, and debate around inductive risk and the role of non-epistemic values in scientific reasoning. We are especially interested in thinking about how one decides which non-epistemic values should play a role in scientific reasoning (if any), and attempts to make precise exactly what role they should play. Within the feminist epistemology, we want to, furthermore, focus on the concepts of situated epistemology and standpoint theory, as a means of exploring how employing the values of marginalised groups in the scientific process can support the claims put forward by these epistemological positions. We wish to supplement these theoretical considerations by various case studies from any branch of science (broadly construed), whereom employing non-epistemic values and especially feminist ones, leads to epistemic, as well as non-epistemic benefits within science, for affected and marginalised groups, as well as for society more generally.

This workshop aims to bring together philosophers of science, including feminist philosophers of science, as well as, more generally, people interested in feminist philosophy, not necessarily at the same time being engaged in philosophy of science.

Workshop Talks:

Does Situated Knowledge Provide a Critical Standpoint?

Sally Haslanger

ne strategy for illuminating and addressing structural injustice is to call for diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) in the process of knowledge production and dissemination. Because this approach rightly assumes that one's social position affects what one knows, it is sometimes defended as a form of "standpoint epistemology." However, the term 'standpoint epistemology' emerged as an effort to address the problem of ideology, and situated knowledge is not itself sufficient to establish a critical standpoint. Because ideology, when successful, recruits us into fluent participation in an unjust structure, some of those who are subject to subordination will not develop

or accept a critique of it. Critique may take aim at deeply held identities that both enable one to coordinate with others and provide a basis for self-esteem. So although the claim that “all knowledge is situated” is true, and although efforts to include diverse knowers in inquiry is important, this will not always (or even usually) be enough to disrupt ideological practices. Situated knowledge may just provide knowledge of the practice, without knowledge of what makes it problematic or what would be better. What’s needed is situated critical knowledge – not just knowledge of the practice, or knowledge from within the practice - which offers insight into the ideological function of the practice and a space of alternatives. What, then, would critical knowledge production and dissemination practices look like? How would they go beyond standard practices of diversity, equity, and inclusion to promote anti-racist, anti-sexist, anti-ableist, anti-colonial, anti-capitalist knowledge?

Incorporating diversity dimensions in philosophy research

Eugénie Hunsicker

hilosophy, along with mathematics and the physical sciences, is often seen as aiming to understand truths that are independent of humanity and human cultures. For this reason, it is often difficult to understand or see the relevance either of calls (eg, by ERC) to consider the sex/gender dimension in research or the demands of decolonisation in research and teaching. In this talk, I will talk about the context of these calls, the reactions that researchers may have to these, and some suggestions of how to incorporate these concerns productively into a research programme.

Endometriosis and Source Based Epistemic Injustice

Lara Jost

ndometriosis is a common gynaecological disorder where the lining of the womb grows outside of it, causing inflammation, pain and subfertility. In the UK, patients suffering from endometriosis have to wait an average of 7.5 years between the first time they report symptoms and the time they get a diagnosis (Endometriosis UK). Other countries do not fare much better, as patients around the world have to wait an average of 5.5 years in individual or private-insure funded healthcare or an average of 8.3

years with government-funded healthcare. Despite increased discussions about epistemic injustice in the domain of healthcare, one phenomenon around endometriosis cannot be explained by the currently available framework: the discrepancy in diagnostic time between patients consulting for pelvic pain and those consulting for infertility. Indeed, patients who consult primarily for infertility wait on average 3.4 years less than patients who consult for pelvic pain. Why is there such an important discrepancy in the diagnostic time between these patients who have the same illness? To answer this question, I first provide an expansion to the concept of epistemic injustice, called source based epistemic injustice, which highlights the unfairness towards knowers who use epistemic methods based on currently unapproved sources of knowledge, like pain and other types of affective experience. I then use this new framework to highlight why patients consulting for pelvic pain suffer from an additional form of epistemic injustice, thus explaining the diagnostic delay. Ultimately, I explain how clinical methods relying on ‘mechanical objectivity’ put endometriosis patients with pelvic pain in an irreconcilable epistemic tension that can only be resolved by reforming our epistemological theories and incorporating affective experience within our approved sources of knowledge.

Epistemic inclusion of marginalized groups in physics

Vlasta Sikimić

 Research in social epistemology emphasizes the importance of cognitive diversity in physics and science in general. On the other hand, without inclusion, the positive potential of cognitive diversity cannot be obtained. Moreover, epistemic inclusion, as a process of incorporating diverse opinions of others, is dependent on the social inclusion of marginalized groups in science. Gender imbalance is common in STEM and early-career researchers are fundamentally dependent on their mentors. I will present the results from an empirical study of job satisfaction and satisfaction with the academic system among physicists (N=123) mainly working in large laboratories. The satisfaction with the academic system scale measures experience of research autonomy, opportunities to use one’s knowledge, and appreciation of the research by the general public. According to the findings, physicists are less satisfied with the academic system than with their work setting. Furthermore, female scientists and junior researchers are more dissatisfied with their jobs. The findings highlight the importance

of improving work and research conditions for marginalized groups in physics. Some of the ways of achieving this are promoting inclusiveness and transforming the dominating masculine culture in the field. Finally, physicists feel that the general public does not understand their work. Since science plays an important role in contemporary society, this is also an aspect that requires our attention.

Section: Workshop
Language: English
Date: 16:30-20:00, 09 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: online



Workshop: Moral and Scientific Expertise

Organisation: Alexander Christian & Julia Mirkin

hen it comes to moral expertise our cultural and political practice do not go hand in hand with the philosophical debate. While it is common to refer to members of ethics committees as moral experts, who due their professional training in moral philosophy have an advantage over laypersons, the ongoing philosophical debates on the practical roles and expectation, political legitimacy and even metaphysical possibility of moral expertise call the idea of objective moral arbiters into question (Singer 1972, Dietrich 2012, Archard 2019). Curiously, the same can not be said about scientific expertise. Only few scientific relativists would doubt the possibility of scientific expertise on principal. The overwhelming majority of philosophers of science agree that proper scientific and methodological training in combination with a solid institutional framework justifies laypersons trust when it comes to the opinion of scientists on scientific questions. The talks in this workshop address this tension known as the asymmetry problem for moral expertise and connected questions.

The talks in this workshop address questions like the following:

- What exactly distinguishes moral expertise from scientific expertise from an epistemological point of view?
- Can we disentangle moral expertise from moral realism or any particular stance on the ontology of moral facts?
- Is moral deference, which is often considered morally problematic, categorically different from scientific / epistemic deference, which is often seen as unproblematic?
- What role can moral experts play in moral deliberation, e.g. in clinical ethics, in corporate consulting and policy-making?
- How can we warrant trust in moral experts? Do we need a moral framework that provides guidelines for moral experts similar to guidelines for scientific experts?

Workshop Talks:

Localized strong moral expertise

Alexander Christian

S defend an interpretation of the moral expertise thesis, according to which some professional agents are, *ceteris paribus* and due to their scientific and moral training, the optimal candidates to make moral judgements about a specific class of moral issues arising in research and publication processes. Against the background of a broader account of expertise based on (Scholz, 2018) I will first illustrate such localized strong moral expertise with a case study on a the moral debate about human germline editing via CRISPR,Cas9 and discuss merits and limitations of this account. Then I will identify conditions under which laypersons should defer to these expertise-based moral judgements – vice versa should be skeptical about non-(localized strong) moral judgements by scientists. The latter issue will be related to moral claims in CRISPR,Cas-policy making, e.g. on a moratorium on human germline interventions (c.f. Lander et al., 2019).

Specifying Clinical Expertise and the Demands for its Transition and Implementation in Clinical Practice

Julia Mirkin

Not only since the outbreak of a global pandemic the central role of clinical expertise, when interpreting and integrating research evidence, is pivotal. It is also a central element of the definition of Evidence Based Medicine (EBM): "Evidence-based medicine (EBM) requires the integration of the best research evidence with our clinical expertise and our patient's unique values and circumstances." (Straus et al., 2018, p. 18). While there are attempts to codify and apply explicit rules for the interpretation of various kinds of medical evidence, "clinical expertise", due to its dependence on personal clinical experience, to a certain degree, seems to elude such a codification, since it is in part shaped by an array of rather diffuse parameters such as socio-economic aspects, climate, nutrition, cultural values in general, patient values in particular (Thornton, 2006; Al-Lawama, 2016). In spite of the dependence of personal clinical experience the transition and implementation of clinical expertise is crucial for successful treatment results in a constantly dynamic environment.

In this talk I aim to explicate what is meant by "clinical expertise" and how it can be specified (Scholz, 2018; Haynes, Devereaux and Guyatt, 2002). In order to identify questions that arise when trying to assess expertise as a part of integrating it in ones own clinical practice, considering the additional requirements in comparison to implementing sheer research evidence.

Moralische Expertise, ethisches Unvermögen und ideologische Interessenkonflikte

Frauke Albersmeier

ie Beschäftigung mit Fragen nach der moralischen Expertise von Wissenschaftlern – etwa danach, ob Kompetenzen auf dem Gebiet der philosophischen Disziplin Ethik mit einer besonderen Zuverlässigkeit in der Beantwortung moralischer Fragen einhergehen oder welche spezifische moralische Expertise von Vertretern anderer Fächer erwartet werden kann – verlangt nach Ergänzung um die Auseinandersetzung mit einem konzeptuellen Gegenstück zu moralischer Expertise: ethischem Unvermögen. Die Probleme mangelnder Fähigkeit oder Bereitschaft zur Reflexion moralischer Fragen fallen zwar in den Gegenstandsbereich der Wissenschaftsethik, werden aber kaum in einen Zusammenhang mit ihrem positiven Pendant, moralischer Expertise, gebracht. Der Vortrag geht diesem Zusammenhang nach, identifiziert dabei ideologische Interessenkonflikte als vernachlässigte Störfaktoren für Forschungsabläufe und zeigt ihre mögliche inner- und außerwissenschaftliche Wirkung auf.

Expertise and the limits of public participation In the Context of communicable disease Outbreaks

David Stoellger

cientific experts are significantly involved in advisory roles to policymakers, the judiciary, and the public. In the context of outbreaks involving novel communicable pathogens, the demands brought forth towards scientific experts are exaggerated by limited available evidence, exceptional time and resource constrains. At the same time, given the peculiarities of communicable disease outbreaks, everyone is an active stakeholder. The success of public health policy critically depends on the public's acceptance of scientific advice and the resulting restrictions of the policies. Still,

expert's advice is usually given greater weight in setting up, evaluating, and adjusting policies, given their better epistemic, practical, and hermeneutical position in their respective field. Nonexperts lacking such a better position are in many circumstances unable to assess expert's advice themselves. I aim to explicate how far scientific experts ought to come to an agreement with nonexperts. To be able to that, I argue for both a bidirectional, but also asymmetrical 'expert-nonexpert relationship'. I wish to ultimately offer conditions, that if violated by nonexperts, give experts good reason to limit some non-experts' input in scientific discourse.

Section: Workshop
Language: English
Date: 16:30-20:00, 09 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: online



Workshop: Social Ontology of Bands and Other Musical Groups

Organisation: Thorben Petersen

isten to The Band! The Philosophy of Pop Groups. A SOPhiA-Workshop on Social Ontology. There is growing interest in the philosophy of popular music (see the articles collected in Gracyk/Kania 2011), and also growing interest in the ontology of social groups (for an overview, see Ritchie 2015, for in-depth discussion, see Jansen 2017), but only little work on the intersection of these topics: the ontology of pop groups, alias bands. This is an unfortunate lapse, as topics in the ontology of bands are vast.

Firstly, there is the continuity of bands, i.e. the question of how bands continue, or persist as bands. More specifically, one may want to know how bands persist despite of adding keyboard-players, firing singers, replacing drummers, and so on (see the pioneering work by Bremer/Cohnitz 2009 on Metallica, White's 2013 examination of the case of Black Sabbath sans Ozzy Osbourne, and the general discussion of Terrone 2017).

A related topic of interest concerns the identity of bands: what exactly are bands? And what is it that distinguishes pop groups from other musical entities, including solo artists, Jazz units and classical orchestras (as mentioned e.g. in Smith 2005)?

Third, there's the individuation of bands. How, for instance, are we to distinguish PINK FLOYD from THE BLACK ANGELS?

Finally, there's the question whether there are such things as pop groups, i.e. whether bands exist at all.

This workshop brings together five philosophers working on the ontology of bands. The main goal of our workshop is to establish the ontology of pop groups as a separate field of research. Additionally, we want to contribute to the wider field of social ontology, by considering whether our results apply to other groups (including other cultural groups, but also ethical, gender, and religious etc. groups) as well.

Talks:

- Daniel Cohnitz (Utrecht): "Is it Still Metallica? On the Identity of Rock Bands Over Time"
- Ludger Janssen (Rostock/Münster): "The Will to Gig and The

Ontology of Music Groups"

- Thorben Petersen (Bremen) "Listen to The Band: An Introduction to The Ontology of Bands"
- Enrico Terrone (Barcelona): "The Ship of Theseus: Social Individuals and Mental Files"
- Julia Zimmerman (Siegen): "On The Persistence of Bands (qua Bundles of Properties)"

References:

- Bremer, Manuel/Cohnitz, Daniel. 2009: "Is It Still Metallica?" In Irwin, William. (ed.): *Metallica and Philosophy: A Crash Course in Brain Surgery*. Wiley-Blackwell. Gracyk, Theodore/Kania, Andrew. 2011. *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music*. Routledge.
- Jansen, Ludger. 2017. *Gruppen und Institutionen*. Springer.
- Ritchie, Katherine. 2015: "The Metaphysics of Social Groups", *Philosophy Compass* 10.5: 310-321.
- Smith, Thomas. 2005. "What is the Halle?", *Philosophical Papers* 34.1: 75-109.
- Terrone, Enrico. 2017: "The Band of Theseus: Social Individuals and Mental Files", *Philosophy of The Social Sciences* 47.4/5: 287-310.
- White, Mark. 2013. "The Name Remains the Same. But Should It?", in Irwin, William (ed.): *Black Sabbath and Philosophy: Mastering Reality*. Wiley-Blackwell.

Section: Workshop
Language: English
Date: 16:30-20:00, 09 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: SR. 1004



Workshop: Realities of Free Will

Organisation: Maria Sekatskaya

Free will is something we usually believe in, and something we value. Most philosophers agree that only the agents who have free will are morally responsible and deserve praise and blame. However, there are some reasons to doubt that free will is real. First, we cannot rule out the possibility that physical determinism is true: this is a classical incompatibilist reason to question free will. Second, free will skeptics have argued that contemporary neuroscience has shown that free will is an illusion because all our actions are determined by prior unconscious brain states. The aim of the workshop "Realities of Free Will" is to explore these threats to free will and to show how free will can nevertheless exist in a naturalistic framework.

Workshop Talks:

Supervenient Fixity and Agential Possibilities

Maria Sekatskaya

Compatibilist libertarianism (CL) has been proposed as an actualist position intended to reconcile physical determinism and an agent's ability to do otherwise. We will argue that at its core, CL is a variant of classical compatibilism rather than a version of libertarianism. We will show that recent objections to CL can be avoided by embracing its compatibilist nature. We will also argue that a slightly modified version of CL is as close to an actualist account of free will in a deterministic world as one can hope for.

Probabilistic Supervenience and Agential Possibilities

Alexander Gebharter

Compatibilist libertarianism proposes a new solution to the problem of an apparent incompatibility of free will and determinism. It drives a wedge between ontological levels and claims that free will is possible as a higher-level phenomenon even if the fundamental physical level is governed by determinism. After highlighting an inconsistency in the current version of compatibilist

libertarianism, we discuss how one of its essential metaphysical assumptions (in particular: supervenience) can be modified in order to avoid this problem. Finally, we discuss the pros and cons of pushing the position to the limits in this way.

Free Will and Illusory Experiences

Sergey Levin

ome people believe that science has proven that free will is an illusion. I propose a thought experiment demonstrating that such view leads to an absurd conclusion, that the term 'free will' can no longer be applied differentially to cases where agents control their bodily movements and cases where they do not. The experiment involves a fictional character, Dr. Strangelove, who suffers from alien hand syndrome in his right hand. He asks another fictional character, Mary to return his free will. Mary is a world-renowned neuroscientist, and she thinks that there is no free will, but merely illusion of it, therefore, she intends to return only the latter to him. To do so, she performs brain surgery that leaves intact the causal roots of the alien hand movements nevertheless creates an illusion of control. Even though Strangelove may be happy with the results, a third-party observer would notice that Strangelove has been tricked into believing that he is in control of the movements of his hand. If the difference between the illusion of control of his right hand and the way he controls his left hand can be spotted and it is practically important, then it is misleading to call free will an illusion.

Determination from Above

Kenneth Silver

hereas many in the free will literature have considered how different views of the laws of nature or causation influence the apparent challenges posed by Determinism, I consider how these conversations are impacted by an acceptance or denial of a levels-ontology. In particular, I suggest that while some threats to freedom are naturally understood in terms of our being upwards determined by physics and neuroscience, our freedom can also be threatened by determination from above. I illustrate how historical materialism and other, less ontologically committed theses with sociology and other social sciences present distinctive threats to our freedom. I show that certain incompatibilist arguments are better framed in terms

of downward determination, and I defend the possibility of this threat from the charge that appeals to determination from above constitute instances of bad faith.

Section: Workshop
Language: English
Date: 17:00-20:00, 09 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: SR.1005



Contributed Talks

Multisensory Perception and Multimodal Mental Imagery

Fabio Tononi

Multisensory perception and multimodal mental imagery describe two very common phenomena in daily life. The first refers to multisensory events that are perceived in more than one sense modality (e.g. vision and audition). Whereas the second refers to multisensory events that are perceived in one or more sense modalities and that also trigger mental imagery in another (or others) sense modality (or modalities). For example, when we are looking at a running motorcycle, we are experiencing a multisensory perception, which involves sight (the motorcycle), smell (the fuel), and hearing (the noise of the running motorcycle). Therefore, we perceive this event by means of vision, olfaction, and audition. In another occasion, we may experience the same event but without seeing the actual motorcycle and smelling the fuel (if we are inside, for instance). In this case, we are receiving sensory stimulation from a multisensory event by means of one sense modality (i.e. audition). The result is a multimodal mental imagery of both the vision of the motorcycle and the smell of fuel. Consequently, on instances like this one, we have multimodal mental imagery: perceptual processing in two sense modalities (vision and olfaction) that is triggered by sensory stimulation in another sense modality (audition). The aim of this study is to combine philosophical research with empirical evidence to address the following questions: What is the role, if any, of top-down influences in multimodal mental imagery? And how does the brain integrate multimodal experiences? These issues still need further investigation, which combines philosophical, psychological and neuroscientific studies.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Matej Drazil
Date: 16:00-16:30, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005



When do we attribute mental states to others and to oneself adequately?

Adrianna Smurzynska

The aim of my presentation is to undertake the issue of mental states attribution and the main focus will be taken on the criteria of their adequate ascription. There will be considered the capability for simulating others' mental state - putting oneself in someone's shoes - which is important but at the same time, not sufficient for the adequacy of mental states ascription. There will be also reflected similarities between interacting people - they may contribute to understanding one another, but they may also impede this process. However, the abilities for differentiating perspectives and separating one's own and other's mental states seem to be necessary conditions for an adequate mentalization. The ability of differentiating the agency of mental states is the essential element for social cognition. It is also important to understand that particular mental states may be shared with others, but not all the time. There will be considered results on the development of the ability of differentiating perspectives and disorders of this ability in borderline personality disorder. The ability of differentiating oneself and others' mental states will be presented as the aspect of social cognition that enable adequate mentalization, due to accepting the presence of various perspectives and the possibility of the coexistence of various representations of reality. This ability enables adequate mentalization as a result of considering various perspectives and recognizing the possibility of the coexistence of various representations of reality. Probably it is not the only aspect of social cognition enabling adequate mental states ascription but it seems to be an essential one.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Daniel Weger
Date: 10:40-11:10, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.005



Media and Analogy

Akhilesh Shridar

Nalmost 100 years ago, Walter Lippman published a scathing critique of democracy in "Public Opinion". Lippman's view is that our opinions on things in the world are formed through estimations and reductions. The world in toto is too complex for us to fully appreciate. In order to overcome this hurdle of excess external stimuli, we as humans estimate the world, and mediate our access to the world such that our experience is manageable. Lippman uses the word stereotype to describe this mediated access. The pictures of the world in our head created by these very estimations, are called pseudo environments. This view can be bolstered and expanded when considered in conjunction with Prof. Douglas Hofstadter's hypothesis of analogy as cognition, and contemporary perturbation theory. I argue that our estimation of the world through analogy and stereotypes, has been hijacked by modern media tactics. Modern media, using anticipatory tools such as recommendations and relational databases, creates ideological isolation and epistemic bubbles. The efficacy of these tools multiply manifold when examined in the context of our internal pseudo-environment. I believe that the anticipatory tools used by the media, the resulting ideological isolation and epistemic bubbles, and our estimation through analogy and stereotypes, give rise to a perfect storm. Each issue, complex in their own right, exacerbates the others, transforming them into a significantly more complex problem. In this essay I re-construct and update Lippman's position, examine the anticipatory tools in the hands of the media, and explicate how ideological isolation results from the confluence of these problems.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Francesca Miccoli
Date: 15:20-15:50, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.005



Excuses and their Role in our Responsibility Practices

Alexander Edlich

 discuss the role of excuses in our responsibility practices and argue that there is a specific reactive stance fitting to excused action, namely conciliation. To do this I rely on a distinction between excuses and exemptions: an agent is exempted when moral demands are not applicable to her because she lacks relevant capacities. Exempted action is not an instantiation of moral agency and not within the scope of responsibility practices. Excused actions are performed by morally competent agents who violate moral demands but are nonetheless not blameworthy due to excusing conditions. My first aim is to vindicate the plausibility of excuses. I use examples of emotional strain, provocation, and extremely burdening moral demands. While I remain neutral on the plausibility of full excuses, I show that partial excuses are widely acknowledged and figure centrally in our responsibility practices by mitigating which agents we view as worthy of blame without mitigating wrongness of action. My discussion builds on Kelly's (2013) account, but I depart from it regarding the normative implications of excuses: whereas Kelly can be read as arguing that excuses override blameworthiness and make blaming the agent all things considered inappropriate, I argue that excuses make blame unfitting. This leads to my second aim. I argue that excuses have a specific place in our responsibility practices: there is a *sui generis* reactive stance fitting towards excused wrongdoing and different from blame, which I call conciliation. It is an attitude that seeks to mend the relationship where it has been impaired by wrongdoing. This contrasts with blame, which has been characterised as a form of moral anger (Wallace 1994) and a form of protest (Hieronymi 2001, Smith 2013). Blame is confrontational and puts the blamer in opposition to the blamee. Conciliation is not oppositional but an attitude that seeks to engage both parties in an attempt to come to terms with the wrongdoing by mutual understanding and resetting the terms of the relationship. Whereas, in a Scanlonian framework of moral relationships, blame consists in adapting one's relationship with the wrongdoer in light of the wrongdoing, conciliation aims at maintaining the relationship without trivialising the wrong done. As such, conciliation is fitting towards behaviour that is wrong but excused.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Markus Fuchsberger
Date: 12:00-12:30, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004



The Natural Emotional Roots of Free Will Skepticism and Compatibilism: Reframing the Free Will Debate

Alexander Veichkov

 propose a sentimentalist way of framing the free will problem, according to which both skepticism and compatibilism about free will are founded on separate and conflicting moral intuitions. Building on Jonathan Haidt's Moral Foundations theory, I suggest that each side identifies a different kind of fairness, which pick out different aspects of our agency. Naturalist (also called Strawsonian) compatibilists correctly identify the fittingness conditions of the attitudes that motivate what Haidt calls "fairness as proportionality": the retributivist motivation to punish or reward agents based on whether their actions express good or bad regard towards others. On the other hand, skeptics base their arguments on intuitions of "fairness as social equality". This is the powerful moral intuition that people should be treated equitably: burdens and benefits should be distributed in a way that reflects people's effort. Skeptics argue that the causal chains of our actions extend back to spheres outside of our control (such as our genes, environment, and perhaps pure chance) and that because of this, it would be unequitable to retributively punish some and reward others. Punishment and reward can only be justified for other, mostly consequentialist reasons. Seeing both compatibilist and skeptical intuitions as in some sense valid and carrying moral weight, I suggest that neither can be ignored; the two must be balanced against each other. Hence, the free will problem can be reframed: it is not a theoretical problem having a binary yes/no answer, but a practical problem arising out of emotional ambivalence about responsibility.

Section: Ethics
 Language: English
 Chair: Mathijs Geurts
 Date: 11:20-11:50, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
 Location: SR 1.004



Representation as representation-as

Ayoob Shahmoradi

I argue that: Representation as representation-as (RAR) Necessarily, for any subject S , object o and time t , if S refers to o at t (by thinking of o or perceiving o), then there is a way "such that S represents o as" at t . First, I motivate RAR by showing that it is independently plausible. Then I will show that the arguments presented against this view are not sound. Susanna Schellenberg (2018) argues that RAR entails that perception has to have a sentential format while perception could have a map-like or pictorial structure. She has also argued that perceptual reference requires discriminating the referent and even if there are cases of representation-as they must be grounded in discrimination. Regarding the former, I argue that not only does RAR not entail that perception has to have a sentential structure. But also it is hard to see how an image of some object o can represent o without representing it as having certain properties—certain color, shape, location, etc. Regarding the latter objection, I argue that even if Schellenberg were right that perceiving o required discriminating it, that would still entail RAR. Jerry Fodor (1981, 2009) and Zenon Pylyshyn (2004, 2007, 2009) have argued that this view leads to an infinite regress which makes object representation impossible in the first place. In response, I will show that their argument relies on an assumption that is not detailed by RAR. I will also argue that this further assumption is false for independent reasons. Pylyshyn and Storm (1988) argue, based on their multiple object tracking studies, that if visual representation requires representation-as, then subjects must represent not only objects but also their properties and their changes over time. They claim that this is not possible due to our computational limitations. I will argue that i) many of the crucial assumptions that this argument relies on are not supported by their empirical work on multiple object tracking.

Also, I will argue that ii) there are other highly plausible accounts of multiple object tracking that are significantly less demanding in terms of the computational resources that subjects need to employ. I discuss blindsight seeing, Balint's syndrome, inattentional blindness, and other neuro-psychological conditions and show that they could not be accounted for if RAR were false.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Martin Niederl
Date: 17:30-18:00, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005



Individuals, Existential Risk Prevention, and Moral Theories

Benedikt Namdar

The realization of an existential risk causes much harm. That harm includes the lives ended by such an event. But it also includes the potential value that would come into existence in the absence of an existential catastrophe. Combining these considerations with a significant overall possibility of existential catastrophes occurring leads to the conclusion that preventing such scenarios should be a major project of humanity. The philosophical discussion surrounding existential risk prevention is mostly about incorporating it into policy making. However, what has yet been ignored is the role of individuals in the project of existential risk prevention. This presentation contributes to that part of the discussion. The first step of this talk is to motivate the claim that individuals should consider existential risk prevention in their moral deliberations as among possible consequences of individual acts are occurrences of existential catastrophes. For example, a single car ride could be the reason GHG threshold is exceeded and have a climate catastrophe as a result. Even given that such results are unlikely, it is important to consider such consequences as the amount of value at stake is huge.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair:
Date: 14:40-15:10, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.005



The Harms of Contraception & The Moral Permissibility of Abortion

Chiara Zucchelli

 aim to argue for the moral permissibility of abortion in cases where contraception has been foregone by the female. I will begin by outlining the argument made by Judith Jarvis Thomson in her paper "A Defense of Abortion", which favours abortion in cases where pregnancy that has come about through failed contraception. I will argue that the arguments Thomson makes in favour of abortion to uphold female bodily integrity can be extended to further cases than the ones she defends. Namely, the moral permissibility of abortion in cases where contraception is foregone - based on a desire to minimise harms on the female population, and to place women on a level playing field as men in terms of consequences of intercourse. I will base my argument on the gendered burdens of contraception that infringe on female bodily integrity, and will show that such infringements are harmful to the extent that female contraceptive use ought to be avoided in favour of less effective methods. I will then defend my argument against two possible counterarguments: that abortion itself infringes on female bodily integrity, and that women hold "special responsibilities" to a foetus. Ultimately, I will conclude that in cases where a woman chooses to forego female contraception, it is morally permissible for her to have an abortion.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Francesca Miccoli
Date: 14:00-14:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.005



Blame It on Me - Is Blame Ever Morally Required?

Dominik Boll

lame is omnipresent in our lives and, recently, in the philosophical literature. Suppose your roommate has promised to clean the house and instead went for drinks. Imagine your sibling bluntly lying to your parents. Blaming them seems a natural response. We may additionally ask whether blame is appropriate. This issue turns particularly pressing since blame is often characterised as entirely bad - as something anyone wants to be protected from - and it can undoubtedly be abused. This challenges our blaming practices: should we forswear blame for good? Several philosophers have defended the value of blame. But realising even appropriate and valuable blame seems entirely up to the blamer. Therefore, there is a stronger and hitherto largely neglected question: is blame ever morally required? Are there instances in which we ought to blame, where abstaining from blame involves failure or moral wrong? I argue that there are. Abstaining from blame can wrong the initial wrongdoer because of a failure in what we owe them due to the common relationship. I first show that blame is positional, viz. some requirements on blame are instantiated by the relationship between blamer and wrongdoer. I then draw on blame as a proleptic mechanism that serves the alignment of moral understandings to demonstrate that blame is constructive. Afterwards, I connect the two threads to develop my argument. By recognising both the positionality and constructiveness of blame, there is a strong case for a requirement to blame. I first argue that there are particular duties in personal relationships, and then show that blame is uniquely apt to provide moral feedback to wrongdoing due to its characteristic force and role in developing moral agency. Abstaining from blame fails to respect the wrongdoer by withholding feedback we owe them qua relationship. If my argument is successful, defenders of blame need not only be on the defence. George Ezra was right: you should blame it on me.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Markus Fuchsberger
Date: 10:40-11:10, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004



Two perspectives on Theory of Mind and Pragmatics

Edoardo Vaccargiu

Cognitive theories of verbal communication build on the assumption that language interpretation requires the Theory of Mind (ToM). Post-Gricean accounts, like Relevance Theory, developed the assumption in a modular view of the mind, by arguing that pragmatics is a sub-module of the ToM-module. Recently, the modular view of pragmatics has been questioned, both on empirical and theoretical grounds. This work takes a stance on the issue by making two original claims: (i) the present debate is vitiated by a "coarse formulation" of the modular hypothesis, (ii) the current state of the art allows to tackle the issue in a more empirically-informed way. To uphold these claims, I firstly spell out Relevance Theory's account of the link between ToM and pragmatics focusing on Sperber's theoretical tripartition of interpretative strategies. Then, I discuss two different perspectives through which the tripartition has been read: the developmental and the normative one. The developmental reading was proposed by Wilson to defend the modular hypothesis in the light of developmental data. In this regard, my claim is that Wilson's reading lacks empirical support. However, I argue that some data from developmental psychology could indeed support a "fine formulation" of the modular hypothesis, which I try to sketch. The normative reading is upheld by Kissine to integrate clinical data from individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder within an "anti-modular" approach to pragmatics. I argue that Kissine's reading fits well with recent data from experimental pragmatics. However, I maintain that while his model succeeds in ruling out the coarse formulation of the modular hypothesis, it loses ground against the fine one. Finally, I propose some advices for addressing the issue of modularity in pragmatics in a more empirically-informed way.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
 Language: English
 Chair: Daniel Weger
 Date: 10:00-10:30, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
 Location: SR 1.005



Do Criminal Offenders Have a Right to Neurorehabilitation?

Emma Dore-Horgan

Neurointerventions - interventions exerting direct physical, chemical or biological effects on the brain - are sometimes administered to criminal offenders for the purpose of reducing their recidivism risk and promoting their rehabilitation more generally. Ethical debate on such "neurocorrectives" has proceeded on two assumptions: that public protection is the chief motivator for their use, and permissibility depends on whether their use unjustifiably infringes offender rights. Scant attention has been paid to a different yet important question: whether offenders have a right to be offered neurocorrectives promising to facilitate their rehabilitation. This paper asks this question and answers affirmatively. I argue offenders have a right to be offered safe, effective neurorehabilitation and my argument is two-fold. I first contend arguments supporting a moral and legal right to conventional rehabilitation extend to support a right to neurorehabilitation. I further argue a right to neurorehabilitation (in the case of some offenders) is a derivative right of the right to health. The structure is as follows. Section 1 outlines three oft-cited grounds of a right to rehabilitation: a) as compensation for the debilitating effects of punishment; b) as a derivative right of the right to hope for renewed liberty; c) and as compensation for systemic injustice. I argue these also support a right to neurorehabilitation: that neurocorrection might sometimes be appropriate and necessary for recompensing offenders and preserving the right to genuine hope. Section 2 argues a right to neurorehabilitation can sometimes be derived from the right to health. I posit that some existing and candidate neurocorrectives plausibly restore mental and physical health; and if we accept that people have a right to access healthcare they require, then a right to neurorehabilitation might sometimes follow from this. Section 3 addresses two potential objections. The first disputes whether a right to rehabilitation includes a right to mere symptomatic relief of one's problems (as might be promised in neurorehabilitation). The second contends neurorehabilitation is a bad option - to the extent that it might undermine offenders' self-respect and make them feel obliged to submit to it - and as such it should not be afforded the protection of a right.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Jon Rueda
Date: 16:00-16:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.004



Visibility

Giorgio Mazzullo

ne of the most intriguing aspects of the way we access the world is that we have conscious sensory experiences of it. Typically, middle-size dry goods are objects of our conscious perceptions. Tables, flowers, and trees are all parts of our visible world. But we also seem to see objects that belong to different ontological kinds like rainbows, holograms and virtual reality. If we restrict our attention to vision, it seems sensible to suppose that not every aspect of reality is open to our visual awareness. Science provides us with a human threshold for visibility: we don't usually see mites or atoms. Yet, in some specific circumstances, some such objects can become visible. Magnifying tools can provide us with access to what is considered to be an invisible part of reality. What is the scope of visibility then? I will suggest that some objects, though not being visible in the ordinary sense, can become, under specific circumstances, hyper-visible. Hyper-visibility, however, does not apply to every entity. I will contest Masrour's claim that surface-heat can become visible under specific circumstances (2019). I will conclude that if we accept some assumptions, some rather unorthodox objects are hyper-visible. I will defend the claim that is a condition on an entity being an object of vision that it possesses some basic visible qualities like colour and shape. Finally, I will provide some considerations regarding picture visibility. I will suggest that, contrary to what we tend to think pre-theoretically, in picture-perception those entities that figure as the content of the picture are not visible.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Daniel Weger
Date: 12:00-12:30, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.005



Listening to music: a unique active experience

Giulia Lorenzi

n philosophy of auditory perception, taxonomic works such as O'Callaghan's (2020) and O'Callaghan and Nudds' (2009) present the musical case as a specific auditory experience. Even though philosophers have considered the musical case as special despite being so common in our everyday lives, few contributions have tried to analyse it from a perceptual point of view (Scruton 1997, Hamilton 2009). Following Crowther (2009b) and O'Shaughnessy (2000), I will consider listening as a mental action carried out by perceivers who are not mere passive entities. After a brief definition of the act of listening, I will then move to the analysis of the musical case. I will argue that listening to music is a joint activity that requires the efforts of both perceivers and musicians, at least in the case of tonal music. On one side, perceivers draw and keep their attention on music, being led by the expectations generated by musical structures. On the other side, musicians lead listeners' attention to the most relevant elements in each musical bit. Even if music structures present synchronous sounds, perceivers do not experience difficulties in grasping what are the most relevant components in a specific passage. I will support my statements in two moves. Firstly, I will compare the experience of listening to a piece of music from a tradition that we are familiar with and the experience of listening to a piece of music that is completely alien to our ears. I will notice as, in the second case, we cannot create expectations. Secondly, I will analyse the case of virtual a-synchronous recordings. Where, the impossibility to rehearse together eliminates the opportunity for musicians to listen to each other and the hierarchy of priority among the elements of the musical structures goes missing.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Martin Niederl
Date: 18:10-18:40, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005



Genetic Enhancement, Human Extinction, and the Best Interests of Posthumanity

Jon Rueda

The cumulative impact of enhancement technologies may alter the human species in the very long term future. In this article, I start showing how radical genetic enhancements may accelerate the conversion into a novel species, along with clarifying the concepts of "biological species", "transhuman" and "posthuman". Then, I summarize some ethical arguments for creating a transhuman or posthuman species that is substantially better than the human one. In particular, I present what I have called the Principle of the Bests Interests of Posthumanity, which states that the enhancement of the human and transhuman species must be directed towards the creation of a posthuman existence that is substantially more valuable than the one of its predecessors. I argue that it seems plausible that human extinction may be considered, within that principle, as one of the best interests of posthumanity. Finally, I develop three reasons that make that principle ethically unattractive.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Mathijs Geurts
Date: 12:00-12:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.004



Restricting the Reactive Attitude: A Critique of Korsgaard's Moral Responsibility

Jordan Myers

Christine Korsgaard holds an absolute position on moral responsibility, shaped by Kant's two viewpoints on persons. I examine Korsgaard's thesis and explicate what she has become logically committed to; she commits to holding others morally responsible without exception. She says as much explicitly, but then shies away from this conclusion in other sections of her work, for reasons I believe are correct, but incompatible with her more formal argument. After this analysis, I critique her thesis on its own grounds by offering two direct criticisms. I then introduce P.F. Strawson's essay "Freedom and Resentment" to inject a different perspective on moral responsibility. I explain Strawson's project of reconciling his optimist and pessimist, and analyze his claims on the morality of reactive and objective attitudes. Strawson's language of reactive attitudes is useful in understanding Korsgaard's commitment, but I argue that he holds an ineffectual descriptive view where a powerful, normative one is needed. I end the critique of Korsgaard's absolutist views on agency and develop three cases in which I believe it is morally permissible to suspend Korsgaard's obligatory responsibility. The first case is when I take the objective attitude towards myself in moments of active deliberation or reflection. Here I view myself in the past or future as a determined thing to be examined or taken into account. The second case of moral permissibility occurs when I suspend my reactive attitudes towards someone who will not or cannot engage interpersonally in a way that warrants reactive attitudes. This person has degraded my relations with her to the point of non-collaboration, and has thus brought the objective attitude on herself. The third case is one where causally deterministic circumstances demand the objective attitude, cases in which a key variable negates even Korsgaard's grounds for practical responsibility. This third case is also the only in which I argue the reactive attitude would be normatively impermissible. I find value in what Korsgaard and Strawson assert, but push for a change in Korsgaard's absolutism and a bolder stance than Strawson's. Holding people in our lives responsible is central to interpersonal relationships, but it is not rational for us to default to the reactive attitude.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Damiano Ranzenigo
Date: 18:50-19:20, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004



Episodic Memory and Probabilistic Causation

José Carlos Camillo

Markus Werning recently brought probabilistic causation up to the debate about episodic memory arguing that if one defends that episodic memory is reliable then one should accept that there is some kind of causal connection between the episodic retrieval and the perceptual experience remembered. His reasoning is basically this: in order to be reliable, the perceptual experience should raise the probability of an episodic memory happening (Reliable Production). And he considers a causal connection to be one that raises the probability of an event happening (Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle). I will defend that this conclusion is problematic for two main reasons: first, establishing a causal connection is not the only option if someone considers episodic memory to be reliable. In Pearl's probabilistic causation approach, the alternative would be to consider the relationship between episodic retrieval and perceptual experience as one of dependence. An event x is dependent on an event y if when y happens it changes the probability of x happening. A causal connection implies that there is a dependence relation, but not all dependence relation implies a causal connection, as Werning concludes. And a dependence relation could also be considered epistemically reliable (Reliable Production), even if there is no causal connection between episodic retrieval and the perceptual experience remembered. Second, Werning's proposal of minimal traces fits better as a dependence (but not causal) relation than as a causal relation. To defend my argument, I will begin my talk by presenting the idea that to be reliable, episodic memory should be causally connected to the perceptual experience. Then, I will expose the problems of that argument through Pearl's account of probabilistic causation. After that, I will defend that accounts like the minimal traces or procedural causation fit better with a dependence relation. Thereafter, I will introduce the

necessity of a probabilistic active path to a relation be considered as a causal one. Finally, I will argue that as far as we know from neuroscience studies, episodic memory does not have a probabilistic active path, therefore, should be considered as having a dependence (but not causal) relation to the perceptual experience.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Martin Niederl
Date: 19:30-20:00, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005



Robotic deception and betrayal

Karen Lancaster

 In the coming decades, sociable robots will be on their way to care institutions, bedrooms, schools, and businesses, but philosophers have expressed concerns about interacting with sociable robots. One common criticism of sociable robots is that they are deceptive, but there has been confusion about the nature of the deception they engage in. John Danaher is seemingly alone in his attempt to clarify robotic deception. He separates it into three types: (A) deception about the world external to the robot; (B) the robot suggesting it has states/capacities which it does not have; and (C) the robot suggesting it doesn't have states/capacities which it does have. I build on Danaher's account and challenge it in two ways: (1) we should not conflate states and capacities, for deception about the former is potentially far more morally troubling than deception about the latter. A robot which says that it cannot do something when really it can is frustrating, but much less morally troubling than one which says that it is not doing something when really it is, e.g. video recording (2) Danaher claims that when a robot suggests it isn't doing something which it is doing, this can amount to betrayal, whereas if the robot suggests it is doing something when it isn't, this is not morally troubling. I show how the latter can amount to (morally troubling) betrayal in the same way as the former.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Jon Rueda
Date: 14:00-14:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.004



Reconceptualizing climate change responsibilities

Kathrin von Allmen

ven though global climate change is considered as one of the most dangerous threats humanity has ever faced, insufficient action has been undertaken to reduce climate change harms. Responsibility plays a crucial role in this context. I argue that the absence of an adequate understanding of climate change responsibilities has aggravated the inaction problem, and thus contributed to the current lack of both theoretical and implemented solutions. The concept of moral responsibility, for example - even though appropriate for paradigmatic harm cases - does not fit well for climate change because of its distinct features as a collective action problem (see also Jamieson 2015). Given the urgency of the climate problem, a concept is required that allows us to assign responsibilities to all agents and not solely to those who were at fault in the first place. My contribution in this paper is to begin to fill this gap by philosophically investigating the concept of remedial responsibility. Remedial responsibility is the responsibility to remedy a harmful or depriving state in the world. The concept of remedial responsibility has been mainly discussed in other contexts, such as by David Miller in the context of global poverty and migration. I argue in a first step that remedial responsibility's forward-looking feature does justice to the fact that climate change harms are a catastrophe that require immediate remediation (in terms of mitigation, adaptation and compensation). Furthermore - by being forward-looking - remedial responsibility can be assigned to numerous agents based on various justificatory reasons. In a second step, I suggest a taxonomy of remedial responsibilities in the context of climate change and present an overview on how the assignment of these responsibilities to various agents - such as nation states and individuals - can be justified.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Ada Smurzynska
Date: 11:20-11:50, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.005



Rape and Its Equivalents: A Conceptual Analysis

Marlene Maislinger

My presentation is about rape and deceit. I am discussing the question whether sexual acts that only take place because one of the participants was deceived about something that influenced their decision to engage in the act are to be classified as rape. To answer this question, I first reflect on the meaning of the concept of rape and then have a look at whether sexual acts that are induced by deceit fulfill the criteria necessary for falling under the same concept. I defend a consent-based definition of rape and argue that consent to a sexual act is not valid when people are deceived about matters that crucially affect whether they agree to engage in the act or not. To scrutinize this assumption, I consider and analyze some arguments in favor of the notion that consent to a sexual act is not invalidated by deceit, only to find that they are not strong enough to dismiss the idea that consent is not valid when it is given while the person who supposedly gives it is deceived about a matter that their decision to consent depends on.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Jon Rueda
Date: 15:20-15:50, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.004



On what planning intentions are made of: the role of inner speech in goal-attainment

Mathijs Geurts

 here are several kinds of intentions, one of which is concerned with planning future actions (Bratman, 1997). These intentions are conscious, not only in the phenomenological sense, but also in the reflective sense: they involve thinking and reasoning about one's experiences. Unlike more short-term intentions, these seem to play a causal role with regard to our action, as argued by Slors (2015). For instance, if I plan to visit my aunt, my conscious intention disposes me to act toward that goal in the future. However, not much attention has been paid to the manner in which these planning intentions are formed. In particular, previous research has overlooked the important role of inner speech in forming planning intentions. Evidence for this aspect of planning intentions can be found in the experimental literature on intentions and effective goal-attainment (e.g. Gollwitzer, 1999). This research appeals to specific linguistic features of planning intentions in their methodology. In particular, this method is based on 1) the assumption that planning intentions should be made explicit and 2) the finding that these intentions are most effective when they have an if-then structure (i.e. "when I go to bowling practise I will visit my aunt afterwards")(Gollwitzer, 1997). This suggests that to the extent they cause our future actions, planning intentions are formed with the use of such cognitive tools as inner speech and visualisation. Therefore the conscious aspect of these intentions might not be very important in itself. More important is the manner in which these intentions are formed. Additionally, inner speech fits very well within the general framework presented by Slors, who argues that these intentions have a self-programming function. If we adopt this framework, intentions formed by inner speech do not cause our actions directly, but they provoke a change in our dispositions to act. The resulting function of inner speech is to facilitate unconscious thought processes that trigger the specified action at the appropriate time.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Ada Smurzynska
Date: 10:00-10:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.005

A new perspective on the free will - determinism debate: nonreductive physicalism

Max Theissen

his paper will walk you through one of the most important decisions of your life. It is not this particular decision per se which constitutes its paramount importance, but rather the option of choice itself. This paper will investigate the meta-physical implications of the assumption of choice commonly referred to as "an ability to do otherwise". For it seems there are some who would rob us of this autonomy. The thesis of determinism vehemently denies us our decisions as being the product of our deliberation, and rather ascribes them to universe's destiny instead. Today, I will challenge the view that determinism excludes the possibility of our having an ability to do otherwise. I will analyse a promising account formulated by Christian List, who proposes implementing the metaphysical thesis of non-reductive physicalism into a deterministic universe. This synthesis distinguishes the dynamics governed by determinism from the dynamics which govern our decision-making, to reconcile free will with determinism. Unfortunately, List's account presupposes a limited perspective on the relevant planes of dynamics, converting his account from intelligible to inconsistent upon further inspection. This discrepancy, aptly pointed out by Alexander Gebharter, leaves List's account vulnerable to the consequence argument, validating its conclusion that free will and determinism are incompatible. Nevertheless, List's template inspired me, and one of his unspecified assumptions in particular leaves room to tinker with the system as a whole. I will check whether editing his definition of supervenience will free a fitting space in a deterministic universe where we may insert an agent their ability to do otherwise after all.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Larissa Bolte
Date: 16:00-16:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.006



Throffers. The nature and logic of coercive proposals

Pablo Rivas-Robledo

Trom playing a pivotal role in Pablo Escobar’s mafia regime in during the 80’s to be a central figure in the enforcement of intentional law, throffers are an important yet often overlooked concept in theories of coercion. Throffers are a kind of coercive proposals in which compliance guarantees an improvement of the recipient’s situation when compared to a situation where the proposal was not made; refusal guarantees deterioration of the recipient’s situation when compared to a situation where the proposal was not made. The most famous example of throffers is the following: “If you go to the movies, I’ll give you \$10,000. If you don’t go, I’ll kill you”, but other examples can be put forward easily: for instance, Pablo’s famous “plata o plomo” (“money or lead”), where the Medellín Cartel often bribed public authorities by offering money in case the official was willing to help the Cartel (plata/money) yet threatening with death in case of non-compliance (plomo/lead, that is, getting shot) can be read as promising money for compliance and death otherwise.

Although the literature on the subject has not been extensive, throffers are often regarded as coercive proposals that can be explained in terms of threats and/or offers and are formalized as an indicative biconditional of the form $\neg p \leftrightarrow q$. I believe that both theses are wrong. And so, in this paper I present a systematic account of throffers along with a logic of coercive proposals where I (1) characterize them as coercive proposals that cannot be reduced to either threats nor offers and (2) attempt to formalize them as a conjunction of conditionals of the form $p \rightarrow (\neg s \wedge q) \wedge \neg p \rightarrow (s \wedge \neg q)$. I will argue that the logic of coercive proposals is a definettian trivalent logic with a TT-validity schema together with Cooper-Cantwell conditionals.

Section: Philosophy of Language
 Language: English
 Chair: Nursan Celik
 Date: 14:00-14:30, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
 Location: SR 1.007



How to Implicate with (Conversational) Silence

Anna Klieber

he idea that we can communicate more with an utterance than we explicitly say has been widely discussed in terms of the Gricean (1967/1989) notion of conversational implicature. It is less clear, how we can sometimes communicate something by not saying anything at all. That is, philosophers of language talk very little about how somebody who remains literally silent during a conversational exchange can bring something across by not saying anything, even though it seems that silences like that are a common occurrence: E.g., think of the uncomfortable silence that can arise when somebody makes an inappropriate remark, or the approving silence of a friend who we know agrees with us. In this paper, I focus on the communicative functions of such silences—specifically, I argue that we can conversationally implicate with silence by critically assessing the Gricean framework and identifying an understanding of implicature that can accommodate cases of remaining silent. My paper is structured as follows: I will first briefly assess Grice’s account of conversational implicature, and define what I will call “conversational silence”. Second, I will think about how implicating with silence might work by referring to Grice’s conversational maxims (Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner), asking: (1) How is a maxim exploited (or observed) by the use of silence, and (2) how can an audience come to calculate a silent implicature? Finally, I identify an altered version of Grice’s original definition that can capture silent conversational implicature, and point to some further questions and challenges.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Nursan Celik
Date: 15:20-15:50, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007



Discriminatory compliments, scales and the common ground

Gabriel Levc

Some utterances of compliments, such as “Your German is excellent” said towards a woman of colour in Austria, seem to communicate discriminatory beliefs or content towards members of minority groups, even if they are intended to genuinely compliment their recipient. In order to explain how this discriminatory content comes to be, I first look at some general properties of compliments, arguing that they allow for scalar implicatures in virtue of the gradable adjectives used in compliments being on so-called Horn scales (Horn 2006). I proceed to explain how a given compliment can be appropriate within a situation but fail to be so in another one by arguing that in order to be appropriate, a compliment needs to meet or exceed a specific standard on an appropriateness scale based on the aforementioned Horn scale. I then point out that in order to fully explain the given phenomena, we must allow for the appropriateness scale to adapt to varying contexts in two ways, either by shifting its scope or by changing the relevant standard.

Making use of the prior theoretical observations, I present an explanation of discriminatory compliments based on Langton’s recent work on the presuppositions of authority-requiring speech acts (Langton 2018). I aim to show that if a compliment does not meet the standard of any contextually salient appropriateness scale, a scale that renders the compliment appropriate will be accommodated as part of the common ground. Furthermore, I argue that uttering a discriminatory compliment requires a form of epistemic authority that most speakers should generally not assume.

In presenting my paper, I hope to direct attention towards a type of speech act that has so far been underappreciated in contemporary philosophy of language, as well as point towards yet another way in which a seemingly innocent type of utterance can express harmful attitudes towards minority groups.

Section: Philosophy of Language
 Language: English
 Chair: Nursan Celik
 Date: 14:40-15:10, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
 Location: SR 1.007

Bridging the Gap: Logic, reason and normativity

Larissa Bolte

e largely accept that logic has at least some normative bearing on our reasoning in a number of different ways: When deliberating, we try to avoid believing what does not follow. Arguments are deemed inferior if they contain logical errors. Additionally, people are faulted on the daily for not complying with the laws of logic. There are even entire websites dedicated to eradicating these rational blunders, brandishing the slogan “Thou shalt not commit logical fallacies”. How does this compelling force of logic come about? Recently, John MacFarlane has introduced talk of bridge principles (henceforth “BPs”) that connect the laws of logic, precisely the laws of logical validity, to norms for belief. It stands to reason that these BPs may illuminate the link between logic and reasoning and eventually lead to an explanation of the normative force of logic. In my talk, I set out to examine what role BPs could play in this regard. First, I will have to define what is meant by “BP”. I will do this by elaborating on what problem BPs are supposed to solve and what form they would have to take in order to serve that function. Next, I aim at analyzing how BPs might express, mitigate or transfer the normative force of logic. For this, I have to be clear on what type of discipline logic is supposed to be: Is it merely descriptive or itself normative? Depending on this, the role of the BP might differ. Instead of committing myself to one option, I will present the consequences of either. I will conclude that, in any case, the notion of logical validity is indeed closely related to our norms for reasoning and rational discourse and that BPs serve the function of expressing that relation. However, no matter how logic is characterized as a discipline, be it inherently descriptive or normative, its normative force is grounded in the pre-existing norms of our rational practices. For this reason, I invite researchers to examine the normativity of reason as the source of the normativity of logic and, perhaps, the source of normativity tout court. BPs do not further that understanding per se. They do, however, capture aspects of it. Ultimately then, the search for the right BP could play an auxiliary role in developing a suitable theory about reasoning and rational discourse, although they can never have any inherent explanatory power in themselves.

Section: Logic
Language: English
Chair: Yannick Kohl
Date: 10:00-10:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.006



Naïve Comprehension in HYPE

Maria Beatrice Buonaguidi

he project of a mathematically tenable naïve set theory is inevitably confronted with the difficulty of finding a suitable nonclassical logic. The proof-theoretic weakness of most naïve set theories and the ad-hocness of some of their tenets, which entail commitment to paracompleteness or paraconsistency, make a theory based on an iterative notion of set look like the best option. I argue that there are some fundamental advantages in adopting a naïve notion of set. A successful naïve set theory must ultimately be based on a framework which allows paradox in a controlled way, retaining classicality in the domain of ordinary mathematics, thus gaining the expressive power given by naïve sets without entirely sacrificing the classical structure and proof-theoretic strength.

A suitable framework is provided by the impossible world approach of the logic HYPE, which allows paracomplete or paraconsistent submodels while maintaining classicality locally in well-behaved situations. Building on recent developments in theories of truth, which show that the theory of truth KFL based on HYPE has the same proof-theoretic strength as its classical counterpart KF, I build an arithmetical theory of naïve comprehension, HYAC. This theory serves as a comparison between theories of truth and theories of naïve comprehension as property instantiation. I highlight the similarities between a notion of set thus construed and a notion of disquotational truth, and show that the theory HYAC based on HYPE has at least the same strength as KFL. I also set to show that HYAC can express compositionality for membership, i.e. iterative or mathematical set formation, hinting that a HYPE naïve set theory built from first principles might achieve a strength similar to that of the iterative set theories. Although the use of the HYPE framework needs to be better justified, the interesting interplay between nonclassicality and strength is worth considering for future developments.

Section: Logic
Language: English
Chair: Yannick Kohl
Date: 10:40-11:10, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.006



The Epistemic Role of Social Values in Mathematics

Paul Hasselkuß

 In social epistemology, “social” values concern an agent’s social, moral or political background, or they involve the agent in a crucial way. They are different from the values that are *internal* to the scientific enterprise (such as empirical adequacy and consistency). In mathematics, studies of mathematicians’ practices describe how agents turn to social values to fulfil various epistemic tasks. For example, considering a conjecture’s purported “beauty” is taken as an indicator of its truth, the authority of a proof’s author is taken as an indicator of its correctness. Social values seem to complement the epistemic role of internal values. But how can social values be epistemically reliable?

In the talk, we shall suggest a reductive explanation. We proceed in three steps. Firstly, we describe a set of (potentially) epistemically relevant social values. Mathematicians do not take any social value to be epistemically relevant, but only a subset that includes, among others, beauty and authority. Secondly, we define the epistemic effect of these values as truth-indicative. Mathematicians rely on these values because they take them to indicate mathematical truth. Thus, to explain why social values are epistemically reliable, one needs to explain the connection between the relevant values (identified in the first step) and mathematical truth. Thirdly, we argue for a weak dependency claim. If a mathematician believes that p is a mathematical truth, because she believes that p is beautiful (in addition to other beliefs concerning p), her belief that p is beautiful needs to be partly grounded in the mathematical properties of the mathematical entity that corresponds with p . That is, only if the relevant social values partly depend on mathematical properties, and only on the right subset thereof, social values can be epistemically reliant. We conclude by sketching some consequences if the weak dependency claim is accepted and some possible problems.

Section: Logic
Language: English
Chair: Larissa Bolte
Date: 14:40-15:10, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.006



Peano Systems and Internal Relations

Antonio Freiles

Recent and less recent metaphysics has contained a good deal of discussion that revolves around internal relations, where a relation R is internal if and only if the essential properties of its relata entail it. One might maintain, given the numbers 2 and 3, their essential properties (e.g., their numerosity) entail the internal relation, “being greater than”, which holds between them. However, in the last decade, the idea that we can dispense with internal relations has caught on. Being R an internal relation, any comparative claim of the form aRb is made true by the essential properties of the individuals they relate, Fa and Gb . The previous thesis belongs to the philosophers of reductionist fashion, those who, for nominalistic reasons, wish to reduce the internal relations in aRb ’s claims to the essential properties of a and b (Simons, 1994) (Lewis, 1986). Throughout this essay, we will argue the opposite: the essential properties F and G of a and b are not always enough to make true comparative claims of the form aRb , where R is a strong internal relation. According to Johansson (2004), strong internal relations are defined in terms of mutual existential dependence. a and b are mutually dependent if and only if a is dependent upon b and b dependent upon a . Hence, a and b are strongly internally related if and only if a cannot exist if b does not exist, and vice versa. Using the latter notion, we offer a counter-example to the reductionist thesis that comes from Peano Systems, where the strong internal relation being greater than and the essential properties of natural numbers are both necessary as truth-makers for comparative claims of the form aRb .

Section: Logic
Language: English
Chair: Larissa Bolte
Date: 15:20-15:50, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.006



A note on the formalism-freeness of Gödel's L

Zesheng Chen

 In his Princeton Bicentennial Lecture, Gödel set out the challenge of conducting a "Turing analysis" of the informal mathematical notions of definability and provability: i.e., finding a formalization of such notions that is natural and stable under formalism variations. In this talk, I shall examine Kennedy's project to establish the class of constructible sets, L, as a formalism-free characterization of definability in set theory, analogous to the role Turing-computable sets play for computability. One key component in her project is a confluence result in the paper Inner Models from Extended Logics by Kennedy, Magidor, and Väänänen (the KMV paper), stating that if L is constructed using definability in generalized logics extending first-order, then for a large class of logics, the resulting inner model is still L. Kennedy takes this result to be a successful test of L's formalism invariance.

On the contrary, I claim that Kennedy's sense of "changes in formalisms" rests on a confused analogy: the confluence result in the KMV paper is best understood on a par with examining Turing machines equipped with oracles, rather than genuinely different formalizations. To support my claim, I shall provide a characterization of the class of inner models obtainable from generalized quantifier logics, which also partially answers a question posed in the KMV paper. Using my characterization, I will argue by way of reductio that if one accepts Kennedy's argument, then one is also forced to accept that every inner model of the form LX is formalism-free, thus trivializing the concept.

Section: Logic
Language: English
Chair: Larissa Bolte
Date: 14:00-14:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.006

A decision-tree inspired semantics of a logic of conditional imperatives and permissives

Fabian Heimann

Recently, Evans et al. introduced a logic of conditional imperatives and permissives. Conditional imperatives roughly amount to expressions of the kind “If you are doing A, you must do something from B”, for sets of actions A und B. Similarly, conditional permissives could be rephrased as “If you are doing A, feel free to do something from B”. Whilst Evans et al. develop their system with Kant’s theoretical philosophy as an application in mind, one can easily imagine other deontic contexts where such rules are relevant. Imagine an agent at the grocery store, where they would be subject to rules such as “You might enter the grocery store.” and “If you enter the grocery store, you have to mask your face” nowadays.

In the light of these applications, the task of finding semantics and logics for such systems appears interesting. Evans et al. introduce two options for a semantics. In this talk, I want to introduce a third option, which formalises the idea of deriving all possible courses of action by a decision tree. Technically speaking, redundancy in semantics is desirable as different claims might appear easier to proof in one system or the other.

Roughly, we follow this idea: The agent, already performing acts A, and subject to a set of rules R first considers which rules of R are applicable. If there is at least one such rule r, they opt for a course of action A’ in line with the chosen rule. Then, the procedure is repeated recursively for A’ and R until no applicable rules are left. In my talk, I give the exact formal definitions of this idea, followed by an overview of how equivalence to the second semantics of Evans et al. can be established.

Section:	Logic
Language:	English
Chair:	Yannick Kohl
Date:	12:00-12:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location:	SR 1.006



How do we understand proof(texts) a frame-semantic approach?

Deniz Sarikaya

ames have already been studied in detail in artificial intelligence (AI), cognitive science and linguistics. They were first introduced in AI by Minsky (1974) and model situations in which one can offer (or request) additional information on demand by connecting a situation with background knowledge. Hence frames explain how the receiver completes the information conveyed by the sender.

We want to make use of the concept to model how an individual can understand a mathematical text elaborating f.i. a proof. The general argument is that a student is internalizing these frames during the university studies, which makes it possible to fill gaps in proofs as they are presented in a text.

We follow Petersen (2015), who develops a model using feature structures closely related to Carpenter (1992).

In this talk we develop a global organization of mathematical knowledge, which a student might learn parts of. We offer a suggestion for a typology of different kinds of frames that come into play when we develop a theory of mathematical knowledge.

This work is foundational in its spirit but strongly connected to several applications. Such include design of knowledge management systems, automated and interactive theorem proving and mathematics education.

Section: Logic
Language: English
Chair: Yannick Kohl
Date: 11:20-11:50, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.006



Mental Files Theory of Mind: How children represent identity and belief

Michael Huemer

Me use mental files theory to provide an integral theory of children's developing understanding of perspective. Mental files capture how we represent the things in the world we think about. Mental files theory can account for different perspectives on the same thing, what characterizes the mental domain. It paves the way for considering perspective - visual, conceptual, mental - as a unified phenomenon. When thinking about an object we individuate it as something, and therefore put a certain conceptual perspective on it. An object can be individuated in multiple ways which subsequently puts multiple conceptual perspectives on it (Clark, 1997; Perner & Leahy, 2016). For instance, Maxi's father and Anne's teacher can be the same person. Multiple conceptual perspectives give rise to identity statements like "Maxi's father is Anne's teacher.". Three year olds have problems making sense of such statements, and these problems relate to their problems understanding different mental perspectives of other people as assessed with the false belief (FB) task (Perner et al., 2011). According to mental files theory, the capacity to understand conceptual and mental perspectives appears around age 4 when children become able to merge or link files (Doherty & Perner 2020). In previous studies on identity understanding an object was introduced to children under one label and subsequently under a second. Only later did children learn that both labels refer to the same object with an explicit verbal identity statement (Perner et al., 2011). Here, we use a different method. We investigated whether using different labels for a visually continuously present object still leads to different ways of thinking about the same object. In addition, we examine whether spatial information about an object is treated in the same way as other predicative information, i.e., stored on the respective file, or in a different way.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
 Language: English
 Chair: Daniel Weger
 Date: 11:20-11:50, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
 Location: SR 1.005



On the Possibility of Assigning the Full Moral Status (FMS) to the Artificial General Intelligent (AGI) Systems

Mubarak Hussain

With due course of time, the AI system has become more and more flexible and adaptable and can perform a large variety of cognitive tasks. Simultaneously, the capacity of AI systems to act autonomously has also been enhanced extensively. At present, AI systems can identify objects from video and image; transcribe speech and translate between languages, Stock trading; drive automobiles; fly drones; write its encryption language; diagnose cancer in tissues, and so on. The modern AI has won against humans at Jeopardy, and at Go. IBM's Watson has defeated two best human players Ken Jennings and Brad Rutter at Jeopardy in 2011. DeepMind's AlphaGo, which is based on an advanced search tree and deep neural networks has won against the three-time European Go Champion Fan Hui in 2015 and eighteen times world Go champion Lee Sedol in 2016. Over time, DeepMind has introduced an extended version of AlphaGo called AlphaGo Zero, which can learn the game by playing it. In late 2017, DeepMind has again launched a new version of the AI called AlphaZero, a self-taught AI algorithm that has become a master in chess, Shogi, and Go. The latest version of DeepMind's AI algorithm, which is called MuZero has taken AlphaZero's ideas one step further and can play Go, Chess, Shogi, and Atari games without knowing any rules of these games. Since AI technologies have continued to move forward and have become more and more capable over time, the question about the ethics of artificial intelligence has become more vital than ever. When philosophers are concerned with the moral status of AI systems, the focus of such status is expected to fall on AGI systems. In the long term, AI researchers and futurists have anticipated developing AGI that can perform any intellectual task similar to a human being. Moreover, the development of such intelligent systems in the future may give rise to the question of the moral status of such systems, i.e. whether it is possible to assign them full moral status (FMS) or not. To investigate the possibility, I put forward an argument, which states that if two entities (a human being and an AGI system) have similar functionality and similar sophisticated cognitive capacity, but they differ in the substrate of their implementation and ontogeny, then they have similar moral status. In conclusion, I argue that the AGI systems may have full moral

status (FMS) by their similar functionality and sophisticated cognitive capacity as normal human beings.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Francesca Miccoli
Date: 16:00-16:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.005



Unconscious Interaction as a Necessary Condition for Belief States

Pelin Kasar

According to the Extended Mind thesis (EMT) certain mental states and processes can include, as constituents, parts of the world that are outside our body. Clark and Chalmers (CC) formed EMT with some thought experiments. In one of them we are asked to imagine the following: Otto suffers from memory loss and stores information in a notebook to serve the function of his memory and Inga in contrast has a normally functioning memory (1998, 13). CC argues that Otto's notebook could realize the same belief states as Inga's biological memory. Different from Inga's beliefs, Otto's beliefs extend partially into his notebook. This argument relies on: (1) functionalism about beliefs and (2) the parity principle. According to these two principles, if we accept that an internal belief state is functionally exactly alike with an extended belief state, it follows that we are also accepting EMT. Framed in this way, this is a valid argument. Yet, one of the antecedents is very problematic: the view that they are functionally exactly alike. In this paper, I argue that the functional role played by an internal belief state cannot be realized by an extended belief state, because extended belief states cannot unconsciously interact with other mental states of an individual as internal belief states do. By analyzing the thought experiment CC put forward for EMT regarding belief states, I will discuss how they ignore that internal belief states have complex dispositional profiles connected with the other mental states of an individual which cannot be realized by an extended belief state. My view is based on the functionalist idea that belief states form a complex network of dispositional connections that possesses an

unconscious structure. Without being part of this network and having this kind of structure an extended belief state cannot function in the same way an internal belief state functions.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Martin Niederl
Date: 16:50-17:20, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005



How Do We Perceive Artificial Moral Cognition?

Riya Manna

Humans are famous for their rational decision-making capacity. Our autonomous systems attempt to replicate the cognitive ability of human beings. Now scientists are moving forward, making artificial intelligence (AI) systems moral performers like humans. For that, we must first analyze the uniqueness of human moral decision-making capacity. The human mind consists of unique abilities that lead us to authentic moral agency and a better competence in information processing. Among all other theories, the computational theory of mind intensifies the mechanistic attitude towards the human mind and its efficacy. It predominantly relates the human mind with the brain and its functionality. However, consciousness will remain a significant issue for this approach because it remains non-computable. Philosophers believed that we should not depend on artificial systems for ethical judgments without a conscious moral agency. The first section of my paper critically analyses artificial moral agency in contrast with human moral agency. The next section considers the 'no ownership subjective agency', which can be implemented in an autonomous ethical agent as a substitute of conscious agency. Apart from consciousness, ethical decision-making is best compared with the computing of information in a particular situation, for which the autonomous machines are well-versed. If we could adequately implement the computing method, we might get a better ethical autonomous agent. My paper concentrates on the feasibility of moral cognition from a computable outset. This analysis will help us understand the feasibility and authenticity of artificial moral cognition, artificial moral agency, and their compatibility with humans.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Jon Rueda
Date: 14:40-15:10, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.004



Against Alethic Views of Moral Responsibility

Robert Pál-Wallin

Recently, some philosophers within the responsibility debate (e.g., Graham 2014, Rosen 2015, Strabbing 2018) have defended different versions of what we might call Alethic views of moral responsibility. According to these views, moral responsibility should be understood in terms of fitting negative or positive reactive emotions (e.g., moral anger, resentment or indignation). Furthermore, the proponents of these views argue that we can establish the fittingness conditions of the relevant reactive emotions by examining their representational content - typically understood as either thoughts, beliefs or judgments. For example, suppose that resentment involves the three distinct thoughts x , y and z . The alethic view of moral responsibility then yields the verdict that insofar as x , y and z are all true of A and A 's phi-ing, A is morally responsible. Although I am in agreement with these philosophers that we should try to understand moral responsibility in terms of fitting emotions, I will in this paper argue that the way in which they try to do it (by appealing to the truth of the representational content of reactive emotions) is misguided. My aim is to show this with a series of arguments which, taken together, will paint a problematic picture and cast doubt on the plausibility of the alethic strategy. As an alternative, I will argue that we should understand emotions as felt evaluative engagements with the world (or objects in the world). As active engagements, the fittingness of emotions should not be understood in terms of whether they represent their objects correctly, but rather their fittingness will be a matter of whether it makes sense for the emoting agent to be engaged in the way characteristic of the emotions type that she undergoes.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Mathijs Geurts
Date: 10:00-10:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.004



Blame, but not merely as a means

Shervin Mirzaeighazi

 In this paper, I will argue that what are typically called unexpressed and third-person blame cannot be considered as genuine instances of blame because of their inability to satisfy the general aims of blame - this is, to a certain extent, because they treat the wrongdoer merely as a means. As I show in section 1, the literature identifies two aims for blame: a) protest and b) norm-reinforcement. For a practice to be considered blame, it must - at least in principle - be able to satisfy those aims. In section 2, we will see, however, what we call private blame is unable to satisfy either aim and therefore should not be considered a real instance of blame. On the other hand, we may concede that third-person blame can satisfy the protest part - but it still fails to meet norm reinforcement. When engaging in so-called third-person blaming, we cannot enforce any norm on the wrongdoer. This section will also consider and refute some accounts (McKenna 2012; Smith 2013; Fricker 2016) that try to show how unexpressed and third-person blame might satisfy the aforementioned aims. Fricker (2016), for example, claims that in third-person blaming, we enforce norms on ourselves or other human beings - wrongdoer excluded. This line of argument is of no help here, however, because - I shall argue - to blame a person in this way would be to use her merely as a means to increase our moral alignment with others. Here I use Pauline Kleingeld (2020) Interpretation of Kant's Formula of Humanity according to which: An agent uses another person merely as a means if and only if (1) the agent uses another person as a means in the service of realizing her ends (2) without, as a matter of moral principle, making this use conditional on the other's consent; where (3) by "consent" is meant the other's genuine actual consent to being used, in a particular manner, as a means to the agent's end. Assuming that using others merely as a means is wrong, what we call third-person

blame cannot satisfy the second aim and therefore should not be considered a real instance of blame. In section 3, I will consider a possible objection. It might be said that there is a conflation, in my account, between justifying the claim that there are no such things as third-person and unexpressed blame, on the one hand, and morally justifying such (alleged) kinds of blame on the other. I will argue, however, that these two cannot be separated. Blame and punishment are ethical responses to wrongdoing and not just a way of deterring undesirable action - by considering this moral element, we can differentiate them from other deterrence practices such as torture.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Markus Fuchsberger
Date: 11:20-11:50, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004



Utilitarianism as a Pragmatic Choice in Joshua Greene's Ethics

Stanislav Spodniak



Joshua Greene is an American psychologist and philosopher who became well known for his psychological experiments with trolley problems. His controversial conclusion from these experiments is that they offer empirical support for utilitarianism over deontology. This led to the huge discussion that overshadows his other pragmatic arguments for utilitarianism introduced in his dissertation and a book *Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them*. These pragmatic arguments are based on the rejection of moral realism and redefinition of the purpose of ethics as a search for those moral norms and principles that fulfill our practical need to resolve moral conflicts in the most successful way. According to Greene, utilitarian moral norms and theories are more suitable for resolving moral conflicts than deontological ones. Specifically, Greene highlights the ability of utilitarians to resolve moral conflicts with an empirically accessible cost-benefit analysis of direct and indirect consequences of the action, while deontologists, he claims, often use incorrect realistic language with frequent appeals to duty, guilt, or obligation. The thesis of my contribution is that stated arguments do not give sufficiently

justified grounds for favoring utilitarianism over deontology. I consider it an unjustified belief that the aim of ethics should be the search for the most successful way to resolve our moral conflicts. There is at least one competitive position according to which the role of ethics is to find the best way to deal with our human vulnerability and dependence on other members of society. Possible acceptance of this interpretation of ethics would inevitably lead to the deontological language of appeals to moral duties and obligations, which Greene rejects.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Damiano Ranzenigo
Date: 19:30-20:00, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004



The Vagueness of Desires

Thorsten Helfer

Desire-Satisfactionism claims that all and only A's episodes of desire satisfaction are constitutive for A's well-being. It is astonishing to see that most proponents of Desire-Satisfactionism of well-being say very little about the concept of desire. One promising concept is the pleasure-based concept of desire. Pleasure-based concept of desire: A desires p iff if A was in conditions C, A would feel pleasure. I will argue that the pleasure-based concept (and other similar accounts) faces a problem because of the underspecified conditions C, and I will present a solution for this problem. For good reasons, these conditions C often include A representing p to herself. Some philosophers have proposed to include some strong idealisations for the representation of p. If we use such idealisations, we will end up with an alienating concept of well-being. It might turn out that my idealised self would find some represented states of affairs pleasurable that I would find utterly repugnant if actually realised. On the other hand, if there is no idealisation, there still has to be some condition C under which A has to represent p to herself. Now, it seems that A could represent p to herself more or less detailed or vivid and these differences in representation might make a difference in whether she feels pleasure representing p to herself. To go to an extreme, I do not see a reason why it should not be the case that for all conditions

C it is true that the representation of p is pleasurable or unpleasurable for A under conditions C but just the opposite, so unpleasurable or pleasurable, respectively, under the slightly more or less idealised conditions C' . In other words, it seems unacceptably ad hoc to settle for one specific condition or a specific range of conditions. So, the concept of desire is either unacceptably ad hoc or leads to an alienating concept of well-being. I claim that a relatively unidealised concept of desire that explicitly allows vagueness can solve this problem: Vague pleasure-based concept of desire: A desires p with strength s iff for all worlds of a vague range of worlds R in which A represents p to herself, A feels an average amount of pleasure s . I will argue that the vague pleasure-based concept of desire is neither unacceptably ad hoc nor leads to an alienating concept of well-being.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Mathijs Geurts
Date: 10:40-11:10, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.004



Truths of the past: would have we a duty to remember?

Vitor de Almeida

he philosophical inquiry display that memory is involved in the process of knowledge (IZQUIERDO, 1989; AUDI, 2003; BERNECKER, 2018). Assuming that remembering, as well as knowledge, implies truth, then, remembering is, largely, knowing truths of the past. But given that memory is a matter of knowledge, would be a matter of morality as well? It seems obvious that memory has to be involved in questions of morality, but what is not obvious is how it occurs. In that context, this abstract aim to present some philosophical insights that could be taken as important reasons to think that, as a community, we have a duty to remember. When we think about memory as the act of remembrance, it is often referred as an individual capacity. But, although it is an activity that occurs, ultimately, individually, it also relies on external resources as at the moment of memory formation as at the moment of recalling

these memories. In this sense, remembering is a process that emerge as an individual capacity and encompass a collective capacity (HALBACKS, 2003). In other words, the collective dimension of memory is an essential part of our temporality sense. Especially because our memories are what maintain us bound to time. It occurs insofar as our personal identity, largely, depends on our memories. We are able to construct our selves, which are composed essentially by material, thinking, and moral dimensions (LOCKE, 1971) because we remember who we were and how we acted. Therefore, if our personal identity bases our moral values and our memory bases our personal identity, then memory is the base for our commitments of moral values. Finally, the way we remember could reveal how fair we are, as a community. For instance, collective remember of the victims of atrocities could mean the first step to prevent its recurrence (BLUSTEIN, 2008). So, even if memory is often an individual unreliable process, in many cases, it is all we have, especially when we need to connect truth to the past. Because the past must be more than a simple story we tell to ourselves. There is a past and we must be able to see, through the memory, the truth on that, in order to be responsible for our wrongdoings and repair them as far as possible.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Markus Fuchsberger
Date: 10:00-10:30, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004



The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism and the Expected Utility Objection

Nina Abesadze

his paper aims to evaluate a novel objection against the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism: the expected utility objection that has been first put forward by Hedden (2013) and further discussed by Wronski & Godziszewski (2017). The Dutch Book argument (DBA) assumes the so-called Ramsey's Thesis (RT), according to which there is a particular kind of connection between an agent's credences and her fair betting quotients. Namely,

on RT, an agent's credence in a proposition matches her fair betting quotient for that proposition. And according to the expected utility objection, RT is false because it conflicts with the principle of maximising expected utility. Hence, the DBA is unsound; or so the objection goes. This paper argues that the new objection is not successful. My argument, briefly, is as follows: RT amounts to a betting interpretation or explication of an imprecise concept of credence. More fully, on this betting interpretation, the proposition "an agent's degree of belief in H should be q" or explicated as follows: "an agent is indifferent between buying or selling the bet for Sq." q is called an agent's betting quotient for H. The proponents of the expected utility objection, such as Hedden, do not provide any interpretation or explication of credence. Instead, Hedden (and Wronski and Godziszewski) take the concept of credence as primitive or uninterpreted. Now, I agree with Hedden that if we take an uninterpreted, primitive concept of credence, then, given some additional assumptions, an agent's degree of belief may not match her fair betting quotients. But this does not show that the expected utility objection against the DBA succeeds. This is because the objection does not address the DBA as an argument by interpretation. And Hedden and other supporters of this objection do not provide any alternative interpretation or explication of credences. I conclude that an unanalysed notion of credence, assumed by the proponents of the expected utility objection, is inferior to the betting interpretation. Thus, the criticism of RT is unfounded.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Kimon Surlas-Kotzamanis
Date: 10:00-10:30, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002



How We Should Talk About Fake News

Glenn Anderau

ake News is a worrying phenomenon which is growing increasingly widespread, partly because of the ease with which it is disseminated online. Combating the spread of fake news requires a clear understanding of the nature of fake news. However, the use of the term in everyday language is heterogenous

and has no fixed meaning. Despite increasing philosophical attention to the topic, there is no consensus on the correct definition of fake news within philosophy either. This paper aims to bring clarity to the philosophical debate of fake news in two ways: Firstly, by providing an overview of existing philosophical definitions and secondly, by developing a new account of fake news. This paper will identify where there is agreement within the philosophical debate of fake news' definition and isolate four key questions on which there is genuine disagreement. These concern the intentionality underlying fake news, its truth value, the question of whether fake news needs to reach a minimum audience, and the question of whether an account of fake news needs to be dynamic. By answering these four questions, I provide a novel account of Fake News. This new definition hinges upon the fact that Fake News has the function of being deliberately misleading about its own status as news.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Lena Mudry
Date: 10:40-11:10, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: HS E.002



Are the Bundle Theorists committed to constituent ontologies?

Marta Emilia Bielinska

One of the key questions in the contemporary analytic ontology concerns the relation between the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) and the Bundle Theory (BT). The majority of authors believe that BT implies PII and because of this reason. Because of this reason, it is widely believed that the example of the world with two indiscernible spheres invented by Max Black (1952) in order to violate PII, is also devastating for BT. However, this has been questioned by Rodriguez-Pereyra (2004), who showed that there is no implication between PII and BT. In order to achieve it, he suggested an interpretation of BT, according to which bundles of universals exist in the world as their instances. However, the result of Rodriguez-Pereyra has been recently questioned by Roberts (2019). He argues that the version of BT with instances is not a constituent

ontology, according to which concrete particulars have their own non-mereological structure. According to Roberts, since BT is an example of constituent ontology by its very definition, the instance view cannot be considered as one of its versions. Therefore, he concludes, the solution to the failure of BT proposed by Rodriguez-Pereyra is wrong. During this talk I present the subsequent stages of this debate, which leads me to questioning Robert's reasoning. In particular, I show that the instance version of BT is compatible with the constraints defining constituent ontologies, and therefore Rodriguez-Pereyra's argument is correct.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Nikolai Shurakov
Date: 12:00-12:30, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003



The mereological aspects of Substances

Angelo Briones

 In the context of a descriptive metaphysics, a substance is defined as an entity that is ontologically independent concerning its existence (Fine, 1995) and/or its identity (Lowe, 2001; Gorman, 2012). Thus, various entities that exhibit ontological independence fall into the category of substance (Simons, 2014). From these ideas is built the ontological independence thesis. Concerning this, Patrick Toner (2011) presents a series of questionings from which the ontological independence thesis is inadequate to account for the category of substance consistently. This research aims to propose a definition of what it is to be a substance that consistently allows accounting for the category of substance. In pursuit of this objective, the mereological aspects of a paradigmatic substance (Correia, 2005) are evaluated to construct an initial definition of what it is to be a substance in terms of its component parts. Specifically, under a mereological pluralist framework, it is argued that substances are generated for structural composition (Fine, 2010; Koslicki, 2014; Sattig, 2019). Hence a substance can be defined as a structural whole, i.e., the conditions of existence of the whole contemplate the type and organization

of the entity's components parts. Finally, it is exposed how this proposal, unlike the ontological independence thesis, is immune to Toner's questioning.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Bogdan Dumitrescu
Date: 10:40-11:10, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.003



Is the Supervenience Argument Forceful?

Nolan Cannon

obust realism in ethics holds that ethical properties are sui generis (they cannot be reduced to any nonethical property) and normative. The supervenience challenge to robust realism is usually taken as the strongest objection to the view, but some have recently objected that the argument is not forceful. I focus on these objections. There are two types of objection: the first targets strong supervenience (SS) the second objection targets Modest Humean (MH). There are two objects to (SS). First, if (SS) is a conceptual truth, then it does not need explaining and, even if it did, it would be easy since robust realists can say that being happiness-maximizing (say) makes something right. I reply that (SS) is a conceptual truth about a metaphysical necessity, and metaphysical necessities normally call for explanation. Further, the making-relation might explain (SS), but it gives us another puzzle: how does being happiness-maximizing necessarily make something right? This is the same puzzle (SS) generated. Second, if normativity involves reasons, and nonethical properties just are the reasons for us to do certain things, (SS) is easy to explain since the nonethical property just is the ethical one. But, nonethical properties must stand in favoring relations to actions. Since the favoring relation is part of the reason, reasons are not nonethical properties and (SS) remains a puzzle. There are two objections to (MH). The first attempts to show (MH) is false by counterexample. I reply to the counterexamples and diagnose what goes wrong with them such that we should doubt any counterexample to (MH). The second objection appeals to the essences of ethical properties to make (MH)

easily satisfiable: the essences of ethical properties explain the necessary connections with nonethical properties. I reply that the simple essence explanation is unsatisfactory since it requires the robust realist to accept that the ethical is really not *sui generis* in the relevant sense.

Section: Ethics
 Language: English
 Chair: Glenn Anderau
 Date: 14:00-14:30, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
 Location: SR 1.004



Entanglement and Composition

Alessandro Cecconi



In the last decades, mereological nihilism, the claim that there is no occurrence of proper parenthood relation, has gained traction within the metaphysical debate. Enthusiastic nihilists abound (Dorr 2002, Dorr and Rosen 2000, Sider 2013), and the view, once discarded as way far too metaphysically queer, has obtained full philosophical legitimacy. Notwithstanding this new nihilistic renaissance, not all that glitters is gold and there are still many challenges that a nihilist has to meet. Famously, the phenomenon of quantum entanglement has been considered to pose a serious threat to nihilism, many arguments have been levelled to this extent (Calosi and Tarozzi 2014, Healey 1991 and 2013, Morganti 2009, Schaffer 2007 and 2010, Teller 1986). In a recent paper, Andrew Brenner (2018) argues that all these arguments fail, for they do not manage to show (i) that a nihilist account of entanglement is impossible or even (ii) that a compositionalist one is preferable. In order to do that, he proposes a nihilist account of entanglement which is purported to meet the extant challenges. In this paper, I shall present a refinement of Brenner's proposal. In particular, I will show that there are really two strategies at the nihilist's disposal. Too bad for her, none of them is successful. While I agree with Brenner, to the extent that a nihilist account of entanglement is possible, I will argue *contra* him that a compositionalist one fares better in all the relevant aspects, as it is simpler and has more explanatory power. More in detail, I will show that starting from mere mereological composition, one can build new kinds of composition, fully definable in term of the former, which allow to provide

a better explanation of the phenomenon. As Katherine Hawley put it, given two metaphysical theories both compatible with the empirical data, one may explain these better, or might be better integrated with other well confirmed theories (Hawley 2006, pp.456-457). While many marriages are possible, not all of them are made in heaven. The one between mereological nihilism and entanglement is definitely made in hell.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Bogdan Dumitrescu
Date: 10:00-10:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.003



Reasons, Motivational Strength and Objective Probabilities of Actions

Daniele Conti

ibertarians about free will often maintain that our free, undetermined actions have objective probabilities of occurring (and of not occurring). According to this view, it makes sense to say that, one minute before I toasted my bread this morning, there was (say) a 0.8 probability that I would do that, and a 0.2 that I would not. But why posit such probabilities? One often-cited reason appears to rest on phenomenological considerations. When we face a choice, we often feel more inclined to choose some options over the others: each option has a certain "pull" on us, and the perceived intensity of some of these pulls may be greater than that of others. Some authors think that to account for this phenomenon we must associate probabilities to the options open to us: the more we feel inclined towards an option, the higher is the probability that we will choose it. In this paper, I will argue that, on the contrary, our agential experience does not support the ascription of probabilities to undetermined actions. To do so, I will examine an assumption that is commonly shared by the advocates of the probability thesis - namely, the assumption that our reasons to act come with different degrees of motivational strength. According to this idea (let us call it MSI: Motivational Strength Idea), it makes sense to say, for example, that some reasons of ours are stronger than others, or that a certain reason has less motivational strength than another. I

will argue that MSI is phenomenologically unjustified. Moreover, I intend to show that MSI makes libertarianism vulnerable to a powerful objection typically raised by compatibilists, and that therefore libertarians had better reject MSI. I will conclude by claiming that, since libertarians can and should deny the idea that motivational reasons have varying degrees of strength, their commitment to the thesis that our undetermined actions have objective probabilities is less justified than usually thought.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Ada Smurzynska
Date: 10:40-11:10, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.005



Cognitive Ontologies and the Status of Folk Psychology

Matej Drazil

olk psychology, understood as our commonsense understanding of the mental, was a prominent topic of philosophy of mind in the 1980s and 90s. The focus main of the debates about folk psychology at this time was the question of its status in relation to the scientific study of mind: How does folk psychology hold up against scientific explanations of mind? Are the commonsense psychological terms and concepts we use every day to be eliminated or vindicated by neuroscience? Is the ontology of folk psychology to be replaced by a more empirically grounded one? The question of folk psychology's status has lost its prominence since the 80s and has been replaced by other concerns regarding folk psychology. However, the question of status has seen a revival in recent years in the debate about cognitive ontologies in cognitive science and neuroscience. The cognitive ontologies debate focuses on a development of formal ontologies for the study of mind-brain in neuroimaging. It also examines the relation of commonsense cognitive ontologies and scientific ontologies and the role the first play in the latter. Similarly to the debates in the 80s and 90s, these considerations lead many authors to calls for elimination of folk psychology from science or to attempts to defend it. The talk is going to introduce the cognitive ontologies debate and examine how and

in what ways it renews and reexamines the old debate concerning the status of folk psychology. It is going to examine how and in what ways the cognitive ontology debate reopens the issues of folk psychology's status and what lessons it could draw from the older debates. It is also going to examine the potential consequences of the cognitive ontologies debate on the issue of folk psychology's status.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Agnieszka Proszewska
Date: 16:00-16:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.003



Can the intentional stance theory help us make sense of mental causation via neural interfaces?

Sebastian Drosselmeier

Recently, it has been argued that - based on an interventionist understanding of causation - the ability to perform actions with the help of neural interfaces (NIs) provides "as clear a case of mental causation as one could imagine" (Woodward 2008, 2017, also List & Menzies 2009, Menzies 2015). NIs enable users to control external devices by measuring their neural activity. Since this measurement allows for some redundancy at the level of single neurons, some authors concluded that the difference makers of actions can only be found at the level of mental variables, and not at the level of neuronal ones. Pernu (2018), however, replied that properly understood NIs do not provide an example of autonomous mental causation, but that instead the whole research paradigm is premised on the identity of mental and physical variables. On his view, NIs merely show that sometimes macro-physical variables are necessary to causally account for the occurrence of actions, but that NIs do not make room for distinct, mental causation. In my talk, I will argue that adopting an understanding of mental states along the lines of Dennett's intentional stance theory (1987) can help us make sense of mental causation via neural interfaces. Central to this view is the rejection of "industrial strength realism" which treats mental states as identical to or ontologically supervenient on brain states. I will argue that such an

understanding of mental states should neither invite the charge of fictionalism (as e.g. Poslajko 2020 argues), nor that it is implausible considering the basic paradigm of neural interfacing, which only seemingly treats mental states as identical to neural states. Instead, I will show that this approach provides a plausible ontological position concerning mental states and mental causation (see also Eronen 2017) and is in fact well aligned with empirical research on NIs.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Matej Drazil
Date: 14:00-14:30, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005



Time travel, free will and the nomological impossibility to kill your younger self

Bogdan Andrei Dumitrescu

he main aim of this talk is to present a connection between the problem of free will and time travel scenarios that may (or may not) involve paradoxes. The second aim is to respond to the claim made by Kadri Vihvelin (1996, 2020) that her argument for the nomological impossibility of autoinfanticide does not have the consequence that time travelers to the past can do only what they in fact do. In the debates regarding time travel, the Grandfather paradox may be used to formulate an argument for the impossibility of backward time travel. If Tim can travel to the past to kill his Grandfather, then we would have to accept the contradiction that Tim can both kill and not kill his grandfather. In order to defend the possibility of time travel, David Lewis (1976) famously argued that there is a sense in which Tim can kill his grandfather and a sense in which he can't. Relative to the facts of his surroundings and his abilities, Tim can kill his grandfather, but relative to a more inclusive set of facts, Tim cannot kill his grandfather. Kadri Vihvelin disagrees that there is a sense in which time travelers to the past could kill their younger selves or their ancestors (before they could pass on their genes). Vihvelin (1996) argued that autoinfanticide is actually nomologically impossible. Suzy, an adult time traveler that would travel to the past in order to kill her

younger self would always fail to commit autoinfanticide. If Suzy were successful in killing Baby Suzy, then this would mean that Baby Suzy would later resurrect and continue on to become adult Suzy. This is logically possible, but it is not something that is nomologically possible in worlds whose physical laws are closer to our own. We typically believe that our world's laws do not permit resurrections. The criticisms brought to her argument either concerned her use of counterfactuals or the supposed consequence that if she is correct, then time travelers to the past can do only what they in fact do and, therefore, lack free will. In her very recent paper, Vihvelin (2020) answered these objections. I am concerned in this talk with her response to the latter criticism. She claims that, while time travelers are unable to commit autoinfanticide, they may be able to do other things in the past as long as those things are nomologically possible. I will argue that more justifications are needed in order to show that her argument does not threaten the time traveler's freedom to do otherwise. The concern is that nomological impossibility may not stop only at autoinfanticide.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Blazej Mzyk
Date: 18:50-19:20, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003



Hope and Blame in Hard Cases

Anton Emilsson

Some people do not have a reason to phi, even if it would be good if they phi-ed, because they are not motivated such that there is a sound rational route from their motivational profile to phi-ing. An uncaring husband, precisely because he is uncaring, might, therefore, not have a reason to treat his wife better. On a commonsense understanding of blame, an agent is blameworthy only if the agent ought to have acted otherwise than s/he did. On this understanding, the uncaring husband may not be to blame; if, that is, it is in fact not the case that he ought to have treated his wife better, because there is no reason for him to do so. This might seem to be a problem for reasons internalism. I think it isn't, as Williams when introducing

internalism and this case didn't; to the contrary, it is meant to motivate internalism. Showing this, I consider what might be a particularly tragic scenario: the wife's stance to her husband's inconsiderateness. May she not blame him, take a participatory stance towards him, just because he is motivationally abnormal is such a distasteful way? I argue that hope awards a place for blame to be appropriate for some (the wife) while not on the part of others (third parties). At the point at which it does not make sense for us to sustain hope that the husband does actually care, it might still make sense for the wife to do so. Hope thus grounds blame by grounding the conditions for appropriate blame. This is possible because whether an agent has a reason is importantly indeterminate, making variously "optimistic internal reasons statements" available. This allows us to explain the appropriateness of some victim's blame, without revising our standard understanding of blame. This has not been duly recognized in the standard literature on blame. This is because the standard analysis is in terms of fittingness, understood as accurate representation. I argue that the relational insight about the uncaring husband presents an important methodological issue, and then gesture how the current insight may be accommodated at the meta-level, on a perspectivist understanding of blame. Importantly, admitting that the uncaring husband may not be blameworthy is not a concession of internalism (pace Kate Manne), but it motivates it: internalism reveals an important limitation to blame, otherwise overlooked or explained away.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Glenn Anderau
Date: 16:00-16:30, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004



What are inquirers?

Leonardo Flamini

pistemologists do not usually pose inquirers at the core of their speculations. They are usually more interested in defining the nature and the normative profile of doxastic and epistemic states, such as belief and knowledge. However, Friedman (2013ab, 2017, 2019, 2020, forthcoming) has recently provided some

insights into what inquirers are. She argues that one must be in an inquiring state of mind to be an inquirer: A state in which one poses a question and tries to find out its answer. Nevertheless, she goes further and argues that the fundamental inquiring state of mind is suspension of judgment. She concludes that inquirers are suspenders. Friedman's radical position has triggered a lively debate within epistemology. As in any debate, some epistemologists are more inclined toward Friedman's position (Lord, 2020; Lord&Sylvan, 2021), while others deny it (Archer, 2018, 2019; Feldman&Conee, 2018; Masny, 2020; McGrath, 2020; Raleigh, 2019). However, even if this debate has posed inquirers at the epistemologists' attention, it is mainly concerned with the question of whether inquirers are suspenders or not. It does not go deeper to better and more broadly understand what inquirers are and do. The aim of this presentation is to foster this broader comprehension. To do this, I develop the platitude that inquirers ask questions and seek answers. In the first part, I identify what kind of asking is relevant to be an inquirer. I argue that it should not be intended as an interrogative speech act representing a request for information (Hilpinen, 1991; Hintikka, 2007; Searle, 1979; Vanderveken, 1990). Otherwise, simple creatures, such as babies and animals, or even subjects who lost the language command could not be inquirers. Rather, the relevant kind of asking should be judged to be a state in which a question is posed in thought (a mental state that an interrogative speech act can express). Therefore, I follow Friedman precisely in this point: Being an inquirer means being in an inquiring state of mind. In the second part, I investigate some insights into this state that Friedman (2017, 2019) only presents but does not develop further: aim-directness and information sensitivity. Typically, an agent in an inquiring state of mind is seeking an answer: She is not only raising a question, but she is also aiming at its answer. Moreover, an agent with this aim must be sensitive to the information relevant to solve her focal question. For example, a detective inquiring into the question "Who committed the crime?" must be disposed to listen to witnesses and acquire evidence if she aims to solve her inquiring state. Namely, she must acquire the relevant pieces of information if they become available to her. In developing these Friedman's suggestions, I propose some cases that show how the sensitivity to information is gradable: Inquirers are more or less disposed to acquire the information relevant to resolve their questions. I explain this gradability by arguing that the cases proposed exemplify agents who are more or less committed to achieving an answer. In other words,

I argue that the inquiring state of mind is not a yes/no state but a degreed one: Some inquirers inquire more than others that inquire less. Finally, in the third part, I show how the degree of the inquiring state one is into commits one to do more or fewer actions with one's body and mind to answer one's questions. After critically assessing Friedman's position that inquirers need not be bodily active, I argue that it depends on the level of the inquiring states of mind they are into. For example, high-level ones can commit an agent to exert an effort that is not only mental but bodily too. Therefore, higher-level inquiring states of mind can require the agent to do many things mentally or bodily to answer her questions. In conclusion, the theory I offer will give an account of what inquirers are, from the more speculative to the more practical, from the lazier to the more dynamic.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Stefan Sleeuw
Date: 14:00-14:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: HS E.002



Getting Real About Antirealism

Francesco Franda

 In recent years, social ontology witnessed a new trend emerging, according to which many - if not all - social kinds are not the product of our mind. This realist turn is revolutionary insofar as it takes a break from a dominant tradition that considers social kinds as the constructed categories par excellence. What I set out to argue is that, while this view has the merit of showing that the nature of social phenomena does not solely depend on our mental states, this type of realism about social kinds relies on a mistaken argument. Here is how my work is structured. First, I draw a distinction between two different types of entity realism, one being about the existence of the entity, and the other one being about the direct mind-independence of the entity. I make clear that I endorse the former type of realism, showing how most social ontologists are actually realist in this sense too. What I want to argue against is the latter sort of realism, since I claim that all social kinds are constructed, not only those towards which our intentionality is clearly oriented, such as

legal kinds, but also those that are typically taken to be examples of social kinds that are not constructed, but rather discovered, such as economic recession and racism. I then proceed to show how the argument typically put forward to maintain that these social categories do not directly depend on our intentionality to exist is that certain phenomena would take place even if we had no clue about their existence and nature: recessions would hit economies regardless of what citizens know about them, and racist acts would be committed even if neither the perpetrator nor the victim is aware of them. I agree that economic recessions had happened long before they were studied by economists, and racist discriminations would take place without anyone's awareness. However, the argument fails insofar it takes the single instances for the kinds themselves: there is a difference between the way in which we draw the contours of social phenomena by categorizing them and the social phenomena themselves as they take place in the world. Economic recessions or racism are not mere figments of our imagination, but we are the ones who devise and over time bring change to social kinds, which are ultimately a tool, working as a compass to help orienting us around the social world. Finally, I stress how the fact that we come up with social kinds does not entail that anything goes, since there are both empirical and normative constraints on how we represent the social world, and that makes some categories better instruments than others.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Andreea Popescu
Date: 16:00-16:30, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003



Grounding Relations in the Matter of Free Will

Christina Fritz

he question as to whether our actions and choices can be considered to be truly free, concerns one of the most controversial problems in philosophy. In my contribution, based on the idea that free decisions are grounded in to-be-specified causal histories, I will defend a compatibilist approach. If we aim for our actions and choices to be free, we need to distinguish the mere

action from what is to bear a so-called free action: the will. While probably nobody would say that all of our actions are completely free, we usually want at least some of our performed actions to be grounded in free decisions of our own. Hence, defining a so-called free action constitutes part one of my talk. The second part of my talk concerns a certain common mistake: considering causality equivalent to determinism. According to this mistaken picture, simple causal relations already rob us of free will. After distinguishing causal relations from deterministic ones, I will argue with Vihvelin (2013) and with the aid of Frankfurt cases that even deterministic causal relations do not rob us of free will as a mental state at all. Finally, I will introduce grounding relations as explanatory metaphysical dependence relations in order to demonstrate an idea of a somehow structured world where grounding relations in contrast to mere causal relations are able to bear free choices and actions. With Sartorio (2016) I will show that if a free act is grounded in which means: is depending on a free decision to act in a certain way, the free decision "the free will itself" is grounded in causal histories that are robust enough to assure us of our aim to act truly free at least once in a while. References: Sartorio, C. (2016): *Causation and Free Will*. New York: OUP. Vihvelin, K. (2013): *Causes, Laws, and Free Will. Why Determinism Doesn't Matter*. New York: OUP.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Andreea Popescu
Date: 14:00-14:30, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003



War Without Death: A Critical Perspective on Non-lethal Weapons

Markus Fuchsberger

War, in which no one has to die, sounds like a utopia. But this promise is implicit in the term "nonlethal weapons". Despite the promise of considerably altering the ethics of war, nonlethal weapons have never really garnered the attention of ethicists. Here, I shall outline a best-case argument in favour of the use of nonlethal weapons in war and subsequently contrast this argument with practical problems. "Nonlethal weapons" can be defined

as weapons "that are intended to incapacitate people without causing death or permanent injury" (Davison, "Non-Lethal" Weapons, 1). From a theoretical standpoint, an ethical justification for the use of nonlethal weapons may look like this:(1) It is morally permissible to intentionally target combatants with (potentially lethal) force in order to stop them from (seriously risking) harming people grievously.(2) Between two weapons that are capable of stopping combatants from (seriously risking) harming people grievously, the weapon that does not harm (or poses less risk of harming) people grievously is to be preferred.(3) Nonlethal weapons are weapons that do not harm (or pose less risk of harming) people grievously.(Concl.) In stopping other persons from (seriously risking) harming people grievously, non-lethal weapons are to be preferred over conventional lethal weapons, since they do not actually harm or pose less risk of harming people grievously.However, the development and use of such technologies shows a more ambivalent picture. The problems are focused around, but not limited to the following aspects:(1) There are no truly "nonlethal" weapons. Variances within the human body itself and among people make it nigh impossible to guarantee nonlethality while also retaining an incapacitating effect.(2) Nonlethal weapons are often designed to include "rheostatic capabilities", i.e. turning them into lethal weapons with the press of a button.(3) In the past, nonlethal weapons have been used by military forces contrary to its design, namely to increase the lethality of conventional weapons.(4) Nonlethal weapons may lead to use of force where one would have otherwise refrained from it, since they reduce the potential for deaths. Additionally, the use of nonlethal weapons may lead to an escalation of the use of force.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Ada Smurzynska
Date: 12:00-12:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.005



Epistemic Divergence and Time Slice Rationality

Simon Graf

 here is a class of arguments, called divergence arguments that traditionally have been understood as supporting inflationary non-summativist approaches in social philosophy. These arguments try to sustenance the inflationary claim that there is a conflict (or divergence) between a property at the collective level and the individual level, by referring to examples of diverging group attitudes. While these arguments have been criticised by Lackey (2016, 2020), among others, I will argue that these critiques fail to dismiss epistemic divergence altogether. Instead, I will present various cases of real epistemic divergence. These cases do not only pose a threat to approaches as advocated by Lackey but, furthermore, tell us something important about the epistemic and ontological structure of social entities rarely accounted for in the literature. Namely, that divergence, as any kind of inflationism, is intrinsically linked to questions in individual epistemology, especially the question of how we should treat rational agents over time. I argue that in striving for continuity in our epistemic theorizing we are advised to endorse the recently popular thesis of Time-Slice Rationality as advocated by Hedden (2015) and Moss (2015). In other words, we ought to treat past time-slices of ourselves similar as we treat members of an epistemic group (we are part of) when analysing the rationality of the temporally extended agents/groups.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Santiago Vrech
Date: 15:20-15:50, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002



Intention and Responsibility

Levin Güver



In *The Method of Ethics*, Henry Sidgwick writes, "I think, however, that for purposes of exact moral or jural discussion, it is best to include under the term "intention" all the consequences of an act that are foreseen as certain or probable" (p. 202). Contrastingly, the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) distinguishes between intended harm and harm that is foreseen, whereas only the latter may be justified by good consequences. The DDE will - whereas Sidgwick will not - differentiate the Strategic Bomber (who, to weaken the enemy, bombs an ammunition factory, knowing that it will destroy the nearby school and kill the children inside) from the Terror Bomber, who bombs the schoolchildren directly. The DDE allows for a nuanced view of these cases because it derives intention from motivational significance, drawing a sharp line between what an agent intends and what she merely foresees. But there are types of cases where equating intention with motivational significance lends counterintuitive judgement, such as with inseparable effects. Consider Glanville Williams' Mad Surgeon who is infatuated with the human body and extracts the hearts of his patients with the sole aim of admiring them. He does not wish for his patients to die, and yet we consider this an instance of intentional killing and label the surgeon a murderer. Sidgwick and Williams had argued this point so forcefully that it was the orthodoxy in British criminal law to consider foresight sufficient for intention. I will argue twofold. First, that intention and responsibility refer to conceptually distinct notions that ought to be kept apart, and that legal scholars are especially susceptible to erroneous judgement due to the highly moralising nature of their examples. Second, I will, drawing from the early works of Elizabeth Anscombe, provide a nuanced defence of the motivational significance view and propose an account on which is able to handle a plethora of cases from the literature.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Damiano Ranzenigo
Date: 16:50-17:20, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004



Two Modes of Suspension of Judgement

Benoit Guilielmo

he presentation purports to examine two different types of suspension of judgement. The distinction is philosophically important for our understanding of the epistemic impact of skeptical arguments. I will argue that there is one suspensive attitude that can be modalized in two different ways: either one suspends one's judgement in an investigative mode, which is constituted by a belief that further evidence is available on whether p, or one suspends one's judgement in a renunciative mode, which is constituted by an opposite belief and support consequently that no improvement of one's epistemic situation is in view. A mode of suspension of judgement is thus, roughly, a way of suspending judgement given one's evidential situation. It is not a way of coming to the state in which the suspensive attitude consists, but a way of being in this state. I shall argue that while being in this mental state is essential to being in a suspensive attitude, and while this attitude is necessarily modalized, the way in which it is modalized depends on the agent's take on her evidential situation. First, I will explicate some important features of suspension of judgement: neutrality, reflection and rationality. Then I will argue that there is only one state of suspended judgement, which can however be entertained through different modes, and that these modes play an important role from a normative point of view: the conditions under which it is rational to suspend judgement depend on the way in which the mental state that is essential to this attitude is modalized. Finally, I will argue that these modes of suspension have different skeptical impacts on one's epistemic position. The investigative mode of suspension will support a support a weak skepticism that one can easily overcome, whereas the renunciative mode will support a strong skepticism which might turn out to be epistemically worrisome. In order to demonstrate this I will use peer disagreement as an illustrating example.

Section: Epistemology
 Language: English
 Chair: Kimon Surlas-Kotzamanis
 Date: 11:20-11:50, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
 Location: HS E.002



The Feeling of Categorical Normative Force Is Just a Feeling

Louis Gularte

rror theorists have long argued that there is something deeply suspicious about moral thinking. In this paper I defend a new (and notably metaphysics-independent) proposal about the source of that suspiciousness: namely an incoherence in the moral feeling of "categorical normative force". When we're experiencing that feeling - about, say, paying a friend back for a loan - we see paying them back as having a specific kind of priority over all incompatible alternatives (e.g. claiming they never lent you anything); that's part of the feeling's overriding-feeling motivational force. I note, first, that an action's seeming that way is either entirely, not at all, or only partly a matter of our being motivated a certain way. I then consider what would follow from fully "internalizing" each possibility on an affective/motivational level. First, if it's just a matter of our being in a specific motivation state, then nothing outside our current motivation-state counts in favor of the action (vis-a-vis this specific kind of priority) over the alternatives. Internalizing that fact, I argue, involves a degree of receptivity to alternatives that is incompatible with the feeling of categorical normative force. Second, if the action's seeming to have priority is a purely non-motivational matter, then it will "leave us cold" in a way incompatible with the feeling. Third, I argue, putting two such components together doesn't help. The result is that if we fully internalize any of the ways things could actually be, nothing seems the way things seem when we're having the feeling of categorical normative force. In fact, I argue, every action will positively seem to lack the kind of priority associated with that feeling. My conclusion is that any domain (like morality) that centrally involves seeing things the way we see them when we're having the feeling of categorical normative force is to that degree in error. The seeming normative force of morality, in other words, is an illusion.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Damiano Ranzenigo
Date: 18:10-18:40, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004



The epistemology of Inquiry

Paul Irikefe

 In recent decades, epistemology as a theory of knowledge has focussed increasingly on athletic domains in order to understand its central notions. For example, the game of archery has served as a useful model environment for unpacking the normative dimensions of beliefs, what it means for them to be justified or to amount to knowledge. And here the suggestion is that the normative dimension of knowledge or justified belief is an instance of a more general normative relation between performances and competence in a game like archery (Greco, 2010; Sosa, 2007, 2009, 2015, 2016; Wayne, 2009). Extending this project to inquiry-based epistemology seems even more natural since unlike epistemology as a theory of knowledge, where the target of epistemic evaluation is whether a belief amounts to knowledge or justified belief, the target of epistemic evaluation in inquiry-based epistemology is activities. And with respect to these activities, three questions have been of interest: what aim or goal are we after in these activities? What strategies help us in attaining our goals in these activities? And what intellectual competence or ability do we deploy in successfully attaining the relevant goal? (Hookway, 2006, p. 9). In this paper, I will be concerned primarily with the last two questions. And I will argue that by thinking of the problem-solving activity constitutive of inquiry as skilled performance like chess, we can derive a set of distinctive and empirically informed answers to these questions. The discussion is as follows. Section II presents and evaluates the extant proposals to the second and the third questions. And Section III draws on the empirical research of Adrian De Groot (2008) on thinking in Chess to provide alternative responses to those questions.

Section: Epistemology
 Language: English
 Chair: Simon Graf
 Date: 17:30-18:00, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
 Location: HS E.002



Metaphysical Coherentism and Vicious Regress

Emma Jaura

Metaphysical coherentism a relatively underexplored alternative to orthodox metaphysical foundationalism. Foundationalism offers a picture of reality's structure on which entities are organised into a hierarchy of linear chains of dependencies, which ultimately terminate in a foundational fundamental level. Coherentism offers an alternative picture where entities are a part of a complex web-like network of dependencies, which is self-sufficient, and has no need for any fundamental foundations. An attractive feature of coherentism seems that does not involve problematic primitives- those fundamental, brute, unexplained entities that foundationalism does, nor does it encounter problematic infinite regress- those never-ending chains of dependencies that come with foundationalism's traditional competitor, metaphysical infinitism. In this paper I address the objection that coherentism does in fact encounter vicious infinite regress or circularity. The worry involves the infinite number of relations and relata that emerge from the relational constitution of all entities. This worry can be addressed by appealing to the nature of the dependence relations involved in creating the network. Coherentism can be held in place without encountering infinite regress or circularity by ontological dependence that is partial, reflexive and symmetric. Bliss (2014) offers the suggestion that regress and circularity are only vicious if they constitute an explanatory failure. For coherentism to be in danger, there must be some worry that it cannot provide a complete explanation of each individual entity. A coherentists complete explanation of entity *W* is in terms of its relational constitution, and in terms of the relational constitution of each entity *X*, *Y* and *Z* etc, that constitute entity *W*, and so on. I argue that despite a complete explanation being extremely complex and seemingly infinite, this is merely an epistemic worry that does not prevent the metaphysical possibility of a coherentist picture. I conclude that coherentism remains a promising position, worthy of further philosophical investigation.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Blazej Mzyk
Date: 18:10-18:40, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003

How to Create an Abstract Artifact Collectively Over Time. On Successively Collective Authorship

Nicolas Kleinschmidt

There are many abstract artifacts in art and design, science and technology which are authored collectively. While some of these artifacts are authored by agent collectives simultaneously, others seem to be authored successively, e.g. a novel or scientific theory that was left fragmentary by one agent (perhaps due to her death) and completed by another. As a mode of collective acting, however, collective authoring presupposes the collective authors to interact which appears to be impossible, though, if the agents act successively. So, is it actually possible for an abstract artifact to be successively authored by an agent collective and, if so, how? In my talk I will argue that an abstract artifact can be successively collectively authored, namely iff a first agent determines some of the abstract artifact's essential properties herself and designates the remaining essential properties to be determined by a second agent who actually determines the remaining essential properties coherently. First, I will define collective authorship as the causal relation between an agent collective and an abstract artifact which the agent collective has brought into existence by determining the artifact's essential properties. Second, I will argue that agents interact in successively authoring an abstract artifact in that a first agent has to allow for a second agent to determine some of the abstract artifact's essential properties and the second agent has to observe those of the abstract artifact's essential properties already determined by the first agent. Third, I conclude that neither concretizing, i.e. determining some accidental properties of a given abstract artifact (e.g. a play) by authoring another abstract artifact (e.g. a production of the play), nor instantiating, i.e. making a concrete artifact token (e.g. a performance of the play) of the abstract artifact(-type) given, is successively collective authoring, because both modes of action do not involve the determination of an abstract artifact's essential properties. Also, an agent continuing an abstract artifact fragment by another agent is not successively collective authoring since the agent who left the abstract artifact fragmentary intended it to be either completed by herself or left fragmentary.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Blazej Mzyk
Date: 16:50-17:20, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003



Additive transformative rationality

Yannick Kohl

 Whenever we ask what makes humans different from animals, our rationality seems to be a good place to start. But how much different are we from non-rational animals? Matthew Boyle (2016, 2012) discusses and criticises the view that humans are just another animal with some cognitive upgrades. According to such additive theories of rationality, rationality is a capacity that is added to or sits on top of older capacities of "believing-on-the-basis-of-perception and our acting-on-the-basis-of-desire" (Boyle, 2016, p. 528). Boyle advocates a transformative view of rationality; one on which the capacity to scrutinise and self-regulate our beliefs and intentions has profound effects on the "lower" capacities such that we cannot consider them to be shared by rational and non-rational animals. Even if rational animals sometimes act and believe unreflectively, their perceptual and motivational states have a "distinctive form of predication". Boyle's view rests on an argument by John McDowell against non-conceptualism. According to McDowell, judgements must appeal to reasons that are reflectively accessible to the subject. They can only be accessible in a way that allows for reflective scrutiny if their contents are conceptualised (see McDowell, 1994, p. 46-47). His assumption seems to be, however, that perception and desire are non-conceptual for non-rational animals. Thus, the perceptions and motivational states of non-rational animals must be different from those of rational animals. Boyle's criticism of additive theories is that they fail to account for our capacity of rational belief and action as these require the conceptualisations of certain perceptions or motivational states as reasons for belief or action. Because perceptions and motivational states are not conceptualised on this view, they cannot inform rational belief and action. Non-conceptual content in perception can only lead to "instinctive" belief (see Boyle, 2016, p. 543). An additive theory like this cannot account for our capacity to ask whether what we perceive is really a good

reason to believe. Boyle's view is essentially about judgements, where for "any judgment J of a rational subject S, a normal explanation of S's judging J must appeal to reasons available to S's reflective scrutiny" (Boyle, 2016, p. 543). His view is that non-conceptualised contents from animal perception and desire cannot lead to judgements. Because humans have the capacity to judge, the inputs of reflective processes cannot be those of animals. There are two ways to read this: one is that Boyle is only committed to saying that all human perceptions and desires are capable of being reflected upon and scrutinised. The other one is that rational capacities are active in every instance of belief and action. If rationality is transformative and not merely additive, that seems to suggest that not a single perception and desire is untouched by rationality. But humans don't only judge. I would like to argue that sometimes we act and believe on "brute impulses". Boyle's view does not make these disappear and fails to account for their possibility. In an important sense, however, even actions or beliefs of rational beings that are based on brute, non-conceptual instincts are in an important way different from those found in non-rational animals. Using a functionalist framework, I want to propose a view that combines transformative and additive aspects into one theory. I think Boyle's argument rests on a misrepresentation of additive theories. There is a characterisation of these that avoids Boyle's argument and can account for our capacity of reflective scrutiny. Characterisations of additive theories have to make it clear what is added on top of what. What do we have in common with non-rational animals and what exactly is added that makes us the reflective beings we sometimes are? Boyle presents additive theories as adding the rational capacity of reflective scrutiny of reasons to the lower capacities of non-rational animals. On this characterisation of additive theories, there is an interaction problem (see Boyle, 2016, p. 553) because rational self-assessment requires conceptual content that cannot be given by the perceptual and motivational states of non-rational animals. However, transformative and additive theories of rationality are not incompatible if we consider the capacity of conceptualisation itself to be that which is added to the lower non-rational system. This could be what Evans had in mind when writing that the lower capacities provide "the input to a thinking, concept-applying, and reasoning system" (Evans, 1982, p. 158). The capacity to apply concepts to the outputs of perception and motivational states - which makes rational scrutiny further down the line possible - is what is added to the capacities of non-rational animals. Non-rational perceptions and motivations are still

very different from their counterparts that do not belong to a subject with rational capacities. Even when I hit the table unreflectively in my rage, for example, I can reflect on this afterwards and come to believe that I did not really have a reason to be angry. Boyle is not clear on how he understands the type of transformation of the lower capacities when they serve as the inputs of rationality. I think that the debate can be enriched by a functionalist approach. A "holistic" modification of overall functional roles of lower capacities could be described as transformative. Such a holism, however, comes with certain caveats regarding the individuation of mental states. Taken too far, holism can lead to cases in which one type of mental state would have to be described as different mental states depending on the functional system in which it is integrated. If perception is transformed on a functionally holistic view, I take that to be a reason for believing that transformative and additive aspects of a theory are not mutually exclusive. Certain capacities can either be transformed or not, depending on how widely the functional net is cast, so to speak. The capacity to conceptualise our perceptual and motivational states can "sit on top of" the capacities we share with non-rational animals. We sometimes act and believe "instinctively", i.e., without explicit representation of support relations between our reasons and our attitudes. Perception has the same functions in rational animals as in non-rational animals. The capacity of conceptualisation of contents as reasons gives perception and desire new causal roles, transforming the overall system they are part of. The important point that differentiates this view from Boyle's is that the lower capacities survive the functional modification and are still exercised in rational beings.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Agnieszka Proszewska
Date: 15:20-15:50, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.003



The preface paradox and higher-order belief

Pak-Him Lai

he preface paradox illustrates that the normative Lockean thesis, the conjunction principle, and the consistency principle can't be consistent with each other. Can we solve the preface paradox without denying any of the three assumptions? In this paper, I show that we can, and suggest that this line of solution requires a new view about the nature of belief. I argue that the crux of the preface paradox is the assumption that all our beliefs belong to a single type. Because of this assumption, inconsistent beliefs are always considered as irrationality. Instead of thinking all beliefs of a person as the members of a huge, single set, we could perhaps allow that there is a stratified hierarchy of belief-types. On this view, beliefs belong to different types or levels rather than a set. If one's overall doxastic state is understood as a stratified hierarchy of belief-types, then one can be justified in holding first-order belief 'p' and higher-order belief 'not-p' at the same time without inconsistency. If belief is so understood, we may be able to overcome the problem of the preface once and for all. In a type-theoretic framework, there are at least two types of beliefs. Following the convention of type theory, we may say that first-order beliefs belong to type-0 level, and second-order beliefs belong to type-1 level. In the preface case, one has a first-order belief that (iii) each claim is true, and has a second-order belief that (iv) some claim is false. According to the normative Lockean thesis, one is justified in holding both types of beliefs. Apply the conjunction principle as usual. Now one is justified in holding both one's first-order belief (iii) and second-order belief (iv) at the same time. But there is no inconsistency at all. For we don't presuppose that one's beliefs (iii) and (iv) form a single inconsistent set. Instead, we understand her overall doxastic state as a stratified hierarchy belief-types. One can rationally believe that (iii) in type-0 level, and that (iv) in type-1 level. If the type-theoretic conception of belief is plausible, one can rationally doubt everything one believes. It sounds paradoxical in a set-theoretic conception of belief, but it makes good sense in the type-theoretic one. If we allow that there are two types of beliefs in one's overall doxastic state, then we won't run into the preface paradox.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Kimon Surlas-Kotzamanis
Date: 10:40-11:10, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002



Existentialism about singular propositions and truth in truth at distinction

Karol Lenart

existentialism is a view according to which singular propositions, i.e., propositions about particular individuals such as "Socrates is human" ontologically depend on individuals they describe. Thus, had Socrates cease to exist, there would be no singular propositions about Socrates. Anti-existentialism is a denial of existentialism. According to it, singular propositions, like all other propositions, exist necessarily. One of the strongest arguments against existentialism has been delivered by Alvin Plantinga (1983). According to it, existentialist has difficulties in explaining a possibility of non-existence of particular individuals. Suppose that Socrates could cease to exist, that is, that there are possible worlds at which there are no Socrates. At such worlds a proposition "Socrates does not exist" is true. However, since according to existentialism singular propositions ontologically depend on individuals they describe, if Socrates is absent from such worlds, then, had such worlds been actualized, there would be no singular propositions about Socrates, including a proposition "Socrates does not exist". Thus, it would not be true that Socrates does not exist, contrary to an initial assumption that Socrates might not have existed. A popular solution to this issue is to distinguish two ways a proposition can be true with respect to a possible world: a proposition can be true at or according to and true in a possible world (Adams 1981). While in order for a proposition p to be true in a possible world w , p has to exist in w , a proposition can be true at w without existing in w . It is sufficient that p exists in some other world w^* , from perspective of which w is evaluated. Thus, a solution to Plantinga's puzzle is that while a proposition "Socrates does not exist" cannot be true in Socrates-free possible worlds, it can be true at such worlds. However, some (e.g., Plantinga) argue that a distinction between truth

at / truth in not legitimate. In this presentation, by drawing on the work done by Iris Einheuser (2012) on truth at / truth in distinction, I show that such distinction is genuine.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Nikolai Shurakov
Date: 10:00-10:30, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003



Intrinsic Modalism and the Modalist Suspect Strategy

Marco Marabello

lassical Modalism (CM) is the thesis that some object x has some property P essentially if and only if it has that property necessarily. It seems fair to say that (CM) has lost most of its appeal due to Kit Fine (1994)'s infamous counterexamples. (CM)'s lovers, however, have refused to throw in the towel and succumb to Fine's challenges. Indeed, amended versions of modalism able to overcome Fine's challenges are legions. In this paper, I focus on a recent proposal (Denby 2014, Bovey 2020) that I call Intrinsic Modalism (IM) and I argue that it fails to deliver a satisfactory theory of essences. (IM) holds that an essential property of an object is a property that is both necessary and intrinsic. Although (IM) is a clever development of (CM) and it is able to cope with Fine's counterexamples, I argue that its success depends on a peculiar strategy to which the friend of (IM) recurs: the Modalist Suspect Strategy (MSS). The gist of (MSS) consists in two components: (i) a modalist analysis of essentiality that the (MSS)'s proponents wish to support, in this case (IM); and (ii) a certain class of contexts, which one would normally take to consist in essentialist claims, which clashes with proposed analysis. In particular, (IM) faces problems with a class of contexts such as claims about origins, natural kinds, sortals, and artifacts. Without recurring to (MSS), (IM)'s friend opens itself to a battery of counterexamples. The (MSS)'s friend, then, either (1) denies that those contexts consist in essentialist claims or (2) she tries to give an analysis of those contexts compatible with (i). I argue that these two possibilities are unacceptable, although

for different reasons. First, (1) is clearly an ad hoc solution and thus it should be avoided by any means. Second, (2) violates the principle of neutrality of a theory of essence (NTE) which holds that a theory of essences should not be biased toward some or other metaphysical account. This, in brief, is what makes (MSS) suspect. Since (MSS) is methodologically suspect, it counts as a strike against any theory that uses it. (IM) is committed to (MSS), therefore, (IM) should be avoided.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Blazej Mzyk
Date: 19:30-20:00, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003



Epistemic Corruption and the Media

Daniella Meehan

Since 2016 there has been widespread interest in the phenomenon of "fake news", both in the public and academic sphere. A vast amount of literature has been dedicated to this phenomenon in epistemology specifically, with philosophers predominantly focusing on the characterization of the term and the various conceptual issues related to how best to understand it (Gelfert 2018, Pritchard forthcoming, Coady 2019, De Ridder 2019). However, despite the array of literature on this topic, there has been significantly less focus on the epistemic harms caused by the phenomena of fake news and how we should understand and ameliorate these harms. I argue that one such example of these harms is those that are inflicted on our intellectual character; that is, a result of the influx of fake news in the environment is that certain epistemic vices have been exacerbated and epistemic virtues suppressed. Insofar as fake news threatens our intellectual character, I argue it is epistemically corrupting, an underexplored but essential form of corruption that is vital to our understanding of the harms and wrongs of fake news (Kidd 2019, 2021). The plan for this paper is as follows. Firstly, I will clarify the notion fake news with reference to the related concept of information disorder. I will then introduce the notion of epistemic corruption, outlining the various ways that information disorder creates epistemically corrupting conditions. Resulting from these corrupting conditions is

the formation of epistemic vice. I will demonstrate how information disorder leads to three distinct epistemic vices: prejudice, conspiracy thinking and epistemic akrasia, by redeploying Kidd's "five modes of corruption" - understood as the various (non-exhaustive) ways that a corrupting system can install epistemic vices in its corruptees. Finally, I conclude by examining the various ways information disorder can overcome its corruptive state, by assessing both individualistic and structural ameliorative solutions.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Lena Mudry
Date: 11:20-11:50, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: HS E.002



Responding to the response: the self-knowledge debate between Moran and O'Brien

Ida Miczke

he aim of my talk is to investigate Richard Moran's response to Lucy O'Brien's critique of his account of self-knowledge. Richard Moran (2001) proposed a theory of self-knowledge that focused on our activity as rational agents. Being a rational agent means being able to create our attitudes on the basis of deliberation (O'Brien 2003: 376) according to the reasons one has (see Gertler 2011: 169). Such an agent has her eyes directed at the world that provides her with reasons and therefore can answer questions about her mind by considering directly the world itself (Moran 2001: 84; Moran 2003: 405-406). Lucy O'Brien challenged Moran's view by noticing that he doesn't really address the epistemic issue, namely: "how agency gives us knowledge" (O'Brien 2003: 377). She tries to find an answer to this question in Moran's view of deliberation; however, she concludes that such an account would require too much conceptual sophistication and would exclude for example small children (O'Brien 2003: 380). Instead, she outlines a different approach (O'Brien 2003: 380-382, see also O'Brien 2005). Moran responded to this critique (Moran 2003). Although he claimed to endorse O'Brien's comments, I will show that his response actually demonstrates that he did not understand the essence of her argument. Not only does he

misrepresent her argument as relating to intentions, whereas O'Brien refers to beliefs, but also proposes solutions that suggest an implausible account of self-knowledge that does not agree with the view proposed in his main book on the subject (Moran 2001).

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Agnieszka Proszewska
Date: 14:40-15:10, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.003



Does Fictional Speech have an Epistemic Value?

Nursan Celik

his contribution aims at mapping the relation and emergence of propositional knowledge through fictional speech. To put it in concrete terms, I will first argue why a.) fictional speech, which I, following a broad analytical tradition, understand as non-assertive and non-propositional (Frege) and consequently as non-illocutionary (Searle) speech, can nonetheless lead to propositional knowledge. Thus, the starting point of this investigation is a common view held in philosophy of language as well as literary theory regarding fictional speech: because fictional speech does not perform any propositions with assertive force, it consequently cannot produce propositional knowledge, as is often stated. However, I will argue that no contradiction is done simply by claiming fictional speech – even though understood as non-assertive speech – to be capable of generating propositional knowledge. In a second step, I will b.) show what types of propositional knowledge are possible in fictional speech (e.g. in fictional literature). For this purpose, I will apply Oliver R. Scholz's threefold division of propositional knowledge to the field of fictional speech in literature, which are the following:

1. propositional knowledge (knowing that)
2. practical knowledge (knowing how to, i.e. knowledge related to action)
3. phenomenal knowledge (knowing how, i.e. knowledge regarding perception)

On the basis of selected fictional speech and statements from literary examples, this contribution thus intends to explain and justify a.) the possibility of propositional knowledge through fictional speech

and b.) the three concrete types of propositional knowledge through fictional speech as suggested by Scholz.

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Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Gabriel Levc
Date: 16:50-17:20, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007



On possibility of pragmatic invariantism

Nikolai Shurakov

pistemic contextualists argue that “know” is context-sensitive. Several widely-known arguments include DeRose’s (2009) The Bank case, the Thelma, Louise, and Lena case, or Cohen’s (1999) the Airport case. Each demonstrates how credible it is to attribute knowledge in one context and deny it in the context with higher stakes (bets, interests, importance, etc.). When cases are properly constructed, we naturally tend to find them plausible. This fact even got some support from experimental philosophy (Hansen & Chemla, 2013; Turri, 2017). Thus, there exists a severe challenge for invariantism that endorses “know” to be independent of context. In my talk, I would like to defend pragmatic invariantism. Following Brown(2006) and Rysiew (2007), I argue that it is possible to explain contextualist cases with Gricean notion of implicature. For instance, Keith’s claim that “I don’t know the bank is open on Saturday” might have an implicature that he does not acquire enough evidence. In my view, this is the most promising way to defend invariantism today. Contextualism that makes a semantic claim about “know” might be cut out by Grice’s razor if one gives the pragmatic explanation. In my talk, I attempt to provide such an explanation.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Gabriel Levc
Date: 17:30-18:00, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007



A Presuppositional Account of Misgendering

Zuzanna Jusińska

 In this talk I will analyze how gender-related information conveyed by pronouns enters the common ground, explore the phenomenon of misgendering in terms of hate speech and propose a presuppositional account of misgendering as a form of hate speech.

First, I will analyze how utterances with gendered expressions such as pronouns and gender-specific nouns work in conversations, using notions of presupposition and common ground. Pronouns and gender-specific nouns trigger presuppositions about the gender of the referent, for example (1) “She is magnificent” presupposes that the person referred to is a woman. Common ground is usually said to consist of beliefs (and assumptions, presumptions) shared by all interlocutors. If the presupposition that the referent of (1) is a woman already was in the common ground the use of pronoun “she” does not convey any new information, it is just consistent with the belief already shared by all participants. If there was no previous information concerning the referent’s gender in the common ground, the presupposition in question will be accommodated into it. I call this approach the presuppositional account of gender-related information.

The next part of the talk will be devoted to misgendering understood as referring to a person using pronouns and/or gender-specific nouns that do not match the referent’s gender identity. Typically, when a speaker intentionally calls a trans woman “he” or “guy” they do it because of transphobic attitudes and rejection of the gender identity of the referent. In such cases there should be a shared correct belief about the referent’s gender in the common ground, but the transphobic interlocutor holds a belief that “trans women are not real women and one should derogate them because of being trans women” which they convey by using the incorrect pronoun/gender-specific noun.

Finally, the presuppositional account of misgendering will be compared to the presuppositional account of slurs (e.g. Cepollaro, 2015; Marques & García-Carpintero, 2020) to see whether these forms of hate speech could be integrated into one framework. I propose that a presuppositional approach may be operative for various forms of hate speech since it accounts for some of the similarities between examples of hate speech such as misgendering and slurs.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Gabriel Levc
Date: 18:10-18:40, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007



An Inquisitive Approach to Anaphoric Reference

Antonina Jamrozik

he phenomenon of anaphoric reference has proven to attract significant attention from both the philosophical and the linguistic community (Quine 1960, Geach 1967, Kamp 1981, Heim 1983). Prevalent issue that is raised by them seems to be the one concerning the choice of formal tool that, on one hand will be a neat logical system in which the relation between anaphor and its antecedents is clearly represented, and on the other will capture the subtleties of how anaphoric reference actually works in natural language.

One feature that is present in almost all of the formal approaches to anaphora is the assumption that the coreference between the anaphor and its antecedent is given; the two are usually represented in the formal analysis as variables sharing the same index.

Following Bittner (2011), I want to challenge this assumption. In my talk I claim that all anaphora, alike in many aspects to indexicals, is ambiguous and that language users have to resort to metalinguistic knowledge in order to resolve this ambiguity. In most cases this resolution is pretty straightforward and automatic, however the existence of ambiguous anaphora proves that it is not always the case.

The framework which I chose for elucidating this idea is the one of inquisitive semantics (Ciardelli et al. 2018), and more precisely dynamic inquisitive semantics (Dotlačil & Roelofsen 2019) as dynamic

theories are best suited to deal with anaphora. Inquisitive semantics proposes that there are in fact two kinds of semantic content – informative and inquisitive one. Some sentences, such as most declaratives, have only informative content, others, such as most interrogatives – only inquisitive one. Moreover, there are sentences, such as certain disjunctions or questions which carry presuppositions, that have both kinds of content. I propose to also classify the sentences containing anaphoric reference as having both informative and inquisitive content.

Finally, I put forward a proposal of a method of explaining why in most cases this ambiguity is visible only in the logical form of the sentences and is readily resolved in the surface form by appealing to the notion of attention.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Gabriel Levc
Date: 18:50-19:20, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007



Understanding stock market charts as visual arguments

Kateryna Bura

 isual arguments are usually presented in the form of drawings, images, graphs, charts etc. and can play a key role in areas such as advertising, politics, financial markets, and so on. On the example of stock exchanges, we can see not only the use of non-verbal arguments, but also evaluate them as visual ones proceeding through rhetorical and demonstrative modes. Rhetorical mode involves the perception of visual images as premises of certain reasoning from which one can conclude (as well as in verbal argumentation). In the demonstrative mode images are put forward in support of certain conclusions turning to the visual channel of perception. Thereby, stock market charts demonstrate gradual price movements, which we can rhetorically clarify as value changes of a particular asset.

Stock market charts as well as visual arguments can be “framed”, which means we incorporate one image of price changes into another one, thus expanding the field of perception and interpretation of an argument. “Framing” provides additional premises which can significantly

affect the obtained conclusion. For example, we can place an image of four-hour-chart in a weekly graph expanding the understanding of which trend dominates the market in a more global perspective. Thus, the original image becomes one of the premises in the new reasoning, significantly influencing the subsequent conclusion. Conclusions based on four-hour candles and weekly ones can vary considerably. The search for alternatives in the rhetorical and/or demonstrative modes leads to radical changes in the conclusions.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Gabriel Levc
Date: 19:30-20:00, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007



Spontaneous Order and Market Shaping

Lukas Fuchs

 riedrich A. Hayek's account of spontaneous market order is a powerful theoretical insight and policy views about the role of the state in market formation must explain how they can accommodate it. This chapter examines market shaping as one view about the role of the state and seeks to show its compatibility with the emergence of spontaneous order and the aspects that Hayek identifies as desirable in it, namely freedom, knowledge and evolution. Market shaping policies are argued to be compatible with freedom required for the maintenance of a spontaneous market order. In addition, they contribute to the epistemic role that markets play as discovery devices.

Section: Political Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Marlene Maislinger
Date: 10:00-10:30, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007



Legal recognition of unconventional families in a liberal state

Francesca Miccoli

his work's purpose is twofold. First of all, it aims to enumerate some reasons why a liberal state should recognize families at all. Secondly, it investigates whether a liberal state should recognize unconventional families such as same-sex and polyamorous ones and even networks of friends, or whether it should recognize only the traditional nuclear heterosexual monogamic family.

Preliminarily, I assume a functional perspective of family (Cutas 2019) and I consider family as an intimate relationship where individuals are committed to reciprocal duties of care, support and cooperation. Given this premise, I claim that there are at least three justifications for the legal recognition of families by a liberal state. First of all, states has a duty to fulfil the individual interest in the recognition of families, if we assume that families are intimate relationships of care and that intimate relationships of care are primary goods (Brake 2010). Secondly, there exist at least two public interests in the recognition of families: relationships of care involve reciprocal vulnerability, and the vulnerable partners need legal protection (Metz, 2007). Family involves economic cooperation and material support, often representing a subsidiary form of welfare (Gheaus, 2012).

However, when the legal recognition is limited to the traditional heterosexual monogamous family then the equality and neutrality principles are violated (Calhoun 2005; Den Otter 2015; Wegwood 1999; Wellington 1995). Indeed I claim that, as long as the intimate relationship of care we chose is committed to care, support and cooperation, it deserves legal recognition regardless of its form. Given the fact that unconventional families such as same-sex and polyamorous families and network of friends are committed to care, support and cooperation, then we can conclude that they all deserve legal recognition by a liberal state.

Section: Political Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Marlene Maislinger
Date: 10:40-11:10, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007

Ideal Theory for Feminists

Lena Könemann

Disagreement abounds in philosophy, but it might nonetheless seem puzzling that political philosophers disagree not just about first-order questions about, say, distributive justice or rights in war but also, at the meta-level, about the nature of their discipline. Questions about methodology are fiercely debated in political philosophy. Some political philosophers express frustration with mainstream political philosophy in a broadly Rawlsian vein that – according to its critics – is preoccupied with highly abstract questions at the expense of more relevant work. Political philosophy that relies on idealisation and is not primarily concerned with real-world applicability is often referred to as ideal theory. Its critics argue that political philosophers should do non-ideal theory instead, meaning roughly that they should factor existing inequalities and the shortcomings of human beings into their theories to guide real-world political action (Farrelly 2007; Sen 2009). While these debates have grown ever more complex in recent years, it is nonetheless noticeable that non-ideal approaches have become more prominent.

This trend also exists in the subfield of feminist political philosophy. Some feminist political philosophers motivate their rejection of ideal theory by appealing to feminist principles. It is not a coincidence that they are critical of both ideal theory and traditional political philosophy in what they argue is a patriarchal tradition. Certain idealised assumptions, the argument goes, rest on a mistake that contributes to the oppression of women and other disadvantaged minorities (Okin 1989).

Which methodological approach, then, should feminist political philosophers take? My aim is to argue that feminist political philosophers can embrace ideal theory and that while non-ideal theory has an important role to play, the feminist project can also benefit from the more abstract and lofty considerations that are commonly taken to constitute ideal theorising.

Section:	Political Philosophy
Language:	English
Chair:	Marlene Maislinger
Date:	11:20-11:50, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.007

Trust and Roles

SuddhaSatwa GuhaRoy

redominantly philosophical canon understands trust to be situated in a closed truster-trustee dyadic arrangement, governed by norms of trust and trustworthiness (Jones, 2017, pp. 102-107). Social norms and normative standards are understood to play marginal and indirect part (Hardin, 1997, p.38). This understanding would find it hard to make sense of two aspects of our practice of trusting, namely, (i) why betrayals in certain closed dyadic arrangements leave an impact not only on the truster, but on the entire society, and (ii) why trust is more intense and significant in certain aspects of life than others.

This paper recognizes these two aspects in our practice of trusting and seeks to explain trust in its embeddedness in the social reality. I argue that norms of trust interact with social norms and a comprehensive understanding of trust commands our attention to its embeddedness in various social relationships. I turn to a structural view of society where social positions are recognized as roles in a social division of labour (Seligman, 2000, p. 7), and social relations as role-relations. Trust, in this view, is understood as embedded in role-relations. Role identification provides context to trust interactions, and allows understanding of associate expectations that accompany trust.

The first section offers a new understanding of roles and role-relation following MacIntyre's (1981) notion of internal and external goods. The second section suggests the advantages of recognizing roles in the practice of trusting. The third section discusses the assumptions and implications of the role-based framework of trust. In the last section I compare my account with Hawley's (2019) account and will state how the two differ in important respects. The conclusion demonstrates how this account is able to explain the two aspects mentioned above.

Section: Political Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Marlene Maislinger
Date: 12:00-12:30, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007



Enacting the Social Contract: Civil Disobedience in Armenia

Hrayr Manukyan

 In this article, I claim that the notion of constructive civil disobedience provides a better framework for explaining the Armenian Velvet Revolution of 2018 than the four main theoretical models of civil disobedience (liberal, democratic, religious-spiritual, anarchistic). First, I describe the Armenian political systems before and after Revolution, and I show that there were radical changes in political institutions as well as sources of government legitimacy. Then I discuss the four main theoretical models of civil disobedience and show why they cannot adequately explain the Armenian case. The liberal model (John Rawls) cannot explain the Armenian case because it considers civil disobedience as a tool for non-radical transformations in newly just societies. The democratic model (Hannah Arendt and Jürgen Habermas) cannot fully explain the Armenian case because it sees civil disobedience only as a "democracy-enhancing" mechanism, not as "democracy establishing". The religious-spiritual model (Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King) cannot explain the Armenian case because religiousness and the concept of god play a crucial role in it. The anarchist model cannot explain the Armenian case because the Revolution did not aim to eliminate the state; it sought to replace the semi-authoritarian state with a democratic one. In the end, I present the notion of constructive civil disobedience. It considers civil disobedience not as a response to a breach of the social contract (as in the cases of liberal and democratic models) but as a mechanism for establishing or enacting the social contract. I show that enacting the social contract is what happened in Armenia in 2018.

Section: Political Philosophy
 Language: English
 Chair:
 Date: 10:00-10:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
 Location: SR 1.007



An absurd ontology or a hidden cosmopolitanism? Rethinking Pettit's interpretation of Rawls's political ontology

Georgios Karagiannopoulos



explore the application of the concept “people” as a collective agent in the second original position à la Rawls (1999). In specific, I argue that either Rawls should be in favor of cosmopolitanism or he is left with an absurd political ontology. First, I reconstruct the hypothetical scenario of the second original position (1.1). While for Rawls “people” is a thick concept, I reason why it should be deflated. My reconstruction of the second original position takes seriously the condition imposed by the veil of ignorance (Rawls 1971). I understand this condition as a process of abstracting all the elements that are contingent (cf. Bäck 2014, ch. 7) to a specific people. “People” in general, i.e. people after the abstraction process, is a concept that includes only the necessary common elements of all peoples. Therefore, contrary to Rawls, the result of this condition is, at least intuitively, closer to cosmopolitanism than to national liberalism. Because Rawls does not reach this thesis, I take on the task of solving the following puzzle: We need to find an anti-cosmopolitan justification consistent with our intuitive reconstruction of the second original position and ground this justification to ontological reasoning, more specifically the political ontology of Rawls’s peoples. This task is allegedly satisfied by Pettit (2005, 2006). I investigate Pettit’s idea of civicity – the relationship between people and their government through the public sphere – and I find that the Rawlsian conception of a fair system of cooperation (Rawls 1983) holds a people together in the final analysis. (1.2) Additionally, Pettit argues that fair cooperation 1 binds a people together as a whole but it does not bind different peoples together. I argue that this idea is outdated in the modern context of globalization (2.1). Finally, I examine some other non-Rawlsian alternatives (Kymlicka 2001, Miller 2012, Moore 2019) that might rescue Rawls’s anti-cosmopolitanism on ontological grounds (2.2). I find them equally unable to pass the veil of ignorance condition. Therefore, either Rawls should be a cosmopolitanist (even though he is not aware of it) or his ontology of “peoples” is incomprehensible.

Section: Political Philosophy
Language: English
Chair:
Date: 10:40-11:10, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.007



The early Wittgenstein's view of nonsense reconsidered

Krystian Bogucki

 In my talk, I will defend the view that Wittgenstein holds the austere conception of nonsense in *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*. According to this conception, there is only one kind of nonsense, since meaninglessness always results from our not having assigned a meaning to expressions in a certain context. I will argue that Glock (2004, 2014), Hacker (2004) and Liptow (2018) did not provide effective arguments against this position. In the last part, I will indicate the need for a clarification of the relation between the context principle and the resolute reading of the *Tractatus*.

The austere conception of nonsense was proposed by Cora Diamond (1978, 1981) as part of new reading of Wittgenstein's philosophy. The resolute reading claims that there are no ineffable truths. The aim of *Tractatus* was therapeutical, therefore Wittgenstein did not want to present a metaphysical or other theory. His basic tools in this endeavour were the austere conception of nonsense and the context principle. The austere conception of nonsense rejects category clash between meanings of words and allows only for mere nonsense. I defend the austere conception of nonsense against four kinds of arguments:

1. there is no textual evidence in favour of this conception;
2. the restrictive reading of the context principle is untenable;
3. the context principle contradicts the compositional view of language;
4. there is no substantial merits in the austere view of nonsense.

Notably, I will argue that the recent revival in the philosophy of nonsense and metaphilosophy (Cappelan 2013, Chalmers 2011) speaks in favour of the austere view. However, I will claim that from the point of view of the resolute readers it is hard to explain the kind of category mistakes characteristic for *Tractatus*. The austere conception

of nonsense rejects the standard view of the logical syntax, but then there is no motivation for a claim that, e.g. “A is object” is nonsense.

Section: History of Philosophy
Language: English
Chair:
Date: 11:20-11:50, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.007



Wittgenstein, Truth Deflationism and Meta-Ethics

Jordi Fairhurst

According to a widespread interpretation (see e.g., Baker and Hacker 1980; Kripke 1982; Williams 2004; Blackburn 2010; Horwich 2016) Wittgenstein adopted a deflationary theory of truth (or truth deflationism) in his later work due to his invocation of the equivalence schema in PI par.136 (see LFM 68, 188; PG, 79; RFM Appendix I,5, Appendix III,6 for other examples). Brandhorst has adduced further textual evidence in favor of this widespread view by bringing to our attention Wittgenstein’s use of the equivalence schema in his conversations about ethics with Rush Rhees. Brandhorst has sought to develop a link between Wittgenstein’s later moral philosophy and truth deflationism in order to shed some light on the meta-ethical implications of his work. Specifically, he argues that Wittgenstein’s embrace of truth deflationism offers a novel conception of moral truths which avoids the objectivist commitments of moral realism. The aim of this paper is to critically examine Brandhorst’s deflationists interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later moral philosophy.

First, it argues that Wittgenstein, in his conversations with Rhees merely presents us with grammatical platitudes about the meaning of “true” and “false”, not a deflationist theory of truth. Specifically, he provides an expressivist conception of truth according to which the words “is true” and “is false” are used to express non-cognitive attitudes, e.g., confidence, approval/disapproval or agreement/disagreement, about a moral judgment. Second, it resorts to Wittgenstein’s later views on truth-aptness and the grammar of moral judgments to argue that moral judgments are not apt for truth and falsity and thus not suitable for substitution into an equivalence schema. Despite their declarative/indicative form, Wittgenstein (LA: Part I 5-7; MWL: 318-333;

AWL: 31-32; Wittgenstein, Rhees & Citron 2015: 30) suggests that moral judgments are primarily used to express certain attitudes, sentiments and feelings which replace and extend natural reactions of approval and disapproval. Thus, moral sentences are used expressively, not to make truth-apt assertions about the world. As Wittgenstein puts it: “An ethical proposition is a personal act. Not a statement of fact” (PPO: 85).

Section: History of Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Karol Lenart
Date: 14:00-14:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.007



How realist is Husserl’s notion of truth?

Gregor Bös

 realist phenomenologists disagree with Husserl’s later metaphysics, but often want to maintain his notion of truth. Lee Hardy has presented a reading of Husserl’s notion of truth that he deems compatible with metaphysical realism.

My paper grants Hardy all exegetical questions, and focuses on the notion of truth that he ascribes to Husserl.

I briefly introduce two ideas from Brentano to explain why Husserl appears at once as a realist (to his contemporaries) and an anti-realist (to me and some of my contemporaries).

The realist feature is that Husserl reintroduces states of affairs, *pace* Brentano. With Brentano, however, he maintains a strict correlation between true belief and a possibility of evident givenness.

I present a logical and a semantic problem for this idea, and suggest that the available responses only fit with an anti-realist metaphysics.

Section: History of Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Karol Lenart
Date: 14:40-15:10, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.007



Cutting off the Head of a Hydra: Plato on the Insatiability of Desire

Alec Sault

 In the Republic, Plato describes our appetitive desires as insatiable. I argue that it is this feature of desire, whatever it turns out to be, that is Plato's chief worry about desires being left to themselves. Thus, if we are to understand what motivates Plato to develop a system of education that shapes our desires, we must understand in what sense he takes them to be insatiable. This talk presents an answer to this question, according to which our desires are insatiable in that they grow always more intense and numerous upon resurfacing. After considering two tempting but mistaken readings, we introduce our own. We explain what it means for the desires to become more numerous, saying that desires fragment into "sub-desires", with desires and sub-desires standing in a genus-species relation. We then explain why Plato finds this worrisome, arguing that the fragmentation of desire necessarily harms the soul. With the reading of insatiability laid out, we go on to explain why Plato thought of the desires as insatiable in this way. We argue that the increases in intensity and multiplicity are due to the spirited and rational parts, respectively, taking on the appetitive desires as their own. We conclude by drawing out a remarkable consequence of our view, namely that it justifies the Republic's central thesis of the goodness of the just life.

Section: History of Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Karol Lenart
Date: 15:20-15:50, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.007



Aristotle on Moral Agency: "He Could Have Not Done Otherwise"

Joy Elbaz

 Contemporary discussions about agency assume that the possibility of doing otherwise is a common feature of human agency (Chisholm, 1967). If not, the course of action considered is held to be necessary and cannot rely on any agent's initiative.

As such, Zingano (2016) claims that the Aristotelian theory of action is based on the conception that any agent is deemed to be capable of doing otherwise than he did. After presenting Zingano's argument, I will show that if relevant, Zingano's claim is incomplete since it no longer allows to distinguish between two types of acting – and two types of men – Aristotle introduces though : *poiein* and *prattein*, that is to say between the man whose actions are strictly technical and the virtuous man whose actions involve his living well. Finally, backed by the analysis of the concept of "power of opposites" (Metaphysics), this presentation will establish that, for he pursues happiness, any moral agent cannot act otherwise than he does.

Section: History of Philosophy
Language: English
Chair:
Date: 12:00-12:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.007



Covert Authority: On Power and Oppressive Speech

Monika Greco

 In *Just Words: On Speech and Hidden Harm*, Mary Kate McGowan employs a particular type of Austinian speech act – the exercitive – to identify two mechanisms by which speech can oppress. While these mechanisms differ in several respects, the most prominent difference is that the first – the standard exercitive – is an authoritative speech act, whereas the second – the covert exercitive – is not. By showing that speech can oppress even in the absence of speaker authority, McGowan takes herself to have uncovered an important yet overlooked mechanism by which the everyday utterances of ordinary people can oppress.

In this paper, I argue (pace McGowan) that portraying covert exercitives as non-authoritative speech acts obscures the important role that power plays in oppressive speech, even when the speaker appears to lack authority, and even when the audience does not recognize the speaker's authority. Unlike standard exercitives, covert exercitives do not wear their authority on their sleeves, but this can make covert exercitives all the more effectual, because power may be at work in sneaky ways that neither the speaker nor the audience are likely to realize. This

“sneaky power,” we will see, can make it exceedingly difficult for us to recognize oppressive utterances for what they are.

I proceed in two steps. First, I amend McGowan’s exercitive taxonomy by introducing a new distinction in the covert exercitive class, between covert exercitives that are authoritative and covert exercitives that are not. The former – what I will call covertly authoritative exercitives – are the subject of this paper. Like standard exercitives, covertly authoritative exercitives involve an exercise of speaker authority, but unlike standard exercitives, that authority does not stem from the speaker’s formal authority over the domain in which the oppressive utterance occurs. Rather, it is granted to the speaker by the norms governing the oppressive system to which the speaker’s utterance contributes. I will call this type of authority covert authority.

Second, I motivate my proposed amendment to McGowan’s exercitive taxonomy by demonstrating the explanatory power that is gained by the addition of the covertly authoritative exercitive. Beginning with the simple and plausible observation that who says what in a conversation matters, I employ the covertly authoritative exercitive to explain why some utterances are especially hard to block, and why some speakers are especially easy to silence. Covert authority, we will see, taps into the antecedent, norm-prescribed distribution of social power, and thereby determines what sorts of contributions a speaker can make, how they are received by the audience, and how they can influence the subsequent progression of social activities. These causal effects, I argue, are due to the presence or absence of covert authority, which is what warrants the proposed partition between authoritative and non-authoritative covert exercitives. Fleshing out these distinctive causal effects allows us to make explicit the role of “sneaky power” in oppressive speech, thereby enhancing McGowan’s account of oppressive speech.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Nursan Celik
Date: 16:00-16:30, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007



In insensitive Knowledge

Ryan Miller

he sensitivity condition on knowledge, the "spirit" of which is that "one would notice if things were different" (Greco, 2012) is supposed to preserve the allure of scepticism without denying Moorean facts. While sensitivity has declined in influence, however, previous criticisms have failed to directly question its ability to carry out this goal. Supporters of sensitivity have thus been able to fine tune their account of methods of knowing in order to resist both scepticism and its Moorean denial, aware that competing analyses of knowledge aimed at different goals. Timothy Williamson (2002) reduced enthusiasm for sensitivity by showing that this leads to a gerrymandered account of methods, but failed to show conclusively that constraining sensitivity to particular methods leads to the denial of Moorean facts. I do this by constructing two cases, one of common-sense knowledge and one of foundational scientific knowledge, and show that in both cases the nearest world where things are different is a world where the subject fails to notice. In both cases I check all four of David Lewis's (1979) options for "nearest world" and both fine- and course-grained accounts of methods of knowing, and sensitivity fails to obtain on any of these ways of cashing out its modal condition. The far-off worlds where sensitivity fails for these foundational cases of knowledge do not behave in the way that partisans of sensitivity naively expect. Because both cases of knowledge are so foundational, however, denying them is a severely sceptical outcome. Sensitivity is thus not merely superfluous in a general account of knowledge, but actively contrary to its intention.

Section: Epistemology
 Language: English
 Chair: Santiago Vrech
 Date: 16:00-16:30, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
 Location: HS E.002



An epistemic relativist approach to the Deep Disagreement Paradox

Hugo Mota

Disagreement can be considered deep when its participants do not agree on what means and criteria should be used to establish a dialogue about the conflict. Investigating this phenomenon, I will introduce the Deep Disagreement Paradox: either we assume that (a) there must be something in common between the epistemic systems of the litigants, which leads us to the hypothesis that there is a hyper system in which both are included; or we assume that (b) there must not be something in common between the systems, which leads us to the hypothesis that the result of a deep disagreement would be a communicative rupture. The consequence of the two alternatives is the same: when there is deep disagreement, there is no deep disagreement at all. If we assume that (a), then there is no deep disagreement, because the two systems are actually parts of a larger system. If we assume that (b), then there is also no deep disagreement, for there would be no communication between the two people. I believe that by using tools offered by epistemic relativism and assuming a pragmatic attitude, it would be possible to assume (b) without this necessarily leading us to a communicational rupture and preventing the very existence of deep disagreement. To sustain this response to the paradox, I will present the scale of continuity between deep and superficial disagreements, obtained by four heterogeneous criteria, namely, complexity, naturalistic, circumstantial and the utility of argumentation criteria. The purpose of this graded scale is to identify different degrees of depth of disagreement. One of my main motivations in developing this approach is to try and find a way to better understand (dis)agreements in general by investigating deep disagreements. I believe that not all deep disagreements are unsolvable by means of rational argumentation, but that doesn't implicate that they cease to be considered deep.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Simon Graf
Date: 19:30-20:00, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002



Suspension of judgment has its own standard of correctness

Lena Mudry

Many have observed that belief is subject to a normative standard of correctness. A belief is correct if and only if its content is true. On this ground, many have built an evidentialist account of belief's normative profile: the only reasons for belief are evidence (truth-indicating considerations) or a belief is correct iff it is sufficiently supported by evidence (Shah 2003; Engel 2014, 2019). In comparison, suspension of judgment and its normative profile have received little interest in contemporary epistemology. Some simply assume that the normative account of standard of correctness for belief can explain the normative profile of suspension of judgment (e.g., Engel 2019). This talk's aims are twofold. First, I will argue that this strategy fails because it does not distinguish between the mere lack of belief and suspension of judgment. However, according to an influential claim in the literature, suspension of judgment is not reducible to the mere lack of belief (Friedman 2013, 2017; Wedgwood 2002). Second, I will explore the possibility that suspension of judgment is a *sui generis* attitude. Consequently, it might have its own standard of correctness. If as Friedman (2017) claims, suspension of judgment is an interrogative attitude, its standard of correctness might be the following: it is correct to suspend judgment as to whether P iff it is correct to inquire into P. The implications are far-reaching: as the standard of correctness is both practical and epistemic, the reasons to suspend judgment are not purely evidential. Some kind of pragmatism might be true of suspension of judgment.

Section: Epistemology
 Language: English
 Chair: Kimon Surlas-Kotzamanis
 Date: 12:00-12:30, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
 Location: HS E.002



Facts and three concepts of truthmaking

Blazej Mzyk

 truthmaking is a relation of gaining the property of being true by some truthbearer (e. g. proposition) in virtue of the existence of an object called truthmaker. So states the truthmaker principle. Hitherto, the philosophers tried to establish one universal sound of the principle by employing in it the mechanism of truthmaking (entailment, supervenience, necessitation, grounding etc.), which they found the most suitable for them. Nevertheless, I hold that all the problems with truthmaking and with the notion of fact in metaphysics emerged exactly because of this approach, which in turn has led to confusion of the different domains by presupposing that truthmaking must have only one face. To solve these problems, I am going to show that one must start with distinguishing three concepts of truthmaking (semantic, ontological, metaphysical) and matching them three truthmaker principles. What is common for these three levels is the operation of satisfaction. However, it might take the form of entailment (semantic truthmaking), necessitation (ontological truthmaking) or grounding (metaphysical truthmaking). The semantic truthmaker principle employs the B-schema: "'p" is true because p" and is deflationary. It merely identifies the references of truthbearers, but does not describe their nature, so its commitments are only alethic (Asay and Baron 2020) and weak. The second principle is the ontological one, which operates in the domain of possibilities and allows to describe the possible nature of objects indicated by referents. However, speaking of different possible entities like tropes, states of affairs or bundles of properties etc. is not sufficient to commit to their real existence. The third principle is the metaphysical one and only it concerns the existing being. First here appear facts in the strict sense and strong commitments, inheriting alethic and medium ones, which occurred at the semantic and ontological levels. Problems with facts come out when one tries to use the term "fact" on the semantic (as true propositions) or ontological (as Armstrongian states of affairs) levels, confusing it with the notions of referent or possible entity, instead of using it at the metaphysical level. Actually, facts have modest features. They are compositional and obtaining objects that have some ontological characteristics, which depends on the true propositions about reality.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Andreea Popescu
Date: 15:20-15:50, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003



Acts of Wisdom

Oushinar Nath

 In this paper I attempt to explain the nature of wise actions, where I define wise actions as the set of morally permissible actions performed in order to reach the goals of certain domains. I accomplish this by taking a two-pronged approach. Firstly, I individuate two modal properties relevant for wise actions: (i) counterfactual success: a wise action is a morally permissible action performed for the sake of reaching a goal such that, in all nearby possible worlds, if an agent performs the action in normal circumstances, she succeeds in reaching the goal; (ii) rational robustness: a wise action is a morally permissible action performed for the sake of reaching a goal such that, in all nearby possible worlds, if an agent has sufficient reasons to perform the action, she performs the action. Secondly, I argue that these two modal properties are best explained in terms of two central features of knowledge: (a) safety: if the agent knows that a certain morally permissible action will help her successfully reach a certain goal under normal circumstances (while believing that the circumstances are in fact normal), then in all the nearby possible worlds, her belief that the action will help her successfully reach the goal under normal circumstances is true; (b) stability: the agent's knowledge that the action will help her successfully reach the goal in normal circumstances (plus, the agent's belief that the circumstances are in fact normal) entails that her belief, that the action will help her successfully reach the goal in normal circumstances, is not based on any reason that could easily have been defeated by misleading evidence.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Simon Graf
Date: 18:10-18:40, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002

Actions, Reasons, and Animals

Martin Niederl

lock (Forthcoming) presents a series of arguments for the thesis that non-linguistic animals are capable of acting rationally and for a reason. These capabilities notwithstanding, he still denies them the ability to conceive of reasons as reasons. This is because he holds that language is plausibly necessary for the possession of concepts as abstract as that of a reason. In this paper, I will argue that Glock need not - and, if he is to be consistent, should not - deny that non-linguistic animals are capable of conceptualizing reasons as reasons. So if Glock's account is plausible, my arguments should remove further conceptual barriers for our regarding animals as the cognitively complex beings they most likely are. To argue for the thesis that animals can conceptualize reasons as reasons, I will apply received minimal criteria for concept possession to the concepts of a reason and of intention. My main argument will thus be twofold. First, I will directly argue for the idea that animals can conceptualize reasons as reasons according to Glock's (2010) and Dretske's (2006) accounts of concept possession. These accounts center around the ability to classify objects, facts, etc. and deliberately discriminate between tokens of one type rather than another. The argument will proceed in two steps. The first is to argue that conceptualizing reasons as reasons is to conceptualize them as sources of conative salience. Then, I will show that animals can plausibly classify objects and facts as sources of conative salience - that is, as that in virtue of which a course of action seems good in their eyes. Hence, animals can conceptualize reasons as reasons. Plausibly, however, understanding reasons as reasons requires the ability to understand intentions as such. Hence, secondly, I will refer to empirical data gathered by Held et al. (2001) suggesting that animals attribute intentions to others. As I will argue, this entails that animals can conceptualize intentions according to the same criteria as outlined above. If the ability to conceptualize intentions really is necessary for conceptualizing reasons, this research should provide further plausibility to the claim that animals can conceptualize reasons as reasons. I thus present two independent arguments, providing two different but interlocking reasons why we (or at least Glock) should hold that animals can conceptualize reasons as reasons. In that way I expand upon Glock's (Forthcoming) account of animals as rational agents capable of acting for a reason by adding a further capability to their repertoire:

they can also plausibly conceptualize reasons as reasons. Since the final verdict is, of course, to be reached through empirical means, I will be content with having proven its conceptual possibility, as well as its intuitive plausibility.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Matej Drazil
Date: 15:20-15:50, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005



Panpsychism and the Laws of Metaphysics

Esteban Ortiz

Panpsychism is the view that experience is fundamental and ubiquitous. Experience is not reducible to or explicable in terms of entirely non-experiential features of reality. And the experience is in some sense involved with everything. For panpsychism fundamental constituents of reality instantiate experience. The fundamental constituents are the microphysical entities postulated by physical science. To explain the phenomenal consciousness of a human being (for example) is to explain the fact that the experience of humans is based on the experience of the fundamental constituents of reality. From the above, it follows that the main concern of panpsychism is the combination problem. If the experience of humans, or other dependent entities, are based on the experience of the microphysical entities, then it is difficult to explain how the microphysical entities with their micro-experiences bound together to form a macrophysical entity with their respective macroexperiences. Of course, there are some attempts to solve the combination problem. Some are based on causality and emergence, others based on grounding (and related notions). But none of these so-called solutions has the recognition as the solution. And this is because it fails to track the ontological chains of dependence. There is no (causal or grounding) explanation of the fact that the experience of humans is based on the experience of the fundamental constituents of reality. Then, it is necessary to add something more, a principle that works to give more explanation power and ensures the connection between the fundamental and the dependent. The latter could do by the addition/postulation of laws of metaphysics. For

laws of metaphysics, I understand supporting linking principles that involve generalizations to connect occurring conditions, the source, to outcome conditions, the result. Therefore, the purpose of the work is to elaborate a (new and better) solution to the combination problem for panpsychism based on the laws of metaphysics.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Matej Drazil
Date: 14:40-15:10, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005



Resisting Relativism: A Realist Defense of Universals in Feminist Metaphysics

Kalin Pak

 In this paper, I argue for a realist category of woman for feminist metaphysics. Until recently, the field of metaphysics had been largely neglected in the feminist tradition. In the past decade, however, several theorists have stressed the importance of a consistent metaphysical toolkit in order to hold the ontological commitments implicated in new feminist theories accountable. This has opened an inquiry into a fundamental question of how we should categorise feminism's purported subject matter: women. Do women make up a genuine kind? Do women have essential properties that unify them into a single category? Or are women simply a germymandered collection of individuals? There have been roughly two camps to answering these questions, namely the realist or anti-realist position. The realist asserts that there is a shared universal property which unifies and grounds the category of woman. The anti-realist maintains that such a property does not exist intrinsically, but is a product of our social and linguistic practices. While the dominant position within feminist philosophy more broadly has been to endorse the anti-realist account that there is no single shared feature or essence that grounds women into a set category, I argue that this approach leads to serious epistemic and metaphysical concerns. I argue that without a mind-independent category of woman, feminism is unable to retain a consistent subject matter, and that a realist ontology is better

suites as the metaphysical backdrop of feminism's normative and political agenda. Drawing inspiration from both David Armstrong's theory of "substantial universals" and Sally Haslanger's theory of gender, I propose a realist account of the category "woman" as an immanent, mind-independent feature about the world.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Nikolai Shurakov
Date: 10:40-11:10, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003



Can there be vague quantum objects?

Marta Pedroni

Ontically vague identity - the idea that the identity of certain objects may be vague because the world itself is vague - is often accused of incoherence. The most famous attack comes from Evans. In his famous one-page paper, Evans (1978) demonstrates that the assumption of ontically vague identity leads to a contradiction. However, this is not the last word on this matter. In fact, Evans' argument is challenged by Lowe (1994), who provides an example of ontically vague identity based on quantum mechanics. In this work, I criticize both Lowe's and Evans' stance. On the one hand, I show that Lowe's proposal fails in refuting the argument against vague identity. More generally, I explain that quantum mechanics-based counterexamples do not work against Evans' argument because his understanding of indeterminacy differs from the one relevant in the framework of quantum mechanics. On the other hand, I argue against Evans' claim that ontic indeterminacy of identity is incoherent. In fact, quantum mechanics establishes a meaningful way in which there is ontically vague identity, which is not captured by Evans. Consequently, quantum mechanics-based counterexamples are not affected by Evans' argument. On the contrary, they demonstrate the limits of his understanding of indeterminacy. I conclude by outlining two promising routes to defend the thesis that there are quantum objects whose identity is ontically vague.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Bogdan Dumitrescu
Date: 11:20-11:50, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.003



Easy Ontology for Group Agency

Andreea Popescu

e ordinarily talk about groups as performing various actions. For instance, we say things like "The Parliament passed a law" or "The Parliament wants to pass a law". This talk implies that groups have purposes, that they act in order to fulfil those purposes. If they act in order to fulfil a purpose, then groups are agents just like individuals. The problem I will discuss is whether there are such group agents. The problem is a controversial matter which does not receive a straightforward yes or no answer. For instance, Kirk Ludwig takes our reference to group agents not to be genuine and to be explained away by logical analysis. Frederick Schmitt argues that our reference to group agents cannot be explained away. Nevertheless, his view is that there are no group agents per se. I propose a discussion of group agency from a deflationist point of view, focusing on the problem of existence. Amie Thomasson proposes an easy approach to existence questions, i.e. existence deflationism. In her view, existence is not a complicated problem and there is no special property which reveals its nature and which we should investigate. This view is opposed to other approaches to existence deriving from a Quinean tradition. I argue that the discussion about group agency has been framed within a Quinean tradition. Furthermore, within this deflationist framework I investigate the way Thomasson's proposal can simplify the debates regarding group agents. First, the deflationist approach has the virtue to deliver a straightforward yes or no answer. Second, based on conceptual analysis and Thomasson's easy arguments concerning existence questions, the question whether there are group agents receives an affirmative answer and it also allows to keep a realist view with regards to group agency.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Blazej Mzyk
Date: 17:30-18:00, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003



Goals shape means, A pluralist response to the problem of formal representation in ontic structural realism

Agnieszka Proszewska

The principal aim of the paper is to assess the relative merits of two formal representations of structure - namely, set theory and category theory - for the purposes of articulating ontic structural realism (OSR). Conclusions drawn from the examination will allow me to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of both concepts, and propose the pragmatics-based approach to the question of choice of appropriate framework. By presenting the case study from contemporary science (comparison of formulation of quantum mechanics in a language of Hilbert spaces and abstract C^* -algebras) and showing how the method of structural representation can be determined based on the pragmatics of goal-oriented research not a dogmatic choice, I will explore a hypothesis stating that we should, similarly to the scientific practice, make use of the interplay between the powers of abstraction and detail of different representational methods, adopting a pluralistic - in opposition to standard, unificatory - view on the role of structural representation in OSR.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Bogdan Dumitrescu
Date: 12:00-12:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.003



Practical Identity, Contingency and Humanity

Damiano Ranzenigo

Thim of this paper is to defend the view that all human practical identities are contingent, which means that there is no single practical identity that human beings necessarily display and cannot shed. I will reach this aim by arguing against the opposite view, namely that at least one practical identity is necessary. This view is defended by Christine M. Korsgaard (Korsgaard, 1996, 2009), who thinks that the practical identity of humanity is necessary for all human beings. Korsgaard understands humanity both in terms of pure self-legislation, and as deep sociality. In the first case, humanity as self-legislation faces what I call "Existential dilemma": either humanity has specific contents, typical of contingent practical identities, but stops being necessary for all human beings, or humanity is emptied of its content and is conceived as necessary self-legislation, but stops being a practical identity. In the second case, i.e., humanity as deep sociality, Korsgaard confuses the necessary biological fact that human beings are a social species like termites and wolves, with contingent contexts of human socialization, which are the true sources of specifically human practical identities. I articulate this confusion in the guise of what I call "Nature/Nurture dilemma", which also applies to the morally neutral account of human personhood advocated by Schechtman (Schechtman, 2014). My conclusion is that conceiving of practical identities as always contingent accommodates common intuitions about selectively ascribing humanity to other people and allows for a better understanding of the value of practical identities, while not undermining universalistic conceptions of morality.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Glenn Anderau
Date: 14:40-15:10, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004



Suspension of Judgement and AI

Daniela Schuster

he rising applicability of artificial intelligence is accompanied by the problem of explainability. Especially current learning-based artificial systems prove to be highly efficient, but often do not allow for insights into the decision-making process. This contributes to serious problems such as the possibility of biased decisions, and the lacking of understanding and trust. On a different node, there is the fairly recent development in epistemology of considering the third doxastic stance, which is a neutral position between acceptance and rejection, to be a proper object of investigation in its own,. In this paper, we bring the two fields together. We argue that the discussion about suspension (of judgement), as the third neutral stance in epistemology, can fruitfully be applied to the area of artificial intelligence. To understand the demand for explaining a system's decisions, it is reasonable to look first at those cases where decisions are (or should be) absent or postponed and the different reasons for this. It is argued one precondition for possibly generating meaningful and accurate explanations of an AI system's choices, is for the system to recognise its own knowledge limits. Here, the recent debate about suspension can help to understand the different situations of a system reaching its knowledge limits and can serve as a tool to communicate this. We want to illustrate this possibility to apply suspension in AI within non-monotonic reasoning, which often serves as the formal framework of symbolic, logic-based AI systems. In a second step, this can also contribute to the discussion of explainability for non-symbolic, data-based AI systems, when neural-symbolic approaches, that try to combine symbolic and non-symbolic approaches, come into play.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Stefan Sleeuw
Date: 15:20-15:50, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: HS E.002



Semantic intuitions of extension, epistemic intuitions of intension and what they justify

Krzysztof Sekowski

he role of intuition in the philosophical methodology is widely discussed in today's analytic philosophy. Most influential theories of their role seem to accept at least one of the two assumptions which together I will label as "the myth of uniformity of the intuitive". The first assumption is that the methodological role or roles of all kinds of intuitions is the same in the whole philosophy. According to the second assumption there is only one methodological role that could be played by all kinds of intuitions in philosophy. Both these assumptions lead to uniformity view. In my speech I will criticize these views. In order to do so I will compare the role of epistemic intuitions in Gettier Case and the role of semantic intuitions in Kripke's Gödel Case. I will argue that in the Gettier Case the so-called epistemic intuitions of intension, i.e. intuitions about the knowledge itself, not its designators, play an evidential role (for the intuitions of intension/extension distinction see: Craig 1990). Nevertheless, in the case of Gödel Case, the semantic intuitions of extension play an evidential role. In other words, what justifies the verdict about the reference of "Gödel" are not intuitions about what 'reference' is, but instead, intuitions about what is the reference of 'Gödel'. I will show that these conclusions entail that the role of epistemic intuitions is to justify revision of the concept of knowledge, while the role of semantic intuitions in Gödel Case is to indicate the set of data that should be captured by a proper theory of reference. My results entail that (1) intuitions could play different roles in philosophical methodology and that (2) different kind of intuitions could play different roles in philosophical methodology which is contrary to the myth of uniformity of the intuitive.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Santiago Vrech
Date: 14:40-15:10, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002



Understanding symbolic understanding

Stefan Sleeuw

n various contributions to the epistemological debate on understanding, Christoph Baumberger has drawn useful distinctions between types of understanding. One of these distinctions concerns the division between what he (2014, p. 70) calls factual understanding and symbolic understanding. The former pertains to the understanding of facts, events, or subject matters, whereas the latter concerns the understanding of symbolic representations such as sentences, explanations, diagrams or theories. While factual understanding has received ample attention from epistemologists, symbolic understanding seems to have been somewhat neglected in the literature thus far. Despite there being a tacit consensus that symbolic understanding requires the exercise of cognitive or behavioural competences pertaining to the usage of symbols, theorists have been reluctant to develop this idea into a full-fledged theory. Arguably, this reluctance is due to the concern that symbolic understanding is too heterogeneous a category to be captured in a unified framework. In my talk, I present a proposal for how we might develop the as of yet rough conception of competent symbol-usage in more detail, without abandoning the aim of theoretical unification. I do so, first of all, by explaining in very general terms what I take symbols to be, and by outlining how I conceive of the notion of usage. Then, I shall draw on work by Ernest Sosa, Thomas Kuhn and Nelson Goodman to argue that one's use of a symbol is competent just in case one's success in using it is due to the right kind of learning process. More specifically, that learning process must involve past exposure to so-called exemplars: particulars that make reference to the universals they instantiate. The claim to be defended, then, is that a symbol is used competently if and only if one's past exposure to exemplars relevant to that symbol explains one's present success in using it. I close off my presentation by offering some suggestions as to how my proposal may account for the fact that competence comes in degrees. Baumberger, C. (2014). "Types of understanding: Their nature and their relation to knowledge", *Conceptus: Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 40:98, pp. 67-88.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Lena Mudry
Date: 10:00-10:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: HS E.002



A Distinctively Epistemic Injustice?

Kimon Surlas-Kotzamanis

Miranda Fricker (2007) introduces the concept of epistemic injustice, which she characterises as a distinctively epistemic kind of injustice, as opposed to a kind of moral injustice. My focus is on testimonial injustice, which occurs when a speaker's testimony is afforded less credibility by a hearer than is warranted, because of a prejudice on the part of the hearer in respect to the speaker's identity. It is clear enough that this is an epistemically interesting phenomenon. In particular, the hearer fails to meet the epistemic standard that is called for in the situation, and deserves blame for doing so. It is also clear that it constitutes an injustice. The hearer fails to give the speaker a good that she has a legitimate claim to, namely credibility, and in doing so treats her unequally. More needs to be said, however, to show that the injustice is a distinctively epistemic one. Fricker locates the primary harm that makes testimonial injustice an epistemic injustice in the hearer's undermining the speaker as a knower, and in particular as a giver of knowledge. Although she does not fully flesh out how this constitutes a distinctively epistemic harm, she makes a number of claims that point towards a purely epistemic account. I follow Fricker's lead and articulate a view according to which the requirement that one assigns a speaker's testimony the appropriate credibility is accounted for in terms of our obligations to each other as participants in the practice of testimony, as constituted by its epistemic aims. Lastly, I consider whether hermeneutical injustice, the other kind of epistemic injustice discussed by Fricker, counts as a distinctively epistemic injustice on the same terms. I argue that it does not. Consequently, I propose that the term "epistemic injustice" can be used to pick out two separate concepts: that of an injustice which concerns epistemology qua injustice, and that of an injustice which concerns epistemology more broadly as a phenomenon.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Lena Mudry
Date: 12:00-12:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: HS E.002



What is Wrong with Doxastic Wrongdoing

Lorenzo Testa

Recently, ethicists and epistemologists have been showing an increasing interest in doxastic wrongdoing. The leading question is whether beliefs can morally wrong people, or only actions can do that. In this paper, I will argue that beliefs cannot wrong people. My argument will proceed as follows. First, I will clarify the notion of doxastic wrongdoing: doxastic wrongdoing happens if one person wrongs another in virtue of what she believes about him. Then, I will show that if we accept that beliefs can wrong others, we should also accept that there are moral constraints to what we should believe. If this is true, however, proponents of doxastic wrongdoing face a challenge. Consider the proposition: "Epistemically, all the evidence is in favor of P. But P is an instance of moral wrongdoing against S, thus I should not believe P for moral reasons. So, in order not to wrong S, I do not believe that P". It seems incoherent, however, to assert that you have sufficient evidence for believing P, while contemporarily denying that you believe P due to moral reasons. This proposition recalls versions of Moore's paradox as applied to epistemic justification. Thus, proponents of doxastic wrongdoing should accept that we are Moorean-incoherent in abiding by morality. Accepting doxastic wrongdoing leads us to accept that, on many occasions, it would be extremely difficult - maybe impossible - to jointly believe as we morally ought to and respect the evidence that we have access to. In conclusion, I will offer an alternative explanation to our intuitions about cases in which a belief seems to wrong others. I suspect that beliefs can only indirectly wrong others, and this generated some confusion around the notion of doxastic wrongdoing. Our beliefs influence our actions, and our actions may wrong others. But while there should be moral constraints to our actions, the same does not apply to our beliefs, since they cannot directly wrong others.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Glenn Anderau
Date: 15:20-15:50, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004



Metaphilosophical Expressivism

Tom Kaspers

Within contemporary analytic philosophy, Quinean methodological naturalism has thrived, which has caused many philosophers to think of philosophical inquiry as continuous with scientific inquiry. In this talk, I shall explore an opposing view, by arguing that, whereas scientific discourse represents reality, philosophical discourse does not. I label this view "metaphilosophical expressivism". I argue towards metaphilosophical expressivism by showing the ways in which contemporary "Quinean" naturalists differ from Quine's actual naturalism. Quine's constraints on his naturalism could be explained using a simple credo: no metaphysics without epistemology. We cannot speak of how the world is without there being a link between ourselves and what is represented, which Quine believes is provided through the empirical sciences. Yet, this link is not maintained by the talk on grounding or fundamentality that permeates contemporary "Quinean" metaphysics. I argue that instead of trying to restrict our philosophical discourse so as to make such talk illegitimate, we should reinterpret our philosophical discourse. It is true that we cannot represent the world without there being a link between ourselves and what is represented, but philosophical discourse does not represent at all. Instead, it conveys practical, value-laden, attitudes about how to go about our practices. I turn to philosophers such as Richard Rorty and Huw Price to get clear on this expressivist view on philosophical discourse. However, Rorty and Price are global expressivists, so they believe that no discourse represents. Therefore, they reject that there really is much of a distinction between philosophy and science just like the Quinean naturalists do. I shall conclude my talk not with arguing that there really is such a distinction, and that scientific discourse represents reality whereas philosophical discourse does not, but with arguing that such a view could at least coherently be held.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
 Language: English
 Chair: Andreea Popescu
 Date: 14:40-15:10, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
 Location: SR 1.003



Epistemology of Sexual Objectification

Rose Troll

Objectivity is usually understood as a norm that leads to true propositions about the world. Yet Catharine MacKinnon writes that "to look at the world objectively is to objectify it". MacKinnon defines sexual objectification as men viewing and treating women as sexual objects of their desire while forcing them to be these objects made possible by men's social position of power. According to her objectivity and sexual objectification constitute each other. Evaluating the claim of objectivity being gendered Sally Haslanger objects in reconstructing an ideal of objectivity she calls "Assumed Objectivity". This ideal is independent from objectification and the male objectifier yet under conditions of gender inequality it legitimates and perpetuates objectification because aperspectivity is falsely assumed. Assumed Objectivity generally justifies an observer assuming to fulfill the norm of aperspectivity to attribute the regular behaviour of an object to its nature and to treat it accordingly. Following this ideal the male observer is justified in viewing sexual submissiveness as being women's nature and in treating them accordingly. Under conditions of gender inequality the ideal of Assumed Objectivity therefore causes an error in modality in naturalising the social fact of objectification. This paper will show that the use of the ideal does not rely on falsely assumed aperspectivity but on premises about the category woman which themselves presuppose an existent context of gender inequality. In order for the ideal to be applied, regular behaviour has to be understood as being the direct and only result of an objects nature. This in turn means that social factors are necessarily excluded. I call this concept of nature Direct Nature. The error in modality therefore occurs as a precondition of the application of the ideal in the case of women, determining their female nature. The necessity of assuming this concept of nature also anticipates the false assumption of aperspectivity as a result, it renders condition 3 non-necessary. Applying

the ideal to women under conditions of gender inequality therefore does not only perpetuate gender inequality as Haslanger argues but presupposes gender inequality. Therefore objectification and objectivity are indeed constitutive of each other as MacKinnon claims.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Stefan Sleeuw
Date: 14:40-15:10, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: HS E.002



The Credit you Deserve. On the Basis of Testimonial Injustice

Michael Vollmer



n cases of testimonial injustice, a hearer downplays the credibility of a speaker based on some social-identity prejudice. Hence, the epistemic assessment in play is, in some sense, "unfair". The phenomenon of "unfair" levels of credibility attributions goes beyond paradigmatic instances of testimonial injustice. For instance, the hearer's deception of the speaker's credibility could stem from some prejudice towards this particular person, independent of her social-identity. But what constitutes an "unfair" credibility attribution? Or, on the other hand, what would make a credibility attribution "fair"? In my talk, I will elaborate on these questions. First, I will discuss and dismiss several candidates for an appropriate analysis. For instance, for an ascription of credibility to be "fair" in the required sense, it appears to be neither necessary, nor sufficient that the assigned credibility matches the actual epistemic merits of the speaker. Maybe the speaker is an expert on the issue, but remains very secretive about her skills. Hence, a diminished credibility judgement by a potential listener is not easily criticisable. Or consider a scenario in which a hearer bases her assessment of a speaker's credibility on some identity-prejudice, but, maybe for very different reasons, the level of credibility she assigns fits the actual epistemic merits of the speaker. Here, the credibility judgement seems "unfair". After going through some of the most promising candidates, I will turn towards my own attempt to analyse "unfair" credibility assignments and defend it against some objections. Taking some inspiration from Sandy Goldberg's work,

I define these sorts of "unfair" assessments as being based on an epistemically improper process. I will close my talk with a short sketch of some potential areas of application of this analysis, e.g. whether or not science deniers are "unfair" in their assessment of the credibility of certain scientists and scientific institutions.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Simon Graf
Date: 16:50-17:20, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002



Philosophy without thought experiments: A critique of the method of cases

Santiago Vrech

How do philosophers test, refute and validate their theories or analyses? From the 1960s on, it became more common to find philosophers presenting cases (or thought experiments) as a manner of refuting or supporting theories and analyses to such an extent that some of the most renowned arguments in different branches of analytic philosophy consist precisely of thought experiments. Think for example of Gettier's cases, Kripke's scenarios, Searle's Chinese room, Jackson's Mary the neuroscientist, Chalmers' zombies and Putnam's Twin Earth, among many others. Obviously, then, the use of cases with the intended purpose of refuting a theory or showing the incompleteness of the stipulated necessary and sufficient conditions of an analysis was and still is a dominant argumentative device in contemporary analytic philosophy. When philosophers use thought experiments as a manner of confuting or validating theories and analyses, they thereby assume that thought experiments are a belief-forming process that produces a high ratio of true to false beliefs. This is, they assume that thought experiments are truth-conducive. Thus, for instance, we believe that "knowledge" is not a justified true belief because of Gettier cases. In this paper I will argue that the method of cases is not truth-conducive. The argument that I will present to defend this claim is the following: 1) If the method of cases is truth-conducive, then using it helps us get closer to correct theories. 2) Using the method of cases we don't get close to correct theories. 3)

Therefore, the method of cases is not truth-conducive. Needless to say, premise (2) needs to be justified, and for so doing I will present three different arguments in section 4 of the paper. Before presenting these arguments, sections 2 and 3 will provide context and together set the stage for the arguments that are presented in section 4. Specifically, I will show in section 2 a crucial feature of philosophical theories and thought experiments. In section 3 I will comment upon the works of experimental philosophers and harness their studies to make my arguments more plausible. Finally, in section 5 I will round the paper off with the consequences of my critique.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Simon Graf
Date: 18:50-19:20, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002



Can the Tracking Theory Account for Phenomenal Content?

Daniel Weger

epresentationalism about phenomenal consciousness holds that the phenomenal character of an experience can be explained in terms of its representational content. A more specific version is tracking representationalism: It combines the representationalist idea with the claim that mental states obtain their representational content in virtue of their tracking features in the subject's environment. Tracking representationalism is thus committed to the view that the tracking theory is an adequate theory about phenomenal content. I will argue that this view is seriously mistaken. My argument takes as its starting point the claim that any adequate theory of phenomenal content should be able to account for all or, at least, most of the acknowledged facts about phenomenal content. These facts include: 1) Phenomenal content (PC) displays specific structural features such as compositional characteristics and similarity relations to other phenomenal contents. 2) PC is introspectively accessible. 3) It is logically and conceptually possible that the properties figuring in PC are not instantiated at all. 4) PC is solely determined by the internal constitution of the subject and, therefore, internally fixed. Thus,

intrinsic duplicates necessarily have experiences with the same phenomenal character. 5) PC is causally efficacious in that it contributes to behavior and the acquisition of beliefs. 6) PC is determinate. The aim of my talk is to show that the tracking theory is not an adequate theory of phenomenal content because it cannot accommodate the aforementioned facts about phenomenal content that any adequate theory of phenomenal content should be able to account for. Moreover, I suggest that the tracking theory fails because it is externalist in spirit and delivers the wrong kind of content. Finally, I will give a short outlook what consequences these deliberations have for representationalism in general.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Martin Niederl
Date: 18:50-19:20, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005



On the Relevance of Ontological Categories

Alexander Michael Witkamp

Ontological categories are a staple of metaphysics and, to be more specific, of ontology. And yet, in spite of their timeworn position in philosophy, their precise relevance is elusive. Why do we, in truth, philosophise about ontological categories? Most recently, John Heil (2012) and Stephen French (2018) have suggested that one important theoretical role that ontological categories play is of an explanatory nature. That is, to a first approximation, ontological categories are necessary for the truth and intelligibility of scientific explanation. If there were no ontological categories, we would be, in other words, hard pressed to be able to scientifically explain anything. But it seems that this proposal suffers from at least one difficulty. Namely, it seems difficult to identify which ontological category could function as necessary for the truth and intelligibility of scientific explanation. Heil would like to insist that all entities that assume the role of the explanantia in scientific explanations belong to the category of substance, whereas French would maintain instead that all such entities belong to the category of structure. But why should it be one over the other? I will argue that the problem with identifying which

ontological category is necessary for scientific explanation is a problem that is endemic to the way we develop ontologies. As Charles B. Martin insisted, ontologies are package deals. They are delicate exercises in checks and balances, give-and-take, where we wrestle with adequate explanations of the world, while being constrained by the requirement to remain faithful to the way the universe is. This suggests that in itself it is not problematic that the same entity can be categorised into different ontological categories, as long as we have the means to decide between the ontologies to which these ontological categories belong to.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Nikolai Shurakov
Date: 11:20-11:50, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003



Critical study of Ludwig's account of institutional agency

Marcin Wozni

 The aim of my speech is to examine two critiques of Ludwig's account of collective agency. Ludwig in his book from 2016 and a series of papers argues that only individual actions are primitive actions and thus speaking about collective actions is only *façon de parler*. In the first critique I will examine, Himmelreich criticizes the method of paraphrase of action sentences which was used by Ludwig to show that it is possible to reformulate sentences about collective actions into sentences about individual actions. Roughly speaking, Ludwig argues that sentence type such as "we do X" can be read as "each of us do something which fall within X". Himmelreich claims that the procedure of paraphrase used by Ludwig is not adequate and recalls three counterexamples to prove that: discursive dilemma, China's avatar and hive minds to show that in some cases paraphrase is flawed because of causal or intentional differences between collective and individual actions, and possibility of existence of collective action without individual actions. Ludwig in his reply argues that the first example is based on oversimplification and the two others are irrelevant to his account. In another critique Blomberg tries to show that Ludwig is wrong: firstly, because that some collective actions are primitive

actions (to prove this claim Bloomberg recalls the Siamese twins case and the example of skilled joint actions); secondly, because composites of primitive actions are actions in the primary sense, which is not consistent with Ludwig's restrictive view on actions inspired by Davidson and thirdly, because Ludwig's sole agency requirement, which assumes that if some action was performed by some agent, it was performed by sole agent, is not adequate. Ludwig replies to this critique by arguing that the existence of composite action does not show that collective actions are primitive as individual actions and by defending the sole agency requirement.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Agnieszka Proszewska
Date: 14:00-14:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.003



Relational value, Intrinsic value and Instrumental value

Yunjie Zhang

he idea of relational value has been discussed in environmental education, sustainability science and environmental policy. The most popular definition is from Kai M.A. Chan: Relational values have been defined as "preferences, principles, and virtues associated with relationships, both interpersonal and as articulated by policies and social norms." Chan and other scientists questioned the traditional dichotomy between intrinsic and instrumental values in environmental ethics and proposed the concept of relational value as an alternative. I agree that, for the traditional dichotomy, the whole point of arguing for the intrinsic value of nature is to attempt to establish the legitimacy of certain moral oughts. I argue that the reason that all these moral views conflict on the issue of intrinsic value is that they focus only on individuals as bearers of value and ignore how individuals are related to each other and the value that arises from these relations. My main purpose in this paper is to propose a consistent type of value theory which will not only include the locus of non-human individuals but also eliminate the conflicts between

single individuals' value and the value of the whole of nature or biotic community.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Damiano Ranzenigo
Date: 17:30-18:00, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004



Critical study of Ludwig's account of institutional agency

Marcin Wozny

The aim of my speech is to examine two critiques of Ludwig's account of collective agency. Ludwig in his book from 2016 and a series of papers argues that only individual actions are primitive actions and thus speaking about collective actions is only *façon de parler*. In the first critique I will examine, Himmelreich criticizes the method of paraphrase of action sentences which was used by Ludwig to show that it is possible to reformulate sentences about collective actions into sentences about individual actions. Roughly speaking, Ludwig argues that sentence type such as "we do X" can be read as "each of us do something which fall within X". Himmelreich claims that the procedure of paraphrase used by Ludwig is not adequate and recalls three counterexamples to prove that: discursive dilemma, China's avatar and hive minds to show that in some cases paraphrase is flawed because of causal or intentional differences between collective and individual actions, and possibility of existence of collective action without individual actions. Ludwig in his reply argues that the first example is based on oversimplification and the two others are irrelevant to his account. In another critique Blomberg tries to show that Ludwig is wrong: firstly, because that some collective actions are primitive actions (to prove this claim Bloomberg recalls the Siamese twins case and the example of skilled joint actions); secondly, because composites of primitive actions are actions in the primary sense, which is not consistent with Ludwig's restrictive view on actions inspired by Davidson and thirdly, because Ludwig's sole agency requirement, which assumes that if some action was performed by some agent, it was performed by

sole agent, is not adequate. Ludwig replies to this critique by arguing that the existence of composite action does not show that collective actions are primitive as individual actions and by defending the sole agency requirement.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Agnieszka Proszewska
Date: 14:00-14:30, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.003



Epistemic risks and computer simulation: a case study from particle physics

Marianne van Panhuys

 In philosophy of sciences, the issue of epistemic risk is usually addressed in terms of inductive risk, focusing on the process of decision-making to accept or reject hypotheses based on empirical evidence. This topic is widely discussed in the literature on the Argument from Inductive Risk (AIR) (Steel, 2010) and mainly concerns with the role of value-laden judgements in weighing evidence to prevent from social and ethical harm.

In many sciences today, however, empirical reasoning is highly inferential as experiments rely on complex instrumented disposals. This means that there is a long process before confronting evidence to hypothesis. This process often involves an increasing use of computer simulations, may it be in life science or particle physics where computer simulations are, for example, centrally involved in the design of particle detectors and data generation. The crucial role of these computer-based practices, which are in this context precondition for empirical reasoning, call for further philosophical insight regarding risks.

In this paper, we zoom in on particle physics and aim to expand the framework of epistemic risks to particularly address the issue of computer simulation-related risks. Based on a case study from ATLAS experiment in top-quark physics we argue that there are relevant epistemic risks besides inductive ones that go beyond social and ethical impacts. The subsumption of risks under inductive ones is insufficient to address the variety of risk arising in the course of scientific inquiry

as well as to address the collaborative feature of producing scientific knowledge (Biddle & Kukla, 2017). After analyzing contingent choices made in the experimental process, we propose to frame epistemic risk as the risk to not fulfil one's epistemic aim, distinguishing between local (e.g., prediction) and global (e.g., discovery) aims. Our contribution can be understood as an attempt to locate uncertainty and risks and explicate relationships at stake.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Anđelija Milic
Date: 14:00-14:30, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006



Searching Probabilistic Difference-Making Within Specificity

Andreas Lüchinger

 The idea that good explanations come with strong changes in probabilities has been very common. This criterion is called probabilistic difference-making. Since it is an intuitive criterion and has a long tradition in the literature on scientific explanation, it comes as a surprise that this criterion is rarely discussed in the context of interventionist causal explanation. Specificity, proportionality, and stability are usually employed to measure explanatory power instead. This paper is a first step into the larger project of connecting difference-making to the interventionist debate, and it starts by investigating whether probabilistic difference-making is contained in the notion of specificity. The choice of specificity is motivated by the observation that both probabilistic difference-making and specificity build on similar underlying intuitions. When comparing measures for both specificity and probabilistic difference-making, it turns out that the measures are not strictly correlated, and so the thesis that probabilistic difference-making is encoded within specificity has to be rejected. Consequences of this result are discussed

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Anđelija Milic
Date: 14:40-15:10, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006



Cultural evolution of human cooperation

Martina Valkovic

Sooperation is central to our species' way of life, in all its domains and on a uniquely large scale. Unlike in other species, human cooperation is not limited to close kin nor is as temporally and spatially limited. It is also by no means a recent development. Biological approaches to the evolution of cooperation abound, but they are only a part of the story: there is a broad consensus on the importance of cultural inheritance and selection. I will present two groups of theories of cultural evolution: cultural evolution¹ and cultural evolution². They differ considerably between each other and within themselves, and I will argue there is a need to compare them and determine their respective places in the story of the evolution of human cooperation. On the other hand, theories from both groups need to be compared to Darwinian biological evolution, to determine which elements are shared, and if and where they go apart. The hope is that research in this area will shed light on the processes at the core of the evolution of human cooperation and the applicability of the label "Darwinian" to these theories, making an original contribution to the field of cultural evolution studies.

Section: Philosophy Science
Language: English
Chair: Daniela Schuster
Date: 16:50-17:20, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006



Expanding Causal Modelling Semantics

Giuliano Rosella

ausal Models allow us to represent the structure of a system of variables and draw inferences about causal connections among variables in the system. Pearl (2000) and Galles&Pearl (1998) have shown how to construct a semantics for counterfactuals based on causal models, call it CMS. According to CMS, a counterfactual $A > B$ is true at a causal model M , iff it is true at MA where MA is the model obtained by the intervention $do(A)$ on M , where $do(A)$ on a model M is manipulation on the structure of M that makes A true at M . However, CMS fails to assign a truth value to counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents of the form $(A \text{ or } B) > D$, since $do(A \text{ or } B)$ is not well defined.

A solution to the limited expressive power of CMS is provided by Briggs (2012). Briggs' main innovation to CMS lies in the application of Kit Fine's truthmaker semantics in order to define disjunctive interventions of the form $do(A \text{ or } B)$.

According to CMS, we can also calculate the probability of a counterfactual $A > B$ at a model M as the probability of B obtaining in the submodel generated by the intervention $do(A)$ on M . But again, in standard CMS, counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents fail to have a probability. I propose that in order to calculate the probability of such counterfactuals, we should assign a likelihood to the submodels generated by a disjunctive intervention as defined by Briggs. The intuition is that we can employ Lewis' idea of similarity among possible worlds and equip causal models with a similarity order as well; having this order, we can measure the likelihood of causal models according to their similarity: the more similar to M a model is, the more likely it is.

Eva et al. (2019) have introduced some procedures to measure the similarity distance among causal models. I propose that the likelihood of the submodels of a model M should intuitively be inversely proportional to the similarity distance from M (in the sense of Eva et al.): the more distant from M a model is, the less likely it is. So, the probability of a counterfactual $(A \text{ or } B) > B$ at M can be calculated as the sum of the probabilities that B gets assigned at each submodel of M generated by $do(A \text{ or } B)$ weighted by the likelihood of that submodel.

In conclusion, by combining Briggs' semantics with the work of Eva et al., we can expand CMS to account for the probability of counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Anđelija Milic
Date: 16:00-16:30, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006



Explaining causation in international migration with a complex-system approach

Gregorie Dupuis-Mc Donald

Sne problem in international migration stems from its causal complexity: There are many varying conditions that drive migration. Given we observe specific migration flows, it is puzzling to attribute the numbers we observe to specific economic, political, social, demographic, and environmental factors. Also, there appears to be different levels (viz. micro-, meso- and macro-level) at which causation can be operating. One can argue that causes must be attributed at the level of agents, - the micro-level, - with respect to their personal characteristics and life histories. One could also argue that causation operates at the meso-level, - the sphere where the community has direct influence on the decisions of other agents. Finally, one can defend the idea that only large-scale systemic factors can account for the specific magnitude of macro-level flows we observe. That being said, the objective of my contribution is to explain how a complex-system approach can help to make progress in the understanding of causation in migration. Since the features of complex-systems are considered to be the result of the exchanges and responses of their elements, a complex-system approach has the potential of bridging the gap between the large-scale systemic behaviour we observe and the interactions between agents from which they emerge. Accordingly, by describing typical features including causal forcings, self-organisation and collective adaptive behaviour, it can help explain why there is multi-level causation between agents, communities and general systemic behaviour. In that contribution, I explain why we can consider migration as a complex system, and I spell out what we need to theorize causation in migration with a complex-system approach. My proposal is the following: First, we need Agent-Based Models (ABMs) that represent the elements, interactions and decisions that lead to migration;

second, we need a general causal account that conceptualises the feedbacks between different levels of causation in a given system. All in all, my proposal indicates one response to the problem of causation in migration science.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Anđelija Milic
Date: 15:20-15:50, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006



Dualities and Empirical Equivalence

Kabir Bakshi



In a series of recent papers, De Haro has presented an argument for the empirical equivalence of duals in physics (i.a. De Bianchi & Keifer (eds.), *One Hundred Years of Gauge Theory* (2020:91-106); De Haro, *Erkenn* (2021)). Our aim in this paper is two-fold: a) we critically evaluate De Haro's argument and b) we introduce a new duality ("the classical double copy") into the philosophy literature. For De Haro, two theories are duals just in case that:

- there exists an isomorphism between their sets of states; and
- there exists an isomorphism between their set of quantities;
- such that the values of the quantities, dynamics, and symmetries are preserved under the isomorphisms.

De Haro argues that any two theories related thus must be empirically equivalent.

After sketching De Haro's proposal, we introduce the classical double copy with the example of the Schwarzschild copy. The Schwarzschild copy is a duality between the Schwarzschild solution in general relativity and the Coulomb solution in electromagnetism such that the metric tensor in general relativity is "copied" to the Faraday tensor in electromagnetism. We argue that the Schwarzschild copy is a duality on De Haro's account by showing that the required isomorphisms exist. Thus, De Haro must hold that the duals of the Schwarzschild copy are

empirically equivalent. But, physicists reject the claim that these duals are empirically equivalent. This raises a puzzle for De Haro. We argue that this puzzle can be solved by disambiguating the notion of empirical equivalence. We submit that the Schwarzschild copy is a case of "weak empirical equivalence" (WEE) but not of "strong empirical equivalence" (SEE) and that De Haro's construction guarantees only WEE. This, we suggest, explains away the contradictory judgements of the empirical equivalence of the double copy duals. We close by considering two options for De Haro but conclude that neither is attractive.

Section: Philosophy of Science
 Language: English
 Chair: Daniela Schuster
 Date: 18:10-18:40, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
 Location: SR 1.006



How to determine the optimal detailedness of probabilistic explanations: a defence of proportionality

Ina Jäntgen

Explanations in the special sciences like economics often refer to "high-level" features such as GDP. But are such high-level explanations better than lower-level ones providing more details, e.g., about individual consumption behaviour? What is the optimal detailedness at which to explain? In response, Woodward (2010) claims that a less detailed causal explanation is better if it is more proportional, meaning it cites a cause conveying enough and only relevant information about its explained effect.

Proportionality has been discussed primarily in deterministic contexts. Yet, the special sciences often rely on probabilistic causal relationships in their explanations. Can proportionality capture the optimal detailedness of probabilistic explanations? Kinney (2018) argues it cannot. In this talk, I defend proportionality as indicating the optimal detailedness of probabilistic explanations against Kinney's criticism.

First, I present Kinney's counterexample, purporting to illustrate that sometimes a more proportional probabilistic explanation is worse than a less proportional one. I show how this judgement stems from Kinney's criterion used to determine which probabilistic explanation is more proportional (an adaptation of Woodward (2010)).

Second, I argue that Kinney's criterion fails to determine the proportionality of probabilistic explanations. To do so, I revisit the concept of proportionality and argue that in perfectly proportional explanations there is a one-to-one mapping between the cause and the effect variable. In such a perfectly proportional explanation, I claim, a cause provides full information about its effect and vice versa. Based on these ideas, I argue for a necessary and sufficient condition for determining the proportionality of probabilistic explanations. Kinney's criterion does not satisfy this condition. Using a new criterion that I propose, I lastly show that the intuitively better explanation is the more proportional one in Kinney's example.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Daniela Schuster
Date: 18:50-19:20, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006



Spatial Separation of Magnetic Moment and Location as an Argument for a Trope-Ontological Interpretations of Quantum Field Theory

Nina Nicolin

 It has been suggested to interpret particles in quantum field theory (QFT) as bundles of tropes, see e.g. Kuhlmann (2012). Following this interpretation, neither particles nor fields strictly appear in quantum field theory anymore. This is what separates quantum field theory from e.g. classical mechanics or quantum theory. What constitutes the basic ontology of QFT? If we see tropes as the basic units, particles are “nothing but” bundles of tropes; they are constituted by particular instead of universal properties. In this reading, a “thing” (like a particle) does not “have” its properties, it is the specific combination of the properties which constitute the thing in the first place.

In this paper, I am going to argue for this very interpretation of QFT. I will present an empirical matter-wave interferometer experiment (Denkmayr et. Al. 2014), which shows that one can indeed separate a particle's properties, experimentally. This seemingly paradoxical phenomenon has also been referred to as the “Cheshire Cat”. It

indicates that when sending neutrons through a silicon crystal interferometer, while performing weak measurements in order to probe the location of the particle and its magnetic moment, the system behaves as if the neutrons go through one beam path, while their magnetic moment travels along the other.

Taking these observations seriously, it seems to be the case that what we call a “property” may exist fundamentally and independently of its particle (or at least can be isolated from it). I am going to argue that a trope theoretical interpretation of quantum particles – which sees the particles properties and not the particle itself as fundamental – is probably the most com-patible ontological interpretation of this phenomenon.

References: – Denkmayr, T. et. al. (2014): Observation of a quantum Cheshire Cat in a matter-wave interferometer experiment, *Nature Communications* 5:4492, DOI: 10.1038. – Kuhlmann, M. (2012): Interpretation der Quantenfeldtheorie, in: Esfeld, M. (ed.), *Philosophie der Physik*, Suhrkamp, Berlin.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Daniela Schuster
Date: 19:30-20:00, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006



Models, Signs and Metaphors and the Law: an Outline of a Peircean Framework

Wojciech Graboń



In modern scientific practice the role of models exceeds that of auxiliary heuristic tools, as they are a key element of research methodology and are indispensable in presenting results in an intelligible way. Models are more than mere representations and fulfill many different functions depending on the area of research and the specifics of the study. But can we say that we are actually dealing with models in jurisprudence? It seems so, taking into account the common use of this notion. It is therefore worth investigating how exactly does the concept of a model function in explanations appropriate to this particular field of social sciences. In my presentation, I will

follow Kralemann and Lattman's (2012) proposal to interpret models as a special kind of signs as understood by C.S. Peirce in order to analyse different kinds of models pertaining to the area of jurisprudence. As Weisberg (2016) suggests, in philosophical contexts modeling is usually described as surrogate reasoning based on an indirect representation of the target system. Such models can be constituted by complexes of interconnected metaphors (see Hardt, 2016). Therefore, I will pay particular attention to the Peircean category of metaphors which is characterized by particular mapping relations. Finally, I will argue that this way of describing models in jurisprudence provides a conceptual framework facilitating the application of useful notions from the field of cognitive linguistics, namely conceptual metaphors as described by Wojtczak (2017).

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Ina Jäntgen
Date: 10:00-10:30, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006



Natural Properties at the Heart of Scientific Practice

Daian Bica

 In this presentation I point out an incompatibility between the Lewisian metaphysics of natural properties and the scientific practice. I couch the argument in the terms of the perspectivist motto due to Margaret Morrison: *one property, many models* (Morrison 2011, p. 342). Within the Lewisian metaphysics of natural properties, the building blocks of the world are a mosaic mind-independent, "natural", "intrinsic" and non-modal properties (Lewis 1986, p. IX). Natural properties are related to predicates from fundamental physics, studied and investigated in scientific practice (e.g. mass, charge, momentum). The scientific knowledge of the natural properties should take the form of a *final God-Eye-View*, a *complete* description of the all natural properties.

Our argument takes the example of how scientific measurement is involved in studying mass. Scientific measurement is a sophisticated theoretical, empirical, and mathematical enterprise that relies on a

plethora of idealized, and partial models of the properties under investigation (Teller 2018, pp. 294-295). The measurement of mass involves *prima facie* two kinds of models: a classical Newtonian model in which mass is an absolute property, a mixture of inertial and gravitational mass; the relativistic model where mass is a relational property, being relative to an inertial frame.

Depending on which model we can manage to pick out, we arrive at different concepts of mass – the choice of the model depends on the interests, the aims, and the values of the agent. We find out in scientific practice a plurality of concepts of mass rather than a unique and natural property. Or, again, we arrive at multiple models with which scientists attempt to theorize about the same property. What I suggest is the Lewisan natural properties cannot account for the pluralism involved in measurement and modeling. It is far from clear whether there are unique and mind-independent natural properties out there, being given that our knowledge about the properties is relative to various scientific perspectives.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Ina Jäntgen
Date: 10:40-11:10, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006



Hume's Dialogues and Teleological Argument

Bogdana Stamenković

Arguments for God's existence appear to be an inexhaustible source of inspiration for philosophers. Some of the most famous critiques of such arguments are provided by David Hume (1711-1776) in a well-known piece entitled *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (1779, 2013). Philo, Demea, and Cleanthes discuss various philosophical arguments for God's existence. Philo is a skeptic, and some think he speaks for Hume himself. Opinions on the efficacy of his argument are divided. Some philosophers maintain Hume's criticism spoken through Philo undermines theological arguments, but others disagree.

In this paper, I use Philo's argumentation as a springboard to explore one of Hume's less-studied critiques of teleological arguments for

God's existence. A teleological argument is an a posteriori argument that, following the empirical observation of the order of the universe, concludes the order can best be explained by the existence of an intelligent and powerful creator. This type of conclusion is the target of a harsh critique in chapter VIII. Through Philo, Hume asks the following question: can we explain the observed harmony of the universe without appealing to an intelligent creator? In what follows, I go beyond Dialogues to give a Humean response to this question. First, I present Philo's argument. Moving forward, to expand on Philo's theses, I turn to Hume's theory of space in *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739, 1960) and explore his ideas of space and extension to show we can state that space is extension. Next, I analyse Hume's ideas of the whole and relation. Hume argues it is appropriate to assert the existence of the whole when there is an appropriate relation between its parts, and he regards the universe as such a whole. He emphasizes the observation of relation between extended entities includes the perception of another relation—the one between different spatial parts. In other words, the universe can be regarded as a finite spatial whole composed of definite spatial parts whose causal functioning enables the creation and maintenance of equilibrium in the universe. In effect, the role of the intelligent creator appears to be redundant.

Section: Philosophy of Religion
Language: English
Chair: Ina Jäntgen
Date: 12:00-12:30, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006



How to Get Past the Problem of God's Omniscience

Marco Hausmann

he problem of God's omniscience is as old as it is simple: The problem is that it appears, given God's omniscience, that one is only able to do something about the future, if one is able to do something about God's past beliefs. It appears, however, that nobody is able to do anything about God's past beliefs (because nobody is able to do anything about the past). It appears, therefore, that, given God's omniscience, nobody is able to do anything about the future.

The problem has led many to give up the view that God is omniscient (or even to give up the view that God exists). The aim of my paper, however, is to reject the problem by drawing attention to a so far unnoticed ambiguity in the formulation of the problem: it is not entirely clear what the phrase “the past” refers to. For while it is clear that what has already ended belongs to the past (such as the last glacial period), it is not entirely clear whether what has already started but not yet ended belongs to the past (such as the current geological epoch or the expansion of the universe). The phrase “the past” may, accordingly, either refer to something that includes that which has already started but not yet ended (to “the inclusive past” as I’ll call it), or to something that excludes that which has already started but not yet ended (to “the exclusive past” as I’ll call it).

The aim of my paper is to argue that, once we resolve the ambiguity, the problem of God’s omniscience disappears (or, at any rate, is not as severe as often supposed). For the aim of the paper is to argue that either God’s beliefs do not belong to the past (if “the past” means “the exclusive past”), or that it is false that nobody is able to do anything about the past (if “the past” means “the inclusive past”). The main idea: On the one hand, if the “the past” means “the exclusive past”, then only that which has already ended belongs to the past. God’s beliefs, however, have not ended yet. God’s beliefs, therefore, do not belong the past (if “the past” means “the exclusive past”). On the other hand, if “the past” means “the inclusive past”, then what has not ended yet (and what is, therefore, still ongoing) belongs to the past. It is false, however, that nobody is able to do anything about what is still ongoing. It is false, therefore, that nobody is able to do anything about the past (if “the past” means “the inclusive past”). Thus, once we resolve the ambiguity, the problem of God’s omniscience disappears (or, at any rate, is not as severe as often supposed).

Section: Philosophy of Religion
Language: English
Chair: Ina Jäntgen
Date: 11:20-11:50, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006



Expert patient intuition – between experience and expertise

Andjelija Milic

edicine and humanities have been dealing with a notion of an “expert patient” for quite some time now (e.g., Larson et al., 2019, Cordier, 2014, Edgar, 2005). Its oxymoronic ring entails numerous questions, but eventually they are summed to the point of: how do we really functionally incorporate such varied patient input in the treatment?

If this is to be analysed with more defintory precision, the central question to ask is: what kind of knowledge makes a formation of patient expertise? Therefore, this paper will address a particular kind of patient knowledge, sometimes called “patient intuition” (Buetow & Mintoft, 2011). Following the assumption that patient possesses both unique and subjective, but also intersubjective first-person knowledge, what remains would be not whether, but when medical practitioners should call upon such an intuition.

First, the main question is to be expanded to clearer epistemic levels where some measurement is possible. On one level, a distinction will be made between knowledge of experience and expertise. On a parallel one should come discernment between common intuition and reasoning, as two different cognitive processes. As these levels intertwine in practice, their mutual influences will be differentiated and compared to the extent to which a therapeutic significance becomes noticeable enough to be contrasted to the general value of each particular insight of one’s own well-being. Second, proposed credibility measurements can be applied in at least two cases where patient intuition could be important. 1) In cases of chronic illnesses, where there is enough time to observe, learn, and develop internal patterns of change. In experts, judgement is usually considered to be more reliable if it is formed through the events showing higher regularity in occurrence. It is important to see how this applies to the expert patient (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). 2) In situations where not enough data on the illness is present. Patient intuitions help better frame various contested illnesses, and also possibly help bring effectiveness and efficacy closer (Francis et al., 2018, Worrall, 2010, Cartwright, 2011).

The framework suggested above entails a substantial change in a life perspective, at least in chronic illnesses. More specifically, this leads to highlighting the domains of intuition and reasoning on epistemological

levels which recognise the degree of regularity of events. From there, the development of awareness and patterns which give “expertise” a supplementary meaning can be traced in a patient, which shows the possibility of establishing certain points of communication of even the most subjective experiences. This then should serve as a tangible point in defining “expert patient” beyond a still largely indefinite description of “having special knowledge and skills” (Badcott, 2005).

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Daniela Schuster
Date: 17:30-18:00, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006

