

SOPhiA

8th Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy

2017



Programme and Abstracts

Organisation: Department of Philosophy
University of Salzburg
Date: September 13–15, 2017
Venue: University of Salzburg
Unipark, Erzabt-Klotz-Straße 1, 5020 Salzburg
Languages: English and German
Website: <http://www.sophia-conference.org/>

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Preface

 In recent years the opportunities for keeping track of science-business for students of philosophy have increased. The raising number of essay competitions and graduate conferences support this claim.



In 2017, the Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy is, once again, joining the midst of these events. The title of the conference already reveals some details about the organisers, the contributors and the conference's guiding principles. To avoid misunderstandings, we want to add the following remarks: (i) Because of the high number of international participants, 'Salzburg' stands for the location of the conference only. (ii) One of the conference's distinctive features compared to similar events is that we do not make any constraints regarding the topic of presentations. (iii) On the contrary, every philosophical discipline – as long as it is carried out in an analytic way – has its place at SOPhiA.



By combining (ii) and (iii) we want to demonstrate, in contrast to some voices which claim that Analytic Philosophy constrains our intellectual life, that all traditional topics can be advantageously examined in Analytic Philosophy. It is our utmost concern to unite analytic philosophers from all around the world (cf. (i)). This is also in the sense of Carnap, who claims in his early work *The Logical Structure of the World*:



“The new type of philosophy has arisen in close contact with the work of the special sciences, especially mathematics and physics. Consequently they have taken the strict and responsible orientation of the scientific investigator as their guideline for philosophical work, while the attitude of the traditional philosopher is more like that of a poet. This new attitude not only changes the style of thinking but also the

type of problem that is posed. The individual no longer undertakes to erect in one bold stroke an entire system of philosophy. Rather, each works at his special place within the one unified science.”



In spirit of this motto, we wish you an interesting conference, fruitful discussions and stimulating thoughts.

The Organising Committee



The Organising Committee:

Albert J. J. Anglberger, Simone Badergruber, Christian J. Feldbacher, Alexander Gebharter, Markus Hierl, Laurenz Hudetz, Sebastian Krempelmeier, Pascale Lötscher, Stefanie Orter, Tobias Wagner

Special thanks to our sponsors:



General Information

TIMEFRAME AND GENERAL INFORMATION. From September 13–15 2017 the eighth Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy (SOPhiA 2017) will be held at the University of Salzburg’s Department of Philosophy (Humanities). The conference is public and attending it is free of charge. The official languages of the conference are English and German. Contributed talks will be given by philosophy students (pre-doc). The conference is hosted by members of the University of Salzburg’s Department of Philosophy (Humanities). The organisers can be contacted via organization@sophia-conference.org.



MISSION STATEMENT. In the conference, problems of all areas of philosophy should be discussed. The conference has no specific topic. The presentations should rather set themselves apart by a methodological limitation to the tradition of Analytic Philosophy by usage of clear language and comprehensible arguments. The conference is meant to be a common effort to clearly formulate and critically assess some of the problems of philosophy. No individual is expected to construct “a whole building of philosophy” all by himself; rather, the conference hosts expect everyone, as Carnap proposes, to bring the undertaking forward “at his specific place within” philosophy.



PROCEDURE. The speakers are from institutions of the following 20 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, China, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA. There are three types of talks:

Plenary talks: held by invited speakers

Workshop talks: held by invited speakers

Contributed talks: held by student speakers

INVITED SPEAKERS.

- Johannes L. Brandl (University of Salzburg, Austria): *Why Language Matters for Self-Awareness: The Conceptual and the Narrative Route*
- Christian List (London School of Economics, UK): *Free Will as a Higher-Level Phenomenon*
- Michela Massimi (University of Edingburg, UK): *What is Perspectival Pluralism?*
- Stathis Psillos (University of Athens, Greece): *Laws and Powers in the Frame of Nature*

WORKSHOP SPEAKERS.

Affiliated Workshop: *Grounding in and after Bolzano*

- Arianna Betti (University of Amsterdam) & Pauline van Wierst (Scuola Normale Superiore Pisa): *Bolzano in Ones and Zeros: A quantitative study in 19th century philosophy of mathematics*
- Jan Claas (University of Hamburg): *Grounding the Scope of Philosophy*
- Edgar Morscher (University of Salzburg): *The Axiomatization of Bolzano's Theory of Abfolge: An Exercise in "Rational Reconstruction"*
- Stefan Roski (University of Hamburg): *Fundamental Truths and the PSR in Bolzano's Theory of Grounding*

Affiliated Workshop: *Modeling Physical Reality*

- Florian Boge (BU Wuppertal): *Simulation Models and Uncertain Reasoning*
- Miguel Carretero (BU Wuppertal): *Modeling long-scale behavior in galactic and extra-galactic systems – The parameters of the Λ CDM model*
- Laurenz Hudetz (University of Salzburg): *What Makes Mathematical Structures Models?*
- Niels Martens (RWTH Aachen): *From Models to Reality: A Plea for Caution*

- Nina Retzlaff (HHU Düsseldorf): *A New Proposal how to Handle Counterexamples to Markov Causation à la Cartwright, or: Fixing the Chemical Factory*
- Paul Weingartner (University of Salzburg): *A Defense for Pluralism of Causality in Physical Explanations*
- Charlotte Werndl (University of Salzburg): *The Neglect of Initial Conditions Dependence and Initial Conditions Uncertainty in Climate Science*

Affiliated Workshop: *Probabilistic Approaches to (Prototype) Concepts*

- Simon De Deyne (University of Adelaide): *Turn the tables: Using word associations to evaluate to what degree text-based distributional semantics capture meaning in the mental lexicon.*
- Annika Schuster & Corina Strößner (HHU Düsseldorf): *Prototype Frames*
- Peter Sutton (HHU Düsseldorf): *Prototypes as Bayesian Networks*
- Marta Sznajder (Czech Academy of Sciences): *Reasoning with Conceptual Spaces: Towards a Bayesian Model*

Affiliated Workshop: *The Power to Change*

- Kristina Engelhard (University of Cologne): *[Title to be announced]*
- Florian Fischer (University of Bonn): *What's this Hip New Thing Called Produrance*
- Beate Krickel (Ruhr-University Bochum): *Activity Causation in Mechanisms*
- John Pemberton (LSE & University of Oxford): *Paradigms of Change*
- Thorben Petersen (University of Bremen): *What is a Theory of Persistence*
- Peter Simons (Trinity College Dublin): *Keep Going: The Motor of Persistence*
- Manfred Stöckler (University of Bremen): *Description of Change in a Quantum Theory*

Affiliated Workshop: *Values in Research: Problems for Philosophy of Science, Moral Philosophy and Policy making*

- Frauke Albersmeier (HHU Düsseldorf): *Terminology as the Achilles' Heel of Value-Neutral Science*
- Alexander Christian (HHU Düsseldorf): *The Vice of Virtues – Virtue-Based Research Ethics and the Problem of Moral Luck*
- Matthis Krischel (HHU Düsseldorf): *The Value(s) of Nazi Medicine*
- Jürgen Landes (MCMP): *The Philosophy of Pharmacology and Evidence for Causal Assessment*
- Julia Mirkin & Jan Felix Wieloch (HHU Düsseldorf): *Disease Mongering: An Analysis of its Methods and Mechanisms*

Schedule

13 September 2017 (Wednesday)

Time	Location				
	SR 1.003	SR 1.004	SR 1.005	SR 1.006	SR 1.007
09:00-13:00	Affiliated Workshop Frauke Albersmeier & Alexander Christian & Matthias Krischel & Jürgen Landes & Julia Mirkin & Jan Felix Wieloch <i>Values in Research: Problems for Philosophy of Science, Moral Philosophy and Policy making</i> Chair: Frauke Albersmeier & Alexander Christian	Affiliated Workshop Kristina Engelhard & Florian Fischer & Beate Krickel & John Pemberton & Thorben Petersen & Peter Simons & Manfred Stöckler <i>The Power to Change</i> Chair: Florian Fischer & Thorben Petersen	Affiliated Workshop Simon De Deyne & Annika Schuster & Corina Strößner & Peter Sutton & Marta Sznajder <i>Probabilistic Approaches to (Prototype) Concepts</i> Chair: Annika Schuster & Corina Strößner	Affiliated Workshop Arianna Betti & Jan Claas & Edgar Morscher & Stefan Roski & Pauline van Wierst <i>Grounding in and after Bolzano</i> Chair: Jan Claas & Antje Rumberg	Affiliated Workshop Florian Boge & Miguel-Ángel Carretero-Sahuquillo & Laurenz Hudetz & Niels Martens & Nina Retzlaff & Paul Weingartner & Charlotte Werndl <i>Modeling Physical Reality</i> Chair: Florian Boge
13:00-14:15	Lunch Break				
14:15-14:30	Opening and Best Paper Award				
14:30-16:00	Plenary Lecture Stathis Psillos <i>Laws and Powers in the Frame of Nature</i> Chair: Alexander Gebharter (English, Location: HS E.002)				
16:00-16:15	Coffee Break				
16:15-16:45	Affiliated Workshop Frauke Albersmeier & Alexander Christian & Matthias Krischel & Jürgen Landes & Julia Mirkin & Jan Felix Wieloch <i>Values in Research: Problems for Philosophy of Science, Moral Philosophy and Policy making</i> Chairs: Frauke Albersmeier & Alexander Christian	Affiliated Workshop Kristina Engelhard & Florian Fischer & Beate Krickel & John Pemberton & Thorben Petersen & Peter Simons & Manfred Stöckler <i>The Power to Change</i> Chairs: Florian Fischer & Thorben Petersen	Epistemology Chair: Markus Hierl Franziska Poprawe <i>Reasons and Reasoning</i>	Philosophy of Science Chair: Gregor Greslehner Jan Philip Vogelsang <i>Empirical Science and Pseudoscience - "Fairytalscience" distorts empirical scientific methods.</i> (in German)	Ethics Chair: Zsolt Ziegler Farbod Akhlaghi-Ghaffarokh <i>Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth, and Existence</i>
16:50-17:20			Luca Zanetti <i>On the Explanation Provided by T-Biconditionals and the Like</i>	David Hopf <i>State of the Art Bias</i>	Walter Veit <i>Why Humeans are committed to Moral Nihilism</i>
17:25-17:55			Yao Niu <i>A Slingshot Argument against truth-maker solution</i>	Birgit Benzing <i>Choosing Methods in Animal Welfare Science: Entanglements Between Ideals and Good Practice</i>	Michael Brückner <i>Here's One Normative Truth, and Here's Another: Evolutionary Debunking and Moorean Facts</i>
18:00-18:30			Felipe Morales <i>Knowing How I Can and Counterfactual Success</i>	Sydney Katherine Green <i>The Russo-Williamson Thesis and Its Implications for Psychiatry</i>	Katharina Anna Sodoma <i>Metaethical Contextualism and the Problem(s) of Lost Disagreement</i>
18:30	Warm evening buffet				

14 September 2017 (Thursday)

Time	Location				
	SR 1.003	SR 1.004	SR 1.005	SR 1.006	SR 1.007
09:30-11:00	Plenary Lecture Michela Massimi <i>What is Perspectival Pluralism?</i> Chair: Christian Feldbacher-Escamilla (Location: HS E.002)				
11:00-11:15	Short Break				
	Metaphysics and Ontology Chair: Zach Johnson	Philosophy of Mind Chair: Alexander Gebharter	Epistemology Chair: Andrea Togni	History of Philosophy Chair: Lucas Battich	Ethics Chair: Noelle Rohde
11:15-11:45	Ali Abasnezhad <i>Vague Objects, Classical Logic and Standard Mereology</i>	Laura Machado do Nascimento <i>The radical enactive cognition approach to Phenomenality</i>	Thomas Mitchell <i>Is it rational to believe that I am wrong? A critical discussion of the Preface Paradox</i>	Artur Kosecki <i>Deflationism in Metaphysics. The Analysis of Carnap's, Ajdukiewicz's and Quine's Views</i>	Matilde Liberti <i>Action-guidance in Aristotelian Ethics</i>
11:50-12:20	Tomi Francis <i>The Contingent Brutalist Response to the Special Composition Question</i>	Christoffer Skogholt <i>Jaegwon Kim's Solution to the mind-body problem: Terminal or Terminological?</i>	Paul Conlan <i>Rational Self Doubt, Disagreement and Closure Principles</i>	Kyrke Otto <i>The Aftermath of the Quine-Carnap Dispute: A Pyrrhic Victory Called into Question</i>	Daniel Matthias Mayerhoffer <i>Predatory Publishers targeting Graduates -- an Ethical Evaluation</i>
12:25-12:55	Benjamin Neeser <i>Persistence and Explanation</i>	Jessica Struchhold <i>Immunity to Error through Misidentification and Episodic Memory (in German)</i>	Weng Kin San <i>How to Revise Credences in Light of Disagreement</i>	Alan Daboin <i>The Status of Transcendental Logic in the Critique of Pure Reason</i>	Franziska Paulmann <i>The Collective Duty to Aid Non-Citizens (in German)</i>
13:00-14:30	Lunch Break				
	Metaphysics and Ontology Chair: Kyrke Otto	Philosophy of Mind Chair: Christian Feldbacher	Epistemology Chair: Franziska Poprawe	Philosophy of Science Chair: Birgit Benzing	Ethics Chair: Katharina Anna Sodoma
14:30-15:00	Julian Husmann <i>Naturalized Metaphysics as Second-Level Explanation. How Metaphysics can explain Scientific Ontologies</i>	Maik Niemeck <i>First-Person Thought and Rational Action</i>	Sara Ipakchi <i>Are Moore's propositions the Foundation of our Belief-System? (in German)</i>	Karim Baraghith <i>The Problem of Speciation in the Cultural Evolution of Signaling Systems</i>	Jiwon Kim <i>Ethics: Carving Humanity at Its Joints</i>
15:05-15:35	Lucas Battich <i>Carnap's Deflationary Metaontology and the Internal-External Distinction</i>	Matias Osta Velez <i>Styles of Reasoning and Modularity in Scientific Cognition</i>	Lukas Lang <i>Common Sense and Rationality</i>	Gregor Greslehner <i>The "Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics" in Biology and the Fallacy from Complexity</i>	Jonas Blatter <i>Ana's Norm: A Model Case of Fitting Attitudes</i>
15:40-16:10	Zach Johnson <i>The Hological Method: Principles of Carnapian Explication Transposed to Philosophical Claims at Large</i>	Marie Michon <i>Emotions as Cognitive Products: The Case of Fear.</i>	Max Timo Goetsch <i>Conflict-Undermining Anti-Skeptical Strategies</i>	Urška Martinc <i>The Problems of Crosscutting and Folk Categories in Biology</i>	Zsolt Ziegler <i>Closest Cases of Particularism: Moral Luck Disqualified</i>
16:15-16:45		Przemyslaw Zawadzki <i>Dispute over an Epistemological Status of Thought Experiments: Platonism, Empiricism and Mental models.</i>	Andrea Togni <i>How many Olfactory Senses do Humans have?</i>	Victor Lefèvre <i>Admitting Teleology in Nature: An Organizational View of Ecosystem Functions</i>	Noelle Rohde <i>Quantificational Discrimination and Epistemic Injustice</i>
16:45-17:00	Coffee Break				
17:00-18:30	Plenary Lecture Johannes L. Brandl <i>Why Language Matters for Self-Awareness: The Conceptual and the Narrative Route</i> Chair: Albert Anglberger (Location: HS E.002)				
18:30	Dinner: on your own				

15 September 2017 (Friday)

Time	Location					
	HS E.002	SR 1.003	SR 1.004	SR 1.005	SR 1.006	SR 1.007
	Philosophy of Law Chair: Florian Wieczorek	Metaphysics and Ontology Chair: Tomi Francis	Philosophy of Mind Chair: Franz Altner	Philosophy of Language Chair: Andrea Raimondi	Philosophy of Science Chair: Samantha Hirshland	Ethics Chair: Jonas Blatter
10:00-10:30	Szymon Mazurkiewicz <u>Metaphysical Grounding in Foundations of Human Rights</u>	Fernando Furtado <u>Invalidating strategies of dealing with Chisholm's Paradox</u>	Sergio De Souza Filho <u>The constancy mechanism proposal for the Limits of Intentionality</u>	Till Gallasch <u>The Gray's Elegy Argument: Can Definite Descriptions be Singular Terms?</u>	Damian Luty <u>Is there a Field-Theoretic Argument for spacetime structuralism?</u>	Victor Mardellat <u>"Why be moral?" Scanlon on morality and normativity</u>
10:35-11:05	Filip Golba <u>Objectivity of Adjudication and Metaethics</u>	Karol Lenart <u>Essentialism, Haecceitism and Possibilities</u>	Maria Matuszkiewicz <u>An Argument for a minimal mental internalism</u>	Natalia Karczewska <u>Experiential subjectivity</u>	Marta Emilia Bielińska <u>Laws of Nature in Branching Time</u>	Alexander Heape <u>Scanlon on Blame and the Moral Relationship</u>
11:10-11:40	Maciej Juzaszek <u>Legal Moralism and Jonathan Haidt's Durkheimian Utilitarianism</u>	Áron Dombrovski <u>From Fictional Characters to Possible Worlds</u>	Christopher Badura <u>Imagining Negative Existentials</u>	Szilvia Finta <u>BY SHIP, BuY a SHIP or an eBay SHoP? Lessons from the Language of Hebrew Scripture for Contemporary Theories of Metaphor</u>	Nina Retzlaff <u>Another Counterexample to Markov Causation from Quantum Mechanics: Single Photon Experiments and the Mach-Zehnder Interferometer</u>	Korbinian Rüger <u>The Unwelcome Implications of Ex Ante Contractualism</u>
11:45-12:15		Petter Sandstad <u>Ryle's Conditional Analysis of Dispositions</u>	Alireza Bani Sadr <u>Action and Perception-Sensation Distinction in Tactile Experience</u>		Eirini Georgiou Mandopoulou <u>Dispositional Properties in Physics</u>	Dorothee Bleisch <u>Publicity as a criterion for moral theories? -- An investigation into the possibility of self-effacing moral theories</u>
12:15-14:00	Lunch Break					
	Logic & Philosophy of Mathematics Chair: Stefan Forster	Metaphysics and Ontology Chair: Petter Sandstad	Action Theory Chair: Albert Anglberger	Philosophy of Language Chair: Till Gallasch	Philosophy of Science Chair: Laurenz Hudetz	Political Philosophy Chair: Maciej Juzaszek
14:00-14:30	Sara Ayhan <u>Proof-theoretic Semantics and Paradoxes</u>	George Stamets <u>In Defense of a "Mixed View" about Powers and Properties</u>	Marta Zareba <u>The Simple View and the Problem of Action Individuation</u>	Andrea Raimondi <u>Semantic Facts and Oughts</u>	Agnieszka Proszewska <u>Is Semantic Structuralism Necessarily "Set-Theoretical" Structuralism?</u>	Florian Wieczorek <u>Three Building Blocks of Real Public Reason</u>
14:35-15:05	Paul Hasselkuß <u>Aesthetic Values in Mathematical Inquiry</u> (in German)	Bogdan Andrei Dumitrescu <u>Freedom and causality in the Block Universe</u>	Jay Jian <u>Agency, Instrumental Rationality, and the Hierarchy of Desires</u>	Rares Fogas <u>Two Dogmas of Saul Kripke (Concerning Language) and a Solution to His Puzzle</u>	Theodore Stone <u>Modelling Science Through Make-Believe</u>	Charlotte Franziska Unruh <u>The Populist Challenge to Public Reason Liberalism</u>
15:10-15:40	Hans Robin Solberg <u>Abductive Reasoning in Mathematics and the Multiverse of Sets</u>	Elton Marques <u>A Thought Experiment about Demons</u>	David Heering <u>Reasons-Responsiveness and Rational Blind Spots</u>	Matej Drobnák <u>Quine on Shared Language and Linguistic Communities</u>	Samantha Hirshland <u>A Critique of Longino's Theory Choice Justifications</u>	Maximilian Fenner <u>Is Perfectionism a Reasonable Alternative to the Neutrality Thesis?</u>
15:45-16:15			Franz Altner <u>Persistence of Intention -- Rationality of Reconsideration</u>		Eser Bakdur & Michael Poznic <u>The Alleged Distinction between Cognitive and Epistemic Values: The Case of Simplicity</u>	Nathan Wood <u>Deploying Racist Soldiers: A Critical Take on the Right Intention Requirement of Just War Theory</u>
16:15-16:30	Coffee Break					
16:30-18:00	Plenary Lecture Christian List <u>Free Will as a Higher-Level Phenomenon</u> Chair: Laurenz Hudetz (Location: HS E.002)					
18:00-	Closing Dinner (Restaurant)					

Plenary Talks

Why Language Matters for Self-Awareness: The Conceptual and the Narrative Route

Johannes L. Brandl

 language can be used for communication but also in cognition when one forms discursive thoughts. That observation leads to the suggestion that language may also have a formative influence on our reflective self-awareness. But how exactly should we understand that influence? In this talk I will examine two routes one can take in answering that question. The first line takes its inspiration from the idea that one acquires a self-concept by acquiring the competence to use the first-person pronoun. This proposal has much to be said for it, but it also has its limits. It leaves us in the dark about the way in which a linguistic self-concept differs from a self-file or a self-notion that may be constructed without employing linguistic means. The question then arises whether we can do better by following a second line. According to the narrative approach, self-awareness takes a reflective turn when one learns to see oneself as the protagonist in a story. I will argue that the idea of a “narrative self” can be developed without implying strong - and implausible - claims about self-constitution that are often associated with this idea.

Section: Plenary
Language: English
Chair: Albert Anglberger
Date: 17:00–18:30, September 14th 2017 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002

Free Will as a Higher-Level Phenomenon

Christian List

It has become increasingly common – especially in popular-science media – to suggest that free will is an illusion. Typically, people argue: free will requires property P , where P might be one or several of the following: intentional agency, alternative possibilities, or mental causation. But then they claim that physics, or some other fundamental science, shows that there is no such thing as P ; P is a relic of a folk-psychological way of thinking. And so, it seems, there is no free will. I will argue that this line of reasoning is incorrect. It may well be true that there is no such thing as property P at the fundamental physical level. But this does not imply that there is no free will. Free will, I suggest, is a higher-level-phenomenon. If we are looking for free will and its prerequisites at the physical level, we are looking in the wrong place.

Section: Plenary
Language: English
Chair: Laurenz Hudetz
Date: 16:30–18:00, September 15th 2017 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002

What is Perspectival Pluralism?

Michela Massimi

 pluralism has attracted a lot of attention in recent decades in philosophy of science. Several varieties of pluralism have been proposed. In this paper, I present one variety that in my view deserves more attention. Building on Ron Giere, I call it “perspectival pluralism”. In the talk, I present the problems it faces and ways of addressing them.

Section: Plenary
Language: English
Chair: Christian Feldbacher-Escamilla
Date: 09:30–11:00, September 14th 2016 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002

Laws and Powers in the Frame of Nature

Stathis Psillos

 The aim of this talk is to revisit the current debate concerning laws of nature and natural powers in light of a re-assessment of the major relevant arguments during the seventeenth century debate. I will revive and defend what I take it to be an essentially Newtonian argument, viz., that to introduce a natural power is to introduce a law and conversely. I will then show how this dual-aspect metaphysics of laws and powers helps us understand better the current debate about natural necessity and to re-conceptualise the relation between laws and powers in the current metaphysics of science.

Section: Plenary
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Gebharter
Date: 14:30–16:00, September 13th 2017 (Wednesday)
Location: HS E.002

Workshops

Grounding in and after Bolzano

Arianna Betti & Jan Claas & Edgar Morscher & Stefan Roski & Pauline van Wierst

Section: Affiliated Workshop

Language: English

Chair: Jan Claas & Antje Rumberg

Date: 09:00–13:00, September 13th 2017 (Wednesday)

Location: HS SR 1.006

Schedule

- | | |
|-------------|--|
| 09:00–09:50 | Jan Claas: <i>Grounding the Scope of Philosophy</i> |
| 10:00–10:50 | Arianna Betti & Pauline van Wierst: <i>Bolzano in Ones and Zeros: A quantitative study in 19th century philosophy of mathematics</i> |
| 10:50–11:10 | Coffee break |
| 11:10–12:00 | Edgar Morscher: <i>The Axiomatization of Bolzano's Theory of Abfolge: An Exercise in "Rational Reconstruction"</i> |
| 12:10–13:00 | Stefan Roski: <i>Fundamental Truths and the PSR in Bolzano's Theory of Grounding</i> |



Abstracts

Arianna Betti (Amsterdam) and Pauline van Wierst (Pisa): Bolzano in Ones and Zeros: A quantitative study in 19th century philosophy of mathematics

 In previous work (Wierst et al. 2016) we have shown that the application of even rather simple, well-known computational techniques to Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre* can yield valuable results. In this talk we extend our computational investigation to three open questions in the interpretation of Bolzano's thought.

The first and the second question concern epochal turns in the history of scientific ideas. The first question regards Bolzano's notion of infinity. According to Jan Berg (in Bolzano 1975), four months before his death Bolzano threw overboard his whole life's work on the infinite, and accepted the Cantorian criterion of 1-1 correspondence as a sufficient criterion for equality of size. According to Mancosu (2009), this can only be partially true: he might have accepted the Cantorian view in the arithmetical context, but not in the geometrical context.

The second question regards the emergence of a radically objective account of the concept of a scientific statement in terms of a mind-independent, language-independent and time-independent entity, known to present-day philosophers as a proposition (more specifically, a Fregean proposition). The majority of scholars holds that it was Bolzano to take this turn and introduce *Sätze an sich* as propositions in this sense, while a minority denies he did (e.g. Cantù 2006).

The third and final question regards the uniformity of Bolzano's notion of grounding (*Abfolge*). Some scholars have conjectured that Bolzano's well-known difficulty with the definition of *Abfolge* is due to his conflation of different notions (Betti 2010). Indeed Bolzano's examples of grounding are so various that it seems unlikely that there can be one notion of grounding which works for all. The majority of scholars however seem to assume that Bolzano's notion of grounding is uniform.

In this paper we endeavour to provide new quantitative evidence to help assessing these three open questions by relying on text-mining software developed by our team to the specific goal of aiding philosophers in the analysis of unusually extended textual corpora.

References

- Betti, Arianna. 2010. “Explanation in Metaphysics and Bolzano’s Theory of Ground and Consequence.” *Logique et Analyse* 211: 281-316.
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- Cantù, Paola. 2006. *Bolzano et les propositions en soi: une théorie objective des vérités*. In *Propositions et états de choses*, ed. J. Benoist. Paris: Vrin.
- Mancosu, Paolo. 2009. “Measuring the size of infinite collections of natural numbers: was Cantor’s theory of infinite number inevitable?” *The Review of Symbolic Logic* 2: 612-646.
- Wierst, Pauline van, Sanne Vrijenhoek, Stefan Schlobach, and Arianna Betti. 2016. *Phil@Scale: Computational Methods within Philosophy*. In *Proceedings of the Third Conference on Digital Humanities in Luxembourg with a Special Focus on Reading Historical Sources in the Digital Age*. CEUR Workshop Proceedings, CEUR-WS.org, edited by Lars Wieneke, Catherine Jones, Marten Düring, Florentina Armaselu, and René Leboutte. Vol. 1681. Aachen.

Jan Claas (Hamburg): Grounding the Scope of Philosophy

ot only does Bolzano develop a detailed theory of grounding. In the short piece *Was ist Philosophie?* from 1839 he also applies the notion in order to define what philosophy is. He thereby provides us with a necessary and sufficient condition for an investigation being a philosophical one. An investigation is philosophical, we are told, if and only if it is either an investigation into the consequences and effects of given grounds and causes or an investigation into the grounds and causes of given consequences and effects. The aim of my talk is to scrutinize this definition. I will focus on the necessary condition provided and a salient counterexample Bolzano briefly considers. Conceptual analysis appears to be a genuinely philosophical endeavour while, at first glance, it does not seem to be concerned with grounds and consequences or causes and effects. Addressing this worry, Bolzano appeals to something

he takes to be closely related to conceptual analysis, namely investigating the ways in which mental states with complex contents arise in us. I will exposit the tight connection Bolzano assumes between mental states and their contents in the *Theory of Science* (1837) and assess to which extent this connection can be used in order to rule out conceptual analysis as counterexample against Bolzano's definition.

The Axiomatization of Bolzano's Theory of *Abfolge*: an Exercise in "Rational Reconstruction"

Bolzano presented his informal theory of *Abfolge* in admirable clarity in his *Wissenschaftslehre*, §§ 198–222. A theory is hereby understood as a deductively closed set of sentences. In order to rationally reconstruct an informal theory, we have to make three substantial decisions: *first*, we have to fix the formal language within which we are going to reconstruct the theory in question; *second*, we must decide about the primitive term(s) which we take as the basis of the vocabulary in our reconstruction language; and *third*, we have to choose the primitive theses, i.e. axioms or postulates, on which we base the theory in its reconstructed form. As far as a rational reconstruction of Bolzano's theory of *Abfolge* is concerned, I propose to answer the three questions in the following way: (1) As my language of reconstructions I take the language of modern quantification logic, augmented with a consistent segment of modern set theory (and not, as some would like to have it, the language of Bolzano's theory of collections or *Inbegriffe*). (2) The primitive term on which I base the vocabulary of my language of reconstruction will be the 2-place predicate ' M is the complete ground of N ', where M and N are sets of (true) propositions (*Sätze an sich*) and N is a partial or the complete consequence of M (and not, as some would like to have it, the 2-place predicate ' M is the complete ground of P ' where P is a single true proposition). (3) For my reconstruction I choose six postulates which determine the formal properties of the grounding relation (among them are not, as some would like to have it, special instances of the *Abfolge* relation such as 'For every proposition P : P is the complete ground of [P has truth]'). In my contribution I will explain why I make these decisions. In doing so, the focus of my interest turns from Bolzano's theory of *Abfolge* to the method of rational reconstruction for which Bolzano's theory serves as an illustrative example.

Fundamental Truths and the PSR in Bolzano's Theory of Grounding (joint work with Benjamin Schnieder)

Bernard Bolzano is often credited with developing the first rigorous theory of grounding in his main work *Theory of Science* (1837). One of the motivations to develop this theory was his concern with the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) that, due to the influence of rationalism, was widely endorsed in his time. Against the background of his theory of grounding, Bolzano was in the position to point out that a number of arguments for this principle were wanting. In addition to that, he also developed original arguments to show that the PSR is false. In our talk we will investigate those arguments and show that one of them is of considerable systematic interest for the contemporary debate on grounding and fundamentality.



Modeling Physical Reality

Florian Boge & Miguel-Ángel Carretero-Sahuquillo & Laurenz Hudetz & Niels Martens & Nina Retzlaff & Paul Weingartner & Charlotte Werndl

Section: Affiliated Workshop
Language: English
Chair: Florian Boge
Date: 09:00-13:00, 13 September 2017 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.007

Schedule

09:00–09:10 Florian Boge: *General Introduction*
09:15–09:50 Charlotte Werndl: *The Neglect of Initial Conditions Dependence and Initial Conditions Uncertainty in Climate Science*
09:50–10:20 Niels Martens: *From Models to Reality: A Plea for Caution*
10:25–10:55 Paul Weingartner: *A Defense for Pluralism of Causality in Physical Explanations*
10:55–11:10 Coffee break
11:10–11:40 Miguel Carretero: *Modeling long-scale behavior in galactic and extra-galactic systems – The parameters of the Λ CDM model*
11:45–12:15 Nina Retzlaff: *A New Proposal how to Handle Counterexamples to Markov Causation à la Cartwright, or: Fixing the Chemical Factory*
12:20–12:50 Laurenz Hudetz: *What Makes Mathematical Structures Models?*
12:55–13:25 Florian Boge: *Simulation Models and Uncertain Reasoning*



Abstracts

Charlotte Werndl (Salzburg): The Neglect of Initial Conditions Dependence and Initial Conditions Uncertainty in Climate Science

Whe talk examines initial conditions dependence and initial conditions uncertainty for climate projections. Climate projections are often described as experiments that do not depend on the initial conditions and that estimate the forced response of the system. Although a prominent claim, it is hardly ever scrutinized, and this talk aims to fill this gap. The conclusion will be that evidence does not support the independence of projections on initial conditions and that thus the forced response of a system is ill-defined. Concerning initial conditions uncertainty, the main contribution will be to identify three kinds of initial conditions uncertainty. The first kind (the one usually discussed) is the uncertainty associated with the spread of the ensemble simulations. The second kind of initial conditions uncertainty arises because the theoretical initial ensemble (relative to which a projection is defined) cannot be used in calculations and has to be approximated by finitely many initial states. The third kind of initial conditions uncertainty arises because of uncertainties in the construction process of the possible initial conditions. To my knowledge, the second and third kinds of uncertainty have hardly been discussed in the philosophy of climate science before.

Niels Martens (Aachen): From Models to Reality: A Plea for Caution

Whe philosophy of physics literature is riddled with examples that trivialize reading off the physical content from a set of (symmetry-related) models of a theory. For instance, the claim that, since a velocity boost forms a symmetry mapping between models of Newtonian Gravity, Newton should have immediately renounced belief in absolute velocities, even though a revised theory formulated merely in terms of relative velocities was not available until much later. I disagree. I will follow a recent trend inspired by Møller-Nielsen in advocating caution when drawing immediate metaphysical conclusions from (symmetries of) models of a theory. I will illustrate several pitfalls using as a case study models of Newtonian Gravity related by (mass) scaling transformations.

Paul Weingartner (Salzburg): A Defense for Pluralism of Causality in Physical Explanations

St will be shown in this talk that a pluralism of causality is needed. Not only, as might be expected, for such different domains as natural sciences and humanities, but even within the domain of physics different causal relations are necessary. This will be illustrated with examples of physical explanations in different domains of physics like Classical Mechanics, Special Relativity, Thermodynamics and Quantum Mechanics. It will be shown that in these different explanations the causal relations have to have different properties.

Miguel Carretero (Wuppertal): Modeling long-scale behavior in galactic and extra-galactic systems – The parameters of the Λ CDM model

The so-called Standard Model of Cosmology or Λ CDM has been enjoying great successes during the last decades. Based on the assumption of a cold dark matter particle and the effect of the dark energy, which together conform the 96% of the total energy content of the known universe, the model has been able to reproduce the long-scale behavior in galactic and extra-galactic systems as well as offering a plausible depiction of the universe's evolution. However, it depends on six free-parameters that are usually regarded by some as a weakness since they have to be chosen carefully. In addition, modeling different systems involves the necessity of choosing, for instance, different distribution profiles in order to make the model fit with the data. How do we reconcile this freedom with some of the *existence claims* cosmologists hold, for instance, the existence of dark matter or dark energy?

Nina Retzlaff (Düsseldorf): A New Proposal how to Handle Counterexamples to Markov Causation à la Cartwright, or: Fixing the Chemical Factory

rtwright (1999) attacked the causal Markov condition (CMC) by providing a counterexample in which a common cause does not screen off its effects: the chemical factory. We suggest a new way to handle counterexamples to CMC such as Cartwright's. We argue that these scenarios feature non-causal dependencies of a certain kind. We then develop a representation of this specific kind of non-causal dependence that allows for modeling the problematic scenarios in such a way that CMC is not violated anymore and compare our solution to a recent proposal how to handle the problematic scenarios put forward by Schurz (forthcoming).

The talk presents joint work with Alexander Gebharter, postdoc at the DCLPS, University of Düsseldorf. For more information, see www.alexandergebharter.com.

Laurenz Hudetz (Salzburg): What Makes Mathematical Structures Models?

n order to apply a mathematical model to a real-world system, it has to be endowed with an empirical interpretation; and if a model is furthermore supposed to tell us something about unobservable aspects of the world and its structure, it has to be endowed with an ontological interpretation that goes beyond the empirical. In this talk, I give a rigorous account of what it is to endow mathematical structures with an empirical and ontological interpretation, i.e. what it is that makes mathematical structures models of a part of the world.

First, I explicate the notion of an uninterpreted formal framework and explain how uninterpreted formal frameworks can be extended to pre-interpreted frameworks. Second, I show how pre-interpreted frameworks can be connected to data. For this purpose, I draw on the theory of relational databases to clarify what data collections and data schemas are. This leads to an explication of the notion of empirically interpreted frameworks. Third, I introduce the notion of an ontological conceptual schema in order to explain how empirically interpreted frameworks can be extended to ontologically interpreted frameworks.

I also discuss how my proposal is related to logical empiricist as well as structuralist accounts of interpretation. I argue that my proposal preserves insights from both traditions while improving on each of these accounts in important respects.

Florian Boge (Wuppertal): Simulation Models and Uncertain Reasoning

omputer simulations (CS) play an integral role in modern science. They are used, e.g., to model and investigate properties of the atmosphere in climate science, investigate the properties of cars, buildings, and other pieces of engineering during the construction phase, and they are involved in the design, execution, and evaluation of highly complex experiments in high energy physics. While it has sometimes been disputed that philosophizing about them can bring about any significant new insights - which may be correct to the extent that the epistemological issues arising in the context of CS are strongly connected to epistemological issues known from other contexts - there still remain some specific issues concerning the role and status of CS in actual research. Most importantly, views about what precisely CS are, epistemologically speaking, strongly contrast or even apparently contradict each other.

In my talk, I will pursue two central aims: I will (i) consider two strongly contrasting views of simulations and demonstrate that these are ultimately complementary, not mutually exclusive, and both have their righteous place in actual scientific practice. The two contrasting views concern, in particular, the view of CS as *arguments*, developed in papers by Beisbart and Beisbart and Norton, and the view of CS as comparable to or epistemically on par with *experiments*, as defended notably by M. Morrison. I will then (ii) argue that the main ‘epistemic thrust’ of CS stems from the inferences they *promote*, not from the inferences that they (arguably) ‘are’. These former inferences, as I will argue, constitute an instance of abductive rather than deductive reasoning, and the specific kind of abduction involved makes it understandable how CS can be both, a ‘kind of experiment’ and a ‘kind of argument’.



Probabilistic Approaches to (Prototype) Concepts

Simon De Deyne & Annika Schuster & Corina Ströbner & Peter Sutton
& Marta Sznajder

Section: Affiliated Workshop
Language: English
Chair: Annika Schuster & Corina Ströbner
Date: 09:00-13:00, 13 September 2017 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.005

Schedule

09:00–09:50 Annika Schuster & Corina Ströbner: *Prototype Frames*
10:00–10:50 Marta Sznajder: *Reasoning with Conceptual Spaces: Towards a Bayesian Model*
11:00–11:50 Peter Sutton: *Prototypes as Bayesian Networks*
12:00–12:50 Simon De Deyne: *Turn the tables: Using word associations to evaluate to what degree text-based distributional semantics capture meaning in the mental lexicon.*



Abstracts

Annika Schuster & Corina Ströbner (Düsseldorf): Prototype Frames

 or most common-sense concepts, no cognitively plausible classical definitions in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions exist. It was argued (e.g. Rosch, Mervis 1975, Hampton 2006) that their meaning is instead constituted by their proximity to a prototype, which is commonly understood as a weighted aggregation of properties of the members of the category to which these concepts refer. The idea put forward in the talk is that

prototype concepts are best explicated in terms of recursive attribute-value structures (frames, Barsalou 1992), which decompose properties into (functional) attributes to which values are assigned, allowing for an in-depth analysis of conceptual structure. Relations like structural invariants and constraints represent dependencies between different attributes and their values. There is evidence for the cognitive reality of frames (*ibid.*, 25-27).

In prototype frames, weights are assigned to both attributes and values according to their contribution to the typicality gradient of the category. We propose to base the weights in prototype frames on subjective conditional probabilities as proposed in Schurz 2012. We also use them to quantify constraints, i.e. correlations between values of different attributes. Conditional probabilities reflect the structure of our evolutionary-shaped world, as fitness-contributing properties are found with high statistical probability. Our mind arguably makes use of the observed probability structure in reasoning (Schurz 2007), which makes prototype frames weighted by conditional probabilities a great candidate to explain the cognitive representation of common-sense categories.

Literature:

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- Schurz, Gerhard (2012): Prototypes and their Composition from an Evolutionary Point of View. In: Wolfram Hinzen, Edouard Machery und Markus Werning (ed.): *The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality*: Oxford University Press, pp. 530-554.

Marta Sznajde (Prague): Reasoning with Conceptual Spaces: Towards a Bayesian Model

While many to this day consider Carnapian inductive logic a failed endeavour, it is in fact the case that subsequent developments in Bayesian statistics can be seen as natural continuations of Carnap's program (Skyrms 1996)—a fact that renders it more relevant than it is commonly given credit for. My paper draws on those later developments, while adding a new thread linking Carnap's work with what came after him—this time in cognitive science.

In his Basic System of inductive logic (Carnap 1971, 1980), Carnap proposed to represent the meanings of the predicates used in the prediction setting as multi-dimensional attribute spaces. The predicates familiar from, e.g., his λ -continuum of inductive methods, were now represented as regions in an attribute space. However, Carnap himself did not put his attribute spaces to full use and did not develop a full theory of how the spaces influence degrees of belief.

My aim in this paper is to fill that gap. The additional motivation for the project comes from the fact that geometrical representations of concepts – this time in the guise of conceptual spaces – are now used in many applications, ranging from the study of perception to philosophy. At the same time, within the conceptual spaces (Gärdenfors 2000) framework, no model of making inductive predictions (or diachronic reasoning altogether) has been proposed so far.

I will start by introducing the Carnapian attribute spaces and showing how a general approach to modelling inductive reasoning directly on them can be founded on the statistical tools for prediction making in cases of value continuum (Blackwell-MacQueen rules (1973) and their Bayesian counterparts, the Ferguson (1973) distributions). I will then show how we can interpret predicates and observations on the conceptual space, and suggest a Bayesian model for inductive reasoning on conceptual spaces. The hypotheses considered by the agent become probability distributions on the space itself, with individual observations being modelled as its points.

Peter Sutton (Düsseldorf): Prototypes as Bayesian Networks

Bayesian networks are widely used as a means of representing knowledge and inference in psychology and cognitive science. This paper explores whether Bayesian networks can be used to represent of prototype structures. I argue that doing so has two benefits: (1) an account of typicality in terms of computing probabilities of conjunctions across the Bayesian net. For example, $P(\text{bird}, \text{flies})$ will be higher than $P(\text{bird}, \neg\text{flies})$. This also allows the computation of more subtle distinctions such as: $P(\text{bird}, \text{coastal_habitat}, \text{squawks}) > P(\text{bird}, \text{coastal_habitat}, \text{sings})$; (2) a means of composing intersective NN compounds that also accounts for challenges associated with such composition such as emergent properties that follows from Bayesian principles. For example, although living in a tank is improbable (i.e. atypical) for a pet and a for a fish, calculating $P(\text{lives_in_tank} \mid \text{pet}, \text{fish})$ can be high given that e.g., $P(\text{lives_in_house} \mid \text{fish})$ and $P(\text{lives_in_lake} \mid \text{pet})$ are both very low. Finally, building on recent work by Taylor and Sutton, I discuss whether Bayesian networks can also be used as a means of defining how diagnostic an attribute is as a function of path distance, namely, I will discuss whether, as a rule of thumb, features ‘higher up’ in a Bayesian network are more diagnostic than those ‘lower down’.

Simon De Deyne (Adelaide): Turn the tables: Using word associations to evaluate to what degree text-based distributional semantics capture meaning in the mental lexicon.

Throughout our lives, we learn the meaning of thousands of words, mostly through exposure to language. This behaviour is predicted by lexico-semantic models that track how words co-occur in large natural language corpora (Firth, 1957). Meaning in this view is based primarily on external language that treats language as an entity that exists in the world, consisting of a set of utterances made by a speech community. In this talk, I propose to take a different perspective using internal language or stored mental representations, that reflect a body of knowledge possessed by the speakers, (Taylor, 2012) using empirical networks derived from word association data to encode this information. Two fundamental claims about the ways humans acquire and represent word meaning will be addressed by contrasting internal and external language models. First, using a new experimental task based on the similarity between remote concepts, I

show that current text-based models do not acquire meaning from a sparse language environment the way humans do. Second, it is not clear to what extent language models alone are sufficient to inform meaning, especially if such meaning depends on multimodal non-linguistic perceptual knowledge. This contrasts with recent works suggesting that these models are also capable of capturing these modal representations at least to some degree (Louwerse, 2011). I will present an overview of studies that sheds light on this issue by comparing the representation of perceptual and emotive multimodal aspects of meaning in internal and external language models. Across these studies, external language models, compared to internal language models based on word associations, capture only a part of the meaning of abstract, concrete, and emotive concepts. Instead, the extra variance captured by internal models reflects more modal specific or grounded representations for all these concepts. As such, word association data provides us with a valuable tool to investigate mental properties that might not be sufficiently encoded in language alone.



The Power to Change

Kristina Engelhard & Florian Fischer & Beate Krickel & John Pemberton & Thorben Petersen & Peter Simons & Manfred Stöckler

Section: Affiliated Workshop
 Language: English
 Chair: Florian Fischer & Thorben Petersen
 Date: 09:00-18:30, 13 September 2017 (Wednesday)
 Location: SR 1.004

Schedule

09:00–09:40 Manfred Stöckler: *Description of Change in a Quantum Theory*
 09:45–10:25 Thorben Petersen: *What is a Theory of Persistence*
 10:30–11:10 Kristina Engelhard: [TBA]
 11:10–11:35 Coffee break
 11:35–12:15 Beate Krickel: *Activity Causation in Mechanisms*
 12:20–13:00 Florian Fischer: *What's this Hip New Thing Called Produrance*
 13:00–16:15 Break: Lunch Break, SOPhiA Opening, Plenary Lecture
 16:15–16:55 John Pemberton: *3 Paradigms of Change*
 16:55–17:35 Peter Simons: *Keep Going: The Motor of Persistence*



Abstracts

Manfred Stöckler (Bremen): Description of Change in Quantum Theory

Sundamental physics used to be an important source of metaphysics for centuries. At present the communities of the philosophers of science and the metaphysicians tend to separate. For this reason, I analyse how contemporary quantum

theory describes change in the microworld. What are the mathematical counterparts of concepts like *property*, *continuant object* or *force* in quantum theory? The concept *state of a system* plays a central part in the dynamical description. The relation of state and properties is much more complicated in quantum theory than in every day life or in classical physics. Quantum theory seems to contain two different ways of change (at least in a common interpretation): *i.* The ‘normal’ change of the state function due to a differential equation (Schrödinger equation) that can be derived from a very general dynamical law and a special description of the system, and *ii.* the change of the state occurring during a measurement. There are good reasons that this second kind of change is not deterministic. So many philosophers of quantum mechanics assert that the state function does only describe dispositions, not real states. While the dynamical law is deeply connected to the core of the theory, the description of interactions (forces) and concrete systems must be added “by hand” in special applications. Causal concepts do not occur at the fundamental level. Newton’s theory of gravitation could suggest that the gravitational force locally changes the momentum of a planet. Such a description seems not to be an adequate picture in quantum theory.

We must be cautious when we derive ontological consequences from physical theories: What is suggested by the mathematical formalism? Which ontological implications depend on additional philosophical assumptions, varying with the plurality of interpretations of the theory? The modest aim of my paper is to show how an important part of contemporary physics conceptualizes change in the microworld. I do not contend that the ontology of our world could be read off from fundamental physics, but I think that metaphysicians should learn more about physics than they normally do before they start to build general theories.

Thorben Petersen (Bremen): What is a Theory of Persistence?

 Research on persistence has developed dramatically in the past 30 years or so. Moving beyond the “classical” endurance/perdurance-distinction of Lewis 1986, philosophers offer more sophisticated explications of the classical conceptions, develop alternative theories, and analyze how theories of persistence fit with Relativity and Quantum Theory (Hawley 2001, Sider 2001, Balashov 2010, Pashby 2016). Still, philosophers working in the wake of

Lewis place far too much emphasis on the (alleged) conflict with Leibniz' law, and (so) almost ignore the crucial question how things persist. It would seem, though, that a theory of persistence basically should reveal how things "keep going into ever new times" (as Peter Simons puts it). However, even though research on persistence has become way more specialized, it would seem that we are just at the beginning.

Actually, it is not easy to even say what a theory of persistence is supposed to achieve. Wasserman 2016, for instance, observes that theories like endurantism and perdurantism attempt to explain how things persist, and are not just ontological claims about temporal parts, or stages, or substances etc. (as they are often taken to be). Unfortunately, he does not say what to expect from a theory of persistence, or even what makes for a good theory, nor what exactly is meant by 'persistence', and so on. In this talk, I will motivate the idea of an explication.

Since it is hard to analyze the concept of persistence, it makes sense to start by distinguishing this concept from related concepts (including the concepts of change, identity and time) and compare different theories of persistence in various contexts. As far as powers are concerned, it seems reasonable to adopt a powers-based theory of the persistence of higher-order social phenomena (like bands and teams and organizations), but not in relation with particles, say (which in turn suggests that we should be pluralistic about persistence).

References:

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Kristina Engelhard (Cologne): [TBA]

Abstract coming soon.

Beate Krickel (Bochum): Activity Causation in Mechanisms

any defenders of the new mechanistic account base their views on an ontology consisting of entities (objects) and activities. Thereby, the notion of an activity is supposed to capture the dynamic, active, causal, and temporally extended nature of mechanisms. So far, no satisfying account of activities has been provided. Especially, it remains unclear how the notion of an activity is related to the notion of causation, and whether we can use the former in order to make sense of the latter. In this paper, I will provide an account of causation in terms of activities that fills this gap. I will argue that activity causation diverges from common attempts to define causation in terms of a relation between distinct relata. I will show how we can determine the truth value of causal statements based on activity causation and how we can solve several problems typically afflicting process-based accounts of causation.

Florian Fischer (Bonn): What's this Hip New Thing Called Produrance

n his *On the Plurality of Worlds*, David Lewis formulates the problem of temporary intrinsics in the following way: 'Persisting things change their intrinsic properties. For instance shape: when I sit, I have a bent shape; when I stand, I have a straightened shape. Both shapes are temporary intrinsic properties; I have them only some of the time. How is such change possible?' [Lewis, 1986, p. 202]. One and the same object (e.g. David Lewis) can have different incompatible properties (bent shape, straightened shape) at different times. In contrast to this a plausible principle, called Leibniz' Law of the indiscernibility of identicals, states that if two things are identical then they share all their properties.

The contemporary accounts of persistence (perdurantism, adverbialism, indexicalism, etc.) focus on avoiding the threatening contradiction with Leibniz' Law. The question *how* change comes about is not covered at all. In this talk, I present a theory of dispositions as change-makers. I understand the manifestations of dispositions as

processes and accordingly I will call the resulting account of persistence ‘produrance’. I will introduce produrantism and sketch how it solves the problem of temporary intrinsics.

John Pemberton (London): 3 Paradigms of Change

According to a popular account (Paradigm 1), change involves one state being followed by (perhaps giving rise to) another. Perhaps powers obtaining in some state give rise to a manifestation, which is a new state (e.g. the instantiation of a new set of properties or powers), or perhaps a transition to a new state; or perhaps a causal relation licenses a cause being followed by an effect. Russell rejects such state-state change: the lack of successors in continuous time implies a temporal gap between the 2 states, and hence an implausible jump of causation across time. Russell proposes instead (Paradigm 2) that causal lines, i.e. the obtaining of similar events at a (perhaps densely infinite) series of ‘neighbouring’ places which exhibit ‘quasi-permanence’, are the ground for change. This avoids pairwise connections between states, whilst rendering such states as brute and unexplained. Under both paradigms 1 & 2, change is the obtaining of one state and then the obtaining of another (related or similar) state nearby shortly afterwards.

Aristotle (Paradigm 3) supposes that many powers attach to time-extended bearers (e.g. things such as knives or hot coals) and manifest through time: the power and its bearer obtain through the period of manifesting. The manifesting of powers together through time give rise to changing (of the configuration of power-bearers) through time. Many of the powers in contemporary focus have such Aristotelian-timing, e.g. the powers which give rise to the basic forces of physics (e.g. gravitational attraction), cutting, pushing, heating, dissolving, pumping, etc. I suggest that changing in this world accords with paradigm 3, and that this has important implications for ontology, and perhaps for time itself.

Peter Simons (Dublin): Keep Going: The Motor of Persistence

We are familiar with two ways in which things keep going. Processes and events (occurrents) keep going by lasting longer, growing or extending in time. Things or objects (continuants) keep going by not ceasing to exist, in whatever manner

of continued existence is suited to their kind. Of these two modes of being in time, I hold the former to be prior to the latter. But both beg another question: how do the entities, whether occurrents or continuants, keep going, into ever new times? Are they simply carried along by a general flow, as Newton thought; are they somehow continually recreated, as Descartes thought; or is there a continual creation of brief new entities, a “creative advance”, as Whitehead thought? Our answer is: None of the above. As for what that answer is: Let’s wait.



Values in Research: Problems for Philosophy of Science, Moral Philosophy and Policy making

Frauke Albersmeier & Alexander Christian & Matthis Krischel & Jürgen Landes & Julia Mirkin & Jan Felix Wieloch

Section: Affiliated Workshop
Language: English
Chair: Frauke Albersmeier & Alexander Christian
Date: 09:00-18:30, 13 September 2017 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.003

Schedule

09:00–13:00

09:00–09:10

Introduction

09:10–09:55

Jürgen Landes: *The Philosophy of Pharmacology and Evidence for Causal Assessment*

10:05–10:50

Alexander Christian: *The Vice of Virtues – Virtue-Based Research Ethics and the Problem of Moral Luck*

11:00–11:45

Matthis Krischel: *The Value(s) of Nazi Medicine*

13:00–16:15

Break: Lunch Break, SOPhiA Opening, Plenary Lecture

16:15–18:30

16:15–17:00

Julia Mirkin & Jan Felix Wieloch: *Disease Mongering: An Analysis of its Methods and Mechanisms*

17:10–17:55

Frauke Albersmeier: *Terminology as the Achilles' Heel of Value-Neutral Science*



Abstracts

Jürgen Landes (MCMP): The Philosophy of Pharmacology and Evidence for Causal Assessment

ne focus of the philosophy of medicine is the epistemological value of evidence, the debate is mainly concerned with the value of evidence provided by Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs) versus evidence obtained from other forms of inquiry (observational studies, expert testimony, bench research, etc). A great number of evidence hierarchies have been developed which help determine the weight of the evidence when it comes to assessing the benefits a treatment may have. Typically, RCTs and systematic meta-analyses of RCTs are at the top of hierarchies.

Evidence for assessing potential side effects caused by a drug often emerges in a non-systematic and spontaneous manner. RCTs often fail to pick up signals of potential side effects—due to a number of reasons. Hence, the assessment of the causal claim that a drug causes a side effect requires the assessment of non-systematic, heterogeneous and often contradictory evidence.

In this talk, I hence introduce a Bayesian network model which aims to model a rational assessment of the claim that a drug causes a side effect.

Reference:

Landes, Jürgen and Osimani, Barbara and Poellinger, Roland. Epistemology of Causal Inference in Pharmacology. *European Journal for Philosophy of Science* (<http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13194-017-0169-1>)

Alexander Christian (Düsseldorf): The vice of virtues – Virtue-based research ethics and the organizational features of scientific institutions

esponsible conduct of research is usually explained in terms of principles which aim at fostering moral integrity and objectivity of research processes. Virtue-based approaches abstain from principles and instead solely focus on behavioral dispositions of scientists (Macfarlane, 2009). On this perspective, scientific

virtues instantiated by individual scientists ensure undisturbed research processes. One problem such a program faces is that scientists sometimes need to comply with demanding requirements, like the obligation to report supposed cases of scientific misconduct (Sprague, 2010). Unfortunately even justified reports involve the risk of severe repercussions for whistleblowers and might result in ostracism or psychological pressure (Gunsalus, 1998). Therefore, it seems that virtuous behavior in cases of whistleblowing depends on moral luck (c.f. Williams, 1982), in that it depends on working under favorable institutional conditions.

In my talk I develop a moral luck argument against virtue-based approaches and discuss whether extending the domain of virtues from behavioral dispositions to the organizational features of scientific institutions is a viable solution.

References:

- Beauchamp, T.L. & Childress, J.F., 2001. *Principles of Biomedical Ethics*, fifth edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gunsalus, C.K., 1998. “How to blow the Whistle and still have a career afterwards,” in: *Science and Engineering Ethics*, 4(1), pp.51-64.
- Macfarlane, B., 2009. *Researching with Integrity*, New York: Routledge.
- Sprague, R.L., 2010. “Whistleblowing: A Very Unpleasant Avocation,” in: *Ethics & Behavior*, 3(1), pp.103?133.
- Williams, B., 1981. *Moral Luck*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Matthis Krischel: The value(s) of Nazi Medicine

 In this presentation I will give a short historical introduction to Nazi medicine and Nazi medical crimes, with a focus on two dimensions of “values”: First, I will describe the underlying values of Nazi medical ethics, including a biologicistic world view and collectivist ethics, focusing on public health over the well-being of individual patients. This approach to medicine made it possible for a majority of physicians in Germany to support discriminatory and eventually murderous health policies and was used to justify medical crimes, including experiments on research subjects

without their consent. Second, I will discuss the history of the evaluation of medical experiments performed in Nazi concentration camps, specifically the hypothermia experiments in Dachau concentration camp. While earlier accounts of the 1980s dismissed their scientific validity in part on grounds of their moral deficiencies and sometimes held them to an ahistorical standard of scientific rigor, I want to argue for a more nuanced analysis that takes the scientific rigor and the morality of the experiments into account separately.

Julia Mirkin & Jan Felix Wieloch (Düsseldorf): Disease Mongering: An Analysis of its Methods and Mechanisms

he term Disease Mongering describes a set of several marketing strategies aimed at drawing inadequate attention to certain diseases and other arguably deficient states of the human body or psyche. The agents of DM typically try to influence the public perception of such states in order to expand the amount of potential clients for therapy or to justify receiving research funding.

In our talk we will explicate the phenomenon DM and put it into context of medicalization and pathologization of society, as well as examine the role of scientists in its conduct. Although there are still problems defining DM it is possible to identify certain mechanisms involved in this process. In order to elaborate those mechanisms, we will investigate the public presentation of hypertension. This example reveals some of the potential damages for society and individuals resulting from DM. It also shows why identifying instances of DM is problematic due to vague terms in recent definitions of the phenomenon.

Reference:

Payer, Lynn (1992): *Disease Mongers: How Doctors, Drug Companies and Insurers Are Making You Feel Sick*. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Frauke Albersmeier (Düsseldorf): Terminology as the Achilles' heel of value-neutral science

ax Weber's influential plea for a value-free science includes both, the demand for scientists to refrain from uttering value-judgments, and a call for transparency and balance whenever they nevertheless "enunciate their evaluations on ultimate

questions ‘in the name of science’ in governmentally privileged lecture halls” (Weber 1949, 4). It was particularly in the context of teaching that Weber demanded scholars to unmistakably highlight where they turn from empirical statements to “practical evaluations”—a clarification so important, that Weber thought “nothing is too “pedantic” to achieve it (20). In this talk, I will point out one kind of practical limit to such pedantry. On the level of word choice, evaluations tend to play a critical, but nontransparent role. Their impact is not only relevant with regard to thick concepts, which have both descriptive and evaluative content (such as ‘rape’, cf. Dupre 2007, 32-5). The choice of purely descriptive content that will be covered by an expression is based on an evaluation (of relevance), too. Although Weber himself seems to be concerned primarily with explicitly advanced evaluations, evaluative judgments underlying the choice of a descriptive framework are equally in conflict with the spirit of the value-neutrality requirement. Looking at the case of nonhuman animals used in biomedical research and their representation as ‘animal models’, I will show how terminology eludes value-neutrality and indicate the potential damage of this lack of transparency.

References:

- Duprè, John (2007) “Fact and Value”, in: Kincaid, Harold, Duprè, John & Wylie, Alison (eds.) *Value-Free Science? Ideals and Illusions*. Oxford/ New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 27-41.
- Weber, Max (1949) *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*. Glencoe: The Free Press.

Contributed Talks

Vague Objects, Classical Logic and Standard Mereology

Ali Abasnezhad

aganini (2016) argues that vague objects, e.g. Mount Kilimanjaro, can be accommodated within classical logic and standard mereology, if the reality is gunky. In particular, she argues that Weatherson's argument for inconsistency of vague objects with classical logic and standard mereology is unsound in a gunky reality. This paper constitutes a response. First, It will be argued that in Paganini's gunky theory, vague objects, especially Mount Kilimanjaro, turn out to be precise (non-vague). Second, a generalized version of Weatherson's argument for gunky reality with the same consequence will be presented. The upshot is that the conclusion of Weatherson's argument, this is, inconsistency of vague objects with classical logic and standard mereology, is irresistible, as long as the the central part of assumptions in his argument are granted.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Zach Johnson
Date: 11:15-11:45, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003



Ali Abasnezhad (LMU Munich (MCMP), Germany)

I am a Doctoral Fellow at the MCMP working under supervision of Prof. DDr. Hannes Leitgeb. My main interests lie in language, logic and metaphysics. My current research focuses on logical and metaphysical problems raised by vagueness.

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Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth, and Existence

Farbod Akhlaghi-Ghaffarokh

ussi Suikkanen (2016) presents an argument against Derek Parfit's Non-Realist Cognitivism (N-RC). According to N-RC, a range of non-naturalistic, cognitivist commitments in meta-normativity are true, and that no feature of reality, nor any additional normative features of reality, make normative claims true (that is, true normative claims have no ontological implications). The plausibility of N-RC remains largely unexplored. Suikkanen has recently argued that Parfit's N-RC faces a serious challenge: to provide a plausible account of how to understand normative truth. This challenge, Suikkanen argues, cannot be met. He maintains this is because a number of traditional accounts of truth are unavailable to Parfit, leaving N-RC forced to adopt a deeply unattractive form of primitivism about truth.

In this paper, I have two aims. First, I argue that Suikkanen's argument for the claim that Parfit cannot endorse a form of deflationism about truth is unsound. Secondly, I argue that how Parfit can show the aforementioned argument unsound gives rise to a deeply problematic challenge for his view, which I maintain there is good reason to doubt Parfit can address – thereby casting strong doubt upon his view.

Section: Ethics
 Language: English
 Chair: Zsolt Ziegler
 Date: 16:15-16:45, 13 September 2017 (Wednesday)
 Location: SR 1.007



Farbod Akhlaghi-Ghaffarokh (University of Cambridge, England) Farbod Akhlaghi-Ghaffarokh is an MPhil Philosophy candidate at the University of Cambridge (where he holds the Darwin Philosophy Studentship at Darwin College, Cambridge). He holds a BA (Hons) in Philosophy from the University of Reading (with First Class Honours, the Philosophy Department Prize, the Laurie Brain Prize, and a Chancellor's Award), and an MLitt in Philosophy from the St. Andrews/Stirling Philosophy Graduate Programme (with Distinction and placement on

the Deans' List for Academic Excellence). In 2017/18, he will begin reading for the DPhil in Philosophy at the University of Oxford (Oriental College), under an Arts and Humanities Research Council Studentship. He is also the President of the British Postgraduate Philosophy Association, and is the former President of the British Undergraduate Philosophy Society and the University of Reading Philosophy Society. He has a broad range of philosophical research interests, primarily within (Meta-)Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, and the intersection between them. For his website, see <http://farbodakhlaghi-g.weebly.com>
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Persistence of Intention – Rationality of Reconsideration

Franz Altner

 It has been argued that if someone forms an intention, she should also be committed to what she has intended. Put differently, her intention should have a certain stability. One response to the question why intentions should by default have that stability, is to say that it would be irrational to have unstable intentions. Intuitively this is so, because we are agents with limited mental capacities. We don't always have time to deliberate and thus have to settle some matters in advance. One proponent of this explanation is John Broome. In his book 'Rationality through Reasoning', he has argued that someone who without reasons fails to do as she has earlier on decided to do, violates a rational requirement called persistence of intention. Center stage in this requirement takes the notion of considering whether one X's.

In my presentation I want to argue that his requirement is deficient. On the one hand, it is too weak in the sense that it doesn't put enough rational pressure on an agent in cases of temptation. On the other hand, it is too strong since it admits for something known in the literature as bootstrapping, falsely rationalizing sticking to an irrational intention. This is typically justified through an inference rule, Broome accepts and that can be found in numerous similar accounts, called necessary detachment.

To solve these problems, I argue that two things have to be done. First, one has to give an account of what it means to rationally re-

consider. Secondly, one has to specify Broome's inference rule called necessary detachment.

The first problem is particularly challenging, since reconsideration can be of two different kinds. One can consider reflectively, which means that one deliberates whether to consider a previously formed resolve. But the most typical form of reconsideration is just to start reconsidering non-reflectively. Non-reflective consideration is thus guided by habits, dispositions and capacities.

Given this discussion, I argue that spelling out rational reconsideration in terms of a logical vocabulary will help us to determine what it means that one necessarily cannot rationally reconsider in the reflective and the non-reflective case of reconsideration. This helps us to solve and clarify the bootstrapping and temptation challenges.

Section: Action Theory
Language: English
Chair: Albert Anglberger
Date: 15:45-16:15, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004



Franz Altner (Universität Leipzig, Germany)

I am currently completing a Master in Logic at the University of Leipzig. In the course of my studies there I have done several courses on non-classical logics and the philosophy of action. I have spent my last year studying at the University of Vienna, taking courses at the mathematics Master in mathematical logic, set and model theory. Philosophically I have concentrated on courses in the theory of mind and group action. Concerning the latter, I plan to write my master thesis on team reasoning and social dilemmata.

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Proof-theoretic Semantics and Paradoxes

Sara Ayhan

Proof-theoretic semantics is an approach to the semantics of (logical) expressions which is based on the concept of proof. As such, proof-theoretic semantics is opposed to the standard semantical approach, namely model theory, i.e. truth-conditional semantics. As it is not based on the notion of truth, the truth tables are not considered to give the meaning of logical constants, but instead – following Gentzen’s remarks on his proof system of natural deduction – the introduction and/or elimination steps are taken to be meaning-giving for logical constants. Thus, proofs are not only considered to be technical devices but to be actually important from a semantical point of view.

What I want to analyze in this talk is how proof-theoretic semantics can be used to cope with logical paradoxes like the Liar paradox. Traditional proof-theoretic semantics was not developed to handle paradoxes so that changes are needed if that is the aim. For our framework it is useful to consider Tennant’s proof-theoretic analysis of paradoxes, namely that they yield a non-normalizing derivation of a contradiction. Next, the choice of the right proof-theoretic representation is important in this context, i.e. whether one works in a natural deduction framework or with the sequent calculus. While the former is the traditional one used in proof-theoretic semantics, there are arguments that the latter is more suitable for dealing with paradoxes. It is then possible to work in a paraconsistent system which does not give rise to the “dangerous” derivations of contradictions without the possibility to normalize them.

Section: Logic & Philosophy of Mathematics
Language: English
Chair: Stefan Forster
Date: 14:00-14:30, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002



Sara Ayhan (Ruhr University Bochum, Germany)

I am studying in the Master of Arts Philosophy program at the Ruhr

University Bochum. I obtained the degree of 1st state exam in philosophy, English and history in 2015 with a thesis about Donald Davidson's conception of truth. During these studies I spent a semester abroad at the University of Adelaide, South Australia. Currently, I am working on my Master's thesis about proof-theoretic semantics.

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Imagining Negative Existentials

Christopher Badura

 argue that the view defended by, e.g. Amy Kind in “Putting the image back in imagination”, that imagination essentially involves mental imagery leads to a dilemma. Concerning mental imagery, there are two major positions: pictorialism and descriptionalism. Pictorialists hold that mental imagery represents just like pictures do (or songs for auditory imaginings), whereas descriptionalists hold that mental imagery represents just like language does.

The first horn, I argue, is that on a pictorialist view of mental imagery to have mental images of negative existentials, we have to commit to absences and hence an ontologically dubious position, or we have a notion of imagination that is not suitable for justifying possibility claims. The argument is based on the claim (which I will argue for) that on a pictorialist view, the only way our imaginings are guides to possibility is to assume that the imagining has as a content which is composed of contents we have or can in principle be perceived. This can only guide us to the possibility of negative existentials if we assume that absences or negative states of affairs can be perceived, which is ontologically dubious.

The second horn is that on a descriptionalist view of mental imagery we can easily have mental images of negative existentials. This is due to the fact that for representing linguistically, there are no constraints on imagining and thus, imagining collapses into supposition. Thus, this way of imagining is no evidence for possibility of the negative existential (or almost any possibility). Thus, we either need to accept a dubious ontology, or we arrive at a notion of imagination that is unsuited for modal epistemology.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Franz Altner
Date: 11:10-11:40, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004



Christopher Badura (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany)

Since July 2016, I am a doctoral researcher at the Ruhr-University Bochum supervised by Heinrich Wansing and Francesco Berto. My research concerns what imagination is, its role in modal epistemology and the logic of imagination. In 2016, I finished the Master of Logic programme at the Institute for Logic, Language, and Computation in Amsterdam with a thesis on truth in fiction, supervised by Francesco Berto. My Bachelor's in Philosophy I obtained at the University of Hamburg with a thesis on Peter van Inwagen's argument for fictional realism, supervised by Benjamin Schnieder.

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The Alleged Distinction between Cognitive and Epistemic Values: The Case of Simplicity

Eser Bakdur & Michael Poznic

 ecently, a number of arguments have been developed to give a new interpretation of the concept of epistemic value and distinguish particular values such as simplicity or scope from epistemic values such as internal consistency and empirical adequacy (Laudan 2004; Douglas 2009, 2013). This paper will examine the question whether simplicity as a cognitive value should be distinguished from epistemic values and argues that simplicity is an epistemic value yet. We will argue against Douglas's (2013) recent account of cognitive values because this account is the most sophisticated approach towards the differentiation of epistemic and cognitive values. By this we also aim to deliver arguments against Laudan (2004) and Douglas (2009), at least implicitly. Finally we will propose an alternative understanding of cognitive values that does not distinguish them from epistemic values.

Douglas (2013) gives a detailed account of cognitive values. Inter

alia, she divides the general category of cognitive values into values that are applied to theory per se and values that are applied to theory in relation to evidence. On Douglas's formulation, simplicity is an example that can fall into both groups of cognitive values. When simplicity applies to theory per se, it is not an epistemic value. Yet, if simplicity applies to theory in relation to evidence, it is regarded as an epistemic value (cf. Douglas 2013).

The question of this paper is whether the distinction between the two senses of simplicity, namely simplicity as a non-epistemic value applied to theory per se and simplicity as an epistemic value applied to theory in relation to evidence, can be upheld. We will pose a challenge against the distinction between theory per se and theory in relation to evidence with three criticisms. These objections seem to show that how Douglas argues for the differences between cognitive values does not lead to the conclusion that simplicity, as a pragmatic value, is a non-epistemic value. Because the distinction between the two senses of simplicity cannot be upheld, we argue that simplicity in both senses is better seen as an epistemic value, still. In accord with this result we will propose an understanding of cognitive values that does not distinguish them from epistemic values.

Reference:

- Douglas, Heather E. (2009). *Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Douglas, Heather E. (2013). "The Value of Cognitive Values," *Philosophy of Science* 80: 796-806
- Laudan, Larry. (2004). "The Epistemic, the Cognitive, and the Social," in *Science, Values, and Objectivity*. Ed. Peter Machamer and Gereon Wolters, 14-23. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Laurenz Hudetz
Date: 15:45-16:15, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006



Eser Bakdur (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany)

Eser Bakdur studied Philosophy (major) at Bilkent University. She received her M.A. in Philosophy from Bogazici University. Her M.A. thesis was about the problem of induction and the recent metaphysical approaches to it. She is now a PhD candidate at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. Her PhD dissertation is on the proper roles of values and objectivity in science. Also, currently she is the spokeswoman of the doctoral students at the Institute of Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis, and one of the researchers in the research group WTP: Philosophy of Science, Engineering and Technology in Karlsruhe Institute of Technology.

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Michael Poznic (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany)

Michael Poznic studied Philosophy (major) and Sociology, Psychology (minors) at RWTH Aachen University. He received his M.A. with a thesis on semantics and ontology of fiction. He finished a PhD project on models and representation in philosophy of science at TU Delft (NL). The thesis has to be defended yet. Currently, he is officially still a PhD candidate at TU Delft but he also holds a position as researcher at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology in the research group WTP: Philosophy of Science, Engineering and Technology.

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The Problem of Speciation in the Cultural Evolution of Signaling Systems

Karim Baraghith

The theory of biological evolution (BE) in the wide and the modern synthesis in the narrow sense could close the gap between micro- and macro level phenomena in the life sciences to a significant extent. It should be expected that a proper theory of cul-tural evolution (CE) can provide something similar in the domain of the social scienc-es, which seem to be afflicted by a very similar divide (Mesoudi 2011). Species are reproductive families in the biological evolution and crucial for macro level taxono-my/classification

whereas in CE we can only talk of quasispecies (Schurz 2011). The reason for this problem is blending inheritance, a two-folded phenomenon that occurs much more frequently in CE than in BE. Nevertheless, a macro level taxonomy seems necessary in order to enable the realization of the claim formulated above. To be evolutionary, such a taxonomy cannot rely on similarity alone but has to involve real reproduction, so a phylogenetic classification of some sort is needed that takes the quasispecies problem into account. (Meta)populations as described in the CIPC (Millstein 2010, 2015) - the causal interactionist population concept - can serve as a more proper formal cluster (using graph-theory) of classification based on the rates of interactions between their elements. I will argue that this shall replace the species concept in CE. In the case of the evolution of semantic forms, the signaling game of coordination (Lewis 1969, Huttegger 2008) can serve as a formal microlevel model (using game-theory) that is – as a possible application – seamlessly transferable into the macrolevel cluster/dynamic.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Birgit Benzing
Date: 14:30-15:00, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006



Karim Baraghith (Heinrich-Heine University, Germany)

Karim Baraghith studied Philosophy, History and Biology at the Johannes-Gutenberg-Universität/Mainz. Currently he is a PhD student and research fellow at the chair of Prof. Gerhard Schurz (Heinrich-Heine-University/Duesseldorf). His fields of research are the generalized theory of evolution, teleosemantics, evolutionary game theory and philosophy of biology.

Relevant Literature:

Baraghith, K. (2015): Kulturelle Evolution und die Rolle von Memen: ein Mehrebenenmodell, Peter-Lang-Verlag, Frankfurt a. M.

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Carnap's Deflationary Metaontology and the Internal-External Distinction

Lucas Battich

 Recent deflationary views in metaontology trace back their attitude to Carnap's "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology" (1950). In his paper, Carnap makes a tripartite distinction between internal questions asked within a language, questions asked external to any language, and pragmatic questions concerning language choice. Existence internal questions are trivially true or false. Ontological questions are external, and thus lack any truth-value. Recently Matti Eklund (2009, 2013, 2016) has advanced an influential reading of Carnap's article as presenting two possible positions: language pluralism and relativism. For Eklund, even though the language pluralist reading seems closer to Carnap, both positions ultimately fail. In this paper I argue instead for a reading of Carnap that veers in between Eklund's two positions. To this aim, I first compare Carnap's deflationism to Eli Hirsch's (2002) quantifier variance, the thesis that there are a plurality of different senses to the existential quantifier, and no privileged ontological language. Contrary to Hirsch and Eklund's language pluralist, I argue that for Carnap metaphysical debates are not merely verbal. Metaphysicians do talk in the same terms and agree on their sense of existence. To sustain the deflationary project, what is crucial for Carnap is the internal/external distinction. I conclude by arguing that the external/internal distinction ultimately rests on epistemic grounds, and thus Carnap's deflationary project is best read as epistemological, and not merely linguistic. I will argue that this challenge to metaphysics remain relevant.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Kyrke Otto
Date: 15:05-15:35, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003



Lucas Battich (Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands)
Lucas Battich is a Research Master student in Philosophy at Radboud

University Nijmegen. His research interests are in metaphysics and philosophy of mind and cognition, and the interaction between these areas. In metaphysics, his work also centres on metaontology and methodological issues. Other research interests and competence include the history of analytic philosophy, especially Carnap, and its interaction with the phenomenological tradition.

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Choosing Methods in Animal Welfare Science: Entanglements Between Ideals and Good Practice

Birgit Benzing

Animal welfare scientists have developed a wide array of methods to assess animal welfare. The validation of methods is considered a key factor to fulfil quality requirements of both good science and husbandry application. Besides validation status, concepts and methodological presumptions also influence the choice of methods. In scientific journals, conceptual papers address this topic; however, original research papers that present empirical data rarely specify their underlying concepts. Moreover, the authors seldom describe their reasons and justifications for choosing a particular method over another. Therefore, two questions remain a matter of interpretation: how much influence upon their daily research do scientists ascribe to concepts and methodological presumptions? How do concepts and methodological presumptions shape the evolvement of the methodical spectrum?

This interdisciplinary research paper approaches these questions by taking statements of scientists as its methodological starting point. It combines an empirical enquiry with meta-theoretical analysis. Structured guideline interviews were conducted with eight senior researchers in order to investigate prevalent explanatory models among scientific practitioners. The objectives of the interview analysis were firstly to explicate the criteria for the choice of methods, secondly to identify those criteria which may legitimate a method as being established, and thirdly to describe reasons for discrepancy between ideal and factual procedures.

The more recent the welfare concept favoured by the interviewees was, the more they acknowledged conceptual influences in general,

whereas the role of methodological presumptions, such as scientific paradigms, remained a largely unrecognised issue. However, a challenge to this implicit bias poses the Qualitative Behaviour Assessment mentioned by most of the interviewees, a method explicitly elaborated on a philosophical basis.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Gregor Greslehner
Date: 17:25-17:55, 13 September 2017 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.006



Birgit Benzing (Kassel, Germany)

My research interests combines philosophical and biological questions which I pursue both in the philosophy of science and ethics. I am interested in the interplay between scientific requirements and procedures on the one side and values (both scientific and societal) on the other side. I investigate this relationship employing animal welfare science, which struggles between the epistemological values of “hard science” and the needs of applied science. Conservation offers another a field of science that intensively deals with complex scientific and ethical questions. Both research topics include questions about the relation between humans and other animals.

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Laws of Nature in Branching Time

Marta Emilia Bieleńska

Sur intuition suggests that our world is full of modalities. We can distinguish some ordered possibilities: e.g. logical, physical or metaphysical (e.g. Muller 2010). One way of talking discussing them collectively is the formalism of branching time (BT). BT structures (trees) consist of a set of moments and an ordering. Unlike Lewis’s possible worlds, they allow us to express the concept of possibilities with temporal terms—a closed past and an open future from a local perspective.

Imagine that we have a BT structure (e.g. representing our world) with an interpretation. I will try to find conditions, which would allow us to distinguish formulas expressing Laws of Nature from the set of all other interpreted formulas. In order to achieve this goal, I will inter alia explore the idea of conceivable worlds (see: Xu 1997). As a basic criteria that should be satisfied by a sentence to be considered a Law of Nature I chose the one indicated by Swartz.

The most important issue is to distinguish Laws of Nature from the logical or semantic truths. Firstly I would define an operator $\Box L$ for the latter kind of truth ($\Box Lp =$ “p is a logical or semantical truth”) and an operator $\Box P$ for a potential physical truth ($\Box Pp =$ “p is a potential for a Law of Nature”). The next step would be distinguishing sentences expressing Laws of Nature from among the potential sentences. I would consider some basic ideas of formalisation (e.g. Dretske 1977) and define them using the first-order logic for BT model (Rumberg 2016). Finally I shall provide the conclusive criteria which a sentence must meet in order to express a Law of Nature in BT.

Finally, I shall point out the numerous advantages of the Laws of Nature in BT over other concepts, i.e. possible worlds. I will try to show that the BT is a useful way of dealing with standard objections (e.g. van Frassen 1989, Bird 1998), as it solves some basic problems of the traditional attitude towards the Laws of Nature and indicates a number of new problems.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Samantha Hirshland
Date: 10:35-11:05, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006



Marta Emilia Bielińska (Jagiellonian University, Poland)

Marta Emilia Bielińska is an undergraduate student in Interfaculty Individual Studies in the Humanities (main division: Philosophy) and studied in Mathematics and Natural Sciences (main division: Theoretical Physics) at Jagiellonian University in Cracow. She is interested in formal epistemology, philosophy of Physics and logic.

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Ana's Norm: A Model Case of Fitting Attitudes

Jonas Blatter

Fitting Attitudes (FA) theories explain evaluative properties (values) in terms of the fittingness of certain evaluative attitudes which people hold in response, e.g. a person is blameworthy iff it is fitting to blame them. Fittingness is often interpreted as having good reasons to hold the attitude. But this faces the wrong-kind-of-reason problem, namely that there are good reasons for holding an attitude, even if they do not warrant ascribing the corresponding value to the object. One solution to the problem is to differentiate between object-given and state-given reasons, and only allow object-given reasons to count as fitting. However, the common interpretation of object-given reasons as reasons for why something has a value leads to the circularity of explaining values through fittingness and fittingness through values.

In this talk, I propose an alternative view of object-given reasons which interprets them as reasons for action rather than reasons to believe something has a value. Such a view has the advantage of not being circular. I construct a simplified model case of Ana, who adheres to a simple norm of fairness which justifies holding an attitude of blame towards another person, Bob. Ana can ascribe the property of blameworthiness to Bob because she has an independent reason that justifies blame, which does not depend on a prior notion of blameworthiness and is not a wrong kind of reason. Using this model, I test whether such a non-circular approach to FA theory is viable and how it can be expanded upon.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Katharina Anna Sodoma
Date: 15:05-15:35, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007



Jonas Blatter (University of Bern, Switzerland)

Jonas Blatter holds a Master of Arts degree in “Political, Legal and Economic Philosophy” from the University of Bern, Switzerland. He has

worked on topics of moral psychology and virtue ethics with particular interests in the role of character in ethics and situationism, philosophy of emotions, and reactive attitudes.

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Publicity as a criterion for moral theories? – An investigation into the possibility of self-effacing moral theories

Dorothee Bleisch

 an publicity be considered as a criterion of adequacy for moral theories? – This is the key question of my paper. Finding an answer to this question is crucial because there exists a whole range of competing moral theories. Yet, to profit from the wisdom of these conflicting theories it is vital to first of all choose one moral theory out of many different and plausible moral theories. For this important decision, criteria are needed on the grounds of which one can make one's choice. By discussing one criterion invoked to test moral theories, namely the so-called *publicity condition* (henceforth PC), i.e. the claim that moral theories must meet a criterion of publicity to be acceptable, I aim to make a contribution towards the bigger question of how we are to assess moral theories.

I will start answering the key question by giving some conceptual explanations of the PC. Having gained a first understanding of the PC, I will then test the claim of the PC by discussing the arguments which are brought forward for and against it. My discussion of the arguments will unfold in three parts. In the first part, I will discuss *conceptually based arguments*, i.e. arguments based on a definition of key ethical and meta-ethical concepts. I will argue that taken as conceptual arguments these arguments do not work. Yet, they might easily be turned into arguments which rely on a normative assumption. Thus, I will proceed by discussing whether they might be converted into decisive normative arguments for the PC. I will, however, argue that the normative arguments – the *argument of objectionable elitism* and the *argument of implausible blame* – do not constitute decisive arguments for the PC. In the third and last part, I will offer an argument against accepting the PC, namely the *argument of unreasonable demandingness* which was most recently brought forward by Ben Eggleston. I will mainly support

Eggleston's conclusions and argue that the PC is too demanding. Thus, I will come to the conclusion that the PC seems not warranted. However, caution is advisable because more attention must be paid to the different versions of the claim of the PC before the final word on it can be spoken. Thus, my conclusion, carefully stated, will be that the claim of the PC is unlikely to be warranted.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Jonas Blatter
Date: 11:45-12:15, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007



Dorothee Bleisch (Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany)

Having graduated from high school in 2011 (A-Levels: Ancient Greek, History/Sociology), I decided to follow my heart's desire and started studying Philosophy and Political Science at the University of Erlangen (B.A. degree in 2015). In 2016 I spend – with the support of the “German National Merit Foundation” – a research term at the university of Reading being supervised by Brad Hooker. Currently I have submitted my Master Thesis in Philosophy (dealing with the so-called Publicity Condition, i.e. the claim that moral theories have to be public in order to be acceptable). Building on my research interest in moral philosophy, I am now looking forward to start a PhD in moral philosophy. In my leisure time I enjoy reading novels (e.g. Walter Moers and Toni Morrison), watching BBC-series (I am a huge fan of Sherlock Homes and Dr. Watson), gardening and dancing (particularly ballroom and Latin).

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Here's One Normative Truth, and Here's Another: Evolutionary Debunking and Moorean Facts

Michael Bruckner

Within meta-ethics, evolutionary debunking arguments are used to attack normative realism, i.e. the view that normative truths are mind-independent. On one interpretation, the challenge that these arguments pose for the realist is a sceptical one: Given the evolutionary aetiology of normative beliefs and the mind-independence of normative truths, the possibility of normative knowledge is a puzzle. A number of realist replies to this challenge involve taking the truth of certain substantive normative claims for granted, for example that pain is bad or that survival is good. This move is dialectically questionable, however, because the evolutionary debunker casts doubt on substantive normative claims wholesale. I side with the debunker in this debate, defending her against a number of attempts to strong-arm her into permitting these assumptions despite their question-begging character. The arguments I look at threaten her with self-defeat, circularity, redundancy, and a descent into external world scepticism. Most of these charges turn out to be unfounded once we get clear about what it means for the normative realist to make substantive assumptions. The argument from a descent into external world scepticism is more robust but not strong enough to yield its conclusion. I draw two lessons from this: (1) The evolutionary debunker can safely refuse to acknowledge substantive normative assumptions on the realist's part. (2) Evolutionary debunking arguments are therefore best understood as leaving the realist's normative beliefs *prima facie* unjustified, rather than as providing epistemic defeaters for them.

Section: Ethics
 Language: English
 Chair: Zsolt Ziegler
 Date: 17:25-17:55, 13 September 2017 (Wednesday)
 Location: SR 1.007



Michael Bruckner (University of Oxford, United Kingdom)
 I obtained my BA in Philosophy from the University of Vienna, where

I also gathered some experience as a teaching assistant in the area of practical philosophy and as a research assistant with the project New Directions in Plant Ethics. Currently, I am studying for the BPhil in Philosophy at Oxford. My main interests are meta-ethics and epistemology.

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Rational Self Doubt, Disagreement and Closure Principles

Paul Conlan

Two strands in contemporary epistemology are (1) the discussion surrounding Peer Disagreement (e.g. (Christensen, 2009)), and (2) examples of so called ‘closure failures’ which appear to undermine what otherwise appear to be natural ways of extending our knowledge.

In this paper, I will present a novel analysis of one case of ‘closure failure’ in terms of ‘Self-Disagreement’, a special form of Peer Disagreement.

I will explain what I mean by ‘closure failure’, focusing on the failures of single premise closure of justification, drawing on an example from Schechter (2013). Schechter’s argument relies on, for its force, a plausible epistemic principle of ‘rational self doubt’. I will give *prima facie* reason to accept such a principle.

I will examine the sort of rational self-doubt case Schechter outlines and frame it in terms of a special form of Peer Disagreement - Self-Disagreement. I will then compare this Self-Disagreement to cases of standard Peer Disagreement to reinforce the structural similarity between the two. Schechter’s discussion of higher order defeat in the rational self-doubt case parallels Feldman (2009) and his discussion of Peer Disagreement as higher-order evidence, suggesting that the defeat relation in both cases is based on the same epistemic principle of doubt.

Having drawn these parallels, I will draw on work by Pryor (2015), to suggest that there may be a principled way to resist such a closure failure, at the expense of the JJ principle, or something like it – that each of an agent’s justifications for believing some proposition must themselves be justified.

Adopting such a solution to the closure failure problem provides a response to at least some versions of the ‘steadfast solution’ to Peer Disagreement which suggest that such a solution is untenable.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Andrea Togni
Date: 11:50-12:20, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005



Paul Conlan (St Andrews - Stirling Programme, Scotland)

Paul Conlan is a PhD student on the St Andrews-Stirling joint programme as part of the Templeton Foundation Knowledge Beyond Natural Sciences project. His general philosophical interests are in self-knowledge, broadly construed, the links between peer-disagreement and defeat and the later Wittgenstein.

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The Status of Transcendental Logic in the Critique of Pure Reason

Alan Daboin

 In this paper, I assess transcendental logic, arguably Kant’s most important innovation in the Critique of Pure Reason, in terms of its relation to what he calls pure general logic (PGL). Kant famously defines logic as the science of the rules of the understanding, and he divides all “logics” into one of two mutually exclusive categories: general and special logics. A general logic concerns the necessary rules of thinking, but it ignores the nature of the objects at which our thoughts are directed. A special logic, on the other hand, contains the rules for thinking about a subclass of given objects. Many commentators have claimed that transcendental logic is a so-called special logic, thereby undermining its profound relation to PGL, with which it is often juxtaposed. I argue here that the relation between transcendental logic and PGL is analogous to that which exists between the categories of the understanding and the logical forms of judgment

(which are equivalent if we ignore the manifold of intuition). I do this by discussing transcendental cognition and looking at the content with which it is concerned, as well as by examining how the categories of the understanding, which serve as the elements of transcendental logic, are necessary for our thinking about all kinds of objects in the logical (and not merely the real) sense. The upshot of all this is that, alongside PGL, transcendental logic must be a general logic. However, it is unique as a general logic in the sense that it is primary to PGL (i.e., PGL requires transcendental logic), and it also unique in the sense that it grounds all special logics.

Section: History of Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Lucas Battich
Date: 12:25-12:55, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006



Alan Daboin (University Paris-Sorbonne, France)

I studied philosophy as an undergraduate at Columbia University in New York City and logic as a graduate student at the Sorbonne in Paris. My interests are mainly in the history of philosophy (particularly Kant and Hegel), but I also have a strong interest in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of mind.

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From Fictional Characters to Possible Worlds

Áron Dombrovski

The aim of my presentation is to find connections between the different contemporary theories of analytic philosophy of language and metaphysics. My main thesis is that the theory of propositions along with the direct reference theory (DR) is incompatible with the possible world fictionalism. I divide my presentation into 4 sections.

In section 1, I introduce the main presumptions and examine the problem of the negative existential statements, concluding that empty

names raise a serious problem for the theory of propositions and DR. To solve the problem, I assume that every name has a reference, even the fictional names.

In section 2, I ask the question: if fictional names have references, what are these objects? I present three plausible options, the Platonism, the non-actualism, and the abstract artefact theory. The arguments show that the best option is to consider the fictional entities as abstract artefacts.

In section 3, I introduce the possible world fictionalism, which is supposed to be an antirealist option. According to the possible world fictionalism, the theory of possible worlds, and the possible worlds themselves in the theory are fictions, which do not exist. But this statement contradicts the claims presented in section 1 and 2: if someone accepts the theory of propositions and the DR, then she has to consider the fictions and fictional characters as existing abstract artefacts. So, the possible world fictionalist should choose other – less plausible – semantical theories, or she should accept that the fiction of genuine realism and the possible worlds in it are actually existing entities.

In section 4 I offer a realist theory of possible world fictionalism. One pillar of my conception is Rudolf Carnap's explication method, and the other is to base the semantics of the possible world speech on David Lewis 1986. My theory is not fully elaborated yet, but it shows that there is a good outlook for a realist possible world fictionalism, which is compatible with the theory of propositions and the direct reference theory.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Tomi Francis
Date: 11:10-11:40, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003



Áron Dombrovski (Eötvös Loránd University, Department of Logic, Hungary)

I got my Liberal Arts BA degree at University of Pécs, where I was a member of Kerényi Károly Special College for Advanced Students.

Currently, I'm a master's student in the Logic and Theory of Science program at Eötvös Loránd University, Department of Logic. I also work in a research group on philosophy of language, investigating the semantics of figurative speech. My main field of interest is the connection among semantic theories and their metaphysical upshot, especially in Kripke's philosophy. My current project in this area is to construct an analogue between the analysis of fictionalist discourse and the fictionalist theory towards modality.

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Quine on Shared Language and Linguistic Communities

Matej Drobňák

 The idea that language is primarily social is at the heart of Quine's views. As he famously states: "Language is a social art" and he continues to talk about language as "ours" and "social" at many places of his writings. Numerous references may create the impression that he believes in some kind of naive conventionalism, that he believes that linguistic communities are basically stable and uniform and so members of those communities share a language. This way of interpreting Quine is sometimes explicitly and often implicitly suggested by commentators. I must admit that it is a tempting interpretation, especially if we look at the role which Quine ascribes to the corrective behaviour and if we take into consideration the way that Quine talks about natural languages.

However, I do not believe that naive conventionalism can be legitimately ascribed to Quine. If we look at his views on language learning in detail, we can conclude that his way of talking about natural languages as shared is no more than a provisional simplification. On the contrary, I believe that Quine is much closer to linguistic individualism, the view according to which an explanation of natural languages builds on the notion of idiolects and according to which there is no guarantee that speakers share a language.

As I will try to show, Quine's views do not depend on the notion of shared language at all. When Quine talks about natural languages he talks about scientific idealizations which are necessary for the scientific practice. Moreover, the criterion for deciding if a speaker belongs to a

community does not depend on the notion of shared language and communities do not need to be uniform. Boundaries of communities depend on successfulness of communication and “successful communication” is a parameter which can be adjusted in accordance with our practical purposes.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Till Gallasch
Date: 15:10-15:40, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.005



Matej Drobnák (University of Hradec Králové, Czech Republic)
Matej Drobnák graduated Mgr. studies in philosophy at Catholic University in Ružomberok. Since 2014 he is doing his PhD. at the University of Hradec Králové under supervision of Prof. Jaroslav Peregrin. His main research areas are philosophy of language and metasemantics, specifically the topic of conventions in language and communication.
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Freedom and causality in the Block Universe

Bogdan Andrei Dumitrescu

 In this paper I will attempt to defend Carl Hoefer’s compatibilist account of free will and determinism that is expounded in his article “Freedom from the Inside Out” (2002. Royal Institute of Philosophy, pp 201-222) I will answer the criticisms brought by Jason Brennan in the article “Free Will in the Block Universe” (Philosophia (2007) 35: 207.) and will show that these can be addressed adequately without changing the core ideas of Carl Hoefer in his compatibilist account of free will and determinism.

Hoefer maintains that the problem of free will is closely related to our understanding of time. He alludes to McTaggart’s distinction of the two times: A series time and B series time. Assuming the A series time, we believe that the past is fixed and that a past time slice will determine all future time slices and our actions in the present. Hoefer

proposes that we conceive time as a B series in a Block universe. Then determinism will not privilege one particular time slice as the absolute determiner of all the rest of the time slices. In this Block universe, our actions are free, because they are parts of time slices that act as determiners of others.

Brennan brings two criticisms. Firstly, we have an asymmetry regarding the causal efficacy of our actions. Hoefer seems to suggest that we have just as much causal efficacy towards the future as we have towards the past which would make our freedom either inexistent or very small.

Secondly, we ought to see our actions in the Block universe as random occurrences or brute facts, in which case they would not be free. Agent causation theory may be the solution here, but it would make Hoefer's account useless.

I argue that Brennan confuses causal efficacy with deterministic relations in the article. Causation and determinism are to be viewed as separate issues. I propose that the introduction of a Kantian influenced agent causation theory will solve these issues without making Hoefer's thesis irrelevant.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Petter Sandstad
Date: 14:35-15:05, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003



Bogdan Andrei Dumitrescu (University of Bucharest, Romania)
I am a BA student at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Bucharest, Romania. I have started the studies in 2015 and I will graduate in June 2017. My research interests are in the fields of metaphysics, ontology, epistemology and meta-ethics. My main focuses are on the problem of free will, determinism, causality, abstract entities and on emotivism in meta-ethics. I am currently working on my Bachelor dissertation.

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Is Perfectionism a Reasonable Alternative to the Neutrality Thesis?

Maximilian Fenner

 In contemporary political philosophy, many liberals claim that the state should remain neutral in their promotion of valuable conceptions of the good life. Some argue that this can be derived from the priority of a theory of the right, others within a neutral framework of reasonable disagreement in a pluralist society. But as these theories have been criticized by communitarians and libertarians on other grounds, there is also good reason to question the validity of the neutrality claim more generally. In theory, the turn towards a neutral political framework is quite new to the philosophical literature and in practice, it is hardly the case that liberal states are neutral in their treatment of competing conceptions of the good. Hence the question arises: is there a reasonable alternative to state neutrality?

I explore this question here. To do this, I venture into a political philosophy of perfectionism as a viable means of critique. But, as much has been written on the topic, I take an alternative route of exploration. This paper analyzes Joseph Chan's Confucian approach from *Confucian Perfectionism: a political philosophy for modern times* (2013) to enrich the current debate. To do this, I first disentangle the idea of neutrality 'within' the liberal paradigm to more deeply grasp the grounds of the general critique. I then dissect Chan's 'outside' perspective, a Confucian approach to ideal conditions and real world problems whilst questioning his innovation and recycling of ideas in my analysis. I evaluate the force of this account to justify a non-neutral political morality by reconstructing possible answers to the priority of the right and the neutrality principle to then look at the added value in general.

My main contention is that Chan's theory succeeds as a vehicle for moderate perfectionism, as it is innovative in harmonizing ideas from the entire philosophical spectrum, yet it does so by recycling Western conceptions of legitimacy, social practices and justice. This is problematic and I discuss this controversy in closing.

Section: Political Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Maciej Juzaszek
Date: 15:10-15:40, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007



Maximilian Fenner (Freie Universität Berlin, Germany)

Currently, I am a bachelor student of Philosophy and Political Science at the Freie Universität Berlin. Previously, I was a student at Columbia University in New York where I studied for two years. I grew up between the United States and Germany. My main interests lie in normative ethics, political cosmopolitanism and democratic theory.

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The constancy mechanism proposal for the Limits of Intentionality

Sergio De Souza Filho

Naturalist theories of intentionality like teleosemantics and informational semantics are often criticized of being too liberal about the requirements for a given state to constitute a representation – they treat certain states as representations when they are clearly not representational. But what is the lower border of intentionality that distinguishes the limiting cases of representational states from non-representational ones? In order to solve this problem, it is necessary to establish conditions for minimal intentionality – those conditions satisfied by the most primitive representational states. Kim Sterelny and Tyler Burge have proposed that the employment of constancy mechanisms constitutes a minimal condition for intentionality. My goal on this presentation is to attack the viability of the constancy mechanism proposal. The objection starts with the demonstration that this proposal is implicitly committed with the thesis that there are no distal content representations, only proximal content ones. As a consequence, its viability depends upon the establishment of a minimal distance between the represented external feature and the organism's sensorial apparatus. However, the fact that the distinction between

proximal and distal features is not clear cut, but rather comes in degree, constitutes a real challenge for the establishment of such minimal distance. My conclusion is that the constancy mechanism proposal is not capable of establishing the minimal distance between the represented external feature and the organism's sensorial apparatus and hence that its viability is doomed.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Franz Altner
Date: 10:00-10:30, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004



Sergio De Souza Filho (King's College London, United Kingdom)
Brazilian PhD candidate at the Department of Philosophy, King's College London. My PhD research is on the problem of mental content and representation and in my thesis I am developing a variation of a teleological theory of content under the supervision of Prof. David Papineau. Master in Philosophy (MPhil) at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. B.A. in Philosophy at the Federal University of Pernambuco, Brazil. Areas of specialization: Philosophy of Mind (intentionality, theories of mental content and representation), Philosophy of Language (rule-following, normativity of meaning) and Metaphysics. E-Mail: sergiofariasfilho@gmail.com

BY SHiP, BuY a SHeeP or an eBaY SHoP? Lessons from the Language of Hebrew Scripture for Contemporary Theories of Metaphor

Szilvia Finta

 In my presentation I analyze the language of the Hebrew Scripture and based on it I propose new aspects for modern Theories of Metaphor. First of all I would like to present some essential characteristics of the Hebrew Language. The Hebrew Language uses only consonants (in the majority of cases); there are no vowels in the words. When we read a newspaper or a book there are

only consonants in the text, so a word can be pronounced several ways. Moreover, in the scrolls of the Hebrew Scripture there are no sentences, but only bigger sections in the text. Therefore if somebody wants to read a sentence in Hebrew, he first has to understand the meaning of the text before reading it out. According to the language of the Hebrew Scripture it is evident, that we can not speak about a first literal meaning and a second metaphorical meaning that is based on the first literal meaning (as several Theories of Metaphor suggest it), but instead we should consider a first meaning which can be literal or metaphorical, and a second meaning which can also be literal or metaphorical. The first meaning is the one that is the most relevant according to the context. Furthermore, I would like to demonstrate in my presentation, that the metaphorical utterances have propositional content, which differs from the propositional content of its literal meaning, and then that the propositional content of the metaphorical utterances can be direct, while the literal meaning can be indirect.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Andrea Raimondi
Date: 11:10-11:40, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.005



Szilvia Finta (Saint Paul Academy, Hungary)

Szilvia Finta finished her M.A. studies in Philosophy at Eötvös Loránd University this year, in January. She holds a Ph.D. in Judaic Sciences from Jewish Theological Seminary (University of Jewish Studies). She is an assistant professor at Saint Paul Academy. Her current research interests include the principal subdisciplines of Analytic Philosophy vs. Biblical / Rabbinic Theology (for example Logic, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind etc.), exegesis (Rabbinic Midrash) and Jewish Philosophy.

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Two Dogmas of Saul Kripke (Concerning Language) and a Solution to His Puzzle

Rares Fogas

 The main interest of my paper is to elaborate on what I call the two dogmas of Saul Kripke with regard to language: language independent of speaker and language determined by metaphysics.

In order to do so, I start with some preliminary remarks (Section 1) on the semantics of proper names, offering some prerequisites for properly understanding the question of my article. In Section 2, I present Kripke's puzzle about belief (1979), hinting at the aforementioned dogmas. I analyze two solutions to this puzzle, proposed by Ruth Barcan Marcus (1981) and Jee Loo Liu (2013), including Liu's 'two-component descriptivist theory of proper names' in Section 3. Marcus offers a referentialist solution and works on one of the principles of Kripke's puzzle, turning the semantical discussion into a rather epistemological one. Contrariwise, Liu aims at dissolving the puzzle by a descriptivist analysis of proper names. I end with some general remarks on Kripke's philosophy of language and the theory of direct reference, but not before I offer my own solution to the puzzle.

Even if I cannot accept Liu's theory in its entirety, my solution is similar to hers. This paper does not claim to have a final answer to the question of proper names semantics, but hopes that it offers a better 'image' of the matter, by avoiding the difficulties of direct reference in epistemic and doxastic contexts. Although I will not expand on this, the article has heuristic reasons as well. It may very well be that 'the preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination round'.

Section: Philosophy of Language
 Language: English
 Chair: Till Gallasch
 Date: 14:35-15:05, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
 Location: SR 1.005



Rares Fogas (University of Bucharest, Romania)

I am a third-year undergraduate student of philosophy from the University of Bucharest, writing my B.A. thesis on what I call the two ‘dogmas’ one can encounter in Kripke’s philosophy of language. My interests are mainly in the area of theoretical philosophy, especially philosophy of language, Early Analytic Philosophy and philosophy of science. For the next two years of graduate studies I plan to advance with regard to philosophy of physics in general and history of philosophy (Kant, Frege, Carnap, Quine and Wittgenstein).

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The Contingent Brutalist Response to the Special Composition Question

Tomi Francis

he Special Composition Question is the question of under what conditions material objects compose. In this talk I will set out and defend the Contingent Brutalist response to the Special Composition Question: it is a brute and contingent matter whether some material objects compose. I argue that just as the existence of objects without proper parts can plausibly be taken to be brute, the existence of objects with proper parts can also be taken to be brute. The obvious picture opposing this is one in which the existence of objects with proper parts is grounded in the existence of those proper parts. I show that this picture is incompatible with the well-foundedness of grounding, and so should be rejected. I further claim that Contingent Brutalism has important theoretical advantages over positions on which composition facts are brute but necessary, in that it avoids unexplained metaphysical connections between some objects being a certain way and there existing a further object which is their composite. Finally, I explain what I think the Contingent Brutalist can and should say about when composition occurs in actuality. I claim that this is relatively little: the Contingent Brutalist ought to be committed to those composites which are indispensable to their best overall theory of the world – in particular, the best available scientific theories – and no other composites. Insofar as the Nihilist strategy of paraphrasing sentences about composites to sentences about their component simples is successful, the Contingent Brutalist should not be committed to any cases (or failures) of composition.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Zach Johnson
Date: 11:50-12:20, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003



Tomí Francis (University of Oxford, United Kingdom)

I'm a first year graduate student in Philosophy, currently studying for the B.Phil. Prior to this, I studied Mathematics at the University of Warwick, switching to Mathematics and Philosophy in January 2015. My main research interests are in the Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, but I also have interests in Ethics and Metaphysics. At the moment, I'm particularly interested in (in)determinacy in mathematics, the semantics of mathematical language, vagueness, population ethics, and mereological composition.

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Invalidating strategies of dealing with Chisholm's Paradox

Fernando Furtado

ould my wooden table have been a golden table? If we have no principle to rule out a couple of possibilities, then virtually anything could have been anything else. This is what seems to be made clear by so-called “Chisholm's Paradox” which does not set up any restriction among de re possibilities interpreted by standard Kripke-style semantics for modal logic. Thinking about my wooden table, one restricted version Chisholm's paradox arises from the fact that we may be in a position to hold both i) the very same table could have been made of a slightly different hunk of wood and ii) the very same table could not have been made of a hunk of wood which does not overlap the original one at all. One interesting (and maybe underappreciated) way of dealing with the paradox is trying to look closer at the logic surrounding it. Supposing that we cannot accept the conclusion of Chisholm's paradox and we do acknowledge its premises as true, then only one sort of strategy is available: to try to demonstrate that there is

something going wrong with the logic which recognizes the paradoxical argument as valid. The infamous logic underlying the paradox is the first-order modal logic with standard semantics for S5. Although there might not be so many of us willing to give up on first-order modal logic, that was exactly what both Forbes and Salmon have proposed. Two completely different implementations have been advanced by each one, so one of the main aims of this talk will be to evaluate which strategy might be the most the successful. On the one hand, Forbes' strategy is a mix of counterpart theory and many-valued modal logic. On the other hand, Salmon's strategy rejects transitivity on the relationship between possible worlds. Neither Forbes nor Salmon provide a simple solution but that was already known. So, let us check which one is the most plausible solution.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Tomi Francis
Date: 10:00-10:30, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003



Fernando Furtado (University of Lisbon, Portugal)

Fernando Furtado is a Brazilian young philosopher currently enjoying the beauty of living in Lisbon. He got his MA degree in philosophy at the Federal University of Minas Gerais, Brazil, in 2014, the same year that he joined the LanCong Group at the University of Lisbon and started his Ph.D research under the guidance of Professor João Branquinho. His Ph.D dissertation is focussed on issues related to modal metaphysics, mainly the relationship between logics and modality. Although Fernando is currently working on metaphysics, he is also interested in many different subjects in analytic philosophy. His main published works so far are “Quem Sabe Outra Hora” and “Teorias da Referência e Resposta Histórico-causal aos Contra-exemplos de Donnellan”. And he has the forthcoming papers waited for the current year “Explicação Pré-semântica das Descrições Referenciais” and “Modal Paradox”. Fernando has been working to increase popularity of analytic philosophy among Portuguese speakers community through his actions as a member of both Brazilian Society for Analytic Philosophy and Portuguese

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The Gray's Elegy Argument: Can Definite Descriptions be Singular Terms?

Till Gallasch

ussell famously presents his theory of descriptions as well as a particular argument against other theories thereof in *On Denoting* (1905). This argument is called 'Gray's Elegy argument' because of Russell's example 'the first line of Gray's Elegy'. It is widely considered as partly cryptic and confused with regards to the use of different types of quotation marks and variables. This has lead Alonzo Church to dismiss the whole argument (1943). Following Nathan Salmon's detailed reconstruction and analysis in *On Designating* (2005) I take Russell's goal to be to refute the popular view that definite descriptions are singular terms as e.g. held by Frege. Russell claims that definite descriptions do not have the function to designate a single individual, they have "no meaning in isolation". Salmon's interpretation of the argument rests on the phenomenon of a collapse within theories which ascribe a content/designatum difference to definite descriptions and take them to be singular terms. It occurs while attempting to form a proposition about the content of a definite description α . When using a name without a content/designatum difference for the content of α , we fail to get a proposition about the content of α and instead get one about the designatum of α . When using a term with a content/designatum difference, e.g. another definite description β , and given a version of compositionality the collapse occurs again within the proposition, since the content of α is part of the content of β . This is what Russell takes to be "philosophically intolerable", since there cannot be a road from designatum to content or as Frege would put it from *Bedeutung* to *Sinn*.

In my talk I would like to present Salmon's reconstruction of the argument and thus to lift the veil of mystery around the Gray's Elegy argument. I will also try to argue for a way to escape the argument and attempt to show why it eventually fails to refute the view that definite descriptions are singular terms.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Andrea Raimondi
Date: 10:00-10:30, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.005



Till Gallasch (Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Germany)

Till Gallasch is a master's student at the Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Germany. He finished his B.A. in 2015 with a major in Philosophy and a minor in History. His thesis was about Hilary Putnam's "Brains in the Vat". Philosophy of language, Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics are his main interests. He is a student assistant since 2014 and has conducted several tutorials on philosophy of language, logic and metaphysics.

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Objectivity of Adjudication and Metaethics

Filip Gołba

The aim of the paper is to consider suitability of tools offered by contemporary metaethics for solution of some issues in theory of adjudication stemming from apparent role moral reasoning plays in legal reasoning. These questions may be raised independently of the stance on nature of law one adheres to. In some cases (interpretivism, natural law theories or inclusive positivism), even the content of legal norms may depend on the content of moral norms, whereas in the case of exclusive positivism, though the content of legal norms is independent of the content of moral norms, the latter may nonetheless be relevant e.g. when legal norms expressly refer to them, when the law alone does not determine one right answer or when it is necessary to use non-textual methods of interpretation.

If moral reasons indeed to some extent determine adjudication, than objectivity of the adjudication may arguably depend on some form of moral realism. This paper will attempt to assess whether the adoption of "modest" metaethical stances, which do not require strong metaphysical assumptions is sufficient to defend the objectivity of moral reasoning appearing in the justifications of judicial decisions.

Neil MacCormick's early theory of interpretation is to be used as a reference point. This theory includes so called "second-order justification", which is based on the consequentialist arguments and the requirements of consistency and coherence, thereby seem to rely on reasoning similar to moral one. An attempt will be made to answer the question whether accepting the account of moral reasoning characteristic for "modest" metaethical positions allows the "second-order justification" to be non-arbitrary.

Section: Philosophy of Law
Language: English
Chair: Florian Wieczorek
Date: 10:35-11:05, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002



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Conflict-Undermining Anti-Skeptical Strategies

Max Timo Goetsch

SCommon sense has it that everyday empirical knowledge is abundant. The skeptic, in contrast, claims to have arguments to the effect that we cannot have such knowledge. In recent years, a number of semantic strategies have emerged, seeking to reconcile both views. Their advocates claim to be able to undermine the apparent conflict between common sense and skeptical argument, resulting in a no-fault view. In particular, variantist proposals such as contextualism and contrastivism have been advanced in this spirit. In my talk, I will inquire whether genuinely conflict-undermining strategies are available for a closure-based skepticism which denies that we can have any epistemic reasons for believing the denials of skeptical hypotheses. I shall give a negative answer. For conflict-undermining strategies generally collapse into revisionary strategies. In conclusion,

I will outline the consequences that this finding has on the dialectical status of variantist proposals as anti-skeptical strategies.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Franziska Poprawe
Date: 15:40-16:10, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005



Max Timo Goetsch (Freie Universität Berlin, Germany)

Max Timo Goetsch is a graduate student of philosophy in the master's program at Free University Berlin. He holds a bachelor's degree in philosophy and linguistics from Albert-Ludwigs University Freiburg. Main areas of interest include epistemology (the analysis of understanding, skepticism, hinge epistemology), meta-epistemology (epistemic relativism and absolutism), as well as applied epistemology (especially, the analysis of expertise) and its connections to political theory (epistemic justification of democracy).

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The Russo-Williamson Thesis and Its Implications for Psychiatry

Sydney Katherine Green

The Russo-Williamson Thesis (RWT) maintains that, for a causal claim to hold water, evidence of both statistical correlation and mechanism is required. For instance, to prove that drug X cures disease Y , researchers must provide both (1) evidence that there is a strong statistical correlation between the use of X and the elimination or amelioration of Y , and (2) evidence of a mechanism by which X eliminates or ameliorates Y . This requirement is intended to eliminate the possibility of confounding, and aims to prevent the acceptance of causal claims which later turn out to be spurious. In this paper, I take the RWT and apply it to one area which has not yet received much treatment: psychiatry. While the RWT's implications have been discussed extensively in connection to medicine and

the social sciences, its implications for psychiatry have not received the same level of attention. I argue that, if it is taken seriously, the RWT eliminates many, if not most, of the causal claims made within psychiatry. This is because these causal claims rarely rely on two separate types of evidence, one of statistical correlations and one of mechanisms. Instead, such claims derive mechanistic explanations from statistical correlations, developing likely causal stories which are not independently verified. To illustrate this point, I discuss a few historical examples from psychiatry, including the dopamine hypothesis for schizophrenia and the monoamine hypothesis for depression. Following this historical examination, I discuss the RWT's implications for scientific practice and decision-making in psychiatry, arguing that a too-strong evidentiary standard risks alienating researchers and clinicians and stifling scientific progress.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Gregor Greslehner
Date: 18:00-18:30, 13 September 2017 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.006



Sydney Katherine Green (University of Antwerp, Belgium)

I am currently a doctoral researcher at the University of Antwerp in Belgium. My doctoral project is focused on the amalgamation of evidence for causal claims in medicine and the social sciences. I completed my MA and MPhil in philosophy at KU Leuven in Belgium, and my BA in philosophy at Hamline University in St. Paul, Minnesota.

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The “Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics” in Biology and the Fallacy from Complexity

Gregor Greslehner

The applicability of mathematics in the natural sciences has been subject to opposing views. Eugene P. Wigner famously discussed the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences” (Wigner 1960). On the other hand, Israel M. Gelfand pessimistically spoke of “the unreasonable ineffectiveness of mathematics in biology”.

I defend the view that arguments against the usefulness of mathematics in the biological sciences are based on

(i) ignorance of success stories from the history of useful applications of mathematical models in biology,

(ii) the misconception that the ideals of how mathematics has been applied to physics in the past would be transferable to biology, and

(iii) a mistaken argument with reference to the complexity of biological systems.

While (i) and (ii) are of historical nature, the argument from complexity (iii) will be analyzed systematically and in more detail. This argument can be reconstructed as follows:

1. Mathematics can only be useful in simple settings.
2. Biology is not simple.
3. Thus, mathematics is not useful in biology.

Contrary to premise 1, I argue with recent examples from systems biology that it is exactly in complex settings where mathematics provides the tools needed for biological reasoning.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Birgit Benzing
Date: 15:05-15:35, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006



Gregor Greslehner (University of Salzburg, Austria)

Gregor Greslehner is a philosophy PhD student at the University of Salzburg, working in philosophy of biology. He also holds a master's degree in molecular biology. Currently, he is a visiting scholar at the University of California, Irvine.

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Ästhetische Werte in der mathematischen Forschung

Paul Hasselkuß

Akademische Mathematiker weisen Aussagen z.B. über “Schönheit” oder “Eleganz” von Theoremen und Beweisen einen erheblichen Stellenwert für die eigene Forschungsarbeit zu (siehe nur G. H. Hardy, G. Rota oder H. Poincaré). Eine systematische Aufarbeitung solcher Aussagen aus wissenschaftstheoretischer Perspektive fand bisher allerdings kaum statt.

Aus mathematikdidaktischer Sicht übernehmen Aussagen über mathematische Schönheit im Hinblick auf die Forschungsarbeit evaluierende, motivierende und generierende Funktionen. Vor diesem Hintergrund werde ich argumentieren, dass diese Aussagen einen Wertmaßstab etablieren, der für die mathematische Forschung unverzichtbar ist.

Wenn vorausgesetzt wird, dass wissenschaftstheoretische Modelle mindestens eine deskriptive Komponente haben – welche real präzise und erfolgreiche Wertmaßstäbe und Theorien beinhaltet – so folgt, dass der Maßstab mathematischer Schönheit Bestandteil wissenschaftstheoretischer Modelle mathematischer Forschung sein muss.

Wann aber sind Aussagen über die mathematische Schönheit etwa eines Theorems eigentlich korrekt? Mathematiker verstehen Aussagen über mathematische Schönheit oft als reduktive Aussagen: Ein Theorem T ist dann und nur dann schön, wenn es z.B. die Eigenschaften maximaler Anwendbarkeit und größtmöglicher Kürze aufweist.

Basierend auf empirischen Untersuchungen werde ich dem gegenüber argumentieren, dass reduktive Ansätze nicht in der Lage sind, mathematische Schönheit adäquat zu erklären, weil sie genötigt sind, Aussagen, die real als Wertmaßstab erfolgreich verwendet werden, als falsch zu verstehen. Stattdessen schlage ich eine ästhetische Theorie mathema-

tischer Schönheit vor, die an realistische Modelle analytischer Ästhetik anknüpft.

Section: Logic & Philosophy of Mathematics
Language: German
Chair: Stefan Forster
Date: 14:35-15:05, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002



Paul Hasselkuß (Heinrich-Heine Universität Düsseldorf, Germany) Paul Hasselkuß absolviert sein Masterstudium in Philosophie an der Heinrich-Heine Universität Düsseldorf. Seine Interessensgebiete umfassen Wissenschaftstheorie, Metaphilosophie und Ästhetik. Außerdem interessiert er sich für die Philosophie der amerikanischen Transzendentalisten.

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Scanlon on Blame and the Moral Relationship

Alexander Heape

Moral wrongs are blameworthy. According to Contractualists, an action is morally wrong just in case it is disallowed by principles that no one could reasonably reject. But, unlike proponents of other moral views, Contractualists cannot explain why moral wrongs are blameworthy by claiming that they are “bad” or “irrational” in any teleological sense. It may be best for everyone, or rational for oneself, to do what some other person could reasonably object to. Contractualists must provide some other explanation.

In recent work, T.M. Scanlon has argued that an action is blameworthy just in case it impairs a relationship with another person. Call this the blameworthiness thesis (BT). To explain the nature of moral blameworthiness, Scanlon further proposes that there is a distinctively moral relationship that we share with all rational agents. Call this the moral relationship thesis (MRT). According to Scanlon, BT and MRT together explain why moral wrongdoings are subject to blame, dissent, and objection.

However, given BT, for any person to be blameworthy for a moral wrongdoing, he must have some relation with the injured party. Given the plausible claim that anyone can be blameworthy for committing a moral wrongdoing against anyone, Scanlon must explain how any two persons are party to a moral relationship. To do so, he rejects the view that a relationship is necessarily constituted by the attitudes of those who are party to it. Call this the attitudinal constraint (AC).

Rejecting AC presents Scanlon's view with a number of problems. First, it seems to conflate the notion of an interpersonal relation with that of an interpersonal relationship. Second, it seems to locate the justification for our practices of moral blame in moral principles rather than facts about substantive relationships. Third, there is no obvious reason to reject AC, other than the fact that doing so is required for Scanlon's view to give the right predictions.

I argue that Scanlon's view can avoid these problems by accepting AC. It can do so by appealing to a modified version of BT. On this view, A's action is blameworthy just in case it impairs a possible relationship with some other person B that there is sufficient reason for A and B to have. Call this the modified blameworthiness thesis (MBT). I argue that MBT gives more accurate predictions about which actions are blameworthy, and is easily accommodated by Scanlon's own account of *impairment*.

Since we ought to accept MBT, there is no reason to reject AC. If blameworthiness does not depend on the impairment of a relationship one actually has, the fact that one does not have the attitudes that constitute it does not imply that one is not blameworthy. This gives proponents of Scanlon's view the resources to develop a much more plausible account of MRT. To do so, they need to explain which attitudes might constitute the moral relationship. I conclude by suggesting what I consider a particularly interesting option.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Jonas Blatter
Date: 10:35-11:05, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007



Alexander Heape (University of Oxford, UK)

Alexander Heape is doctoral student in philosophy at the University of Oxford. He works on trust and its relation to topics in moral theory, practical reasoning, and blame.

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Reasons-Responsiveness and Rational Blind Spots

David Heering

 It is commonly held that akratic actions are a subclass of free actions while compulsive actions are a subclass of unfree actions. But in virtue of what are akratic action free and compulsive actions unfree? A prominent type of approach is to spell out free will in terms of a special dispositional property of the agent, her reasons-responsiveness or rational capacity (RR). The relevant rational capacities are global capacities, according to RR-accounts, capacities agents keep even if they cannot manifest them in their actual circumstances. The sense of capacity RR-accounts latch onto is then comparable to the sense in which a glass wrapped in bubble wrap keeps its disposition to break.

This model of free will accounts for the difference between akrasia and compulsion as follows: Akratic agents (i) keep RR and (ii) their failure to exercise that capacity explains their action. Compulsive agents don't keep RR, so something else, like an irresistible desire, explains their action.

I argue that the RR-solution is flawed. RR-accounts cannot handle rational blind spots. Rational blind spots are a kind of Achilles Heel to an agent's rational capacities: highly local incapacities to respond to a very particular type of reason. If a rational blind spot is triggered, then, because the agent actually fails to respond to the type of reason relevant to the circumstances she is in, her action is unfree. But she keeps the global capacity to respond to the relevant reasons and her failure to exercise this capacity explains her action. This is because RR-accounts focus on the global capacity to respond to reasons, which an agent keeps even if she actually fails to exercise it. So if agents act on the basis of blind spots, they satisfy (i) and (ii), but they nevertheless act compulsively. There is therefore a type of compulsion – blind spot compulsion – that RR-accounts are structurally incapable of accounting for.

Section: Action Theory
Language: English
Chair: Albert Anglberger
Date: 15:10-15:40, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004



David Heering (University of Leeds, UK)

David Heering is a PhD student at University of Leeds. His PhD project focuses on the relationship between our capacities to recognize and act for reasons and free will. His research interests include metnormativity and metaethics, especially theories of rationality, as well as the philosophy of action.

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A Critique of Longino’s Theory Choice Justifications

Samantha Hirshland

elen Longino argues in her 1990 book, *Science as Social Knowledge* that if the underdetermination thesis is true, then we should allow political and other non-cognitive values – which she calls “contextual” values – to guide our choice of which scientific theories to adopt when competing theories have the same amount of empirical evidence.

In this paper, I focus on Longino’s justifications for her choice of favoring a theory of the role of the brain in behavior, which Longino calls the “selectionist model,” over a conflicting theory which she calls the “linear-hormonal model,” based on her desire for a model that allows for human agency and therefore fits with her values.

I first explain the relevant differences in the two models and then outline Longino’s justifications for her preference of the selectionist model over the linear-hormonal model. Second, I offer general criticisms of her approach and explain why I believe her rationale for the choice is misguided. I don’t comment on the choice itself, however—it may indeed be true that her selectionist model is a superior theory. I explain here why the idea that we should increase the use of “good” social and political values does not necessarily follow from Longino’s claim that

incorporating some amount of contextual values in theory choice is inevitable. Third, I discuss some of the specific dangers in using Longino's justifications for theory choice. I provide a hypothetical example where using her strategy for theory choice could be problematic. I end by providing possible alternative methods for theory choice in the face of underdetermination.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Laurenz Hudetz
Date: 15:10-15:40, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006



Samantha Hirshland (Northeastern University, USA)

Currently an undergraduate student at Northeastern University. Main research areas are bioethics and philosophy of science. Graduated from Deerfield Academy in 2013.

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State of the Art Bias

David Hopf

When we talk about the trustworthiness of scientific findings, we might think of biases detrimental either to the robustness or validity and thus the reliability of research. In this talk, I point out a novel concept of bias that implies no such thing: State of the Art Bias (SAB). Multiple examples for this phenomenon have appeared in the recent literature:

– Brown (2008) describes the problem of a bias towards patentable research. Corporate sponsors will only be interested in research that leads to innovations that they can make money from and not in alternative approaches like sports or diet that might prevent disease instead of curing it.

– Sismondo (2008) calls attention to what he calls “multiple trials with predictable outcomes”. He claims that there are many drug trials

on products already on the market which are used as a sort of advertisement for these blockbusterdrugs by informing physicians about each new trial, while less lucrative products receive much less attention.

– Kearns, Glantz and Schmidt (2015) analyze internal documents from the sugar industry, concluding that the industry tried to deflect possible damages to their sales resulting from scientific findings by funding research on how to reduce the damage from sugar consumption instead of reducing the intake itself.

All these examples share a common mechanism, that so far hasn't been well explored in philosophy of science: the sheer quantity of research on certain topics – reaching from overemphasis to no research at all – can profoundly influence the confirmation of hypotheses, the comprehensiveness of decision-relevant information and, thus, the perceived weight of alternative courses of action.

My presentation has two main goals:

1. To give a definition of SAB, and discuss differences and common features of the examples
2. To discuss how SAB diminishes the trustworthiness of scientific findings, both as a cognitive bias as well as a genuine epistemological problem.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Gregor Greslehner
Date: 16:50-17:20, 13 September 2017 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.006



David Hopf (Leibniz Universität Hannover, Germany)

David Hopf is a doctoral candidate at the University of Hannover, working on a dissertation on the interrelation between independence and objectivity. Together with his supervisor Prof. Dr. Torsten Wilholt, David is a member of InRes (<https://independenceofresearch.org/>), a collaborative research project funded by the Volkswagen Stiftung. In Hannover, David is also an associated member of the DFG research training group GRK 2073 “Integrating Ethics and Epistemology of Scientific Research”.

David has an M.A. in European Studies/Philosophy from the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, where he specialized in both general philosophy of science as well as the interrelations of science, ethics, and values.

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Naturalized Metaphysics as Second-Level Explanation. How Metaphysics can explain Scientific Ontologies

Julian Husmann

aurie Paul (2012) defends naturalized metaphysics claiming that the empirical sciences and naturalized metaphysics share the common method of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). The IBE has proven successful in the sciences and since metaphysical IBEs are not fundamentally different, Paul concludes that “if we accept *IBE* in scientific theorizing, we should accept it in metaphysical theorizing.” (Paul 2012, 22)

She conceptualizes the methods of the sciences and of naturalized metaphysics as “running in parallel”. In general the method of IBE yields the best explanans for a given explanandum. For Paul, the explananda of scientific and metaphysical IBEs differ and so do the explanantia which are to be determined. While the sciences explain experimental data proposing scientific theories, metaphysics explains our ordinary experience proposing metaphysical theories (cf. Paul 2012, 16).

Against Paul, I argue that the explananda of naturalized metaphysics are scientific ontologies, i. e. the set of a theory’s ontological commitments. Thus results of scientific IBEs become an input of metaphysical theorizing and metaphysical explanations are second-level explanations (of scientific ones). Scientific ontologies assume a role for metaphysical theorizing analogous to the role of experimental data for scientific theorizing. The adequacy of metaphysical theories is measured by scientific ontologies but such ontologies underdetermine metaphysical theory-choice so that the method of IBE is to be pursued.

In this picture, the sciences and naturalized metaphysics are more closely linked than Paul suggests. Furthermore, metaphysics inherits inductive risks from the sciences and adds additional risks. This explains why naturalized metaphysics is less certain than the sciences and it

confines the impetus of revisionary metaphysics on the sciences.

Reference:

Paul, Laurie (2012): "Metaphysics as modeling. The handmaiden's tale", in: *Philos Stud* 160, pp. 1-29.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Kyrke Otto
Date: 14:30-15:00, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003



Julian Husmann (Münster University, Germany)

Julian Husmann is a graduate student in Philosophy at Münster University. His main areas of interest are general philosophy of science and metaphysics of science. At Münster University he works as a tutor for scientific writing and as a student assistant. He is member of the German Society for Philosophy of Science (GWP), the German Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP) and the Münster-based Center for Philosophy of Science (ZfW).

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Sind Moore'sche Sätze das Fundament unseres Urteilssystems?

Sara Ipakchi

ach G. E. Moore umfasst der common sense wahres Wissen, welches keine Rechtfertigung benötigt. In 'A defence of common sense' (1925) beginnt Moore mit einer ausführlichen Liste von Sätzen, von denen er mit Sicherheit weiß, dass sie wahr sind: 'Derzeit existiert ein lebender menschlicher Körper, der mein Körper ist.', 'Dieser Körper ist zu einer bestimmten Zeit in der Vergangenheit geboren worden und existierte seitdem fortwährend.', oder 'Die Erde ist sehr alt.', etc. Da solche Wahrheiten nicht nur Moore, sondern jedem Menschen gewiss sind, nimmt er sie als unstrittige Prämissen in seinem Beweis der Außenwelt an. In 'Proof of an external world' (1939)

schließt er beispielsweise: Hier ist eine Hand. Hier ist eine andere Hand. Also es existieren zwei menschliche Hände. Die Existenz zweier Hände zeigt, dass es eine Außenwelt gibt. Im Unterschied zu Moore vertritt Wittgenstein die Auffassung, dass es sich bei solchen Sätzen – bekannt als Moore'sche Sätze – im Normalfall nicht um Wissen handelt. Angesicht der klassischen Auffassung des Wissensbegriffs – wahre gerechtfertigte Überzeugung – sind solche Sätze, wie Wittgenstein behauptet, aus Mangel an Rechtfertigung kein Wissen.

Wenn Wittgenstein Recht hat und es sich bei den Sätzen des common sense nicht um Wissen handelt, gleichzeitig ihre Wahrheit aber gewiss ist, welchen Status haben die Sätze dann und welche Rolle spielen sie in unserem Urteilssystem? Wittgenstein beantwortet diese Fragen in 'Über Gewissheit' (1969) und seine vorläufige Antwort lautet, dass die Moore'schen Sätze die Prinzipien unseres Urteilssystems sind, womit er eine Zwischenposition zwischen Fundierungs- und Kohärenztheorie einnimmt. Im Vortrag werde ich diese Zwischenposition auf der Grundlage von 'Worauf man sich verlässt' (2007) von Andreas Krebs rekonstruieren. Das Ziel ist dabei, die Rolle der Moore'schen Sätze als Fundament unseres Urteilssystems zu diskutieren.

Section: Epistemology
Language: German
Chair: Franziska Poprawe
Date: 14:30-15:00, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005



Sara Ipakchi (Heinrich-Heine-Universität, Germany)

Sara Ipakchi studiert seit 2016 Philosophie (Master) und seit 2015 Mathematik (Bachelor) an der HHU Düsseldorf. Neben dem Bachelorabschluss in Philosophie an der Heinrich-Heine-Universität in Düsseldorf hat sie einen Bachelorabschluss in Informatik an der University of Science and Culture in Teheran, Iran erworben.

Das Thema ihre Bachelorarbeit in der Philosophie lautet: 'konnexive Logik'. Sie interessiert sich innerhalb der analytischen Philosophie, besonders für Logik, Wissenschaftsphilosophie, Erkenntnistheorie und Sprachphilosophie. In diesem Vortrag stellt sie einen Abschnitt ihres

Teamprojektes ‘Woran können wir nicht zweifeln?’ vor.

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Agency, Instrumental Rationality, and the Hierarchy of Desires

Jay Jian

 Recent studies on instrumental rationality (IR) have suggested that IR can be taken to be a basic constituent of agency (Korsgaard 2009; Raz 2005; Smith 2013). Some of our desires, however, can sometimes figure as the interfering factors that undermine the proper functioning of our agency (Frankfurt 1971,1977). So I shall develop from this idea a novel argument against the central Humean doctrine concerning how none of our ends can be rationally criticized under the instrumentalist picture of rationality.

The argument roughly runs as follows. Instrumental irrationality consists in failing to take the means to satisfy one’s ends. But sometimes we might fail to take the means to satisfy an end A only because we have another contrary end B which prevents us from taking the means to A. (For instance, I might fail to fulfill my desire to finish my paper in time only because I succumb to, and satisfy, my desire to procrastinate). So in cases of conflict between our ends, some of the contrary ends that we have might figure as the sources of our instrumental irrationality. These desires can therefore be criticized under the instrumentalist picture of rationality.

In fact, if an agent has been taking the means that aims to satisfy a long-term end A, then we would tend to take the long-term end to be the default standpoint for judging instrumental rationality. And we would tend to regard other conflicting short-term ends as the interfering factors that undermine her instrumental rationality. As I shall explain, this common assumption that we make in determining people’s instrumental rationality is supported by Davison’s principle of charity. Such an assumption, as I shall further contend, implies how there can be a substantive principle for rationally criticizing our ends under IR, namely, our short-term ends can be rationally criticized under IR if they run contrary to our long-term ends.

Section: Action Theory
Language: English
Chair: Albert Anglberger
Date: 14:35-15:05, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004



Jay Jian (University of Oxford, United Kingdom)

I am a second year DPhil student studying philosophy in the University of Oxford. Prior to my DPhil study, I completed my BPhil degree in the University of Oxford and my bachelor degree in National Taiwan University.

My current research, supervised by Prof Terence Irwin and Prof John Gibbons, focuses on the instrumentalist conception of practical rationality and its presuppositions. In my thesis I try to develop a more refined understanding of instrumental rationality that will challenge the traditional Humean picture of rationality and normativity.

My research therefore deals with the following topics: the structure of rational agency, the wide and the narrow scope reading of instrumental requirement, full-information accounts of normativity, and the stability of intention. I am also interested in the study on rationality and normativity in general.

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The Hological Method: Principles of Carnapian Explication Transposed to Philosophical Claims at Large

Zach Johnson

 hat is the hological method? Hological is defined as relating to the study of the whole, or a philosophical hology. The hological method is a new method of analysis, clarification, and argumentation that seeks to explicate broad philosophical claims, with the simultaneous aim of providing a basis upon which to rank competitive claims. To truly explicate a claim such as ‘X is the best available ethical or political theory’: as such claims are often

implicit in arguing for a particular theory, a hological inquiry must be undertaken.

The hological method is able to articulate the full grounding of philosophical claims in metaphysical parameters, epistemology, metaphilosophical parameters, and ontology, with logical soundness. This initial grounding fully explicates claims within this primary core, and seeks their corresponding extension into ethics and morality, or more downstream philosophical branches such as political philosophy and aesthetics, depending on the claim.

After briefly examining the metaphysical, epistemological, and metaphilosophical foundations that allow for the possibility of the application of the hological method, this essay moves to explain the hological method by a transposition of the principles for explication in Rudolph Carnap's "The Logical Foundations of Probability". Special attention is given to what makes the hological method capable of evaluating and ranking competing philosophical claims, where it might be applied, potential objections, the role of conceptual analysis and clarification in the method regarding definitions, and how the hological method has hitherto been practiced subconsciously in philosophy, historically. As Carnap called for the transformation of an inexact, prescientific concept into a new exact concept, the hological method seeks to transform inexact, specialized philosophical claims into exact and aggregate claims in a move to increase philosophy's efficacy.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Kyrke Otto
Date: 15:40-16:10, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003



Zach Johnson (St. John's University, United States)

An undergraduate student at St. John's University, studying philosophy and graduating (Fall 2017) with plans to pursue a Ph.D and work in education policy research and/or private business. Specializes in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche and seeks to develop new approaches to philosophy. Research assistant for philosopher Douglas B. Rasmussen,

who specializes in political philosophy, ethics, ontology, and epistemology. Currently working on two related, book-length manuscripts.

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Legal Moralism and Jonathan Haidt's Durkheimian Utilitarianism

Maciej Juzaszek

The main aim of the paper concerns the justification of legal moralism, ie. the state's right to enforce morality by the law and criminalise conduct only because it is immoral, even though it does not result in any harm to others. On the one hand, the majority of Western democracies decided to decriminalise male sodomy on the basis of liberal reasons on freedom of John Stuart Mill. This reasons are concentrated on the harm principle according to which, the criminalisation of conduct is legitimate only if the conduct may result in the harm of others. On the other hand, the same countries, recognise such offences as bigamy, incest or flag desecration. It leads to a contradiction between the basic, philosophical principles underlying legal systems.

The paper aims to answer the question as to whether legal moralism can be morally justified by the normative theory of society, called Durkheimian utilitarianism. Its creator, American moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt, claims that in order to achieve its main aim, which is promoting the welfare of citizens, the state should not only focus on the utilitarian cost-benefit analysis but also take into account the moral foundations (described in the Haidt's Moral Foundations Theory) whose evolutionary function is to strengthen social bonds within the groups, e.g. Loyalty or Authority.

Provisionally, I will present the hypothesis that Durkheimian utilitarianism cannot morally justify legal moralism because it: a) commits naturalistic fallacy, b) its assumptions about human nature are not empirically grounded enough, and c) provides too weak positive reasons for legal moralism in comparison to the reasons against. To justify the validity of such theory, I will use the method of reconstruction of the strongest plausible interpretation (ie. the interpretation which contains as few gaps as possible and is resistant to the greatest number of counterarguments) to clarify the claims of Durkheimian utilitarianism.

Then, intended to choose the version of legal moralism adequate for further research, main focus will be put on a conceptual analysis of terms used in ordinary, moral and legal discourse. After that I will include an analysis of the results of recent empirical studies on moral foundations, based the evaluation criteria of the assessment of scientific theories, such as empirical adequacy, simplicity, explanatory power, etc. Finally, I will provide the analysis and weighing of reasons for and against moralism.

Section: Philosophy of Law
Language: English
Chair: Florian Wieczorek
Date: 11:10-11:40, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002



Maciej Juzaszek (Jagiellonian University, Poland)
PhD student in law and in philosophy at Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland. Interested in legal philosophy, ethics and moral psychology. Works on the problem of moral and legal luck, moral intuitions and legal moralism.
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Experiential subjectivity

Natalia Karczevska

S faultless disagreement is often described as a situation in which two speakers disagree but it does not seem like either of them made a mistake (Kölbel, 2003). It seems that we can disagree faultlessly about the subjective matters: what is beautiful or ugly, what is right or wrong, what is tasty or disgusting (Lasersohn, 2005). Some philosophers claim that we can also agree to disagree about application of vague predicates when we are talking about borderline cases (Wright, 1997). For example, if A and B disagree about whether their friend, who is 174 cm, is tall, there is no one to decide who is right about it—their language is not precise enough to set a precise threshold on tallness. In a series of recent papers Christopher Kennedy proposes to distinguish two kinds (or sources) of subjectivity:

one associated with evaluativity (that is with the lexical component of words which stand for negative or positive valence) and one associated with vagueness. I modify his account to make place for a third, distinct kind—subjectivity connected with experiencing certain qualities. Such subjectivity is a trait of standard ‘objective’ terms such as “cold”, “heavy” or “long” when they are used to express speaker’s perception of something. For example, I might find a bag heavy when I’m tired even if I know that it is not objectively heavy (i.e. according to the relevant contextual standard). I propose a linguistic test which can be used to distinguish these subjective-experiential expressions from the evaluative ones, as well as a shot at a contextual semantics thereof. I also argue that distinguishing experience as the third source of subjectivity helps illuminate the problem of faultless disagreement. Moreover, it can explain why we can felicitously say: “I agree it is beautiful, but I don’t like it”.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Andrea Raimondi
Date: 10:35-11:05, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.005



Natalia Karczewska (, Poland)

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Ethics: Carving Humanity at Its Joints

Jiwon Kim

 argue that moral values are not objective by contrasting Mackie’s argument from queerness with David Wiggins’ reply. Clarifying Mackie’s argument from queerness, I distinguish three metaphysical and epistemological relations which moral properties do not satisfy: a property intrinsically causes other phenomena (CAUSATION); a property can be perceived through sensory faculties (EPISTEME); and a property supervenes on other prop-

erties (RELATION). If a moral property satisfies any of these relations, these relations would turn out to be queer. According to Mackie, moral properties cannot be objective. Even though moral properties can be derived from subjectivity and consensus and moral properties can be universalizable, SUBJECTIVITY, CONSENSUS, and UNIVERSALIZABILITY do not entail objectivity. Against Mackie, Wiggins argues that there are objective moral values; objectivity of moral properties gets explained and justified by our subjective dispositions and tendencies in the practice of first-order ethics. By adopting the conception of objective truth as approximate, which can be reached from the dialectical method of first-order ethics, Wiggins pushes moral realism. I block Wiggins' move by breaking the conceptual connection between objectivity and truth. I strengthen the conditions for objectivity by adding the following conditions: a property must be measured by agreed standard (MEASUREMENT); the pattern of a property must be predictable (PREDICTABILITY) and repeatable (REPEATABILITY). Even though moral properties do not satisfy the conditions for objectivity, I conclude that moral properties can still be normatively true.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Katharina Anna Sodoma
Date: 14:30-15:00, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007



Jiwon Kim (University of St Andrews, United Kingdom)

Jiwon Kim is a graduate student at a department of Philosophy at University of St Andrews. She is interested in metaethics and normative ethics, especially with the concepts of moral truth, the connections between relationship and normativity, value and reasons, and moral vagueness. She has spoken at a number of international workshops and conferences about Humean expressivist account of blame, truth in contractualism, and ethics of artificial intelligence.

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Deflationism in Metaphysics. The Analysis of Carnap's, Ajdukiewicz's and Quine's Views

Artur Kosecki

 It is deemed that Ajdukiewicz anticipated some Quine's ideas and that there is a strong similarity between Ajdukiewicz's theory of meaning and Quine's views (Maciaszek 2007). The first of them formulated a directive theory, while the other a behavioral theory of meaning. A pragmatic approach is common to both theories. These comparative analyses apply mainly to the philosophy of language. However, in this paper I will focus only on the ontological disputes.

Ajdukiewicz's views on ontology should be associated with his belief that cognition is linguistic in its character. One of the consequences of this stance is that the ontological views should be relativized to the language in which they are evoked (Jedynak 2003). A similar view is shared by Quine who argued that questions about existence should be reduced to the ontological commitments of scientific theories (Quine 1960/2013).

Both Ajdukiewicz and Quine used a method of paraphrase and wanted to solve ontological disputes from a logical perspective. The American philosopher redefined the notion of existence to solve some difficulties with the use of names of non-existent objects (Quine 1948/2004). The Polish philosopher used a "logical" notion of existence to argue that idealism was intrinsically inconsistent (Ajdukiewicz 1949/1978). In this paper it will be indicated that a use of paraphrase leads to deflationism—a view that all the issues in ontology are either linguistic or trivial (Tahko 2015).

The purpose of this article is to point out that the method of paraphrase faces not only the methodological problems, such as the argument of symmetry or indication of the conditions of the correct paraphrase (Keller 2014; Keller 2016; Solodkoff 2014) but also on the basis of the analysis of Ajdukiewicz's and Quine's ontological views I will point out that we apply paraphrase as the method of analysis only to the existential statements of scientific theories. In their theories Ajdukiewicz and Quine do not respond to metaphysical problems and do not solve ontological dilemmas. Their views on ontology are the same as Carnap's (1950).

In addition, the paper provides a comparison between the views of Anglosphere philosophers and the Polish philosopher's stance as discussing similarities and differences in the methods used by the main representatives of both philosophical environments.

Section: History of Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Lucas Battich
Date: 11:15-11:45, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006



Artur Kosecki (University of Szczecin, Poland)

I am a candidate for a PhD degree. The fields of my research are history of analytic philosophy, ontology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science. I received a grant to realize a project titled: "The Paraphrase Method and Ontological Disputes. The Analysis of Carnap's, Ajdukiewicz's and Quine's Views". Funds: The National Science Center (Poland). The aim of this project is to reconstruct the selected applications of paraphrases. Their usage will be analyzed on the basis of Carnap's, Ajdukiewicz's and Quine's philosophy. I was also a member of the research group: "Analytic Philosophy: History nad Problems of Contemporary Philosophy". Grant director: Prof. T. Szubka. Funds: Foundation for Polish Science.

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Common Sense and Rationality

Lukas Lang

Common Sense is thought by many to be strong enough to refute skepticism and the findings of revisionary metaphysics. But what is Common Sense and wherein lies its power? According to recent work by Thomas Kelly, the propositions of Common Sense are just those that are more rational to believe than most other, including the premises of skeptical and revisionary arguments.

I argue that this idea is faced with a dilemma. We can generally understand rationality either as practical or as theoretical. If we take

the former option, skeptics and revisionists can agree with Kelly's theory without being threatened. Of course, they might argue, it is not rational to believe that we have no knowledge and that there are no composite objects in our daily lives. But that is simply because we have to ignore the truth (there being no composite objects/no knowledge) to get along in life. Understanding the rationality in play as practical rationality, therefore, fails to hit the skeptics and revisionists. But if we understand the rationality in play as theoretical rationality, then, since what is true is at issue, proclaiming that the Common Sense propositions are more rational to believe than the premises of the skeptical argument is begging the question against the skeptic or the revisionist.

In the remainder of my talk, I want to consider Kelly's own theory of rationality and argue that it does not help to prevent the dilemma. We therefore have to look for another way to understand Common Sense, or accept that skeptics and revisionists have some more room to breathe.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Franziska Poprawe
Date: 15:05-15:35, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005



Lukas Lang (University of Hamburg, Germany)

I am currently a PhD-student at the University of Hamburg. My research interests lie mostly in epistemology and metaphysics. I wrote my M.A. thesis about conceivability-arguments and am now thinking about the anti-skeptical potential of Common Sense both in contemporary philosophy and in the history of philosophy.

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Admitting Teleology in Nature: An Organizational View of Ecosystem Functions

Victor Lefèvre

Sociologists ascribe functions to biotic and abiotic parts of ecosystems like bees, fires or beaver dams (Balvanera et al., 2005; Abades et al., 2014; Rosell et al., 2005). This practice looks ill-justified. It is notably subject to the rebuke of teleology. Cooper (2016) made a review of the three main options to solve this issue: the systemic one, the selective one, and the organizational one. The systemic account of Cummins (1975) faces the difficulty that it underdetermines ecosystem functions. Hence, Odenbaugh (2010) adopts it and ascribes ecological functions to volcanoes and lightning—what ecologists don't do. The selective accounts is the main accounts for naturalizing biological teleology but they seem to don't apply to ecosystems because ecosystems don't reproduce and reproduction is a necessary condition for being selected (Lewontin, 1970). The solution of Bouchard and Dussault (2016) is to combine the forward-looking selective account of Bigelow and Pargetter (1987) and the redefinition of fitness as persistence of Bouchard (2008, 2011). Against this option, I defend like Nunes-Neto and al. (2014) the application to ecosystems of the organizational account of Mossio and al. (2009) according to which biological functions are constraints under closure. I actualize the work of Nunes-Neto and al. in using the definition of constraint given by Montévil and Mossio (2015) and in showing that this updated organizational account fits very well with the different kind of ecological functions, especially with functional ascriptions toward abiotic parts of ecosystems, without falling in panglossism. Volcanoes, clouds, and lightning are ecological constraints that are not under closure contrariwise beaver dams and fires, so the organizational account gives a good reason to recognize the activities of the latter as teleological and not the ones of the formers.

Section: Philosophy of Science
 Language: English
 Chair: Birgit Benzing
 Date: 16:15-16:45, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
 Location: SR 1.006



Victor Lefèvre (Pantheon-Sorbonne University, France)
PhD Candidate Institute of History and Philosophy of Sciences and
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My dissertation aims to show that ecological organicism contributed to the birth of ecosystem ecology, to formulate anew the hypothesis that ecosystems are organized beings, and to explore the epistemological and ethical implications of this hypothesis.

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Essentialism, Haecceitism and Possibilities

Karol Lenart

he aim of this presentation is to show a connection between haecceitism and essentialism. In order to achieve this both theories would be analysed in the scope of their modal and ontological commitments. On the one hand, essentialism states that there are qualitative constraints imposed on the range of possibilities for individuals (Plantinga 1974, Lewis 1986, Cowling 2012). These restrictions determine the ways in which individuals could have changed without losing their identity. On the other hand, haecceitism states that possibilities are constrained only nonqualitatively (Adams 1979, Mackie 2006, Stalnaker 2012), which means that individuals could have changed in respect of all their qualitative properties but still preserve their identity. It is argued that both theories are in conflict (Adams 1979, Salmon 1996, Mackie 2006). In this presentation, I would like to argue that they are not. In order to accomplish that I would like to distinguish two kinds of possibilities: essentialistic and haecceitic ones. Former kind of possibilities would describe the situations of change of properties possessed by identified individuals. In other words, essentialism would be understood as a theory explaining how given individual could have changed and whether it could have become different in some qualitative aspects. Later kind of possibilities would describe the logically possible scenarios in which individual objects could have been completely different entities than presently. In principle, both possibilities could be investigated independently of each other. However, I claim that essentialistic possibilities are grounded in haecceitic ones. It is the case due to the fact that in order to investigate whether given individual X could have become F one has to identify X as distinct from other entities and do it without any reference to qualitative aspects of analyzed individual. Only

haecceitism can provide such criteria of identification of individuals.

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Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Tomi Francis
Date: 10:35-11:05, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003



Karol Lenart (Jagiellonian University, Poland)

I am a PhD student and teaching assistant in the Department of Philosophy at Jagiellonian University in Cracow. The main field of my interest is metaphysic, especially the problem of essentialism and possible worlds. Currently I work on a paper concerning the relation of grounding and essence. I am managing editor at *Polish Journal of Philosophy*.

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Action-guidance in Aristotelian Ethics

Matilde Liberti

Shis paper addresses the problem of action-guidance in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* according to which we are not told how to act, but rather what sort of person we should be, thus leaving us with no substantial instruction when faced with hard cases. I start by introducing McDowell's particularist reading of Aristotle, according to which the virtuous person sees the right course of action in every situation she is faced with. There is no need for general moral principles to function as action-guiding (which is not to say that they do not exist at all), because if we are virtuous we will always know what to do. I then argue that this interpretation is not accurate and that general moral principles do play a significant role in action-guidance in Aristotelian ethics. In order to support my argument I first consider Book V, where Aristotle briefly accounts for *equity* as what corrects the inevitable omissions of the process of applying universal laws to particular cases, and then Book II, where Aristotle mentions *perception* as what allows the virtuous person to hit the right mean when doing so implies deviating from the mark in order to hit it. In both cases I argue that McDowell's particularist interpretation fails to account for the fact that general moral principles provide action-guidance and that it is not the case that the virtuous person sees an answer that is already particularised in the situation itself; rather, the virtuous person will see the principles as action-guiding, but will find a way to apply the universal moral principles to particular cases, exactly in the same way the adjudicator will bend the limits of law in order to re-interpret them in accordance with the particular hard case.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Noelle Rohde
Date: 11:15-11:45, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007



Matilde Liberti (University of Stirling, UK)

I am currently graduating in Philosophy at the University of Stirling

(4-year-programme). In September 2017 I will enrol in the MA Cultural Studies at SOAS University in London. I wrote this paper as an assessment for the module on Aristotelian Ethics I have just concluded. E-Mail: mal00049@students.stir.ac.uk

Is there a Field-Theoretic Argument for spacetime structuralism?

Damian Luty

The debate on the ontological status of spacetime between substantivalism and relationism seem to have reached a stalemate when adherents of both views had to refer to the same element – g – of the general form of a spacetime model (in standard tensor analysis): $\langle M, g, T \rangle$ (where M is a set of points with specific topological and differentiable structures; g is the metric tensor, which can be taken as representing the gravitational field; T is the stress-energy-momentum tensor—this tensor can vanish, so it can be omitted in general, conceptual issues).

The famous hole argument (while not being a decisive argument at all in the debate!) pointed out that there is no unproblematic way to distinguish a bare general relativistic spacetime from what is contained in it, rendering the classical *container–contained* dichotomy unworkable. In effect, relationists cannot repudiate M while retaining only g . And substantivalists have to refer to a purely material entity – a field – in order to make sense of their account; they have to use a strategy classically completely alien to substantivalistic views. This leads to an impetus. One of the proposed solutions is to conceive a middle way: spacetime structuralism.

In my presentation I would like, firstly, to present the state of current spacetime structuralisms and claim that certain positions have shortcomings because of the lack of a good field-theoretic argument to support them. I will also argue why such an argument is needed. Secondly, I will show difficulties with formulating a field-theoretic argument for spacetime structuralism by discussing different symmetries in spacetime physics. I will focus mainly on the problem of structural individuation of spacetime points. Finally, I will propose a sketch of a needed argument, where I refer to the curvature itself while preserving standard (non-controversial) methods of describing coordinate charts in the con-

text of general relativity.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Samantha Hirshland
Date: 10:00-10:30, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006



Damian Luty (Adam Mickiewicz University, Polska)

Damian Luty (1989) is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Philosophy at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Poland. He received his Master's degree in philosophy in 2013, thesis title: "The relations between cosmological models and ontological commitments of physical theories". Currently he is in the fourth year of his Ph.D. His scientific interests are: philosophy of physics, ontology, philosophy of science, methodology. He is working on a dissertation under the title "Structural ontologies of spacetime", where he analyses different structural approaches to spacetime in General Relativity and defends a highly modified version of a moderate ontic structural realism towards spacetime.

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Dispositional Properties in Physics

Eirini Georgia Mandopoulou

urpose of this presentation is to justify why dispositional terms provide a perspicuous tool in the vocabulary of physics. Physics bears within it the commitment of explaining not only what is accessible to our experience, but also the many facets of the world that are likely to happen and occur. Dispositions introduce the notion of potentiality. Under specifiable circumstances, properties can afford possibilities and entertain merely potential behaviors. I aim to examine the status of dispositions used in the field of classical mechanics and to take a look at their use in quantum mechanics. I will conclude by evaluating the extent and the manner, in which dispositional ascriptions play an explanatory and a predictive role in both of those branches of physics.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Samantha Hirshland
Date: 11:45-12:15, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006



Eirini Georgia Mandopoulou (University of Hamburg, Germany)

I am an undergraduate student at the University of Hamburg pursuing her final semester in Philosophy and Classics, where I will be graduating end of September with the thesis “Dispositions in Classical and Quantum Physics”, supervised by Prof. Dr. Ulrich Gähde. Since 2016 I have been a student assistant in the research project Knowledge and Decision. Interests include mathematical philosophy, philosophy of science and the metaphysics of time. I am also a member of the Society for Philosophy of Time.

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“Why be moral?” Scanlon on morality and normativity

Victor Mardellat

he philosophers of the social contract tradition set out to account for the validity of principles of justice and of various ways of interacting with each other in terms of justification. Tim Scanlon, for instance, grounds the moral rightness of actions in their interpersonal justifiability. Yet the Foole and the immoralist object that the philosophical arguments that establish the legitimacy of particular principles of justice are themselves unable to show why we should care about morality in the first place. But what exactly is the status of this question? Does it call for an answer that the moral theory itself should provide? And especially, does it threaten to undermine the ground of morality? Looking at the way Scanlon deals with what he calls, in chapter 4 of *What We Owe to Each Other*, *Prichard's dilemma*, I will commit myself to analyse in my talk the relationship between the normative domain of reasons and the moral domain, and thereby delimit the scope of the moral question of justification. As Prichard's

dilemma makes clear, it can't be satisfactory, in answering the "why be moral?" question, either to provide the immoralist with moral grounds, indicating for example that the action he intends to perform is wrong, as this would presuppose that he recognizes the authority of precisely that which he calls into question, or to appeal to his self-interest, underlying for instance the costs of social ostracism, since this would constitute a reason of the wrong kind for doing the right thing. If the arguments that aim to demonstrate that a particular action is right or wrong cannot at the same time tell us why we should care about acting morally, the Foole's objection is then maybe unintelligible when understood as a moral question. This is rather a normative question, one that asks for a reason and falls outside the ambit of any moral theory framed in terms of justification. As such, it neither threatens (contra Parfit) to undermine morality nor shows (contra Darwall) that the contractualist moral theory still needs to be grounded.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Jonas Blatter
Date: 10:00-10:30, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007



Victor Mardellat (Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, France)

I am a French student in philosophy, particularly interested in ethics and political philosophy. I was first educated in continental philosophy, but then discovered analytic philosophy: I have been highly interested in Axel Honneth's theory of recognition, before being strongly attracted by the moral and political philosophy of Thomas M. Scanlon, one central notion of which precisely is recognition. Before studying philosophy, I studied political sciences both in France and Germany, which helps me to bear in mind some of the practical implications of the research projects I work on. And I am also a passionate musician, clarinet player and singer (baryto)!

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A Thought Experiment about Demons

Elton Marques

 In this paper, I intend to propose a useful thought experiment to identify and separate the conditions under which an eternalistic, non-deterministic and non-fatalistic world could be (theoretically) known. Using well-known characters (Laplace's Demon and Newton's Demon), and introducing new ones (Laplace's Demon's Twin), I intend to challenge some relatively common associations. The most obvious of those is one relating some determinism or fatalism to the actual space-time picture of the world, inspired by Minkowski—the eternalistic block-universe (Lockwood 2005, Shanks 1994). Another common idea is that to know something about the future implies a certain form of Fatalism or Determinism. The overall aim will be to show how those ideas can intelligibly be kept apart. In the course of this discussion, I hope to shed light on the relationship between this theories.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Petter Sandstad
Date: 15:10-15:40, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003



Elton Marques (University of Lisbon, Portugal)

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The Problems of Crosscutting and Folk Categories in Biology

Urška Martinc

 In this article we will analyze the problems of crosscutting between the categories. We will also analyze the problems of folk categories. Problems will be analyzed using the examples from biology. We will help use mainly the works of Muhammad Ali Khalidi and Ian Hacking. The question that Muhammad Ali Khalidi asked in his work *Natural Kinds and Crosscutting Categories* is whether the systems categories crosscut. Categories that crosscut in the sciences are common and they can't be eliminated as non-real kinds, says Khalidi (Khalidi, 1998, p. 40).

When a scientific category is replaced by the folk category it is because of the same interests, argues Khalidi (Khalidi, 1998, p. 44) Replacing the folk category with scientific, it is more widespread in certain sciences such as medicine, explains Khalidi (Khalidi, 1998, p. 44).

We will analyze the question if the crosscutting categories can be natural kinds and if the natural kinds are arranged in a hierarchy. Here we will also help with Khalidi's work. Khalidi says that the crosscutting categories are not only popular among real scientific classification systems, but are also present in folk categories. He says that the reason that the categories can crosscut with each other without being rivals is in the fact that they do not have the same interests (Khalidi, 1998, p. 45).

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Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Birgit Benzing
Date: 15:40-16:10, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006



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Styles of Reasoning and Modularity in Scientific Cognition

Matias Osta Velez

 an Hacking's notion of style of reasoning is a very broad unit of analysis in philosophy and history of science which seeks, mainly, to integrate three different levels of scientific thinking: the individual, the social, and the historical. The notion was generally accepted and incorporated to the philosophical literature and only recently – most notably by Kusch (2010) and Bueno (2012) – it has been pointed out that its vagueness and lack of analytical definition do not allow for systematic use.

One of the most interesting features of the notion of style is its potential to explain the complex relationship between individual and social dimensions of scientific cognition. Hacking believes that this interaction gives shape to scientific thinking and methodology in every particular science, and that it 'provides the space in which to understand scientific reason' (Hacking, 2009: 18).

Throughout his work, Hacking has highlighted the historical and social dimensions of styles of reasoning. However, in his most recent

work, he claims that even if styles are culturally shaped, they are also rooted in some innate cognitive capacities which are part of our cognitive architecture. Hacking does not offer any argument to back up this idea, but he suggests that modularity is the key concept to understand the relation between styles and cognition. (ibid: 38)

I intend to follow Hacking's suggestion by exploring in what sense(s) styles of reasoning could be related to the idea that the mind/brain is modular. In particular, I will analyse three different versions of the latter concept: Fodor's classical notion (1983, 2001), Sperber's reformulation (1996, 2002), and Carey's version (1995).

I will favor Carey's account of mental modules as domain-specific cognitive abilities which can be seen as naive theories with a central explanatory role in our cognitive life. Then, I will try to argue that Carey's ideas about the modularity of mental capacities could play an important role in trying to give a coherent and systematic explanation of the elusive notion of style of reasoning.

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Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Christian Feldbacher
Date: 15:05-15:35, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004



Matias Osta Velez (Universite Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne, France) B.A. (4 years) in Philosophy, Master in Logic, PHD candidate in philosophy of science at the IHPST (Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology) and the University of Paris 1, Sorbonne.
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An Argument for a minimal mental internalism

Maria Matuszkiewicz

 In my paper I will argue that we must assume a minimal mental internalism in order to explain the cognitive significance of our mental states. In order to defend my claim, I will consider a radically externalist position advocated by Robert Stalnaker and explain why this position leaves the content of our mental states undetermined in respects which are important to account for intentional action. Stalnaker holds three theses: (1) the content of our beliefs is determined by causal interactions with the environment, (2) to have a belief is to differentiate between different possible ways that the world might be, (3) in order to account for the contents of our mental states, we do not need to posit concepts or any kind of mental entities. I will argue that although both (1) and (2) are well-motivated postulates that a good theory of beliefs should accommodate, the causal account does not suffice to fix the content as it is defined pragmatically in (2). My argument rests on the claim that although the causal story determines which objects we represent, it does not fix how we represent them. As we know, we often think of the same object in different ways without realizing it. Lacking the knowledge that two concepts we entertain refer to the same object is of considerable cognitive significance. In such a case, we distinguish more possibilities than the mere causal story can account for.

Focusing on the indexical aspect of many of our beliefs, I will show that we need to accept a minimal internalist position, according to which the way we think about objects is an internal fact and it partially fixes the content of our mental states. While it accommodates the intuition that the external world and our causal interactions with it put a constraint on the contents that we might have, it differs from externalism in claiming that these external factors do not fully determine the contents of our mental states.

Section: Phiosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Franz Altner
Date: 10:35-11:05, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004



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I am a graduate student at the University of Warsaw. My PhD thesis concerns singular contents and their role in psychological explanation.

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Predatory Publishers targeting Graduates – an Ethical Evaluation

Daniel Matthias Mayerhoffer

So-called Predatory (Open Access) Publishers have developed a business model to exploit authors by charging exceedingly them high fees. Publications in such journals are of highly questionable value for their authors because, despite their impressive sounding names and claim to be peer-reviewed, the journals usually accept any submission whose author is willing to pay, regardless of the quality of the work. Predatory Publishers advertise their “service” by actively approaching researchers and hope to reach them in a weak moment. Early stage researchers and graduate students are one of their main target groups, as e.g. e-mails sent to contributors of SOPhiA show.

The talk will develop an ethical judgement of this specific targeting: On the one hand, even publishing in a low-level journal might be helpful

for early stage researchers because they gain first experiences in the system; and in some situations, having any publication might let them stick out, e.g. when applying for Ph.D. funding. On the other hand, the financial burden usually is relatively higher for students without a regular income of their own than for researches with a job (however badly paid). Thus, it is case-dependent whether Predatory Publishers cause more harm to senior or graduate researches if they succeed.

However, the latter are especially weak targets: While later in their career, researchers are aware that publishing in low-level journals is a bad idea, graduates entering academia might lack sophistication about differences between journals. They will simply feel honoured by someone from a journal with an impressive name seemingly likes their work and even tries to approach them. Predatory Publishers only play on senior researchers' lack of willpower but in the case of graduates, they additionally try to exploit a lack of knowledge. This is not only bad for the targeted early stage researcher themselves but also potentially corrupts academic culture by promoting a focus on quantity instead of quality to those who are not experienced enough to see why this might be problematic.

Therefore, publishers act particularly worse when trying to trick graduate researchers, as an especially vulnerable group, into spending money for publications in their low-level journals.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Noelle Rohde
Date: 11:50-12:20, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007



Daniel Matthias Mayerhoffer (University of Surrey, UK)

Daniel did his undergraduate studies in Philosophy & Economics at the University of Bayreuth and is currently is an MA student of Social Research Methods at the University of Surrey (focussing on Political Philosophy and Computational Social Modelling). In October, he wants to return to his Master programs in Politics at the Otto-Friedrich-University of Bamberg and of the elite study program Ethics of Textual Cultures at the Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg which he currently pauses for his stay at Surrey. He plans on staying in Bamberg and starting a Ph.D. there 2018 in the area of Computational Policy Models.

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Metaphysical Grounding in Foundations of Human Rights

Szymon Mazurkiewicz

he aim of this paper is to analyze whether the explanation of foundations of human rights and relations between objects that are postulated to justify their existence (human nature, human dignity) is possible in terms of metaphysical grounding.

Discussing foundations of human rights in the light of grounding can be valuable epistemically both for human rights philosophers and grounding theoreticians. Concerning human rights theory, applying grounding into discourse on foundations of human rights may give more precise and intelligible tool in understanding relations between objects which are postulated to be fundaments for human rights. On the other hand, metaphysical discussion on grounding seems to suffer on the lack of practical applications of grounding, which could sharpen the notion of grounding due to some less logical and purely ontological investigations. Last but not least, one of the charge of sceptics about grounding is that it has no or few examples to employ.

In the discussion on foundations of human rights one can often meet statements like: “human rights are possessed in virtue of humanity” (Tasioulas 2013) or “human rights are rights that humans have simply in virtue of being human” (Gardner 2008). In metaphysics it is claimed that “in virtue” phrase expresses the relation of metaphysical grounding, however, philosophy of law has not introduced metaphysical grounding

into explaining fundamentals of human rights.

In the first part, I will present shortly main *classical* theory of foundations of human rights, which claims that human rights exist in virtue of some substantive aspect. Next, there will be shown drawbacks of classical justification based on is/ought distinction.

In the second part, I will demonstrate core issues concerning grounding. Especially, I will discuss questionable features of grounding that are significant in human rights justification. These will be (1) possibility of normative grounding (e.g. Vayrynen 2013); (2) primitivity of grounding or possibility of its further analyzing; (3) problem of transitivity with division on full and partial ground and (4) explanatory role and force of grounding.

In the third, I will look at foundations of human rights by means of grounding with strong emphasize on four above mentioned problems and analyze whether grounding suits well as relation between human rights and objects that are their fundamentals. Finally, conclusions on metaphysics and justification of human rights as well as grounding will be drawn.

Section: Philosophy of Law
Language: English
Chair: Florian Wiczorek
Date: 10:00-10:30, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002



Szymon Mazurkiewicz (Jagiellonian University, Poland)
Fifth year MA in Law student on Jagiellonian University (Cracow, Poland) and first year BA in Philosophy on Jagiellonian University. An active participant of academic movement (e.g. President of the Audit Committee in Student Research Groups Association on Faculty of Law in 2015/2016 year; Associate (till 2014) and Vice-President (2015/2016) of Student Research Group of Philosophy of Law). Author of 6 papers concerning mainly philosophy of human rights and international law and numerous presentations on conferences. Awarded by Polish Minister of Science and Higher Education with Academic Scholarship for Distinguished Academic Achievements in 2016 and four time by Jagiellonian

University Rector with Academic Scholarship for Best Students. After finishing MA in Law on June 2017 planning begin PhD in Law (specializing in philosophy of law) on Jagiellonian University and judicial legal apprenticeship in National School of Judiciary and Public Prosecution. E-Mail: szymon.pobog.mazurkiewicz@gmail.com

Emotions as Cognitive Products: The Case of Fear

Marie Michon

 motions studies in Philosophy seem to have reached an understanding: they cannot agree on what an emotion is or what it should be referred as. My goal is to argue for a broader consideration of emotions considering that they result from a cognitive act, and thus have their place among cognitive products in the sense of Twardowski (1912). This definition is the only one succeeding to encompass the rich diversity of emotional occurrences and especially their semantics. A stunning example is the study of fear, which is well documented. It illustrates the problems arising when you try to fit emotions in already existing notions: desire and judgment or belief. 'I am afraid because I have a desire to escape a dangerous situation' is true for survival situations, but it fails to include neither when one is terrified in front of a movie (Walton 1978) nor phobias. What of one fear of failure that stops him to apply to a job? Inner human egoism is also important: there is fear for others and one can put his life at risk for that, which is paradoxical.

'I am afraid because I judge the situation dangerous' accounts for judgments and beliefs as they influence each other. Judgments are supposed to be made in conscience and emotions are not (always). Self-control is not sufficient to allow humans to surpass emotional crisis or phobias (Stocker 1996). None of this account for the fact that you can trigger emotions by making the corresponding emotional face (Ekman et al. 1980).

Semantically, those views allow to map emotions with propositional attitudes but those are relations between agents and propositions. Emotions are not propositions nor the people who experience it are agents. Furthermore, the mental content of an emotion cannot be a proposition, how would this account for fear in infants or the primal fear of animals, two instances unable to grasp propositions or language (Deigh 1994)? I

argue there is no such thing as a constructed propositional fear.

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Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Christian Feldbacher
Date: 15:40-16:10, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004



Marie Michon (Universite Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne – IHPST, France)

I am in the second year of my PhD at the IHPST in Paris. My thesis advisor is Friederike Moltmann and I study the semantics of expressing your own emotions. Even though I am doing my thesis in Philosophy, my background is more diverse. After a scientific high-school cursus I went to do a Bachelor in Modern Literature. Then I moved indirectly toward Philosophy by spending a first Master in Psychoanalysis and Philosophy. I studied freudian psychoanalysis and I did my master thesis challenging his views about women. It is during this part of my life that I knew I needed to study language and discourse. Naturally I did a second Master in Language Studies, specializing in discourse analysis and semantics. Because I was not fully satisfied with the paradigms in Linguistics I

choose to do my PhD in Philosophy.

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Is it rational to believe that I am wrong? A critical discussion of the Preface Paradox

Thomas Mitchell

his essay will examine the Preface Paradox and offer a solution. Along the way, we will discuss the Lottery Paradox, which will inform our discussion. In particular, it will show us that high credence is insufficient for belief, but that this fact does not on its own resolve the Preface Paradox. This will prompt us to search for another necessary condition for rational belief, which, it will be argued, is the epistemic possibility of knowing what is believed. This is motivated by the view that knowledge is successful belief; believing is trying to know, which is pointless when knowledge is impossible. This idea that it is irrational to believe a proposition that cannot be known drives our solution: the author should not believe what is written in the preface, for it leads them to believe unknowable propositions. Specifically, for each proposition in the main text of the book, they are forced to believe that it is true and might be false. We will prove this to be unknowable and also show why this does not apply to agents in normal circumstances who believe without absolute certainty.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Andrea Togni
Date: 11:15-11:45, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005



Thomas Mitchell (University of Oxford, UK)

I attained a BA in philosophy from the University of Birmingham last year. I am now studying for a BPhil at Oxford, with a view to undertaking doctoral studies in the future and becoming a professional academic.

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Knowing How I Can and Counterfactual Success

Felipe Morales

Spencer (forthcoming) argues that it is not the case that if a subject s is able to ϕ , it is possible for s to ϕ . Consider the following case: K lives in a fully deterministic world. She is, in all respects, similar to her peers in intelligence and creativity. Now, her peers all know the conjunction of the initial state of the world and the complete set of natural laws (nl). However, K herself never gets to know nl . We want to say that K is able to know nl , even though she does not succeed in any possible world. If Spencer is right, the counterfactual analyses of ability are false. Furthermore, Spencer's cases can be extended to show that knowledge of ways to ϕ also fails to be supported by counterfactual cases. Suppose that in the previous scenario, K is taught a way to learn nl , but never follows through it. Then, K does not follow through it in any world. K is then able to do something, it seems, which it is impossible for her. Knowing how in the relevant sense does not, then, entail counterfactual success (contra Hawley 2003). However, this weakens the link between knowing how and its effectivity. An intellectualist account of knowing how should be able to explain the intuitive differences between knowing that x is a way to ϕ and knowing how to ϕ . Stanley (2011) has proposed that the difference lies precisely in that the latter entails some form of counterfactual success (bypassing the need to postulate 'practical guises' as in Stanley & Williamson (2001)). This entails, implausibly, that attributions of knowledge-how to K in the scenario above are improper. Here, I will discuss diagnoses of the case which appeal to a genericity intuition (K is able in the sense that her peers typically are—she herself lacks the ability), or explain it away as a case of ambiguity (K knows how she would try to ϕ , not that she would ϕ if she tried). I will then argue that it would be reasonable for K to try even though it is not possible for her to succeed.

Section: Epistemology
 Language: English
 Chair: Markus Hierl
 Date: 18:00-18:30, 13 September 2017 (Wednesday)
 Location: SR 1.005



Felipe Morales (KU Leuven, Belgium)

I am a PHD Student at KU Leuven, working in the topic of modal epistemology. Previously, I did my MPhil in KU Leuven, where my thesis was on the structure and measures of understanding (as distinct from knowledge or other epistemic notions). I came to Leuven from Universidad de Chile, at Santiago, Chile, where I did my bachelors and first masters, also on the topic of modal epistemology and understanding, but from a broader metaphilosophical perspective.

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The radical enactive cognition approach to Phenomenality

Laura Machado do Nascimento

n spite of all advances that Cognitive Science has developed throughout recent years, some issues are still puzzling, to say the least. One of them is the phenomenality of our conscious experiences, that is, why do our conscious experiences have the subjective quality they do. How to account for it in a purely natural basis is a problem that has engaged an enormous amount of time and debates and still, no solution to it has been acknowledged. Recently, Enactivist approaches have been emphasizing that, maybe, one of the reasons why there is no solution to the problem of consciousness is because of the mistaken presuppositions that have guided scientific and philosophical research on the topic. Enactivists claim that, by considering experience as an activity performed by a subject in her historical and biological context will be helpful to a better understanding of the issues involves. That is a reasonable bet, however, it is nevertheless puzzling how the explanatory gap can be bridged by considering experiences as situated activity. So, this idea still has to be worked out. The Radical Enactive Cognition approach (REC) offers some interesting insights to the discussion. REC claims that even some of the more committed enactivists still fail to fully recognize the consequences of a purely naturalistic approach and that precludes an adequate account for consciousness. In a nutshell, REC claims that even if phenomenal consciousness is constituted only by physical events, this narrow approach falls short of explaining it adequately and, so, the explanation of it needs to take the historical, contextual and biological aspects into account. This paper aims to describe the radical enactivist account for

consciousness and assess its advantages.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Gebharter
Date: 11:15-11:45, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004



Laura Machado do Nascimento (State University of Campinas, Belgium)

Laura Machado do Nascimento is a PhD student at State University of Campinas (UNICAMP - Campinas, Sao Paulo, Brazil) under the supervision of prof. Marco Ruffino. The theme of her PhD research are enactivist approaches to cognition. More specifically, the research is focused in the enactivist accounts to the phenomenality of conscious experience. As a part of her research grant funded by FAPESP (Sao Paulo Research Foundation) she is currently at University of Antwerp (Belgium), as a Visiting Research Student, under the supervision of Prof. Erik Myin, where Laura is working on the Radical Enactive Cognition approach, advanced by Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin in recent books (Radicalizing Enactivism - 2013, and Evolving Enactivism - forthcoming). Laura has been working on themes from analytic philosophy since her undergraduation, having background on the Quinean naturalization of Epistemology from research in undergraduation and Philosophy of Science and Perception from her master's degree. Also, she has studied problems of the Fregean tradition in Philosophy of Language by working with prof. Marco Ruffino. More recently, she has also developed an academic interest in the intersection of Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology, in order to achieve a better understanding of the embodied aspects of experience.

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Persistence and Explanation

Benjamin Neeser

his paper investigates the explanatory aims and resources of theories of persistence over time. Perdurantism claims that persisting objects have temporal parts at each time of their existence, and endurantism that they are “wholly present” at each time they exist, which is taken to entail that they lack any temporal part.

Wasserman (2016) recently challenged this way of setting the debate, arguing it reduces the vies to mere ontological theses about persistence (more specifically: temporal parts) that lack any substantial explanatory power. Metaphysical theories of persistence, he contrasts, should be answers to the question: “what grounds the fact that an object persists over time?” However, he concludes, only perdurantism can properly meet this challenge, by appealing to the temporal parts it postulates as grounds. Endurantism on the other hand, fails to meet this explanatory stance, since being “wholly present” can only provide circular (thus flawed) grounding.

In this paper, I challenge Wasserman’s argument. I show that to succeed, the argument must rely on a mereological, negative conception of endurantism which begs the question against the view. Indeed, pressed with this challenge, endurantists should reject (or supplement) it in favour of a locational conception (see e.g. Gilmore (2006)). An explanatory version of locational endurantism is advanced, under which some object’s persisting over time is grounded in its having an exact location at different times. The view is shown to stand clear off Wasserman’s circularity objection.

Although misled about the fate of endurantism, Wasserman’s plea in favour of explanatory theories of persistence is shown to be beneficial. I present various ways to use the idiom of grounding in the debate, and assess their respective merits. They allow one to resist sceptical challenges (see e.g. Miller (2005); Hirsch (2002)), and make room for non-standard, hybrid theories of persistence (e.g. the brand of temporal-parts-friendly endurantism suggested in Hawthorne (2006) and Fine (2012)).

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Zach Johnson
Date: 12:25-12:55, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003



Benjamin Neeser (University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland)
2nd year PhD student at the University of Neuchâtel (Switzerland) under the supervision of Prof. F. Correia, preparing a thesis defending the stage theory of persistence in a relativistic setting, entitled “Every Thing Changes, Everything Stands Still: Dynamics and Persistence in a Relativistic Spacetime”. Main area: metaphysics, bordering on philosophy of physics. Side interest: social ontology.
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First-Person Thought and Rational Action

Maik Niemeck

F long lasting and quite influential tradition of philosophers, which has its roots in the work of Perry (1977; 1979), Lewis (1979) and Castaneda (1966), believes that first-personal self-thinking (FPT) is essential in some sense and cannot be reduced to other types of thoughts a thinker can grasp about him- or herself. What this essentiality consists of is not always clear, but the most common way to define the essentiality of first-person thought is to posit a necessary or at least in some sense special relation between FPT and agency. (cf. Owens 2011: 267; Prosser 2015: 212)

Recently, this line of thought has been questioned by so called ‘De Se Sceptics’ (cf. Torre 2016), such as Millikan (1990), Devitt (2013), Cappelen/Dever (2013) and Magidor (2015). They maintain that the proposed connection between rational action and first-person thought is not as tight or even necessary as believed by many adherents of the Perry-Lewis-Castaneda-tradition. Cappelen/Dever (2013) for instance argue that their action-inventory-model (AIM) is able to explain rational actions without an appeal to indexical thought or any agent-related contents. Even persons with the same set of non-indexical beliefs and

desires are able to act differently in the same circumstances, since they have different actions available to fulfill their desires. Moreover, agents do not need to have any beliefs about their available actions in order to act rationally.

In the proposed talk I will firstly offer a critique of Cappelen's and Dever's AIM and present cases their model is not able to account for. I will conclude with an inference to the best explanation that we should rather adopt a model for rational action that appeals to beliefs (or other forms of representation) about the available actions than to the action inventory itself. Then, I will argue why those representations about the available actions should be regarded as first-personal. I will identify three peculiarities of FPT – i.e. reflexivity, effortlessness and relational presuppositions – that support this claim. In the final section, I will sketch how these features of FPT relate to rational action in general. I will come to the conclusion that it is not only important that we have beliefs about our available actions but that we additionally have the information that these available actions are also ours.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Christian Feldbacher
Date: 14:30-15:00, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004



Maik Niemeck (University College Freiburg, Germany)

Maik Niemeck is a PhD student and research assistant at the University College Freiburg with a research focus on the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness. Before he came to Freiburg he did his B.A. in Halle, his M.A. in Göttingen and was a visiting student at the University of Notre Dame.

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A Slingshot Argument against truth-maker solution

Yao Niu

his paper takes a brief look-back to the Gettier Problem in epistemology, and introduces the truth-maker solution which is proposed by Adrian Heathcote. Then, this paper raises a set of problems based on a variant of the slingshot argument, and argues that, the truth-maker solution can not succeed in solving the Gettier Problem.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Markus Hierl
Date: 17:25-17:55, 13 September 2017 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.005



Yao Niu (Wuhan University at China, China)
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The Aftermath of the Quine-Carnap Dispute: A Pyrrhic Victory Called into Question

Kyrke Otto

he debate over ontology that took place between Quine and Carnap around the middle of the twentieth century is traditionally pictured as one in which the two radically disagreed, and in which Quine came out the winner. Alspector-Kelly (2000) challenges this account, arguing that where it matters – in rejecting traditional metaphysics – Quine and Carnap are actually on the same side. He concludes his paper with the suggestion that the misrepresentation of Quine as having overthrown Carnap’s anti-metaphysical project might be the cause of current confusion regarding Quine’s own attitude toward metaphysics. In this paper, I aim to show that this is indeed the case. I will to this end first analyze how a distorted view of the

Quine-Carnap debate could be said to be the source of such confusion. Then I will discuss one of the troubling ways in which this confusion manifests itself, focusing on a paper by Raley (2007), in which she subjects Quine's criterion of ontological commitment to a critique which I will argue to be valid only under the false assumption that Quine is or aims to be a traditional metaphysician.

Section: History of Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Lucas Battich
Date: 11:50-12:20, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006



Kyrke Otto (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands)

Kyrke Otto studies philosophy and classical languages at the University of Amsterdam. Her main interests within these disciplines include history of philosophy, Plato and (Neo)platonism, and naturalizing approaches to phenomenology. Above all, however, she is fond of blurring the lines between such categories. She works on the side as an editor, writer and baker.

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Institutionelle Hilfspflichten gegenüber Flüchtenden

Franziska Paulmann

 In dem Vortrag möchte ich mich mit der Zuschreibung und Begründung positiver Hilfspflichten im internationalen Raum auseinandersetzen. In diesem Zusammenhang werde ich anhand der Fluchtbewegungen über das Mittelmeer diskutieren, dass positive Hilfspflichten den Flüchtenden gegenüber vorliegen und dass diese kollektiv von Staaten oder Staatengemeinschaften getragen werden sollten. Der Fokus des Vortrags wird auf der Problematik der Adressierbarkeit von positiven Hilfspflichten liegen. Diese Problematik entsteht, wenn wir positive Hilfspflichten von individuellen Subjektrechten auf die Hilfeleistung ableiten. Um einer Überforderung zu entgehen, kommen als Pflichtenträger vor allem kollektive Akteure und, wie in der

Menschenrechtsdebatte angenommen, vor allem politische Ordnungen infrage. Infolgedessen fällt der individuelle Rechtsschutz in den Bereich derjenigen politischen Ordnungen, deren Mitglieder die Rechtssubjekte sind. Aus dem universellen Anspruch auf grundlegende Rechte wird ein einklagbarer Anspruch auf positivierte Grundrechte. Das bedeutet genauer, dass in erster Linie faktisch Nationalstaaten für den Rechtsschutz ihrer Bürger_innen verantwortlich sind.

Problematisch wird die Zuschreibung von Pflichten allerdings dort, wo positive Hilfspflichten von Rechtssubjekten gegenüber politischen Ordnungen gerechtfertigt werden sollen, wenn diese Individuen keine Mitglieder dieser Ordnung sind. Es stellt sich also die Frage: lässt sich eine starke positive Hilfspflicht seitens Staaten und supranationalen Institutionen gegenüber denjenigen rechtfertigen, die nicht Bürger_innen dieser Staaten sind?

Section: Ethics
Language: German
Chair: Noelle Rohde
Date: 12:25-12:55, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007



Franziska Paulmann (Universität Kassel, Germany)

Franziska L. Paulmann is a Ph.D. student at the University of Kassel in the Department of Philosophy since October 2016.

She works in ethics and political philosophy within the college for social human rights where she is working on her Ph. D. thesis about collective responsibility and positive duties in the realm of european refugee policies.

Her research interests focus on moral philosophy, applied ethics, political philosophy and especially on global ethics.

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Reasons and Reasoning

Franziska Poprawe

any believe that there is some tight connection between the normative reasons we have to believe or do things, and the mental activity of reasoning through which we form beliefs and intentions. I argue that this is a mistake. I examine and ultimately reject the two prominent (mutually exclusive) views of the relation between reasons and reasoning. (I) Some understand reasons in terms of correct reasoning: a fact *p* is a normative reason for you to if and only if you can reason correctly from believing *p* to -ing (e.g. Williams, Hieronymi, Raz, Way, Setyia, Gibbons and Torri accept some version of this view). (II) Others understand correct reasoning in terms of reasons: you reason correctly if and only if, and because, you appropriately respond to normative reasons (e.g. Piller, Scanlon, Dancy, Kiesewetter, Lord and Alvarez). I argue that we should not only not accept both views on pain of circularity, but neither one.

Regarding (I), I present two counterexamples to the view and argue that it cannot evade the verdict it aims to deny: what ultimately makes a fact *p* a reason for agent *N* to is a relation between the fact *p* and the normative standing of *N*'s -ing (as opposed to a correct pattern of reasoning). I argue that we should reject the widespread dogma that the reasons to must be appropriate premises of reasoning towards -ing.

Regarding (II), I argue that normative reasons do not set the standard of correctness of reasoning. It is not the case that reasoning is correct if and only if, and because, it follows the paths of reasons. By means of counterexamples, I argue against four versions of this view, namely that a pattern of reasoning is correct if and only if a) the contents of the premise-attitudes are reasons for the contents of the conclusion-attitude, b) the contents of the premise-attitude are reasons for the conclusion-attitude, c) the premise-attitudes are reasons for the conclusion-attitude, or d) the premise-attitudes are reasons for the content of the conclusion- attitude.

In conclusion, I deny the alleged close link between normative reasons (for belief or action) and correct (theoretical or practical) reasoning; we cannot understand one in terms of the other.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Markus Hierl
Date: 16:15-16:45, 13 September 2017 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.005



Franziska Poprawe (University of Oxford, Vereinigtes Königreich)
Franziska is a DPhil (PhD) student at the University of Oxford. Her research centers on the nature and the norms of reasoning, normative reasons and rationality. In general, she is interested in normativity and works at the intersection of Ethics and Epistemology. Prior to coming to Oxford, she received her MA in Philosophy and Economics from the University of Bayreuth, and her BA from the University of Mannheim. E-Mail: franziska.poprawe@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

Is Semantic Structuralism Necessarily “Set-Theoretical” Structuralism?

Agnieszka Proszewska

Standard semantic approaches to scientific structuralism are based on the concept of shared structure between models, most often by adopting a formal frame of set theory. Such framework is then generally used to provide a formal interpretation and analysis of the structure of scientific theories, the problem of applicability of mathematics to a physical theory, and the philosophical account of structural realist’s commitment to the structure shared by successive physical theories. Within such frame, as presented by Suppes, “(...) a model of a theory may be defined as a possible realization in which all valid sentences of the theory are satisfied, and a possible realization of the theory is an entity of the appropriate set-theoretical structure” (Suppes 1962).

Generally, arguments for the necessity of using such formal frame are motivated by the assumption that adopting this approach makes the question about models of an empirical theory, axiomatized within the unified framework, similar to the one about the “shared structure” in terms of isomorphisms between mathematical models (Suppes 1960,

French 2000). Following this intuition, the formal framework of set theory allows us to discuss the structure of scientific theories, the applicability of mathematics etc. by making use of precise concepts of a model (as a set-theoretical entity) and of shared structure (as an isomorphism between models).

In my presentation I will try to analyze origins of this assumption and, moreover, its validity. Then, following Landry (2005, 2007), I will make an additional attempt to challenge the idea that both the concept of a model and of shared structure, in order to be accurate and precise, need to be framed within a single unified framework of set theory.

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Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Laurenz Hudetz
Date: 14:00-14:30, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006



Agnieszka Proszewska (Jagiellonian University, Poland)

Agnieszka M. Proszewska is a Ph.D. student and teaching assistant in the Department of Philosophy at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, where she teaches logic and set theory, epistemology and theory

of computation. She graduated from Philosophy and Swedish Philology at the Jagiellonian University and currently, she is also working on her Master's thesis in theoretical computer science at the Department of Physics, Astronomy and Applied Computer Science. Her research interests focus on the philosophy of natural sciences, structural frameworks and mathematical logic. Since 2014 she serves as a regular member of Polish Artificial Intelligence Society.

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Semantic Facts and Oughts

Andrea Raimondi

emantic realists disagree about the nature of semantic properties and facts. According to semantic naturalism (SN), semantic facts are reducible to non-semantic natural facts (Papineau 2009). Advocates of semantic anti-naturalism (SAN) deny this (Wedgwood 2009).

SN has difficulty accommodating the intrinsic connection between semantic facts and oughts. Kripkenstein (Kripke 1982) offers an example of this normativity objection against dispositionalism, a version of SN holding that semantic facts are reducible to dispositional facts. This objection is generalizable to any version of SN: there is no intrinsic connection between non-semantic natural facts and semantic oughts. Thus, semantic facts are irreducible normative facts.

I shall reconstruct Kripkenstein's argument (KA) and reject one of its premises: the claim that a normative statement concerns normative, non-natural facts. It can be rejected in two ways.

1. Adopting Gibbard's expressivism (2012), one may argue that the normative/non-normative distinction is not a distinction between two kinds of facts, but between two kinds of concepts. Hence: (a) the concept of meaning is normative, while semantic facts are (or may well be) natural; (b) normative statements concern natural facts and normative concepts. Unfortunately, this solution commits us to a controversial anti-realism about normative facts.

2. Leaning on the notion of grounding-relation between facts, one may argue as follows: semantic facts obtain in virtue of the obtaining of normative facts which, in turn, obtain in virtue of a collection of

non-normative, natural facts. Ultimately, normative statements concern normative facts that are grounded in natural ones. Recent work due to Väyrynen (2013) and Rosen (2017 forthcoming) focuses on grounding-relations between normative and natural facts in methaethics; my proposal is to employ their results (a) to show that KA is unsound and (b) to give an account of the normativity of meaning compatible with SN.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Till Gallasch
Date: 14:00-14:30, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.005



Andrea Raimondi (Universita degli Studi di Milano, Italy)

I am a MA philosophy student at the University of Milan; in July I will get my MA degree. Before attending the university, I studied foreign languages (English and German) at the high-school. I wrote my BA dissertation on scepticism. I am currently working on my MA dissertation on semantic normativity and its relationship with naturalistic approaches in the theory of meaning. I am applying for PhD programs because I would like to work on these topics employing some results of recent works in methaethics and metaphysical grounding.

Currently, I am a member of the “editorial stuff” of an online platform that offers open access to philosophical essays and papers written by students and teachers of my university. The aim of this platform is to incintivize philosophical discussion among students (<http://spaziofilosofico.filosofia.unimi.it/> – unfortunately, we do not have an English version yet). Finally, I participate in the organization of a permanent seminar of Philosophy of Literature (in collaboration with teachers and students of Theory of Literature).

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Another Counterexample to Markov Causation from Quantum Mechanics: Single Photon Experiments and the Mach-Zehnder Interferometer

Nina Retzlaff

he theory of causal Bayes nets (Pearl 2009; Spirtes, Glymour, Scheines 2000) is, from an empirical point of view, currently one of the most promising approaches to causation on the market. There are, however, counterexamples to its core axiom, the causal Markov condition. The probably most serious of these counterexamples are EPR/B experiments in quantum mechanics (cf. Näger 2016; Wood, Spekkens 2012). EPR/B experiments are, however, the only counterexamples yet known from the quantum realm. One might wonder whether EPR/B experiments are the only phenomena in the quantum realm that make problems for causal Bayes nets. In this paper I provide a negative answer to that question: I show that single photon experiments in a Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI) also violate the causal Markov condition. I then argue that the Markov violation does not occur under the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation of Bohmian mechanics.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Samantha Hirshland
Date: 11:10-11:40, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006



Nina Retzlaff (DCLPS, University of Duesseldorf, Germany)

Nina Retzlaff is a research fellow at the Düsseldorf center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (DCLPS) at the Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf. She studied mathematics with a minor in biology at the University of Cologne and is interested in quantum mechanics. Her research interests lie in philosophy of science and metaphysics, especially in causality within quantum mechanics. In the context of her PhD thesis, she is investigating causality with regard to quantum mechanics.
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Quantificational Discrimination and Epistemic Injustice

Noelle Rohde

he illuminating concept of epistemic injustice as an instance where an individual is being wronged in their capacity as a knower was put forward by Miranda Fricker, prompting much philosophical interest in this particular area of intersection between the epistemic and the ethical.

Although it is never stated explicitly throughout her work, I argue that a close analysis of Fricker's account reveals that it is quintessentially centred on the epistemic dimension of a very well-known philosophical concept—discrimination.

It is however precisely this conceptual kinship that has detrimental effects on Fricker's theory as, which I aim to show, a crucial distinction between two broad and fundamentally different categories of discrimination has gone unnoticed in the existing research. The distinction in question relates back to two kinds of features which can invite discrimination: quantified features (e.g. age, weight, IQ, grades etc.) and non-quantified features (e.g. gender, complexion etc.). It is when one becomes a victim of unjust, disadvantageous treatment as a result of “bearing” a particular number that I speak of quantificational discrimination.

I hold that quantificational discrimination is, in contrast to well-researched “classical” discrimination based on non-quantified features, harder to detect, harder to call out as wrong and often mistaken for legitimate science-based selection. What is more, it invites what I call reflexive discrimination, i.e. disadvantageous treatment at one's own hands. Crucially, I argue that quantificational discrimination operates without regard to social salience and thus affects not only marginalized groups but each and every individual on an almost daily basis.

Unfortunately, Fricker's theoretical framework fails to adequately capture this situation because of a hermeneutical lacuna where the concept of quantificational discrimination should be. As a result, a tremendous number of epistemic injustices are left unacknowledged as being morally reprehensible and based on pseudo-scientific stereotypes.

The aim of the present paper is thus twofold: to flesh out a the-

ory of quantificational discrimination as well as to present a model of how quantificational discrimination and epistemic injustice interact as subsequent stages in the discriminatory process.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Katharina Anna Sodoma
Date: 16:15-16:45, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007



Noelle Rohde (University of Oxford, UK)

Noelle Rohde is a Master student in Medical Anthropology at the University of Oxford. She previously read for a Bachelor degree in Philosophy and Linguistics at the Universities of Oxford and Paderborn.

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The Unwelcome Implications of Ex Ante Contractualism

Korbinian Rürger

Ex ante contractualism holds that in situations involving risk we ought to act in accordance with principles that license the action that satisfies the strongest individual claim, where those claims are a function of the expected value that a given policy gives each person ex ante. According to the proponents of the view, adopting such an ex ante mode of justification makes it possible for contractualists to deal with cases under risk, something contractualism has been claimed to be ill equipped for.

I here challenge ex ante contractualism. I argue, first, that adopting ex ante contractualism would have far reaching implications that contractualists, or nonconsequentialist in general, would find very hard to accept; second, that ex ante contractualism includes an implicit appeal to a kind of interpersonal aggregation of harms and benefits contractualists reject; and third, that the ex ante contractualists' argument for the principled priority of identified over unidentified lives, an implication of ex ante contractualism, is unsound. I also briefly comment on

a pluralistic attempt to get around some of the defects of ex ante contractualism and conclude that to deal with uncertainty contractualists should not adopt ex ante contractualism, but a suitably amended ex post approach.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Jonas Blatter
Date: 11:10-11:40, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007



Korbinian Rüger (University of Oxford, United Kingdom)
Korbinian is a PhD student in philosophy at Balliol College, Oxford University. His main research interests lie in moral philosophy. Before coming to Oxford he studied at the University of Bayreuth and the London School of Economics.
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Action and Perception-Sensation Distinction in Tactile Experience

Alireza Bani Sadr

What is the difference between perception and mere sensation? This question arises immediately when one considers perception as a form of ‘openness to the world’. The perception-sensation distinction is based most often on the relation of perception and sensation to the external world. Therefore, some philosophers explain the perception-sensation distinction in terms of the externalization of sensory experiences. In this work, I try to study, from a non-conceptualist point of view, the possibility of the perception-sensation distinction in the sense of touch.

I will study three phenomena relative to the sense of touch : bodily sensations, passive touch and active touch. The difference between bodily sensations and tactile perceptions is explained often by the fact that tactile perceptions involve the experience of external objects, unlike mere sensations which are merely qualitative and do not have external

objects. It can be suggested that a perception is resulted from the externalization of our sensory experience.

I propose to study three possible explanation of such an externalization. First, the account according to which the awareness is externalized by the means of exploratory actions (Fulkerson, 2011, Matthen, 2015); secondly, the claim that the content and the character of experiences can be explained by the exercise of sensorimotor knowledge, that is the knowledge of law-like relationships between sensory input and motor output (Noe, 2006); thirdly, the account only concerning the sense of touch which holds that the experience of a ‘resistance’ or an ‘obstacle’ to our active movement allows to bodily sensations to reach out to the external world (Smith, 2002).

I will argue that exploratory actions can be considered as sufficient conditions for the externalization but they are not necessary to experience an external object. Similarly, I will criticize the necessity of the sensorimotor knowledge to a tactile perception. Finally, I will argue that the third account can be reduce to first or second account. These three accounts being based on a certain dependency between action and perception, I will try at the end to establish the conditions according to which an enactive explanation of the perception-sensation distinction would be possible in the case of touch.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Franz Altner
Date: 11:45-12:15, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004



Alireza Bani Sadr (Universite Paris 1, France)

I am a five-year PhD student in philosophy at the university Paris 1 (Sorbonne-Pantheon), doing my PhD project under the supervision of Max Kistler. I graduated with a Master’s degree in electronics (specialization: sensors, instrumentation & measurement) from University of Paris 6 (UPMC) and a Bachelor’s degree in electronics from Azad University of Tehran. After two years of research in Electronics, I decided to turn to the philosophy of science in 2010 which is more responsive to my career goals and personal interests. After tow years of study in Logic,

Philosophy and History of Science and Epistemology at the University of Paris 1 (Sorbonne-Pantheon), I graduated with a Master's degree in Philosophy in July 2012. My PhD research concerns a set of central topics of philosophy of perception such as the distinction between perception and sensation, the interdependence between perception and action, and the relation between knowledge and perception. This research is based on a study of the sense of touch.

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How to Revise Credences in Light of Disagreement

Weng Kin San

According to conciliationists, when individuals encounter disagreement, they ought to revise their credences. But how? Suppose Jack's credence in p is 0.9 and Jill's is 0.4. One possibility is to adopt, for each proposition, the (linear) average of the disagreeing individuals' credences (in this case, 0.65). Another possibility is to take their geometric mean (in this case, 0.6). However, I argue that both linear and geometric averaging, which many conciliationists endorse, are problematic.

More generally, a broad class of rules for determining how disagreeing individuals ought to revise their credences faces the following problem: they cannot distinguish cases involving genuine points of consensus among disagreeing individuals from certain pathological cases where no such consensus exists. In particular, all 'non-holistic' rules face this problem. These are rules according to which how disagreeing individuals ought to revise their credence in p just depends on what credence each individual assigns to p . That is, the credences assigned to propositions other than p are irrelevant.

The problems with non-holistic rules have important implications for the epistemology of disagreement. According to conciliationists, disagreeing individuals ought to revise their credences. This view is tenable only if there is a plausible rule for determining how individuals ought to revise their credences. What I argue is that *prima facie* plausible rules like linear and geometric averaging are problematic. So, unless there are viable alternative rules that circumvent this problem, we should be pessimistic about conciliationism about peer-disagreement.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Andrea Togni
Date: 12:25-12:55, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005



Weng Kin San (University of Oxford, United Kingdom)

I am currently a BPhil student at the University of Oxford. My interests are mainly in epistemology, especially formal epistemology.

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Ryle's *Conditional* Analysis of Dispositions

Petter Sandstad

he conditional analysis of dispositions, of the form $\forall x(Sx \supset Mx)$, is frequently associated with and accredited to Gilbert Ryle. This misrepresents Ryle's view, since he held what is today an unorthodox view of conditionals: namely, as the ordinary indicative conditionals indicated by the phrase 'if...then...', such that they license us to make inferences (hence they are "inference-tickets"). A surprising result of this, I argue, is that Ryle's view is in fact closer to a tendency-view, as defended amongst others by Mumford and Anjum. Further, as in contrast to the material and counterfactual conditional it allows the antecedent to be true and the consequent false, his conditional analysis turns out to be invulnerable to the well-known problems of antidotes, masks, and finks, and could thus be a viable alternative to contemporary analyses of dispositions. Thus instead of expanding the antecedent, a more promising revision is to reinterpret the conditional relation holding between the antecedent and consequent. Still, Ryle's conditional analysis seems to fail as an analysis, thus suggesting that causation is *sui generis*. Lastly it is argued that Strawson's closely related view, which does assert an ontological connection between the antecedent and the consequent, matches very well with a dispositional view of causation.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Tomi Francis
Date: 11:45-12:15, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003



Petter Sandstad (Rostock, Germany)

I am a doctoral student in philosophy at Universität Rostock (third year), working on formal causation in Aristotle and contemporary philosophy. Before that I studied at the university of Oslo.

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Jaegwon Kim's Solution to the mind-body problem: Terminal or Terminological?

Christoffer Skogholt

 In this paper I put forward two arguments, one specific argument directed against Jaegwon Kim's proposed solution to the mind-body problem in his *Physicalism, or Something Near Enough* (2005). The core of my argument is that Kim's solution involves an elimination of precisely that whose causal powers he sets out to save: mental states qua conscious. Given that the whole rationale for Kim's advocacy of reductive rather than non-reductive physicalism is that he claims it to be necessary in order to retain mental qua conscious causation within a physicalist ontology this is a fatal shortcoming of his proposal. It cannot therefore be said to represent the 'plausible terminus to the mind-body debate' which Kim claims it to be.

Secondly, through my analysis of Kim's position I put forward a more general argument the essence of which is that many discussions in philosophy of mind suffers from, or trades on, an ambiguous use of the notions of 'reduction' and 'identity'. When one clarifies these ambiguities it seems as if reductive physicalism is not a stable position, but must be construed either as eliminativism or as something like panpsychism according to which the material constituents of the brain have qualitative experience as a basic (and not an emergent or supervenient) property.

So, contrary to Kim's claim that non-reductive physicalism is an unstable position I argue that it is reductive physicalism which is unstable and that a choice must be made, by the reductive physicalist, between eliminating conscious experiences from her ontology or affirming that the matter she claims conscious experiences to be identical with has such experiences as a basic property (alongside, perhaps, electrical charge). This follows from the symmetry that holds between identities, something which is often forgotten within philosophy of mind.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Gebharter
Date: 11:50-12:20, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004



Christoffer Skogholt (Uppsala University, Sweden)

I have recently started my PhD in philosophy of religion at Uppsala University.

I am interested in questions concerning the relationship between science, religion and worldviews, philosophical and theological anthropology, political philosophy and philosophy of mind.

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Metaethical Contextualism and the Problem(s) of Lost Disagreement

Katharina Anna Sodoma

Metaethical contextualism" is the view that the meaning – and hence the truth-conditions – of moral claims depend on certain features of context, e.g. a contextually salient set of moral standards. Therefore, when uttering the same moral sentence in different contexts, different speakers can say different things. Following Alex Silk, I distinguish between versions of *speaker contextualism*, which take the set of standards endorsed by a speaker to be relevant to the context-sensitivity of moral expressions and versions of *group contextualism*, which take a set of standards shared by the speaker's group to be relevant.

Although metaethical contextualism has some theoretical advantages, the overall prospects of (different versions of) the view remain to be explored. Like its epistemological counterpart, metaethical contextualism is fraught with the notorious problem of “lost disagreement”: It is often argued that contextualism cannot give a satisfactory account of disagreement because on a contextualist interpretation the parties to an apparent disagreement do not actually contradict each other. However, Silk has recently argued that this problem only affects versions of speaker contextualism, but not versions of group contextualism.

I argue that a different problem of lost disagreement arises for versions of group contextualism: the challenge to account for cases of *inter-group* disagreement, i.e. disagreement between members of different groups. This shows that Silk’s claim only holds under the assumption of an undue restriction to cases of *intra-group* disagreement, i.e. disagreement between members of the same group. The problem of lost inter-group disagreement has so far been underexplored in discussions of (metaethical) contextualism, but takes center stage in related discussions of moral relativism. Therefore, I look at how contemporary moral relativists deal with the phenomenon of inter-group disagreement and assess these strategies in comparison to canonical solutions to the problem of lost disagreement as confronted by versions of speaker contextualism.

Reference:

Alex Silk (forthcoming): “Metaethical Contextualism”, in: David Plunkett & Tristram McPherson (eds.), *The Handbook of Metaethics*. Routledge.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Zsolt Ziegler
Date: 18:00-18:30, 13 September 2017 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.007



Katharina Anna Sodoma (University of Vienna, Austria)

I am a PhD student in Philosophy at the University of Vienna working on a dissertation on moral relativism and moral progress as part

of the ERC Advanced Grant Project “The Emergence of Relativism – Historical, Philosophical and Sociological Perspectives” (PI Martin Kusch). My supervisors are Prof. Martin Kusch and Prof. Herlinde Pauer-Studer.

Before starting on the relativism project, I completed my MA in Philosophy and my BA in Philosophy and German Philology at the University of Vienna. My MA-thesis was about Ludwig Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, more specifically the question how the logical notation developed in the *Tractatus* relates to Wittgenstein’s understanding of philosophy.

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Abductive Reasoning in Mathematics and the Multiverse of Sets

Hans Robin Solberg

 hat guides theory choice in mathematics? The fact that certain mathematical statements, like the statement that there is no cardinality strictly between the cardinality of the natural numbers and the cardinality of the real numbers, known as Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis, have been shown independent of the standard axiomatization of set theory, ZFC, has led set theorists to explore further axiom candidates that might be added to ZFC. How should one justify the acceptance of new axioms for set theory? One suggestion is that set theoretical principles can be justified extrinsically by some kind of abductive reasoning, where the axiom candidate is accepted not for its immediate intuitiveness but its explanatory power, simplicity or elementary consequences.

One might think that the use of extrinsic evidence is a staple of any scientific practice and therefore also legitimate in mathematics. I want to resist such a quick legitimatization of the method, and argue that the notion of extrinsic evidence might be problematic in the case of set theory. I do this by appealing to what I call the criterion of match, which is a claim to the effect that proper methodology within a scientific field must match up with the ontology of the subject matter. I then investigate in particular how the view that there is a multiverse of set theoretical universes might block the appropriateness of certain uses of extrinsic evidence in set theory, especially in the case of establishing

new set theoretical principles. The thought is that, if the multiverse exists, then some uses of extrinsic evidence will not be legitimate due to a mismatch between methodology and ontology.

Section: Logic & Philosophy of Mathematics
Language: English
Chair: Stefan Forster
Date: 15:10-15:40, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002



Hans Robin Solberg (University of Oslo, Norway)

I am from Oslo, Norway. Currently, I am taking a master's degree in philosophy at the university of Oslo, supervised by Øystein Linnebo and Peter Fritz, on the topic of set theoretic pluralism. My BA is also in philosophy with a minor in linguistics. Before I started my studies I worked in a kindergarten here in Oslo.

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In Defense of a “Mixed View” about Powers and Properties

George Stamets

Powers realism is the view that the powers of individual objects are conceptually and ontologically irreducible features of the actual world. The powers realist thus rejects the still-popular project of trying to give conditional analyses of statements that employ power terms, where such analyses seek to “reduce” supposedly problematic or obscure concepts to concepts which fit more comfortably into a “naturalistic” picture of the world. This comes in part because powers realism rejects any variety of Humean metaphysics according to which the world is comprised merely of events or facts that sometimes happen to fall into “patterns”, but which never bear any sort of necessary connection to one another. Even if we suppose that every true proposition ascribing a power to an object entails a true counterfactual conditional proposition about how that object would behave in certain circumstances, any such true conditional would appear to require a

truthmaker—i.e., something that makes it true. But it seems that only the distinctive powers that objects of various kinds bear, and which they exercise in their interactions with one another, could possibly be the needed truthmakers.

I begin by briefly making a case for understanding powers as (irreducible) properties of objects. If this is right, then the powers theorist must aim to find an alternative to categoricism, which is the view that all (sparse or natural) properties are “qualitative” (or “categorical”) and causally inert. This, of course, is a view of properties that fits nicely into a Humean picture of the world, but it is also adopted by some anti-Humeans, including notably Armstrong. There are three main alternatives to categoricism: (1) pandispositionalism, which holds that all properties are “pure” powers; (2) the identity view, according to which all properties are both qualitative and powerful; and (3) the mixed view, which posits two irreducible categories of properties—most commonly, one category comprised of non-powers and the other of pure powers. I will argue that the powers realist should reject pandispositionalism and the identity view in favor of a particular version of the mixed view—one which holds that objects have powers, understood as irreducible intrinsic properties, in virtue of having non-power intrinsic properties.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Petter Sandstad
Date: 14:00-14:30, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003



George Stamets (University of Leeds, United Kingdom)

I am a PhD student in the philosophy program at the University of Leeds, with primary research interests in philosophy of action, mind, and metaphysics generally. My PhD thesis, being prepared under the supervision of Professor Helen Steward, defends a powers-based approach to free will and ultimately a non-causal libertarian account of human agency, which will be built upon a substance-powers theory of causation (centered on the claim that causation in general consists in the exercise, by individual substances, of irreducible intrinsic powers). The project will divide into sections on (1) powers, causality, and laws of nature, (2)

personhood and mental causation, and (3) free and intentional agency.
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Modelling Science Through Make-Believe

Theodore Stone

ne of the more recent debates within the Philosophy of Science has been that of how one should perceive modelling in science, and what the consequences are. Lately, the concept that models should be seen as a form of imagined, and thus fictional, systems, as advocated by Godfrey-Smith (2006, 2009) Frigg (2010, 2016) and Toon (2010), has become prevalent. They see modelling as a form of imaginative process, an act of make-believe, wherein scientific models can be compared to children's games and playthings; we can imagine things that are not really there in order to play with them, just as we can when demonstrating the mechanics of scientific theories. This approach has been criticised for the idea that this forces models to no longer be accurately representative of what is found to be the objective case.

I wish to use this paper to defend the notion that models are a form of imagined system, within the framework of the theory of make-believe (Walton 1990), by demonstrating that, by using make-believe, we are able to determine that the problem of denotation; what the model is designed to denote as its target system, vanishes, by providing an account wherein the imagination can target a variety of ways and places, and thus not concern itself with creating an exact replica of what the model wishes to demonstrate. Instead, the model can be seen as an antirealist example, wherein we do not require the introduction of an object itself, and thus not worry ourselves with intersubjective identification of characters/things that are referred to by fictional names, an idea that I will develop from Salis (2013).

I will thus conclude that we can demonstrate how seeing models as make-believe provides us with a unified framework when it comes to thinking about modelling. They are able to represent the world even when the model is not an exact replica of what the model wishes to demonstrate; a problem often affiliated with realist perspectives (Magnani 2012).

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Laurenz Hudetz
Date: 14:35-15:05, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006



Theodore Stone (The University of Exeter (The University of Amsterdam come September 2017), United Kingdom)

I am set to graduate from the University of Exeter in July 2017 with a BA (Hons) in Philosophy. In September, I shall begin studying for an MA in Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam.

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Immunity to Error through Misidentification and Episodic Memory

Jessica Struchhold

 will discuss whether first-person past-tense judgments based on episodic memory are immune to error through misidentification (IEM). To answer this question I start giving a brief overview of the discussion of IEM mostly focusing on Sydney Shoemaker's account. Shoemaker was first to introduce the notion of IEM in 'Self-Reference and Self-Awareness' in 1968, mostly to shed a light on Wittgenstein's distinction between uses of 'I as object' and 'I as subject'. But if we have a closer look at first-person past-tense judgments based on episodic memory, it is not clear whether they are immune as well. Shoemaker concludes in his paper "Persons and their past" (1970) that the possibility of quasi-memory shows that first-person judgments based on memories are not immune to error through misidentification - at least they are not necessarily immune.

After presenting a brief overview of Shoemaker's argument, I want to add some critical remarks mostly held by Gareth Evans (1982) and McDowell (1997), who both criticize that it is not necessary for quasi-memory to causally originate in a property that is the subject's own. Last but not least I want to question how intuitive the notion of quasi-memory is.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: German
Chair: Alexander Gebharter
Date: 12:25-12:55, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004



Jessica Struchhold (University of Düsseldorf, Germany)

Jessica Struchhold is a master's student at the Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Germany. She finished her B.A. in 2016 with a major in Philosophy and a minor in German Literature. Her thesis was about Jerry Fodor's Language of Thought Hypothesis.

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How many Olfactory Senses do Humans have?

Andrea Togni

Since Grice's paper *Some remarks about the senses* (1962), the debate about the criteria to define and classify the senses has drawn the attention of a number of philosophers. It often happens that what *prima facie* looks like a single sensory modality can be decomposed in more 'submodalities'. Olfaction is useful to exemplify this kind of cases. Indeed, a three-fold distinction can be made: 1) Orthonasal olfaction enables perceivers to get information about the chemicals in the surrounding air; 2) Retronasal olfaction is stimulated by volatile chemicals released by food in the mouth; 3) The trigeminal system plays a significant role both in monitoring inhaled air and in savouring food.

During this talk, I will argue that the experiential criterion and the behavioral criterion are the best suited to categorize olfactory perceptions. According to the first, the sensory modalities are to be defined in phenomenological or experiential terms, and each of them has a peculiar qualitative character that distinguishes it from the others. According to the second, behaviors and actions play a constitutive role in the definition of the senses, and their classification should take into account the types of behaviors thanks to which animals explore, live and get knowledge of the environment.

On the basis of the experiential criterion, I will defend the theses that retronasal perceptions should be detached from olfaction and that they should be considered as constituents of the sense of flavor. On the basis of the behavioral criterion, I will suggest that trigeminal sensations are accessory to both orthonasal olfaction and flavor perception, because they contribute, as orthonasal olfaction does, to the ecological function of monitoring the air that is brought into the nose, and because they contribute, as retronasal olfaction does, to the ecological function of savoring.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Franziska Poprawe
Date: 16:15-16:45, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005



Andrea Togni (FINO Consortium (Universities of Turin, Eastern Piedmont, Genoa and Pavia), Italy)

In 2013, I received a M.A. in philosophy after studying at the State University of Milan. Since 2014, I have been a PhD student in Philosophy, curriculum mind, language and cognition, at the FINO Consortium (Universities of Turin, Eastern Piedmont, Genoa and Pavia), where I'm working on a dissertation about the criteria to define and categorize the senses. From January to June 2016, I was a visiting fellow at the Institute of Philosophy, University of London. I'm currently spending the first six months of 2017 as a visiting student at the University of Glasgow. In 2015, I attained the Italian qualification for history and philosophy teaching (TFA, Tirocinio Formativo Attivo). In 2016, I won a ministerial public competition for a job as secondary school teacher of history and philosophy.

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The Populist Challenge to Public Reason Liberalism

Charlotte Franziska Unruh

 In this paper, I investigate the possibility of a public reason liberal critique to Cas Mudde's so-called "minimal" definition of populism as an anti-elitist, anti-pluralist ideology.

In the first part of the paper, I argue that public reason liberalism cannot provide a convincing critique of this minimal version of populism. I discuss two public reason liberal arguments against populism. First, populists assume an unrealistic view of society, and second, populism is exclusive in nature. I show that the populist can reject those arguments. Moreover, I argue that public reason liberalism itself faces the charge of being unrealistic and exclusive.

In the second part of the paper, I discuss whether these considerations should lead us to reject public reason liberalism. On the one hand, I suggest that adopting populist views on democracy can be appropriate and beneficial under non-ideal circumstances. On the other hand, I suggest that public reason liberalism should be kept as an ideal theory, since it emphasizes features that we should aim for in political discourse in favourable circumstances. In those circumstances, the benefits of adopting public reason liberalism as an ideal theory (thereby discouraging populism) might outweigh its disadvantages.

If I am correct, then public reason liberals are wrong in asserting that populism is inherently anti-democratic. The upshot, then, is that the charge of populism made to political actors from a liberal perspective is, to a large part, unjustified rhetoric.

Section: Political Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Maciej Juzaszek
Date: 14:35-15:05, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007



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Why Humeans are committed to Moral Nihilism

Walter Veit

Since John Leslie Mackie’s “popularization” of moral error theories in meta-ethics, increasing attention has been focused on how to escape the conclusion that there are no moral facts. In this essay I argue that a Humean conception of normative reasons as being relative, i.e. lacking convergence on agent’s normative reasons, is incompatible with the existence of categorical imperatives, without which morality lacks objectivity, i.e. authority. If there was a criminal who tortured innocent children for fun, then we would neither want to say that his act was wrong according to some institution—as that would make morality no different from etiquette or, worse, ‘Nazi morality’ for that matter, nor would we want to accept the wrongness of our moral judgement if he claimed that his one and only goal and pleasure in life is to torture innocent people. Richard Joyce (2001) refers to this as the moral rationalist’s “metaethical dilemma”; “one horn is alienation of an agent from her normative reasons, the other horn is moral relativism” (p. 80). While the first horn eliminates the special authority of morality, the second horn eliminates the inescapability of morality by citing different desires, both properties being a conceptual part of morality. This is why Kantian categorical imperatives capture moral discourse so adequately. However, as Kant anticipated, Humeans cannot evade the following valid argument for the moral error theory postulated by Joyce:

1. If x morally ought to Φ , then x ought to Φ regardless of whether he cares to, regardless of whether Φ ing satisfies any of his desires or furthers his interests.
2. If x morally ought to Φ , then x has a reason for Φ ing.
3. Therefore, if x morally ought to Φ , then x has a reason for Φ ing regardless of whether Φ ing serves his desires or furthers his interests.
4. But there is no sense to be made of such reasons.
5. Therefore, x is never under a moral obligation. (2001, p.42)

I argue that the Humean move to moral subjectivism by denying (1), is just moral nihilism in disguise, as categorical imperatives are a necessary part of morality. If Williams' conception of morality allows that some agents simply do not have a reason not to torture children for fun, or worse ought to torture children, this is a prima-facie ground to reject calling such a conception morality at all. The relativistic conception of normative reasons is incompatible with the non-relative conception of moral reasons that is required for categorical imperatives. Employing both commits the Humean to a moral error theory. As Joyce (2016) points out, "one's reason to move a chess piece in a certain manner exists only in virtue of some human-decreed system of rules. But moral rules, according to Mackie (1977), have their reason-giving quality objectively; we do not treat them as norms of our invention, for to do so would rob them of their practical authority, which is, arguably, their whole point", something Kant was right to fear as a result of Hume's work.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Zsolt Ziegler
Date: 16:50-17:20, 13 September 2017 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.007



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Walter Veit is a Philosophy & Economics student at the University of Bayreuth. His research focuses on philosophy of science (in particular biology), evolutionary explanations (in particular explaining altruism with evolutionary game theory and evolutionary psychology) and metaethics (in particular the moral error theory/nihilism).

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Empirische Wissenschaft und Pseudowissenschaft in ein und der selben Debatte. Wie Fairytalescience die wissenschaftliche Methode verzerrt.

Jan Philip Vogelsang

 n der medizinwissenschaftlichen Community gibt es die Überzeugung, dass gut durchgeführte klinische Studien ausreichen, um alles zu überprüfen, was die menschliche Gesundheit betrifft. Dieser Ansatz wird auch von Vertretern der Alternativmedizin eingesetzt, um die Wirksamkeit ihrer Heilmethoden zu beweisen. Zwar werden diese Beweise bisher recht stark angezweifelt, jedoch stimmt man diesem methodischen Ansatz prinzipiell zu. Man verhält sich agnostisch zu der Frage der prinzipiellen Sinnhaftigkeit dieser klinischen Studien und hofft auf Ergebnisse, die zeigen, dass die spektakulären Annahmen im Bereich der Grundlagenforschung, wie die Möglichkeit der Potenzierung von Arzneistoffen durch Verschüttelung oder ein Gedächtnis der Trägersubstanz, ausgeschlossen werden. In diesem Vortrag soll jedoch gezeigt werden, dass dies eine Fehleinschätzung ist. Es werden Positionen von Skeptikern der Komplementärmedizin aufgezeigt, die Fehler in der Studiendurchführung und Interpretation von Homöopathiestudien zeigen. Ebenfalls werden die evidenzbasierte medizinische Forschung, wie auch Aspekte von Pseudowissenschaft charakterisiert, mit ihren jeweiligen Forschungsprinzipien und ihren Methoden. Es wird argumentiert, dass eine unkritische Akzeptanz der Ergebnisse von alternativmedizinischen Studien und das alleinige Durchführen dieser klinischen Studien, zu einer Vermischung von unterschiedlichen und gegensätzlichen Forschungsprinzipien führt, und somit sowohl die Ergebnisse der generellen medizinischen Forschung, als auch der öffentliche Diskurs verzerrt werden, wie bereits heute in öffentlichen Debatten zu diesen Thema festzustellen ist.

Section: Philosophy of Science
 Language: German
 Chair: Gregor Greslehner
 Date: 16:15-16:45, 13 September 2017 (Wednesday)
 Location: SR 1.006



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Three Building Blocks of Real Public Reason

Florian Wieczorek

he central puzzle of liberalism is the concurrence of deep reasonable pluralism and normative individualism. If the assumption of pluralism on all levels is taken seriously, it becomes very difficult to build a justificatory theory connecting individual reasoning and social states or rules of any kind. According to many scholars, specifically those referred to as realists, the grand theories of public reason (i.e. Rawls and Habermas), have failed to come to terms with the reality of ineradicable conflict. I find this line of critique persuasive and therefore argue for real public reason as an alternative approach. The proposed paper will defend its three central building blocks. The first central thesis is that any principles or rules of good social order for a given society are to be determined by the actual history and social processes – i.e. the real politics – of that society, because we cannot reconstruct and prescribe the correct moral rules or principles of justice for a given society in theory. My second claim is that the best we can hope for in a pluralistic society is justified constitutional order as a pragmatic, open-ended ideal. This means to think of constitutional order as a compromise that is at least a *modus vivendi* and at best a reasonable compromise supported by ownership relations. The latter is the case when citizens have their own good reasons to endorse a constitutional order as their order. However, even if constitutional regimes can be understood as a pragmatic, reasonable compromise in

this sense, how do we know that they really are and what would that actually mean for a given society? In order to offer an answer, my third thesis is that we need a form of actual agreement that puts the justification of real social orders to the test. One promising way to think about actual agreement is political participation under deliberative conditions of voluntary, well-informed and well-considered action.

Section: Political Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Maciej Juzaszek
Date: 14:00-14:30, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007



Florian Wieczorek (University of Hamburg, Germany)

Currently I am a Ph.D. student, working on the topic of justified social order under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Peter Niesen at the University of Hamburg. The goal of my dissertation is to formulate a realist theory of justified social order, embedded in the empirical literature on social norms, normativity and democracy research. My research interest focus on political philosophy / theory, realism, democracy research and the evolution of social norms. I received my bachelor's degree in philosophy and political science from the University of Konstanz and my master's degree in PPE from the University of Hamburg.

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On the Explanation Provided by T-Biconditionals and the Like

Luca Zanetti

t is generally granted that if 'p' is true, then 'p' is true because p and not vice versa. Wolfgang Kühne and Benjamin Schnieder claim that these explanations are conceptual explanations, that is, that they are based on conceptual relations between the explanans and the explanandum. In this paper we consider two challenges for their view.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Markus Hierl
Date: 16:50-17:20, 13 September 2017 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.005



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I am currently a PhD student at the Center for Neurocognition, Epistemology and theoretical Syntax (NEtS) of the School for Advanced Studies IUSS Pavia, Italy. Before, I got an MA in Philosophy from University San Raffaele, Milan, and a A.phil . Master in Analytic Philosophy from the University of Barcelona.
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The Simple View and the Problem of Action Individuation

Marta Zareba

She main goal of my presentation is to justify the claim that moderationism, a doctrine which emerged during a discussion about action individuation in analytic philosophy is incompatible with the Simple View, an intuitive account of the relationship between intentions and intentional actions. My considerations will begin with a critical reconstruction of two different solutions to the problem of action individuation. In G.E.M. Anscombe's well-known example, a man moves his arm, thereby moving a pump, supplying poisoned water to a village and killing the inhabitants. According to externalist moderationists [Thomson 1977, Thalberg 1977], actions are complex events extending in time and space beyond the movements of agent's body. For example, an action of killing the inhabitants performed by the man should be identified with the whole chain of causally related events leading from the movements of the man's arm to the inhabitants' death. In opposition to the moderationism stands the view that when an agent does something by doing something else only one single action is performed. For internalist minimalists [Anscombe 1963, Davidson 2001] the only actions people perform are 'mere movements

of a body’—particular events under various descriptions (‘operating a pump’, ‘killing of the inhabitants’).

In the second part of my presentation I will present the analysis of intentional action that has been dubbed the ‘Simple View’, according to which an agent A intentionally ϕ -s only if A intends to ϕ [Adams 1986, McCann 1999]. In order to support the claim that the dispute about individuation of actions is much more than a verbal issue, I will develop a detailed argument in favor of the claim that every theory of action which conjoins moderationism with the Simple View [McCann 2013] is incoherent. More precisely, I will present a thought experiment demonstrating that in the light of moderationist view of action individuation one’s mental states at the time one intentionally ϕ ’s may not include an intention to ϕ . And this observation may serve as a good starting point for developing a new argument against the Simple View.

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Section: Action Theory
Language: English
Chair: Albert Anglberger
Date: 14:00-14:30, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004



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PhD student at the Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, master in philosophy; master thesis about the debate on action individuation; PhD thesis (in progress) about the concept of intention in analytic philosophy of action; Areas of philosophical interest: analytical philosophy of mind and action, ontology and analytical aesthetics.

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Dispute over an Epistemological Status of Thought Experiments: Platonism, Empiricism and Mental models.

Przemyslaw Zawadzki

 will begin with the introduction of what constitutes thought experiments. Afterwards, I will picture a general outline of the background of modern discussion over thought experiments, which is supposed to reveal that the most substantial as well as controversial aspect of this discussion was a dispute between empiricists, platonics and mental models proponents over the epistemological status of thought experiments. According to platonics, thought experiments are tools that enable philosophers' and scientists' insight into the realm of Platon's necessary and eternal truths. Empiricists, in contrast, consider thought experiments as disguised arguments that can be in fact reconstructed to normal arguments with premises based on empirical evidence. On the other hand, proponents of the last approach characterise thought experiments as mental models. They regard them as analogues of the physical world or imagined situations, processes or events, which are constructed in the mind in order to build a base to infer from.

I will present a critical analysis of aforementioned approaches. By

pointing out their limits I will undertake an attempt to defend a thesis that none of these approaches is able to fully explain the nature of thought experimenting. On this basis I will conclude with a general reflection on the state of the art.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Christian Feldbacher
Date: 16:15-16:45, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004



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Closest Cases of Particularism: Moral Luck Disqualified

Zsolt Ziegler

Bair cases of moral luck (Levy 2015, 1) are essential to form the problem of moral luck. It has been argued that the existence of moral luck is against the principle stating that “two people ought not to be morally assessed differently if the only other differences between them are due to factors beyond their control” – Control Principle-Corollary (Nelkin 2013). Similarly, Zimmerman, a leading figure of the moral luck debate writes that “Georg would have freely killed Henrik but for some feature of the case over which he had no control. This being so, it seems that we must conclude here, as before, that Georg is as culpable as George.” (Zimmerman 2002, 565) Traditional pair cases of moral luck are very much alike sharing all morally significant features except the luck factor. Moral particularism is the view that bounds morally similar cases and so ascribes moral judgment in accordance with the similarity that holds between cases (Dancy, 2004, 2013). Instead of the traditional pair cases of moral luck,

I am going to argue, the particularist framework offers pair cases that are closer pairs (than the traditional moral luck cases). If this is right, the traditional pair cases of moral luck cannot be formed in accordance with particularism.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Katharina Anna Sodoma
Date: 15:40-16:10, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007



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