

Patchwork Approaches to Concepts and Different Scales

Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla Philipp Haueis

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Project Information

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Introduction

Many concepts of science seem to have no general distinct meaning, but work more like a set of **patches** forming a **patchwork**.

E.g.: *hardness* is used differently for different materials (metals, rubber etc.).

We use such concepts **polysemously**.

The different uses are not only due to different materials, but also due to different **scales**.

In this talk we **link** the discussion of **patchwork concepts** to the discussion of different **measure theoretical scales**.

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Polysemous Concepts and the Patchwork Approach

Polysemous Concepts in Science

We often use polysemous concepts in science. E.g.:

- temperature: the mean kinetic energy within the **domain** of gases at the molecular **scale**; the *frozen order* of solids at the polymer scale;
- homology: for the domain of genes and that of body parts partly based on the same **techniques** of searching for a common ancestor and an evolutionary transformation series;
- gold: with different **specific properties** such as that of being (non-)catalytic at different scales such as the macro, nano, and atomic scale.

Traditional Approaches to Polysemy

Speaking about polysemy, one should distinguish between the *standing* and the *occurrent* meaning of a word:

- *standing meaning*: is the meaning the word has as a type
- *occurrent meaning*: is the meaning a word has as particular tokens of that word-type

Given this distinction, we can classify three semantic approaches to *polysemy* (cf. Vicente 2018, pp.949ff):


- *Literalism*: each word-type has exactly one literal standing meaning; differences in the occurrent meaning are only due to pragmatic factors.
- *Underspecification (thin) account*: the standing meaning of a word is underspecified with respect to its occurrent meaning.
- *Overspecification (rich) account*: the occurrent meaning of a word is just a part (or a selection) of the total standing meaning of the word.

Traditional Approaches to Polysemy


Literalism



Underspecification



Overspecification



Problems of the Traditional Approaches

Traditional semantical approaches fail to characterise polysemous concepts of science adequately:

- Vs. **Literalism**: there is no privileged meaning; e.g.: **temperature**
- Vs. **Underspecification**: general abstract representation exist but do not encompass all occurrent meanings; e.g. **homology**;
also general meanings could be too unspecific to be useful;
- Vs. **Overspecification**: there is no total meaning from which individual features are recruited; e.g. **hardness** (see below)

The Patchwork Approach: Structure

The *patchwork approach* to polysemy avoids the assumption of a privileged, underspecified or overspecified standing meaning.

Rather, it suggests to focus on the initially highlighted elements: **scale**, **techniques**, **domain**, and **specific property (θ)**:

$$\overbrace{\text{Term}^s \langle t, d(\theta) \rangle}^{\text{Patch}}$$


And consider it like the material structure of a **quilt**. Each patch in a quilt is stitched to neighbouring patches, without there being a central piece.



The Patchwork Approach: Structure

Scientific Concepts as Patchworks

General reasoning strategy



(cf. Haueis 2021)

Technique (t)

Instructions how to use experimental or mathematical tools to achieve result

Domain (d)

Class of entities to which the concept applies

Property (θ, ϕ)

Objective feature of scientific interest (e.g. quantity, disposition, mechanism)


Scale (s)

Spatial, temporal or energetic interval at which a property is instantiated

The Patchwork Approach: Example

Scientific Concepts as Patchworks: Example of “Hardness”

Reasoning strategy: (a) mechanically intervene on material
 (b) find quantity describing resistance to intervention



Technique (t)

Indenter test

Durometer test

Domain (d)

Metals

Elastomers

Property (θ, ϕ)

Load causing plastic deformation

Load causing elastic deformation

Scale (s)

Macroscale

Macroscale

(cf. Haueis 2021)


The Patchwork Approach: General Advantages

Like in everyday situations, polysemy in science does **not hinder communication** (Falkum 2015).

⇒ Scientists are trained to use polysemous words in scale-dependent technique-involving, domain-specific, and property-targeting ways (Haueis 2021).

Generalised patchwork approach offers **norms** which govern when extending a patch is legitimate (Haueis 2021).


⇒ Normatively constrained pluralism: Scientists can use legitimately constrained patchwork concepts without eliminating general term (Taylor and Vickers 2017).



- ## Patchwork Approaches and Different Scales

The Patchwork Approach to Concepts of Different Scales

Measure Theoretical Scales



Interestingly, the problem of scale-dependent polysemy of concepts has been mainly discussed with respect to **scales of the same type**.

However, there is also a problem of scale-dependent polysemy with respect to scales of **different (measure theoretical) types**.

We can distinguish between different types of scales (cf. Stevens 1946):

- **qualitative**: nominal
- **comparative**: ordinal
- **quantitative**: interval and ratio

Take, e.g., the concept of **temperature**. We distinguish high temperature (nominal), higher temperature (ordinal) and temperature to degree r (interval/ratio); other examples: **hardness**, **length** etc.

To speak of *temperature*, *hardness*, *length*, is to use a **polysemous concept**.

Measure Theoretical Scales: Mathematical & Philosophical

(Mathematical) measure theory studies ways of linking concepts of different scales as well as their epistemological features (philosophical).

Questions of the **mathematical** measurement theory:

- Which quantities are fundamental?
- How can we measure a quantity (structural presuppositions)?
- etc.

 π

Questions of the **philosophical** theory of measurement:

- How to define quantities (operationally)?
- What is the role of conventions in measuring?
- Are quantities real in the sense of being independent of attempts to measure them?
- etc.

 φ

Example of Linking Concepts of Different Scales: Length

Measuring **length** is a form of **fundamental measurement**.

Here is in a nutshell how it works (simplified presentation of Hempel 1974):

- We pick out a *quasi order relation* such as ... *is longer than or equally long to* ...: L ; this relation is ...
 - *transitive*: if zLy and yLx , then also zLx ,
 - *reflexive*: xLx ,
 - *connex*: xLy or yLx

... and allows us to define an equivalence relation $=_L$: $x =_L y$ iff xLy and yLx
- We constrain a **measure** I by the general conditions:
 - if $I(y) = I(x)$, then $y =_L x$
 - if $I(y) > I(x)$, then yLx
- and achieve this in a unique way by **fundamental metrisation** via ...
 - setting $I(y) = I(x)$ if $y =_L x$,
 - relying on an **additive physical operation** \circ (concatenation): $I(y \circ x) = I(y) + I(x)$,
 - defining a **unit**: $I(\text{international prototype measure}) = 1$

π



Example of Linking Concepts of Different Scales: Length

This allows us to measure **directly** any length that (a) is a **multiple** of our unit or (b) whereof the unit is a multiple.

We can also fix “incommensurable” lengths **indirectly** (e.g. the diagonal of a square with the unit length).

What is important for **fundamental measurement** is the existence of an operation \circ that shares relevant features with mathematical operations (addition, multiplication: commutativity, associativity etc.).

Furthermore, it is important that we have “**enough**” **objects** that stand in relevant relations to each other. E.g.: if no two x, y are $x =_L y$, then *fundamental metrisation* will only assign $I(\text{international prototype measure}) = 1$.

In the later case, information of **direct** measurement of the quantitative scale does not exceed that of the **ordinal** scale.

Linking via Derived Metrisation: E.g. Temperature

There are also other ways to measure/metrise: via **derived metrisation**.

E.g.: **temperature** t : regarding the classical concept no “natural” operation is additive: $t(y \circ x) = t(y) + t(x)$

non-natural: combining individual substances and heating the combined substance up to the sum of the individual temperatures;

However, “deriving” t via l of the **extension of mercury in a bar** brings in additivity.



Within the range of mercury's liquid aggregate phase, this “derivation” is **conventional** (coordinating definitions). The mapping also **correlates empirically** with the volume of gas of the same temperature under fixed pressure:

$$t(x) = f(v(x))$$



Based on this correlation, the definition also extends to cases not covered by mercury's liquid aggregate phase. This derivation is then **empirical**.

Polysemy due to Different Types of Scales

We have seen a bit how measure theory links [concepts of different scales](#).

Now we can ask how to best account for the [polysemy](#) of concepts for different scales?

Recall, we have discussed four approaches:



In the following, we argue in favour of an interpretation *Patchwork*.

Vs. Literalism



Literalism: **one scale is fundamental** and the others are derived or can be eliminated.


We find such claims in early philosophy of science (Carnap) but also in philosophy in general regarding theoretical concepts (in the debate about Lockean bridging cf., e.g., Kyburg).

Problem: outline above makes clear that **also fundamental quantities** are constituted on the basis of (elements of the) **ordinal** and **nominal** scales.

Only in very general cases there is a “logical **bottom-up linking**” of different scales:

metric \Rightarrow quasi order \Rightarrow equivalence relation \Rightarrow partition/categories

Vs. Underspecification



Concepts of different scales have different features:

- **nominal**: thresholds (or threshold elements)
- **ordinal**: order (vs. nominal) and generality (vs. interval/ratio; see, e.g., discussion in economics regarding preferences vs. utilities and industry of impossibility theorems)
- **interval/ratio**: quantity

To rely only on a general concept of measurement (e.g. measurement as the construction of mappings from empirical into numerical structures) is unlikely helpful to **specify the occurrence meanings** for different scales;

Vs. Overspecification



Scales can be specified via their transformation properties; these become less specific from quantitative to nominal:

- **ratio**: invariance under multiplication by a positive number
(e.g.: $cm = 2.54 \times in$)
- **interval (linear)**: furthermore invariance under constant shift
(e.g.: $^{\circ}F = ^{\circ}C \times 9/5 + 32$)
- **ordinal**: any monotonically increasing transformation
- **nominal**: any one-to-one substitution transformation

However, as we have seen, the construction of the scales for the different concepts (*length*, *temperature* etc.) is **not** simply one from an overspecified concept to a **specification** of the different concepts of the different scales.

The Patchwork Approach



Rather, instead of thinking about a single set of defining features, one should think of several features that are “locally linked”.

We think that this can be seen quite well with respect to the problem of *selecting a unit/standardisation* in measurement ...

... which brings us back to the *philosophical theory of measurement*.



The Patchwork Approach: Standardisation



Standardisation involves **choices among nontrivial alternatives**.

E.g.: the choice among different thermometric fluids or among different ways of marking equal duration (Tal 2013, 2020).

Problem: Appealing to theory to decide which standard is more accurate would be circular, since theory cannot be applied prior to a choice of a measurement standard.

⇒ “**problem of coordination**” (Van Fraassen 2008)

⇒ “**problem of nomic measurement**” (Chang 2004, chpt.2)

Conventionalists attempted to escape the circularity by positing **a priori** statements, known as “**coordinative definitions**”.

Problem: it supposes that choices of measurement standard are arbitrary and static, whereas in actual practice measurement standards tend to be chosen based on empirical considerations and are eventually improved.

The Patchwork Approach: Standardisation



New philosophical approaches on measurement counter the problem of coordination/nomic measurement by aiming to show that the involved **circularity is not vicious** (cf. Tal 2020, sect.8.1).

Chang argues that constructing a quantity-concept and standardising its measurement are **co-dependent and iterative tasks** (“epistemic iteration”).

Epistemic iteration as, e.g. in the case of the (pre-scientific) concept of **temperature** respects existing traditions while at the same time it corrects them (Chang 2004, chpt.5).

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
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The Patchwork Approach: Advantages


WHY TAKE PATCHWORK STRUCTURES AT FACE VALUE?

- special case of **polysemy** - multiple related lexical meanings (e.g., "book")
- generating new meanings from old ones: **flexibility of language** (Falkum 2016)
- patches are connected by local links without sharing **core meaning**



The Patchwork Approach: Key Principles


NORMATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON PATCHES



- **Reliable techniques**
detect the same property in two entities
- **Homogeneous domains**
same property assigns entities to extension
- **Significant properties**
used to describe, classify or explain behavior of entities


The Patchwork Approach: Key Principles Exemplified

NORMATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON "HARDNESS" PATCHES



The Patchwork Approach: Pragmatic Unity

PRAGMATIC UNITY OF PATCHWORK CONCEPTS



Reuse techniques

Use technique to detect property of another patch

Overlapping domains

Two properties usable for some entities (here: nylon)

Combine properties

Material property charts describe relation between hardness quantities