

SOPhiA

2nd Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy

2011



Programme and Abstracts

Location: Department of Philosophy (Humanities)
University of Salzburg
Date: September 8–10, 2011
Languages: English and German
Website: <http://www.sophia-conference.org/>

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Preface



In recent years the opportunities for keeping track of science-business for students of philosophy has increased. The raising number of essay competitions and graduate conferences support this claim.



In 2011, the Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy is, once again, joining the midst of these events. The title of the conference already reveals some details about the organizers, the contributors and the conference's guiding principles. To avoid misunderstandings we want to add the following remarks: (i) Because of the high number of international participants, Salzburg stands for the location of the conference only, not for the nationality of its participants. (ii) One of the conference's distinctive feature compared to similar events is that we do not make any constraints regarding the topic of presentations. (iii) On the contrary, every philosophical discipline – as long as it is carried out in an analytic way – has its place at SOPhiA.



By combining (ii) and (iii) we want to demonstrate, in contrast to some voices which claim that Analytic Philosophy constrains our intellectual life, that all traditional topics can be advantageously examined in the framework of Analytic Philosophy. It is our utmost concern to unite analytic philosophers from all around the world (cf. (i)). This is also in the sense of Carnap, who claims in his early work *The Logical Structure of the World*:

“The new type of philosophy has arisen in close contact with the work of the special sciences, especially mathematics and physics. Consequently they have taken the strict and responsible orientation of the scientific investigator as their guideline for philosophical work, while the attitude of the traditional philosopher is more like that of a poet. This new attitude not only changes the style of thinking but also the type of problem that is posed. The individual no longer undertakes to erect in one bold stroke an entire system of philosophy. Rather, each works at his special place within the one unified science.”



In spirit of this motto, we wish you an interesting conference, fruitfull discussions and stimulating thoughts.

The Organization Committee



Figures and Facts

TIMEFRAME AND GENERAL INFORMATION. From September 8th-10th 2011 the second Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy (SOPhiA 2011) will be held at the University of Salzburg's Department of Philosophy (Humanities). The conference is public and attending it is free of charge. The official languages of the conference are English and German. Contributed talks will be given by philosophy students (pre-doc). The conference is hosted by members of the University of Salzburg's Department of Philosophy (Humanities). The organizers can be contacted via organization@sophia-conference.org.



MISSION STATEMENT. Within the conference, problems of all areas of philosophy should be discussed. A thematical focus is not intended. The conference therefore has no specific theme. The presentations should rather set themselves apart by a methodological limitation to the tradition of Analytic Philosophy by usage of clear language and comprehensible arguments. The conference is meant to be a common effort to clearly formulate some of the problems of philosophy and to provide critical assessments of them. No individual is expected to construct "a whole building of philosophy" all by himself; rather, the conference hosts expect everyone, as Carnap proposes, to bring the undertaking forward "at his specific place within" philosophy.



PROCEDURE. About 100 participants are expected. There will be 59 talks. The speakers are from institutions of the following fourteen states: Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the USA. There are three types of talks:

Plenary talks: held by invited speakers

Talks within a symposium: held by invited speakers

Talks within sections: held by contributed speakers



SPEAKERS. Invited speakers are:

Opening: Hans Rott (University of Regensburg)

Plenary: Gerhard Schurz (University of Düsseldorf)

Closing: Carlos Ulises Moulines (University of Munich)

Symposium I: Analytical Philosophy of Religion

Norbert Hoerster (Mainz)

Reinhard Kleinknecht (University of Salzburg)

Clemens Sedmak (King's College London & University of Salzburg)

Symposium II: Formal Ethics

Heinrich Ganthaler (University of Salzburg)

Norbert Gratzl (Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy)

Edgar Morscher (University of Salzburg)

Olivier Roy (University of Munich & Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy)

The list of contributed speakers and their abstracts is to be found on the following pages.

Legend of Programmes

September 8th, 2011 (Thursday)

Time	Location			
	HS 111	HS 303	HS 304	SE Phil
09:00-12:30	<p align="center">Symposium I: Analytical Philosophy of Religion Norbert Hoerster & Reinhard Kleinknecht & Clemens Sedmak <i>Symposium Programme</i> Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher & Stefan H. Gugerell (German and English, Location: HS 304)</p>			
12:30-14:00	Lunch Break			
14:00-15:30	<p align="center">Plenary Lecture: Opening Hans Rott <i>Enthymematic validity</i> Chair: Albert J.J. Anglberger (English, Location: HS 304)</p>			
15:30-16:00	Break			
16:00-16:30	<p>Logic & Philosophy of Language James Garrison <i>A Fregean Critique of Kantian Logic</i> Chair: Albert J.J. Anglberger (English)</p>	<p>Epistemology Michele Palmira <i>Philosophical evidence and the Socratic method</i> Chair: Alexander Gebharter (English)</p>	<p>Philosophy of Religion Ebrahim Azadgeran <i>Swinburne On The Sceptical Theism</i> Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher (English)</p>	<p>Philosophy of Mind Max A. Seeger <i>Mein Gehirn, mein Geist, mein Gedanke - Autorenschaft vs. Ownership</i> Chair: Nora Heinzelmann (German)</p>
16:45-17:15	<p>Logic & Philosophy of Language Isaac Manuel Gustavo <i>Syntax and semantics before their time. A setting process between intensional vs. extensional paradigms</i> Chair: Albert J.J. Anglberger (English)</p>	<p>Epistemology Merel Lefevere <i>Unification and integration: different yet the same?</i> Chair: Alexander Gebharter (English)</p>	<p>Philosophy of Religion Angelo Marc Kalies <i>"Wir sehen ein kompliziertes Netz von Ähnlichkeiten" - Zum Begriff des Fundamentalismus</i> Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher (German)</p>	<p>Philosophy of Mind Stefanie Houben <i>Die Farbe des Apfels und die fehlende Blauschattierung. Einige Bemerkungen zur Farbwahrnehmung bei David Hume</i> Chair: Nora Heinzelmann (German)</p>
17:30-18:00	<p>Logic & Philosophy of Language Karine Fradet <i>Rationality and Co-operation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma</i> Chair: Albert J.J. Anglberger (English)</p>	<p>Epistemology Thorben Petersen <i>Lorentzian Presentism: Epistemically Confused As Well?</i> Chair: Alexander Gebharter (English)</p>	<p>Philosophy of Religion Alexander Christian <i>Der wissenschaftliche Status des Intelligent Design</i> Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher (German)</p>	
18:30-	Warm buffet at the Department of Philosophy (Humanities)			

September 9th, 2011 (Friday) – Part II

Time	Location			
	HS 111	HS 303	HS 304	SE Phil
15:30-16:00	Logic & Philosophy of Language Christine Schurz <i>Zwei kontextuelle Reformulierungen des Verstärkten Lügnerargumentes</i> Chair: Moritz Cordes (German)	Epistemology Péter Hartl <i>Why shouldn't we be afraid of scepticism about intuitions?</i> Chair: Merel Lefevere (English)	Ethics Claudia Reitering <i>Das Non-Identity Problem und die Rechte zukünftig Lebender</i> Chair: Norbert Paulo (German)	Philosophy of Mind Michael Sienhold <i>Conceptual mental content. A critique of four Fregean principles against the background of embodied cognition</i> Chair: Alexander Georg Mirnig (English)
16:00-16:45	Break			
16:45-17:15	Philosophy of Science Sebastian Lutz <i>Armchair Philosophy Naturalized</i> Chair: Christian Wallmann (English)	Epistemology Lech Palmowski <i>Theoretical Rationality: Between Internalism and Externalism</i> Chair: Arne Martin Weber (English)	Ethics Karl Christoph Reinmuth <i>Zum Zusammenhang zwischen Regeln und Recht-auf-etwas-Aussagen in Regelwerken</i> Chair: Norbert Paulo (German)	Metaphysics & Ontology Ulrich Lobis <i>Über die Relevanz der Augustinischen Zeittheorie</i> Chair: Vera Flocke (German)
17:30-18:00	Philosophy of Science Richard Brunauer <i>Maschinelles Lernen zur Modellbildung in den empirischen Wissenschaften</i> Chair: Christian Wallmann (German)	Epistemology Dennis Graemer <i>Das Basisproblem: Eigenpsychische Basis oder Konvention?</i> Chair: Arne Martin Weber (German)	Ethics Michael-John Turp <i>The real problem of egoism</i> Chair: Norbert Paulo (English)	Metaphysics & Ontology Bastian Reichardt <i>Spielarten des Realismus</i> Chair: Vera Flocke (German)
18:30-	Warm buffet at the Department of Philosophy (Humanities)			

September 10th, 2011 (Saturday)

Time	Location			
	HS 111	HS 303	HS 304	SE Phil
09:00-12:30	Symposium II: Formal Ethics Heinrich Ganthaler & Norbert Gratzl & Edgar Morscher & Olivier Roy <i>Symposium Programme</i> Chair: Albert J.J. Anglberger (German and English, Location: HS 304)			
12:30-14:00	Lunch Break			
14:00-14:30	Logic & Philosophy of Language Sebastian Sanhueza <i>Wittgenstein's Two Notions of Interpretation</i> Chair: Hans Rott (English)	Philosophy of Science Christian Wallmann <i>Single-case probabilities and their impact on statistical methods</i> Chair: Sebastian Lutz (English)	Practical Philosophy: Philosophy of Law Daniel Gruschke <i>Ist Vagheit in Gesetzestexten eine Bedrohung für den Rechtsstaat?</i> Chair: Sebastian Becker (German)	Metaphysics & Ontology Marion Haemmerli <i>The Structure of Spatial Location and the Question of Perspectivity</i> Chair: Bastian Reichardt (English)
14:45-15:15	Logic & Philosophy of Language Moritz Cordes & Friedrich Reinmuth <i>Logik als Wissenschaft vom Schließen</i> Chair: Hans Rott (German)	Philosophy of Science Tilmann Massey <i>Laterale Theoriendynamik - ein Beispiel aus der Biologiegeschichte</i> Chair: Sebastian Lutz (German)	Practical Philosophy: Philosophy of Education Sonia Pavlenko <i>The University, Knowledge and Wisdom</i> Chair: Sebastian Becker (English)	Metaphysics & Ontology Vera Flocke <i>Time is discrete for Four-Dimensionalists</i> Chair: Bastian Reichardt (English)
15:30-16:00	Logic & Philosophy of Language Christian Wimmer <i>Freie Logik, Quantoren und existentieller Gehalt</i> Chair: Hans Rott (German)	Philosophy of Science Julia Liebtrau <i>Wertbasierte Handlungserklärungen</i> Chair: Sebastian Lutz (German)	Practical Philosophy: Political Philosophy Sebastian Becker <i>Immigration and the Stability of the Demos</i> Chair: Alexander Gebharter (English)	Metaphysics & Ontology Alexander Dinges & Julia Zakkou <i>Semantic Relativism for Metametaphysics</i> Chair: Bastian Reichardt (English)
16:00-16:30	Break			
16:30-18:00	Plenary Lecture: Ending Carlos Ulises Moulines <i>Theory-Structuralism: A Programm for Analyzing Science</i> Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher (English, Location: HS 304)			
18:30-	Closing Dinner			

Abstracts & Biographical Notes

Swinburne On The Sceptical Theism

Ebrahim Azadergan

According to the skeptical theism there are good reasons to think that we are not well-positioned to find out exactly what might be God's reasons for permitting evils. Skeptical theism has been developed as a response by contemporary philosophers like Wykstra, Alston, Plantinga and Bergmann to a sort of evidential argument from evil which is mainly developed by Rowe. They argue that because there is an epistemic distance between God and us, and because of the limitations in our cognitive faculties it is likely that there be many types of goods with which we are not acquainted at all. Indeed even if we believe to be acquainted with the relevant goods, there is good reason to doubt that we would have any idea what role particular evils might play in bringing about those goods. Within this skeptical paradigm our ability to make judgments concerning whether any evil is gratuitous or not would be emasculated. In this paper first I shall examine the skeptical theist answer to the evidential argument from evil. Second I shall consider the objections to such a skeptical approach. Both theist and atheist philosophers have argued against this approach. In this paper I shall focus mainly on Rowe and Weilenberg's objections to skeptical theism. I will try to argue that none of them are successful in stopping the skeptical theism. However based on Richard Swinburne's proposed principle of credulity one can argue that if it seems to us that for some cases of evil there cannot be any justifying reason for God to permit them to be happened then we are prima facie justified in believing that God has no outweighing reason for permitting such a case to be happened. In this situation, the atheist is prima facie justified in believing that God does not exist. According to Swinburne's principle of credulity, if it seems to someone that there is some bad state incompatible with the existence of God, he ought so to believe, and so believe that there is no God in the absence of counter-reasons. Accordingly, I suggest, for a theist to overwhelm the atheistic intuition she cannot appeal to skeptical theist's approach and for discrediting the atheistic argument she should provide a true story as theodicy or at least a possible circumstance as a defense, which based on that God could have outweighing reason for permitting such a horrendous (and seemingly gratitude) evils to be occurred.

Section: Philosophy of Religion
Language: English
Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher
Date: 16:00-16:30, September 8th, 2011 (Thursday)
Location: HS 304



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Immigration and the Stability of the Demos

Sebastian Becker

Someone willing to migrate to a country does not usually have politically institutionalized influence on this state's border policy. Arash Abizadeh (2008) attacks this for being inconsistent with the idea of democracy. He argues that since members as well as non-members of a state are coerced by its border policies, those should be multilaterally controlled by both groups. In my presentation, I defend Abizadeh's thesis against a potential counter-argument informed by the work of David Miller.

First, I argue against Abizadeh's claim that the "demos" of democracy, i.e. the people whom legitimation of a policy is owed to, is necessarily unbounded. Abizadeh rejects the common assumption that the "demos" is constituted by the members of a nation. The demos should rather be in principle unbounded and include anyone coerced by a state's policy. In line with David Miller, I show that there might be in principle good reasons to restrict the size of the demos because an increase in size may diminish its capability to fulfil its functions.

Second, I present Miller's potential counter-argument to Abizadeh. Miller claims that democracy can only work within the nation state, as a group has to be stable in order to be able to make democratic decisions, i.e. its members have to meet regularly. Processes of public deliberation rely on the participants' willingness to compromise in order to reconcile divergent interests. However, someone has an incentive to compromise only if she can expect that the others are willing to give up some of their claims in return on another occasion, i.e. the group has to be stable. Even though Miller does not explicitly state this, it is reasonable to assume that he would argue that a group of residents and foreigners cannot form a "demos" as it does not fulfil the stability-criterion.

Third, I show that this is not the case. Because residents and foreigners have the prospect of a shared community in the future, they have an incentive to compromise when jointly creating a country's border policies. Although this prospect is not given if residents exclude the option of letting immigrants into their country in the first place, this unwillingness is no reason to assume that foreigners are not part of the demos, i.e. that no legitimation of border policies is owed to them. This is made clear via an analogy to woman suffrage: Just because 19th century men did not want to share voting rights with women, from a

normative-democratic point of view women still had a right to vote.

Section: Practical Philosophy: Political Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Gebharter
Date: 15:30-16:00, September 10th, 2011 (Saturday)
Location: HS 304




Sebastian Becker (University of Bayreuth, Germany)

Sebastian Becker will finish his B.A. in Philosophy and Economics at the University of Bayreuth in August 2011 with a thesis on the (in)compatibility of moral realism and natural explanations of moral intuitions. In Bayreuth he has worked as teaching assistant for the introductory courses on philosophy, ethics and modern ethics. His areas of interest are political philosophy, especially democratic theory and global justice, ethics, and metaethics, with a focus on moral intuitions and the connection of ethics and evolutionary theory. In September 2011, he will start his masters in philosophy in the Graduate Programme of the Universities of St Andrews and Stirling (Scotland).

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Maschinelles Lernen zur Modellbildung in den empirischen Wissenschaften

Richard Brunauer

eit Francis Bacon und Isaak Newton hat in der naturwissenschaftlichen Methode die Idee Einzug gehalten, dass allgemeine Gesetze aus Beobachtungsdaten gewonnen werden können. Diese Idee einer induktiven Methode wurde unter anderem von David Hume und Karl Popper stark kritisiert. Aufgrund der vor allem von Popper aufgeworfenen Probleme hat sich nun in den modernen Naturwissenschaften der Fokus in Richtung einer Bestätigungstheorie verschoben. Das heißt, das Ziel ist nicht mehr allgemeine Gesetze mittels Beweistechniken (Deduktion, Induktion) zu finden sondern einmal gefundene allgemeine Gesetze kritisch zu hinterfragen und möglichst gut empirisch zu bestätigen.

Der Vortrag möchte nun zeigen, wie mit Hilfe der Idee des Maschinellen Lernens wieder eine Synthese zwischen der Methode zum Finden und der Methode zur Bestätigung allgemeiner Gesetze erreicht werden kann. Die Grundgedanken für diese methodische Adaption des Maschinellen Lernens werden anhand des Fallgesetzes von Galileo Galilei gezeigt, da Galilei sehr ähnlich zu der von Popper favorisierten wissenschaftlichen Methode vorging.

Als mathematische Grundidee für diese Synthese dient die Annahme, dass eine quantitative Bestätigungstheorie unmittelbar zur Modellbildung, also dem Prozess zum Finden von allgemeinen Gesetzen, genutzt werden kann. Diese Vorgehensweise ermöglicht daher nicht nur die Synthese sondern liefert auch einen allgemeinen methodischen Rahmen zur teilweise automatisierten Konstruktion von bestätigten Modellen.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: German
Chair: Christian Wallmann
Date: 17:30-18:00, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: HS 111




Richard Brunauer (University of Salzburg, Austria)
Richard Brunauer (Dipl.Ing.). Paris-Lodron-Universität Salzburg. 2001
Ingenieur in Tiefbau; 2006 Bakkalaureat in Angewandter Informatik;

2008 Master in Angewandter Informatik. Planung und Bauleitung im Tiefbau; Projektdurchführung und Leitung mehrerer Forschungs- und Entwicklungsprojekte zur Modellbildung und Optimierung durch Maschinelles Lernen; Vorträge und Publikationen zu künstlichen neuronalen Netzen, Modellbildung und Optimierung.

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Der wissenschaftliche Status des Intelligent Design

Alexander Christian

hilip Kitcher vertritt in *Living with Darwin* (2007) die These, dass Intelligent Design eine tote Wissenschaft sei. Denn die Vertreter dieser Variante des Kreationismus würden lediglich altbekannte und längst widerlegte Argumente gegen die Evolutionstheorie vorbringen. Dies begründet Kitcher mit dem Verweis auf die Entwicklung der modernen Evolutionstheorie von 1850 bis 1960, die durch die schrittweise Widerlegung der Argumente charakterisiert sei, die von Genesiskreationisten, Neuerungskreationisten und Antiselektionisten formuliert wurden.

In meinem Vortrag werde ich dagegen die These vertreten, dass Kitchers Argumentation sowohl wissenschaftshistorisch wie auch -soziologisch zu kurz greift. In Anbetracht seines Bestrebens, den unterbestimmten und oftmals pejorativ verwendeten Begriff der Pseudowissenschaft zu vermeiden, erscheint mir sein Verdikt als eine mangelhafte und unbefriedigende Teillösung. Nach der Identifikation der Mängel dieser Auffassung werde ich eine Erweiterung des Verdiktes der toten Wissenschaften vorschlagen, welche die modernen Varianten des Kreationismus als untote Wissenschaften typisiert:

Def. untote Wissenschaft

Eine Theorie T1 ist genau dann eine Theorie einer untoten Wissenschaft, wenn (1) T1 von der Forschergemeinschaft aus guten Gründen zugunsten einer alternativen Theorie T2 aufgegeben wurde, (2) gegenwärtig T1 mehrheitlich nicht in den Institutionen der wissenschaftlichen Forschung vertreten wird und (3) im Zusammenhang von T1 ein Mangel an professioneller Integrität zu erkennen ist.

Def. professionelle Integrität

Ein Wissenschaftler ist genau dann professionell integer, wenn seine Forschung (1) die Wertneutralitätsforderung erfüllt, (2) allgemeinen wissenschaftlichen Standards entspricht und (3) hinsichtlich historischer, sozialer und methodischer Gesichtspunkte nicht in täuschender Weise auftritt.

Meine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Kitchers jüngstem Beitrag zur Debatte um Kreationismus und Intelligent Design soll zeigen, dass meine Erweiterung ein in ideologiekritischer Hinsicht nützliches Instrument

liefert, welches sich wohltuend der terminologischen Esoterik und philosophischen Pomade enthält, die vielen Definitionen von Pseudowissenschaft anhaftet.

Section: Philosophy of Religion
Language: German
Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher
Date: 17:30-18:00, September 8th, 2011 (Thursday)
Location: HS 304



Alexander Christian (University of Düsseldorf, Germany)
Alexander Christian (*1984 in Düsseldorf) studiert an der Heinrich Heine Universität Düsseldorf Philosophie, Soziologie und Biologie. Er arbeitet als studentische Hilfskraft bei Prof. Dr. Gerhard Schurz.
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Logik als Wissenschaft vom Schließen

Moritz Cordes & Friedrich Reinmuth

Logik ist auch eine Wissenschaft vom (korrekten) Schließen. Eine ihrer Aufgaben ist die Reflexion und Stützung des Schließens, Ableitens und Beweisens und zwar auch des gebrauchssprachlichen Schließens, Ableitens und Beweisens. Nun gilt: 'Schließen', 'Ableiten' und 'Beweisen' sind Handlungsverben: Jemand schließt von etwas auf etwas, jemand leitet etwas aus etwas ab, jemand beweist etwas. Die beiden letztgenannten Handlungen sind in dem Sinne komplex, als dass sie mehrere eigenständige Teilhandlungen umfassen können: Beim Ableiten und Beweisen schließt man auf Aussagen, nimmt Aussagen an und zieht u.U. Aussagen als Gründe an.

Die Logik ist also u.a. eine Wissenschaft von bestimmten Handlungen, dem Annehmen, Anziehen und Folgern, und von Abfolgen dieser Handlungen, dem Ableiten und Beweisen. Sie klärt, worin der Volzug dieser Handlungen besteht, und reguliert diesen. Diese Aufgabe wird zumeist Kalkülen zugeschrieben. Spätestens seit Łukasiewicz, Jankowski und Gentzen wird dahingehend die "Natürlichkeit" von Kalkülen zum Qualitätsmerkmal erhoben - das, was von einem Kalkül reguliert wird, soll, so dieser tatsächlich zur Reflexion und Stützung einer Praxis dient, möglichst nahe an dieser Praxis liegen. Wir versuchen diesbezüglich, durch die Betrachtung einer gebrauchssprachlichen Ableitung, folgende negative Thesen zu substantiieren:

(i) Gebrauchssprachliche Ableitungen sollten nicht als Aussagenfolgen formalisiert werden.

(ii) Gebrauchssprachliche Ableitungen sollten nicht unter Verwendung metalogischen Vokabulars, wie etwa eines Folgerungsprädikators, formalisiert werden.

(iii) Gebrauchssprachliche Ableitungen sollten nicht als Bäume oder unter Verwendung von Boxen oder anderen graphischen Elemente formalisiert werden.

Akzeptiert man (i)-(iii), dann ergibt sich, dass viele der bekannten Kalküle "unnatürlich" sind - inklusive vieler Kalküle des Natürlichen Schließens. Am selben Beispiel argumentieren wir dann für folgende positive Thesen:

(iv) Gebrauchssprachliche Ableitungen lassen sich als objektsprachliche Satzfolgen formalisieren, wobei Sätze das Ergebnis der Anwendung eines Performators (eines illokutionären Operators) auf Aussagen sind.

(v) Dieser Ansatz erlaubt es, Kalküle anzugeben, in denen das

Schließen auf “natürliche” Weise reguliert wird.

Section: Logic & Philosophy of Language
Language: German
Chair: Hans Rott
Date: 14:45-15:15, September 10th, 2011 (Saturday)
Location: HS 111




Moritz Cordes (University of Greifswald, Germany)
Moritz Cordes (M.A.). Universität Greifswald. 2008 Magister Artium in Philosophie mit einer Arbeit zu Scheinproblemen bei Rudolf Carnap. Derzeitige Forschungsschwerpunkte: Scheinprobleme, Redehandlungskalküle, Formalisierung und Rekonstruktion.
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Semantic Relativism for Metametaphysics

Alexander Dinges & Julia Zakkou

 In our paper we argue for an interesting connection between metametaphysics and semantic relativism - two currently much discussed philosophical theses - by showing that semantic relativism provides the best construal of the central thesis of metametaphysics.

Metametaphysics claims that ontological questions have no substantive answer. So if, for example, a philosopher believing in mereology such as Lewis (DKL) endorses "Tables exist" while van Inwagen (PVI), who believes only in simples and organisms, denies it, none of their claims is non-trivially correct. The most prominent way to spell out this thesis is that disputes over such existence questions are merely verbal.

In the current debate, this thesis is, in turn, interpreted in two different ways:

First, both DKL's and PVI's claims are perfectly fine. For the proposition DKL endorses is different from the proposition PVI rejects. This is so because one expression contained in the sentence in question - most likely "exist" - is either ambiguous or context dependent.

Second, either DKL or PVI makes a mistake. For one of them misuses "exist" by deviating from the ordinary usage. This view amounts to the thesis that existence questions of the kind discussed can be answered by simply looking at how we use the term "exist". So the answers are either trivially true or trivially false.

As we will show, both interpretations of the metametaphysical claim face serious problems. We therefore propose a third account: semantic relativism. According to this view what DKL affirms and PVI denies is one and the same proposition. So they really disagree. Nevertheless no one is at fault. For the proposition they endorse or deny is true or false relative to their respective perspectives.

We then show that our proposal avoids the problems besetting the above accounts while retaining their merits. Other than the second it explains why philosophers do in fact engage in passionate debates over the existence of tables. In contrast to the first it does justice to the intuition that there is a real disagreement. Furthermore, it also is in accordance with the fact that we do not dispute over the existence of tables in everyday life. Last, the proposal captures the basic intuition behind metametaphysics: that there are no substantive

answers to ontological questions.

Section: Metaphysics & Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Bastian Reichardt
Date: 15:30-16:00, September 10th, 2011 (Saturday)
Location: SE Phil



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Vagheit und Glaubensgrade

Katharina Felka

Vie Eber manche Dinge sind wir uns unsicher, d.h. wir glauben sie nur zu einem bestimmten Grad. So glaube ich z.B. nur zu einem bestimmten Grad, dass es morgen in Berlin regnen wird, dass Schneeleoparden vom Aussterben bedroht sind, oder dass es Leben auf dem Mars gibt. Graduelle Glaubenseinstellungen können auch durch Vagheit zustande kommen. So glaube ich z.B. nur zu einem bestimmten Grad, dass Tom glatzköpfig ist, weil Tom weder eindeutig glatzköpfig noch eindeutig nicht glatzköpfig ist. Stephen Schiffer hat in "The Things We Mean" behauptet, dass graduelle Glaubenseinstellungen, die in Fällen von Vagheit vorliegen, von gänzlich anderer Art sind als solche, die in Fällen gewöhnlicher epistemischer Beschränktheit vorliegen. Dementsprechend unterscheidet er zwei verschiedene Arten gradueller Glaubenseinstellungen, nämlich VPBs (für "vagueness related partial beliefs") und SPBs (für "standard partial beliefs"). Seiner Ansicht nach sind die gängigen Vagheitskonzeptionen inkompatibel mit der Beobachtung, dass Vagheit zu VPBs führt. Wir können ihr, so Schiffer, nur gerecht werden, indem wir Vagheit selbst mit Hilfe von VPBs explizieren und damit eine psychologische Vagheitskonzeption vertreten. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass Schiffers psychologische Vagheitskonzeption nicht überzeugend ist. Der Grund hierfür ist, dass sie eine gelungene Explikation von VPBs voraussetzt, Schiffers Explikation von VPBs allerdings ungenügend ist.

Section: Logic & Philosophy of Language
Language: German
Chair: Moritz Cordes
Date: 14:00-14:30, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: HS 111



Katharina Felka (University of Hamburg, Germany)


Katharina Felka (M.A.) hat an der Universität Konstanz im Bachelor- und Masterstudiengang Philosophie und zudem ein Jahr im Masterstudiengang Logik des ILLC der Universität Amsterdam studiert. Derzeit ist sie als wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin in dem von Prof. Benjamin Schnieder geleiteten Projekt "Nominalizations: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives" an der Universität Hamburg angestellt. Ihre For-

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Analyticity from a Use-theoretic Perspective

Andreas Fjellstad

his paper examines the prospects of an account of analyticity from a use-theoretic perspective by exploring (1) which vocabulary is acceptable, (2) how to introduce a suitable predicate and (3) which functions analytic sentences can have in the approach. The goal is a plausible account which avoids the typical criticism against the conventionalist approach commonly associated with the Vienna circle.

The paper suggests that a satisfactory vocabulary is achieved if we restrict ourselves to syntactic or pragmatic vocabulary as long as the semantic vocabulary is either not confined to principles such as the T-Scheme or not reducible to syntactical or pragmatic vocabulary. In accord with these considerations, I suggest how to explicate the predicate "is analytic" by combining ideas from Carnap's "syntactic" and "semantic" phases which avoids Quine's claims about circularity. To elaborate on the function of analytic sentences, two accounts of their genesis fitting the use-theoretic perspective are introduced and compared. The first traces their modal status back to their role as statements of prescriptive rules in language games, whereas the second connects their necessity with the fact that some claims about the world are turned into policies for informal reasoning and usage of words. Both of them must face the critique that analytic sentences seem to be just as much about the world as other sentences and take a stance towards reflexivity axioms for analyticity. I argue that the second account presents better solutions.

The outcome is an understanding of analyticity with no epistemological or metaphysical import, something which ought to be considered as a virtue, at least from a Quinean point of view. However, we can now give content to the claim that the T-Scheme is analytic, thus enabling us to defend approaches such as modalized disquotationalism or work towards appropriate ways of formalizing analytic connections, for example by replacing the material conditional.

Section: Logic & Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Moritz Cordes
Date: 10:45-11:15, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: HS 111



Andreas Fjellstad (Humboldt-University Berlin, Germany)

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Rationality and Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Karine Fradet

An analysis of the payoff matrix in a prisoner's dilemma (PD) shows that defection is the only rational choice (it is the dominant strategy, it is the maximin strategy, and mutual defection is the only Nash equilibrium). Yet, the literature contains several attempts to explain how it could be rational to cooperate in a PD, especially when we iterate the game. Indeed, a strike of mutual cooperation will yield a greater outcome than a strike of mutual defections, and it is always possible to punish a defection by defecting at the next round. We will show that even though it is right to assert that cooperation is a rational choice in these situations, this choice is not made within the payoff matrix of a PD.

Section: Logic & Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Albert J.J. Anglberger
Date: 17:30-18:00, September 8th, 2011 (Thursday)
Location: HS 111



Karine Fradet (Université de Montréal, Canada)

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Time is discrete for Four-Dimensionalists

Vera Flocke

As John Hawthorne points out, Four-Dimensionalists conceive of the structure of material objects in "deep analogy" to the structure of the space-time of modern physics (Hawthorne 2008: 263). Yet Four-Dimensionalists are relatively silent on what account of space-time they embrace. In this paper, I argue that proponents of a stage-theory of perdurance, such as Theodore Sider (Sider 2003), who hold that the temporal parts of objects rather than their fusions are the referents of referring expressions, should adopt a conception of time in which not every instant of time can be further divided.

On the opposite view of time as dense, not only instants of time, but also each temporal part of some object can be further divided. Yet in that case the reference to a temporal part *z* of some object *y* is indeterminate between the temporal parts in which *z* subdivides. My central contention is that this indeterminacy of reference leads to indeterminacy of truth-value of counting phrases. But this indeterminacy in turn undermines the third premise of the dialectically very weighty Argument from Vagueness (Sider 2003:4.9) in support of Four-Dimensionalism, according to which it can't be indeterminate whether composition occurs.

The initial expository sections present central theses of Four-Dimensionalism and expound the complex Argument from Vagueness in support of this view. In the middle part I develop the charge of circularity (cf. Koslicki 2003) against the third premise of this argument and show that one way to escape this objection is by fixing the reference of essentially generalized counting phrases. In the final sections I discuss different strategies for how the Four-Dimensionalist can fix reference and distinguish the restriction of the scope of her argument to worlds in which time is not dense as my preferred route.

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Section: Metaphysics & Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Bastian Reichardt
Date: 14:45-15:15, September 10th, 2011 (Saturday)
Location: SE Phil



Vera Flocke (University of St. Andrews/Humboldt University Berlin, Scotland, United Kingdom)

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A Fregean Critique of Kantian Logic

James Garrison

Much has been made of the apparent harmony between Immanuel Kant and Gottlob Frege on the notion that "exists" is not a truly universal predicate, however the real story is a bit more complicated. Even though it makes no explicit reference to Kant, Frege's paper "The Thought" highlights problems in Kant's notion of how the "is true" predicate functions, while also sketching out some possible solutions.

In the section "Of the Transcendental Ideal" from *The Critique of Pure Reason* Kant makes use of the principle on non-contradiction (PNC) in a transcendental argument to establish that all possible predicates contain some necessarily true content via negation. Frege's vocabulary of truth and thinking, as developed in "The Thought" counters this view, providing the basis for an updated Fregean analysis of Kant's notion of a "true (wahr) negation." Frege's writing provides a framework for critiquing Kantian logic, because it implicitly issues correctives for the handling of the "is true" and "exists" predicates in Kant's work.

Since, as Arindam Chakrabarti points out, the views of both Kant and Frege can with some accuracy be expressed in the notion that existence is property of concepts, not objects, there is an incorrect tendency to say that Kant anticipated Frege and existential quantification. This inquiry continues further explores Chakrabarti's counter-argument and shows a two-fold problem with Kant's logic, which can be well understood from a Fregean perspective. First, by disobeying his own premises Kant makes the scope in which the "is true" predicate may be applied hopelessly unclear. Secondly, Kant misapplies the predicate "is true" by attaching it to the wrong class of entity, namely to negations rather than to propositional judgments. Thirdly, Kant misunderstands "is true" and treats it like a normal predicate, the error of which Frege clearly demonstrates. Seeing Kant's missteps through a Fregean lens gives proper context to the many differences between him and Frege and helps in understanding the trajectory of analytic philosophy.

Section: Logic & Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Albert J.J. Anglberger
Date: 16:00-16:30, September 8th, 2011 (Thursday)
Location: HS 111




James Garrison (University of Hawaii, USA)

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Das Basisproblem: Eigenpsychische Basis oder Konvention?

Dennis Graemer

 m Folgenden will ich mich dem Basisproblem in Erkenntnistheorie und Wissenschaftstheorie zuwenden. Die Frage nach einer womöglich sicheren Basis der Erkenntnis ist so alt wie die Philosophie selbst. Heute hat sie nichts von ihrer Relevanz verloren. Die Positionen, die ich gegeneinander abwägen möchte, sind zwei an der Zahl: Zunächst einmal die These des Logischen Empiristen Rudolf Carnap, der die "Eigenpsychische Basis" als Fundament der Erkenntnis herausstellt, und auf der anderen Seite Karl Raimund Popper, bei dessen Kritischen Rationalismus Basissätze konventionalistisch festgelegt werden. Ich werde die Stärken und Schwächen beider Positionen diskutieren, und dabei sowohl auf erkenntnistheoretische Fragestellungen, als auch die praktische Umsetzbarkeit in der Wissenschaft eingehen. Letztendlich möchte ich die These aufstellen, dass ein Basismodell, das auf introspektive Sätze baut, noch lange nicht widerlegt ist und im Gegenteil von einem erkenntnistheoretischen Standpunkt aus ohne Alternative ist.

Section: Epistemology
Language: German
Chair: Arne Martin Weber
Date: 17:30-18:00, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: HS 303




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Who's telling the truth about Alfred Tarski?

Monika Gruber

 In 1933 Tarski wrote his most famous article "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages". There, he presented a formally correct and materially adequate definition of truth for the formalized languages of finite order. In the last chapter, using as an example the language of the general theory of classes, he claimed it was impossible to construct such a semantical definition for the languages of infinite order. Two years later, in 1935 the German translation of the paper appeared. It included an additional chapter written by Tarski. In it he states that he can not longer agree with all of the results he reached a couple of years ago. He draws a sketch of a method of constructing a definition of truth for all formalized languages, including the languages of infinite order, and by that rewriting the final results of his original paper. Ever since philosophers and logicians have been discussing this controversial issue. Even today, the problem has not been settled and the opinions remain very discrepant. But who is telling the truth?

Section: Logic & Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Moritz Cordes
Date: 11:30-12:00, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: HS 111



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Ist Vagheit in Gesetzestexten eine Bedrohung für den Rechtsstaat?

Daniel Gruschke

The use of vague terms, especially vague predicates, in legal texts has attracted considerable interest in the analytic philosophy of law (cf. Endicott 2003) for at least two reasons: first, vague predicates are "tolerant" (Wright 1975). If it is true that someone is young, one more second of age will not make him old; if something is a heap of sand, one less grain will not make it anything other than a heap. It is well known since Antiquity that the tolerance of vague predicates gives rise to the sorites paradox (Barnes 1982, Sainsbury & Williamson 1997): if something is a heap and one less grain will not make it anything other than a heap, then one single grain still is a heap. This paradox has obvious repercussions in adjudication. If a volume of 10 db may not be called "noise" and a minimal change does not make a difference, no volume may be called "noise". But how, then, can a court justifiably rule that defendant's doing is an offence against a statute's provision that no one shall make noise on the streets past midnight (cf. Jonsson 2009)?

Secondly, a vague predicate admits of borderline cases (actual or possible ones) in which it is persistently unclear whether a is F. If defendant's doing is a borderline case of "making noise", how is the court to decide this case according to the law (cf. Sorensen 2001), provided that it has to render a decision, and that "we don't know" is not an admissible way out?

Drawing on Fuller's (1969) and Raz' (1979) conceptions of the rule of law, I shall argue that, pace Waldron (1994), vagueness in law is a threat to the rule of law and a source of arbitrary government, which should not be downplayed. It raises serious questions concerning judicial and executive decision-making and the justification of decisions as lawful. Secondly, I shall argue that, pace Endicott (1999), the rule of law neither is an incoherent ideal nor is in need of reinterpretation, and that Endicott is wrong to assume that the use of vague terms qua vague terms in law is desirable and implied by the rule of law. Rather, it is vague predicates as general and multidimensional predicates whose use is valuable in law (cf. Soames forthcoming). Thirdly, I shall outline a strategy of how to reasonably deal with vagueness in law, based on an analysis of legal interpretation and adjudication.

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Section: Practical Philosophy: Philosophy of Law
Language: German
Chair: Sebastian Becker
Date: 14:00-14:30, September 10th, 2011 (Saturday)
Location: HS 304



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2001-2008 Studium der Philosophie, Religionswissenschaft, Logik & Wissenschaftstheorie und Ethik der Textkulturen an der Hochschule für Philosophie München, der LMU München sowie der FAU Erlangen-Nürnberg; 02/2008 Magister Artium; seit 11/2008 Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Institut für Philosophie der RWTH Aachen sowie der

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Syntax and semantics before their time. A setting process between intensional vs. extensional paradigms: the Frege-Husserl case

Isaac Manuel Gustavo



will talk about semantics and syntax before their time, when nothing is yet stabilized and their dichotomy is just inchoative. In order to do so, let's go back to the turn of the 20th cent., during the crisis and the foundational projects, etc. And then take two works mirroring at that time the redefinition of the theory of signification: Husserl and Frege's.

If I focus on this conjuncture, it's because this report emerged from the crossed perspectives: each one reduces the ternary and canonical semiotic structure - language, thought, reality - to a binary articulation (i.e. meaning/ denotation vs. representation (thought) for Frege; sign/ concept vs. referent (reality) for Husserl ante-1900 style; signification/ intuition vs. symbolism (language) for Husserl 1900/1 style). The intersection of these three perspectives on the ternary structure of the sign is evidently schematic - simply because the triangles involved are not isomorphic, the reductions aren't similar, neither the exclusions radical. But what their comparison traces is the setting process of the dichotomy syntax/ semantics. On this point, here are my two key-hypothesis, issues of my talk: (i) to explicit, not only the installa-

tion, but also the internal articulation of the dichotomy in the different models supposes them opposed via the theoretical alternative between intensionality and extensionality; (ii) it's by correlating it to an interrogation about the modalities of exclusion of each semiotic third that the intrinsic limits of the three models can be revealed.

For Husserl, I'll propose a rereading of the pure logical grammar (1900/1) on the axiomatic pattern for proto-set theory (1890-1900), and this to get the evolution of the semantics/ syntax articulation through the translation from the intension to the intentionality modulo a transcendental turn. As for Frege, I'll analyze its extensional turn (1884-1893) from the indecision between *lingua characterica* and *calculus ratiocinator/ philosophicus* (1879) to explain the triptych meaning-representation-denotation genesis through the prospective homologation of the duality syntax/semantics - this, with for corollary the progressive loss of the sense (1892-1923) as a process (or *calculi dynamics*). Finally, as none of the models attempt to reduce the ternary semiotics to the binary dichotomy syntax/ semantics is successful, I'll finish by an evaluation of their respective "monistic" potentials (the point where both the poles of the signification aren't yet dichotomized) in the perspective of the present reconfiguration of the logical "semantics" on an interaction paradigm.

Section: Logic & Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Albert J.J. Anglberger
Date: 16:45-17:15, September 8th, 2011 (Thursday)
Location: HS 111




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The Structure of Spatial Location and the Question of Perspectivity

Marion Haemmerli

 In recent years, philosophers and computer scientists alike have pointed out the importance of an understanding of the geometrical structure underlying human conceiving of space for an analysis of our interaction with our complex environment. In this spirit, the philosophers Roberto Casati and Achille Varzi formulated a mereotopological theory of our spatial representations, supplemented with a theory of location. Their theory is grounded on the two-place relation of exact location $L(.,.)$, holding between spatial entities and regions of space. Exact location as they understand it presupposes a map-like frame of reference with the aid of which spatial regions are absolutely characterized.

We suggest to extend the formalism presented by Casati and Varzi so as to account for perspectival spatial relations, that is spatial relations one of whose relata is a point of view in space. To this aim, we introduce a family of functional terms $\alpha : \{Spatial\ Entities\}^2 \rightarrow \{Regions\ of\ space\}$ which take a pair of spatial entities as arguments to produce a perspective-dependent region of space. The perspectival spatial relation *left* as in *the chair is to the left of the table* should be formalized as a variant of exact location, $L(.,.)$, holding between the chair and the region $left(table, agent)$. $left(.,.)$ computes the region of space *to the left of the table* by extracting a point of view from the reference object agent, thereby determining where the region will be situated, and by calculating its morphological features using those of the object table.

This approach enables us both to maintain a formal continuity between the analysis of absolute and perspective dependent location and to avoid the intricacies that arise from treating perspectival spatial relations as relational predicates. As a whole, we present a new piece of formalism capable of accounting for any kind of perspectival spatial relation, thus revealing philosophical insight into the notion of a point of view.

Section: Metaphysics & Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Bastian Reichardt
Date: 14:00-14:30, September 10th, 2011 (Saturday)
Location: SE Phil




Marion Haemmerli (University of Geneva, Switzerland)

Marion Haemmerli (MA phil) obtained her Master Degree in Philosophy at the University of Geneva in September 2010. She is currently pursuing her PhD in Metaphysics while finishing a BSc in Mathematics. She works at the University of Geneva as a research and teaching assistant for the Swiss National Science Foundation and in the editorial board of the philosophy journal *Dialectica*. A committee member of the Swiss Graduate Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science (SGSLPS), her main fields of interest have been the metaphysical approach to foundations in mathematics and logic. She is currently working on perspectival spatial relations.

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Die Relevanz kollektiver Interessen für die angewandte Ethik

Tobias Hainz

ie Frage, ob und wie kollektive Intentionalität möglich ist, ist bislang ungeklärt. Mit "Intentionalität" wird klassischerweise das Merkmal bestimmter mentaler Zustände bezeichnet, sich auf einen Gegenstand zu beziehen - diese Zustände werden dann auch als "intentionale Zustände" bezeichnet. In der Debatte um kollektive Intentionalität geht es im Kern um die Frage, ob es auch Gruppen, im Gegensatz zu Individuen, möglich ist, eigene intentionale Zustände hervorzubringen: Kann es gemeinsame Absichten, Wünsche, Überzeugungen, etc. geben, die sich auf einen Gegenstand beziehen?

In dem Vortrag soll ein Spezialfall von Intentionalität untersucht werden, nämlich der Zustand, ein Interesse zu haben. Es soll der Frage nachgegangen werden, ob es kollektive Interessen geben kann, die möglicherweise unabhängig von Individualinteressen sind und vielleicht sogar mit diesen konfliktieren können. Eng verwandt mit dieser Frage und deshalb ein Schwerpunkt des Vortrags ist die Frage, ob Interessen von Individuen aggregiert werden können, so dass sich aus ihnen ein Kollektivinteresse herleiten lässt: Ist es also möglich, Einzelinteressen miteinander zu verrechnen, so dass sich als Summe ein Kollektivinteresse ergibt? Oder gibt es andere Formen der Aggregation? Ein Argument gegen eine solche Möglichkeit der Aggregation soll im Detail vorgestellt und diskutiert werden. Beschlossen werden soll der Vortrag mit einem Ausblick auf die Konsequenzen der (Un-)Möglichkeit der Aggregation von Interessen für die angewandte Ethik.

Section: Ethics
Language: German
Chair: Norbert Paulo
Date: 14:45-15:15, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: HS 304




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Why shouldn't we be afraid of scepticism about intuitions?

Péter Hartl

empirical examinations about cross-cultural variability of intuitions, the well-known publication of Stich and his colleagues criticizing thought-experiments and intuitions in philosophical debates, is still a challenge that faces analytical philosophers. I present and examine the sceptical arguments of experimental philosophers. I would like to show that though experimental philosophers build upon empirical data, scepticism about reliability of intuitions haven't brought any radically new considerations compared to classical sceptical arguments, namely the argument from criterion and the regress argument.

Based on these classic sceptical arguments, some experimental philosophers maintain that analytical philosophy as an evaluative and normative project is not a sensible way of philosophical thinking at all, therefore we need to replace analytical philosophy as a conceptual analysis with an empirically research of the variability of people's intuitions.

I would like to point out that Williamson, Bealer, Sosa and others' considerations against scepticism about intuitions have the same structure as the classical, *reductio ad absurdum* anti-sceptical argument. Who is sceptical about intuitions in philosophy must be sceptical about all kinds of rational judgments. But this consequence is self-defeating, because the sceptical conclusions are based upon intuitive judgments as well. Additionally, experimental philosophers don't doubt the epistemic value of scientific knowledge, nevertheless their local sceptical arguments can be extended to their own belief forming methods and standards, therefore their position is inconsistent.

I don't want to take stand on the question whether this kind of objection is conclusive or not, rather I would like to argue that if we don't accept radical scepticism, than the arguments against intuition are as much serious as the traditional sceptical challenge.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Merel Lefevere
Date: 15:30-16:00, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: HS 303



Péter Hartl (Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary)

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On Lewis' Critique of the Knowledge Argument

Nora Heinzelmann

Physicalism is the most prominent theory in the philosophy of mind. According to Frank Jackson, physicalism is the thesis that the actual world is entirely physical, which implies that complete physical knowledge is just complete knowledge simpliciter. Phenomenal consciousness is regarded as the biggest challenge for physicalism. A popular objection against physicalism is Jackson's knowledge argument and his thought experiment of Mary: Mary has never seen a color in her life but apart from this, she has gained full knowledge about colors. Most people assume that Mary will nevertheless learn something when she first sees a color.

The knowledge argument goes as follows: If physicalism is correct, Mary knows everything there is to know. But as she learns something upon seeing her first color, physical knowledge does not include everything there is to know. Hence, physicalism is false.

This essay clarifies David Lewis' critique of Jackson's knowledge argument in his article entitled "What Experience Teaches" (1988). I shall first restate Jackson's knowledge argument and distinguish it from the knowledge intuition. The knowledge intuition consists in the assumption that physicalism is not correct as it fails to capture qualia. Most importantly, the knowledge intuition does not involve the Mary thought experiment.

Second, I shall analyze Lewis' reformulation and critique of the knowledge argument. I think that Lewis and Jackson differ on what the knowledge argument actually is. The argument understood by Lewis as the knowledge argument does not correspond to Jackson's argument but rather to his definition of physicalism.

Third, I shall discuss Lewis' line of reasoning critically. I argue that Lewis' critique aims at the knowledge intuition rather than at Jackson's knowledge argument. The knowledge intuition is strengthened by Jackson's knowledge argument but is not equivalent to it. I therefore conclude that Lewis' critique therefore fails to meet the knowledge argument.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Georg Mirnig
Date: 14:00-14:30, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: SE Phil




Nora Heinzelmann (University of Zurich, Switzerland)

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Das Natürliche als normatives Element?

Clemens Heyder

 inner der am häufigsten vorgetragenen Einwände gegen die Fremdeizellspende stützt sich auf die Unnatürlichkeit der gespaltenen Mutterschaft. Die Aufspaltung zwischen genetischer und biologischer Mutter ist freilich nur mittels der heterologen Eizellspende möglich, jedoch ist damit nicht gesagt, dass dies unnatürlich ist. Zudem bedarf es für eine ethische Rechtfertigung eines solchen Verbots außer des faktischen Seins auch einer moralischen Komponente, wenn nicht dem naturalistischen Fehlschluss aufgefressen werden soll.

Zuvorderst erfolgt eine Begriffsklärung der (Un-)Natürlichkeit. Was bedeutet es zu sagen, etwas sei unnatürlich? Es könnte bedeuten, dass etwas in der Natur nicht vorkommt. Jedoch beschränkt sich diese Aussage immer nur auf die bisher bekannte Natur, zumal auch zwischen Entstehungs- und Erscheinungsformen unterschieden werden muss. Einschränkend ließe sich sagen, dass dies in der menschlichen Natur nicht vorkommt. Unter den Aspekten der Identifikation des Natürlichen mit dem Gewöhnlichen, der Entkopplung von Mensch und Natur und der Schwierigkeit der Setzung einer zeitlichen Zäsur muss geprüft werden, ob die Bestimmung des Natürlichen überhaupt möglich ist.

Falls hypothetisch angenommen wird, dass eine solche Bestimmung möglich sei, bleibt dennoch offen, inwiefern der Begriff der Natürlichkeit in einem normativen Kontext Gültigkeit erlangen kann. Wenngleich eine innere Ordnung der Natur zu postulieren werden kann, nach der sich gerichtet werden soll, ergibt sich hieraus allerdings eine erkenntnistheoretische Barriere; dass stets das moralisch richtig, was natürlich ist und vice versa ist zweifelsfrei tautologisch. Darüber hinaus ist der Mensch ein Teil der Natur, die auch diese Zwecke bzw. die Ordnung vorgibt. Ein Zuwiderhandeln gegen selbige ist (aufgrund einer postulierten Freiheit) nur begrenzt möglich. Der Natur eine moralische Vorbildwirkung zuzuweisen, bleibt ebenfalls unbegründet. Letztlich bliebe noch die Möglichkeit eines normativ gezeichneten Menschenbilds, also die Bestimmung idealtypischer Funktionen. Zwar wäre dadurch dem naturalistischen Fehlschluss entgangen, so bleibt allerdings die Frage offen, welche Funktionen der Mensch erfüllen muss und wann diese als erfüllt gelten, ohne dabei dem Diskriminierungseinwand ausgeliefert zu sein.

Section: Ethics
Language: German
Chair: Albert J.J. Anglberger
Date: 11:30-12:00, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: HS 304



Clemens Heyder (University of Halle-Wittenberg, Germany)
Clemens Heyder (M.A.) studierte Philosophie und Geschichte in Leipzig und Basel, welches er 2009 mit der Magisterarbeit über die gerechte Mittelverteilung im Gesundheitswesen abschloss. Anschließend absolvierte er das Masterstudium "Medizin-Ethik-Recht" an der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg und beendete dies im Mai 2011 mit der Masterarbeit über die ethische Rechtfertigung des Verbots der heterologen Eizellspende.
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Epiphenomenalism and agency

David Hommen

A prominent objection against epiphenomenalism - the doctrine that mental phenomena are causally inefficacious - is that it is incompatible with the possibility of agency. It is, as the objection runs, essential for our being agents that our mental states causally contribute to our actions. In my talk I wish to reject this objection and argue that epiphenomenalism is compatible with agency. I first develop the argument raised against epiphenomenalism: According to it, individuals are agents only if their behavior expresses their mental states (1). A piece of behavior expresses a mental state only if it is explained by this state (2). A mental state explains a piece of behavior only if it causally contributes to it (3). Hence, the possibility of individuals being agents requires that their mental states causally contribute to their behavior. Then, I proceed to criticize the argument: I claim that there is an ambiguity in the notion of mentality in premises (2) and (3). (2) uses a behavior-orientated conception of mentality, with mental concepts referring to an individual's behavioral dispositions, whereas (3) uses an experience-orientated conception, with mental concepts referring to an individual's subjective experiences. Moreover, I suggest that (2) is plausible only as long as it uses the behavior-orientated conception, whereas (3) is relevant to the epiphenomenalism debate only as long as it uses the experience-orientated conception. Thus, the argument against epiphenomenalism is implausible or irrelevant or unsound. Last, I shall consider the strategy of merging the two conceptions of mentality into one and thereby rescuing the argument. This strategy, I argue, turns out unsuccessful because it is implausible within the new conception of mentality that mental concepts discharge their explanatory role by designating causally efficacious mental states.


Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Georg Mirnig
Date: 14:45-15:15, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: SE Phil



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Die Farbe des Apfels und die fehlende Blauschattierung. Einige Bemerkungen zur Farbwahrnehmung bei David Hume im Abgleich mit neueren wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen

Stefanie Houben

avid Hume bezieht sich bei der Aufstellung des Copy-Principles, dem Fundament seines Empirismus, auf Farben und die Weise ihrer Wahrnehmung. Er betrachtet jede spezifische Farbe als einfache, nicht zusammen gesetzte Vorstellung.

“Ich glaube, es wird wohl bereitwillig zugegeben werden, daß die einzelnen gesonderten Vorstellungen von Farben (...) wirklich voneinander verschieden und doch zu gleicher Zeit einander ähnlich sind. Gilt dies nun von verschiedenen Farben, so muß es nicht minder von verschiedenen Schattierungen derselben Farbe gelten (...).” (Untersuchung, S. 21)

Aus heutiger Sicht wirkt dies einerseits einleuchtend (denken wir beispielsweise an ein Computerdisplay, das Millionen von Einzelfarben präzise darstellen kann) andererseits beginnen die ersten Probleme bereits, wenn Hume Farbschattierungen lediglich als Abstufungen von heller zu dunkler betrachtet. (Ebd.)

Die grundlegende Frage dieses Papers, bzw. Vortrags ist nun die, inwieweit die Berücksichtigung neuerer Erkenntnisse über den biologischen Mechanismus der okularen Wahrnehmung sich mit Hume harmonisieren lassen. Ist es etwa tatsächlich so, dass unser Verstand sich Ideen jeder unterscheidbaren wahrgenommenen Farbschattierung bildet? Kann Humes "System" das Problem der Differenz von wahrgenommener und tatsächlicher Farbe eines Gegenstandes bei unterschiedlichen Lichtverhältnissen (Lee, S. 146) lösen?

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Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: German
Chair: Nora Heintelmann
Date: 16:45-17:15, September 8th, 2011 (Thursday)
Location: SE Phil




Stefanie Houben (Universität zu Köln, Germany)

Stefanie Houben studiert Philosophie, Mittlere/Neuere Geschichte und Politikwissenschaft im Magisterstudiengang an der Universität Köln (currently graduating).

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“Wir sehen ein kompliziertes Netz von Ähnlichkeiten” – Zum Begriff des Fundamentalismus

Angelo Marc Kalies

eim Thema Fundamentalismus gilt es Vorurteilen entgegenzuwirken: Anders als die gegenwärtige Medienlandschaft bei Zeiten suggeriert, ist das Auftreten von Fundamentalismen keine exklusive Eigenschaft des Islams. Vielmehr handelt es sich um einen Begriff, der ursprünglich auf ein im protestantischen Christentum auftretendes Phänomen verwandt wurde. Heute werden verschieden(st)e Gebilde als Fundamentalismen bezeichnet. Die Spannweite reicht dabei vom Dominionismus in den USA über den Wahhabismus im Nahen Osten bis hin zu bestimmten Ausprägungen des Chassidismus in Israel. Eine Übertragung u.a. auf den politischen Sektor ist ebenfalls beobachtbar.

In der Forschungsliteratur herrscht scheinbar Einigkeit darüber, den Begriff der Familienähnlichkeiten (Wittgenstein, PU 67) für den Umgang mit verschiedenen Formen des Fundamentalismus zu bemühen. Die prinzipielle Skepsis der Majorität der Autoren bezüglich der Erreichbarkeit einer einheitlichen Charakterisierung des Begriffs wird im Vortrag nicht geteilt: Anstatt den Ausweg über die Familienähnlichkeiten als Ergebnis zu akzeptieren, wird der Versuch unternommen, den Begriff so zu umreißen, dass man einige hinreichende und notwendige Bedingungen für dessen Verwendung angeben kann. Gemein scheint allen Ausprägungen ein geschlossenes Weltbild, eine strikte Trennung der Welt in "Gut" und "Böse", sowie die Ausgrenzung von Personengruppen, insbesondere von Frauen.

Für die Zielsetzung ist ein differenzierteres Vokabular vonnöten: Neben der Klärung des Begriffs "Fundamentalismus" gilt es zu untersuchen, was unter fundamentalistischen Fs, wie beispielsweise fundamentalistischen Konzeptionen, Überzeugungen, Handlungen usw. zu verstehen ist. Ferner soll geklärt werden, was ein Fundamentalist ist.

Gesucht ist eine Charakterisierung des Fundamentalismus, welche wenigstens politischen und religiösen Fundamentalismus vereint, also weit genug gefasst ist, um die gängigen Fundamentalismen als eben solche zu betiteln. Zum anderen soll sie eng genug sein, um nicht jede Art von Religiosität oder Konservativismus zu umfassen. Gleiches gilt für fundamentalistische Gebilde und Fundamentalisten. Nicht jeder Gläubige oder jedes Parteimitglied ist ein Fundamentalist, nicht jede Ideologie, Weltanschauung usf. ist fundamentalistisch.

Section: Philosophy of Religion
Language: German
Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher
Date: 16:45-17:15, September 8th, 2011 (Thursday)
Location: HS 304



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John McDowell's "Avoiding the Myth of the Given" as a response to relationist criticism

Nadja El Kassar

Over the first decade after the publication of his seminal *Mind and World* (1996) John McDowell has famously countered any criticism of his conception. McDowell claims that the content of perceptual experience must be conceptual if experience is to justify beliefs. But lately the existing debates have been shaken up by McDowell's article "Avoiding the Myth of the Given" (2008), in which he retracts two central claims of *Mind and World*: experiential content does not have to include everything that can be non-inferentially known based on the particular experience and most importantly, the content of experience is no longer supposed to be propositional content. McDowell distinguishes between intuitional content and discursive content of perceptual experience, and only the latter has propositional content.

McDowell credits Charles Travis with having induced him to make these changes and so in order to understand the changes they must be read in the context of Travis' work. Travis argues for a relationist theory of perception: experience is fundamentally a relation between the perceiver and the external world. Perceptual experience does not represent the world as thus-and-so, because there is no notion of representation that is demonstrable and at the same time provides for the correctness conditions of the representational content of the experience.

In my paper I want to first present Travis' arguments against the idea that perceptual experience has representational content. I will then correlate McDowell's modifications and Travis' criticism and examine whether the modifications are an appropriate response to Travis' arguments. I will claim that we can only regard the changes as an appropriate response and as the outline of an improved, coherent conceptualist theory, if we do not read intuitional content as representational content and instead start bringing conceptualism and relationism together.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Merel Lefevere
Date: 14:00-14:30, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: HS 303




Nadja El Kassar (University of Potsdam, Germany)

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Rationaler Dissens

Hendrik Kempt

eit Beginn der systematischen Ethik mit Aristoteles diente diese dazu, gesellschaftliche oder individuelle Konflikte zu bewältigen. Während in der Nikomachischen Ethik noch präventiv der "gute Staatsbürger" entworfen wurde, wandelten sich die Ethikkonzepte hin zu Instrumenten zur Findung von Curations- oder Kompensationswegen von Konfliktsituationen. Besonders erfolgreich waren im letzten Jahrhundert der Kontraktualismus und die Diskurstheorie. Beiden ist der Zweck gemein, dass am Ende eine Einigung dastehen soll, der sog. Konsens. Dass dieser nicht immer, oder gar nur selten erreicht werden kann, wird niemand leugnen. Doch was dann? In diesem Vortrag soll auf genau diese Frage Bezug genommen werden. Denn ein aus welchen Gründen auch immer gescheiterter Diskurs stellt nicht das Ende der Diskursethik dar, sondern hebt diese auf eine höhere Stufe und macht eine Analyse über die Mindestanforderungen von Argumenten erforderlich. Zentral wird dazu der Begriff der Akzeptabilität, mithilfe dessen sich die rationalen Rahmenbedingungen für einen Dissens erarbeiten lassen. Gemäß dem Motto "Man muss sich nicht einig sein, was zu tun ist. Aber man sollte sich einig sein, was nicht zu tun ist." können inakzeptable Wendungen sowohl aus der deontologischen Logik, der Sprachphilosophie als auch der Handlungstheorie abgeleitet werden. Der gesellschaftliche Bezug wird durch einen Hinweis darauf hergestellt, dass besonders religiöse und ideologische Argumentationen in Rechtfertigungsdiskursen so funktionieren und daher zurückzuweisen sind.

Section: Ethics
Language: German
Chair: Norbert Paulo
Date: 14:00-14:30, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: HS 304




Hendrik Kempt (Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Germany)
Hendrik Kempt (stud. phil.), Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf und Universität Duisburg-Essen, erste Tätigkeiten an der Europäischen Akademie in Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler, erste Veröffentlichung (im

September voraus. die zweite) in der Aufklärung & Kritik. Voraussichtlicher Bachelor-Abschluss im September 2011 mit einer Arbeit über den Begriff der Unterlassung im handlungstheoretischen Kontext bei Prof. Dr. Dieter Birnbacher.

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What Analytical Philosophy can Contribute to the Science of Consciousness – About an Axiomatic Framework and the Neuron-Glia Index

Richard König

ince the last twenty years the mind-body problem has developed to a commercial problem. So that also natural scientists are tackling the psychophysical problem in their everyday journals and organizing congresses dealing with the science of consciousness. Latter emerged to one of the most interdisciplinary topics within modern science. Regarding its interdisciplinarity the scientific treatment of consciousness seems to be a perfect challenge for philosophy of science; bridging the gap between different disciplines (there vocabularies, methods, presuppositions) and further, by the use of formal methods, building up theoretical tools, to clarify given data and to ensure further progresses - empirically and philosophically. My target is to show how useful analytical methods are, to treat the mind-body problem in a scientific manner.

The study of consciousness has lead to an abundant variety of positions. A clear delineation between the various ontological positions can therefore be helpful in identifying any possibly privileged positions on one hand and help to avoid redundant argumentation on the other. Therefore Mirnig and me built an axiomatic framework for the different positions within the philosophy of mind, based on first order logic and set theory. The outcome of this work was partly presented at this year's TSC-conference, Stockholm. But here this axiomatic framework is used as an example to show how formal methods can shed new light on problems within the science of consciousness.

Another example is the puzzle about the neuron-glia index. The central nervous systems of vertebrates contain neurons and glia cells as well - both in a specific ratio to each other. Humans do have the highest amount of glia cells per neuron in there cerebral cortex, compared to other primates. The meaning of this ratio is poorly understood. Given this puzzling question I show, how analytical methods can help to tackle also purely non-philosophical problems in neuroscience.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Nora Heinzelmann
Date: 10:45-11:15, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: SE Phil



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Unification and integration: different yet the same?

Merel Lefevere

According to the Oxford dictionary unification is "the process of being united or made into a whole", while integration is "the action or process of integrating". Integrating is further defined as "combining (one thing) with another to form a whole". Although there are different frameworks to describe how and to what extent unification could work (Kitcher 1981, 1989, Weber 1999, Schurz 1999, Mäki 2001), it seems as if unification and integration have the same meaning. However, a filtered search for unification in the category "Science and Technology" on the web of science resulted in 16 233 hits, while the results for integration (with the exclusion of mathematical integration) counted no less than 74 263 hits. If unification and integration mean the same, then why the huge difference? Are unification and integration interchangeable or is there a difference in application and evaluation?

In the first divergent part of the paper I want to explore the differences between unification and integration. One possible distinction, made by Törnblom et al. (2007) is that the process or the activity is described as "integration" while the result or the product of this activity is described as "unification". Derksen (2005) argues against unification and integration, since integration of biological and social sciences is defended under the banner of the unity of science, which is an illusion. Integration, unification, disintegration and disunification are often used in the same context. If the goal of unification is reached through integration, as Törnblom claims, this would explain why scientists often use the terms interchangeably. However, by means of examples and case studies from different domains of science, I want to provide some guidelines to make the difference between the unification and integration.

First, I want to suggest that integration can be a goal in itself. Mitchell (2006) defends an integrative pluralism in biology, without the ultimate goal of a unified theory. She claims that "because of the diversity in biology, imposing unity is not a good strategy, but in order to explain concrete phenomena, biologists integrate the multiple accounts of explanation" (2007, p.76). This means that integration is not only an activity, but also a goal in itself. The reverse question will also be tackled. Is it possible to unify without the use of integration? Or is integration a necessary intermediate step to achieve a unification.

Second, the claim will be made that there is a difference in explananda in unification and integration. Using Kleinhans' study of river patterns I will show that to unify, at least two explananda are required. In order to integrate, only one explanandum is needed. To provide a fulfilling explanation about why river patterns show the pattern they have, different methodologies are used. There is a reduction to physics, stratigraphic data are collected, the stratification patterns are ordered and explained by means of radiometry, fossil studies, biogenical studies, tectonics, and a whole lot of other scientific theories. Although Kleinhans himself calls this a unificatory approach to the study of river patterns, I will suggest that the use of different explanantia to explain one explanandum is integration. Unification is the opposite. In order to explain multiple explananda only one explanans is used. Besides the number of explanantia and explananda there is also a difference on a structural level. By examples I will show that there is a difference in level of the unifier and the integrator and the unified and integrated objects. The unification itself is situated at the level of the explananda, they are unified. The structure of integration is conversed. The integration is situated at the level of the explanantia, they are integrated to provide an explanation. This will be further clarified with examples.

A third suggestion is the idea that there is a difference between unification and integration on the methodological level. The difference between inter-field theories and mere interconnectedness will be used to show a discrepancy between unification and integration. Grantham suggests that cell biology cannot be captured in purely biochemical terms, but that both theories are nevertheless strongly connected. Such an interconnectedness is stronger if the connections between the two fields are more numerous and if the connection starts transforming the neighboring field. His case study is about the place of fossil records in phylogeny reconstruction of placental mammals. The dating of the first appearing of placental mammals shows a difference of 45 million years in neontology and paleobiology. Grantham suggests that if the two fields involved in the discussion become interconnected, and thus more unified, the problem will be solved. However, I want to make a difference between methodological integration and methodological unification. If methods can be developed to assess a hypothesis in light of data of two fields, this should be called integration. If the same method is used in two fields, this is unity of method.

By comparing different explanatory structures, I hope to show that a difference between unification and integration can be useful to clarify

what scientists are actually doing when explaining.

In the second convergent part of the paper I want to explore whether unification and integration are really two different concepts. Although voices are rising to oppose the search for unification or integration (Derksen 2005, Mitchell 2006, Van Der Steen 1993), the search for connectedness in our knowledge is still going on. This resistance can originate from the unsuccessfulness of unifying biology and the social science or from a radical pragmatism that all the sciences are merely tools to interact with reality. Midgley argues that a variety of ways of thinking is necessary, since that variety is the variety or our needs (2000, p.71). But what if a coherent, even unified knowledge is one of our human needs? Starting from this second question, I will explore whether there is an underlying common need or goal of a more broader connectedness present in both unification and integration. My claim is that unification and integration have a similar goal, but they take a different stance on autonomy of the sciences. Are unification and integration two distinct methods, or are they just two paths to reach the same purpose to connect everything with everything?

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Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Gebharder
Date: 16:45-17:15, September 8th, 2011 (Thursday)
Location: HS 303




Merel Lefevere (Ghent University, Belgium)

Merel Lefevere is a PhD-student and a teaching assistant in Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science at Ghent University since 2009. She obtained her Master in Philosophy in 2008 and completed the Postgraduate Program in 2010. Her PhD-thesis is an investigation of unification as a cognitive value in science.

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Wertbasierte Handlungserklärungen

Julia Liebtrau

egenstand des Vortrages ist die Diskussion einer wertbasierten Theorie der Handlungserklärung im Vergleich zu dem derzeit vorherrschenden kausalen Erklärungsansatz. Ausgangspunkt ist die Annahme, dass Handlungen die Wertorientierungen von Akteuren sowohl realisieren als auch offenbaren. Zum einen handeln Akteure, weil sie etwas verwirklichen wollen, das einen Wert besitzt bzw. worin sie einen Wert zu sehen glauben. Dieses Tun halten sie für geeignet und - als Verwirklichung eines Werts - selbst für wertvoll. Dass Handlungen wertvolle Ziele haben und es daher gut ist, sie auszuführen, liefert Handlungsgründe. Zum anderen zeigt das Verhalten eines Akteurs einem geschulten Interpreten, welchen Wert der Akteur damit verwirklichen wollte und was ihm wichtig war. Dass wir sein Verhalten als Handlung erklären können setzt voraus, dass dem Akteur unterstellt wird, er habe dem, was er tat, einen Wert beigemessen.

In dem Vortrag sollen Argumente dafür untersucht werden, eine kausale Theorie der Handlungserklärung à la Donald Davidson zugunsten einer teleologischen Konzeption aufzugeben. Bei der genaueren Betrachtung der kausalen Handlungserklärung zeigen sich gravierende Probleme, die sich einer wertbasierten teleologischen Erklärung vermutlich nicht stellen. Zunächst wird zu zeigen sein, welche Probleme das im Einzelnen sind und aus welchen Annahmen der kausalen Theorie sie resultieren. Hier knüpft anschließend die Motivation zu einer stark wertbasierten teleologischen Handlungserklärung an.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: German
Chair: Sebastian Lutz
Date: 15:30-16:00, September 10th, 2011 (Saturday)
Location: HS 303




Julia Liebtrau (Universität Erfurt, Germany)

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Über die Relevanz der Augustinischen Zeittheorie

Ulrich Lobis

enn in der momentanen philosophischen Debatte in einer historischen Art und Weise über die Zeit gesprochen wird, kommen den meisten Personen zuerst Denker wie Aristoteles und Kant in den Sinn. Da beide Denker prima facie auch versuchen, sprachlich sehr klar und in ihrer Argumentation stringent zu sein, sind sie in der analytischen Gemeinschaft präsent und werden immer wieder rezipiert.

Ich möchte in meinem Beitrag nun schauen, wie es sich mit der Augustinischen Theorie der Zeit verhält. Für lange Zeit war er einer der wichtigsten Autoren, die sich mit diesem Thema befassten, und sein Einfluss war auch auf die scholastischen Denker ein nicht zu unterschätzender. Aber es scheint so, als wäre er kontinuierlich aus der Diskussion verschwunden und würde nur noch im Zuge der Philosophiegeschichte behandelt.

Man darf aber nicht vergessen, dass er doch zu den wenigen Philosophen zählt, die von Ludwig Wittgenstein namentlich erwähnt worden sind. Wittgenstein setzte sich vor allem in den "Philosophischen Untersuchungen" und im "Blue Book" kritisch mit der Augustinischen Zeittheorie auseinander.

Auch Bertrand Russell hat sich mit der Augustinischen Zeittheorie auseinandergesetzt, und in seiner "Geschichte der westlichen Philosophie" behandelt er dieses Thema als eine für Augustinus zentrale Frage.

Ausgehend von Wittgenstein und Russell soll nun untersucht werden, ob es nicht auch in der aktuellen, der analytischen Tradition nahestehenden Philosophie augustininische Einflüsse und Spuren gibt, bzw. ob man nicht auch teilweise Augustinus' Gedanken für den momentanen Diskurs fruchtbar machen kann.

Section: Metaphysics & Ontology
Language: German
Chair: Vera Flocke
Date: 16:45-17:15, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: SE Phil



Ulrich Lobis (University of Innsbruck, Austria)

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sität Innsbruck, 2006 Bakkalaureat in Philosophie, 2010 Magister in Philosophie, (Diplomarbeit über "Die Erkenntnis der Natur durch den Laien bei Nikolaus von Kues"), Schwerpunkt in Wittgenstein, Editionswissenschaft und mittelalterlicher Philosophie
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Armchair Philosophy Naturalized

Sebastian Lutz

Natural language philosophy (ALP) as developed by Carnap and others relies on the choice of language in general and the explication of concepts in particular. Although it is usually seen as the paradigmatic armchair philosophy, I argue that it can be and historically has been strongly methodologically naturalistic (that is, reliant exclusively on methods that are used extensively in the sciences). This is not because ALP makes any empirical claims, but because the sciences make extensive use of language choice. Chang (2004) and Stotz et al. (2004) have shown in case studies how heavily scientific research relies on language choice. I will argue on conceptual grounds that it has to: The semantics for scientific theories that Andreas (2010) has developed allows the identification of meaning postulates that are free of any empirical implications and therefore can be chosen to be true. An argument against taking the Ramsey-sentences of a theory to represent the theory itself (Demopoulos 2003) shows the extent of this language choice. A purported counterargument (Papineau 2009) relies on an incorrect reading of the Carnap-Sentence. Therefore, ALP can be methodologically naturalistic by choosing languages the way that the sciences do. Historically, this is how ALP has been pursued.

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Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Christian Wallmann
Date: 16:45-17:15, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: HS 111




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Laterale Theoriendynamik – ein Beispiel aus der Biologiegeschichte

Tilman Massey

n der Wissenschaftstheorie stehen bei der diachronischen Untersuchung empirischer Theorien die Änderungen einzelner Theorien (bzw. Paradigmen, etc.) im Vordergrund. Dies gilt sowohl für die formal arbeitende Wissenschaftstheorie als auch für Untersuchungen kulhnscher Prägung. Es soll hier ein alternatives, an die wissenschaftliche Praxis angenähertes Bild entworfen werden: deutlich voneinander abtrennbare Theorien mit mehr oder weniger überlappendem Anwendungsbereich koexistieren über längere Zeiträume und beeinflussen sich gegenseitig. Hauptthese ist, dass diese gegenseitige Beeinflussung begriffsdynamisch relevant ist.

Zur Unterstützung dieser These wird nun eine historische Fallstudie betrachtet, nämlich die "Moderne Synthese der Evolutionstheorie" der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jhs., in der - grob gesagt - darwinsche Selektionstheorie und Genetik fusionierten. Die diesbezüglichen historiographischen Untersuchungen verweisen auf Theorien(-fragmente) als zu vereinigende Entitäten - sie verpflichten dabei allerdings auch auf einen pragmatisch angereicherten Theorienbegriff. Basierend auf einer pragmatisch-diachronisch angereicherten Version des wissenschaftstheoretischen Strukturalismus, lässt sich der geschichtliche Vorgang formal darstellen. Zentral dabei ist die Änderung des Mutationsbegriffs von einem Mechanismus der Artbildung zu einem Mechanismus der Entstehung von erblicher Variation. Die Genetik musste den Anspruch aufgeben selbst eine Artbildungstheorie zu sein, wurde aber im Gegenzug an prominenter Stelle in eine selektionistische Artbildungstheorie "eingebaut".

Es kam also aus anfänglicher Rivalität heraus durch eine Umstrukturierung der beteiligten Begriffssysteme zu einer begrifflichen Vereinheitlichung. Das obige Beispiel zeigt, dass die "Umgebungen" von Theorien (und nicht nur neue Beobachtungsdaten) eine wichtige Rolle im theoriendynamischen Prozess spielen können.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: German
Chair: Sebastian Lutz
Date: 14:45-15:15, September 10th, 2011 (Saturday)
Location: HS 303




Tilmann Massey (LMU Munich, Germany)

Tilmann Massey (Dipl. Geol.). Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. 1998-2005 study of geology, paleontology, logic and philosophy of science. Currently completing his PhD thesis on the concept of theoretical synthesis including a case study of the so-called modern synthesis of evolution. Main research interests: Theory dynamics, interdisciplinarity, diachronic concepts, philosophy of biology.

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Mental states, adverbs, and their adequacy for direct realist theories of perception

Alexander Georg Mirnig

he question regarding the ontological status of the subjective content of our perceptions and how they let us gain epistemological access to the outside world is, albeit being one of the oldest questions asked by mankind, still as unanswered and puzzling today as it was millennia before. There have, however, been many quite interesting attempts at solving the problem in the last few decades, two of which being mental state disjunctivism and the adverbial theory of perception.

The two classical metapositions in this debate are known as indirect realism, which claims that contents of perception are separate entities (inferential objects) standing in a certain relation to the physical objects of the outside world and therefore giving us indirect epistemological access to them, and direct realism, according to which we access the outside world directly thus not needing to postulate contents of perception as separate entities. Mental state disjunctivism and the adverbial theory of perception are direct realist positions trying to answer to the typical direct realist problems by trying to venture very close to the border of indirect realism without actually crossing it. Mental state disjunctivism does so by employing mental states, and the adverbial theory by allowing "adverbial" modifications of individual acts of perception. Both approaches, however, are rarely formulated within a clear systematic framework and it is not immediately evident, whether they can indeed keep their promise of explaining perception without crossing the line between direct and indirect realism.

In my talk I will therefore (a) give an overview of direct and indirect realism based on the two ontological positions of naturalism and idealism and show that the classic direct-indirect categorization has more facets to it than it might seem at first glance, and (b) demonstrate that, based on available literature, that it is quite possible (and also very plausible) to interpret mental state disjunctivism and the adverbial theory as theories employing inferential objects (therefore not being direct realist theories in the classical sense) and give a quick outlook of what will or would be necessary for any supporter of one of the two families of theories to keep them true to their claims.


Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Nora Heinzlmann
Date: 11:30-12:00, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: SE Phil



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Kalibrierbarkeit als Problem für modales Wissen

Sebastian Müller

ach Kripkes Remodalisierung der Philosophie wurde geraume Zeit recht unbedarft mit modalen Annahmen umgegangen. Dies hat sich zwar seit Yablo (1993) und Chalmers (1996) verändert. Heute versuchen Empiristen und Rationalisten gleichermaßen, zu erklären, wie wir modales Wissen erwerben können. Einem speziellen Problem wird jedoch kaum Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet - dem Problem der Kalibrierung metaphysisch-modalen Wissenserwerbs. Üblicherweise wird eine These als metaphysisch-modale Wahrheit anerkannt, wenn sie mit etablierten Annahmen über Notwendigkeiten a posteriori vereinbar ist. Diese Annahmen beruhen aber ihrerseits auf modalen Intuitionen, deren Verlässlichkeit weder geprüft noch systematisch korrigiert werden kann. Folglich lassen sich unsere Methoden modalen Wissenserwerbs nicht kalibrieren.

Ich werde in meinem Vortrag ein Argument von Roca-Royes (2010) diskutieren, die metaphysisch modales Wissen zu Wahrnehmungswissen und mathematischem Wissen analog setzt und schließt, da diese nicht kalibrierbar seien, sei dies auch von Theorien modalen Wissens nicht zu verlangen. Ich werde gegen Roca-Royes folgende Überlegung aufbieten. Zwischen Wahrnehmungswissen und metaphysisch-modalem Wissen besteht eine grundlegende Disanalogie. Für Wahrnehmungswissen und mathematisches Wissen haben wir andere Prüfsteine, für metaphysisch-modales Wissen hingegen nicht. Aus diesem Grund, so werde ich argumentieren, kann nur eine Theorie, die metaphysische Modalität an begriffliche oder epistemische Modalität knüpft, mit dem Problem der Kalibrierbarkeit fertig werden. Um metaphysisch-modales Wissen zu kalibrieren, muss metaphysische Modalität auf etwas beruhen, was uns besser zugänglich ist, als sie selbst. Essenzen - la Fine/Hale und Mögliche Welten - la Lewis sind hierfür ungeeignet. Nur eine Reduktion metaphysischer Modalität auf eine andere, epistemisch zugängliche Form von Modalität verspricht Abhilfe in dieser Frage.

Section: Epistemology
Language: German
Chair: Max A. Seeger
Date: 11:30-12:00, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: HS 303




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Philosophical evidence and the Socratic method

Michele Palmira

 It is common ground that two scientists can agree on what the relevant evidence concerning the issue under analysis is. The same holds for mathematicians, physicists, and so on. Philosophy looks very different. Philosophers are often in disagreement on the relevant data they rely on for canvassing a philosophical problem. In recent times, philosophy is increasingly characterized by a blazing debate on what amounts to evidence in philosophy. The paper addresses this topic by assessing what I call the "Socratic method" of philosophy. This method imposes two constraints on evidence: on the one hand, it prescribes to reach an agreement on the shared evidence. On the other, it says that only true propositions can be count as evidence. Let me call the former the agreement-side and the latter the truth-side of Socratic method.

Timothy Williamson, in *The Philosophy of Philosophy*, offers a thorough analysis of the Socratic method. He endorses and defends the truth-side and rebuts the agreement-side. Such a denial is motivated by the fact that the agreement-side commits us to accept intuitions as evidence. Accordingly, intuitions are bad philosophical tools since they cannot accomplish the epistemic tasks we assign to evidence, i.e. they can neither raise nor lower nor the probability of hypotheses. Thus, they cannot be evidence. Contrary to Williamson, I argue that intuitions are useful epistemic tools provided that they are reliable and there is consensus on such a reliability. It is shown that this idea has its probabilistic rationale in the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Finally, I contend that the endorsement of the truth-side may give rise to a sort of methodological paralysis which ultimately results in aporetic outcomes. This leads me to say that the agreement-side is a methodological-key principle for a proper development of philosophical enquiry.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Gebharter
Date: 16:00-16:30, September 8th, 2011 (Thursday)
Location: HS 303




Michele Palmira (University of Modena & Reggio Emilia; Cogito Research Centre in Philosophy, Italy)

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Theoretical Rationality: Between Internalism and Externalism

Lech Palmowski

his paper investigates the relationship between rationality and justification. These two concepts are often used interchangeably, at least in the theoretical domain (i.e. concerning beliefs). Nevertheless there are important differences. One of them is global/focal distinction: theoretical and practical rationality can be understood as elements constituting rationality of a person (global rationality); this is not so for justification. This distinction will be used at the end but in the proceeding I will focus on the case of beliefs.

In the main section of the paper I examine the relationship between justification and truth. Two types of link are presented: metaphysical and teleological connection. The first of them construes justification as feature which is truth-conductive (although not infallible); the second emphasizes the directedness (goal) of the process of justification and not its actual result. It is showed that this distinction is another way of looking at internalism/externalism controversy.

Having clarified the options I come to the question which of these two approaches better suits our intuitions regarding rationality. I discuss few skeptical scenarios (e.g. what happens when one is moved to an environment where her perceptual experiences are no longer reliable) and state the possible consequences: 1) people are irrational (at least in the skeptical scenarios) 2) externalism is wrong regarding justification 3) externalism is wrong regarding nature of rationality (but not necessarily regarding justification). I come to conclusion that the last option is the most convincing.

In the final part I try to explain the failure of externalism in capturing the nature of rationality. I attribute it to the facts that 1) rationality is primarily property of agents (and only secondary of their beliefs) hence importance of the notion of global rationality 2) rationality (in theoretical domain) sets similar, yet lower standards than justification.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Arne Martin Weber
Date: 16:45-17:15, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: HS 303



Lech Palmowski (Jagiellonian University, Poland)

Lech Palmowski (MS Computer Science). Jagiellonian University. 2011 (expected) master in philosophy (thesis regarding perfect rationality).

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Über die Beziehung zwischen ethischer Theorie und angewandter Ethik

Norbert Paulo

Die Frage, wie man konkrete ethische Fragen transparent und nachvollziehbar beantworten kann, ist als Beweggrund, Ethik zu betreiben, in den Hintergrund getreten. Nicht zufällig hat sich die Angewandte Ethik als ganz eigener Teil der praktischen Philosophie herausgebildet.

Die Angewandte Ethik entwickelt überwiegend zu den einzelnen Bereichsethiken aus den abstrakten Prinzipien der klassischen Ethik konkretere Prinzipien ("mittlerer Reichweite"), die eine Orientierung in Einzelfragen erlauben sollen. Wie allerdings der Übergang von den abstrakten zu den konkreteren Prinzipien funktioniert und ob beide überhaupt in Verhältnis zueinander stehen, ist weitgehend ungeklärt.

Hiermit ist die Frage nach einer Grenzziehung zwischen klassischer Ethik und Angewandter Ethik aufgeworfen. Einige sehen die einzelnen Bereichsethiken als "Anwendungen" abstrakter Prinzipien klassischer Ethik, ziehen eine Grenze also im Abstraktionsgrad, nicht im Anwendungsbereich. Andere sehen gar keinen Zusammenhang zwischen klassischer und Angewandter Ethik und ziehen damit eine klare Grenze: Klassische Ethik habe mit den Gegenständen der Bereichsethiken nichts zu tun. Es sei gar nicht ihre Aufgabe, konkrete ethische Fragen zu beantworten.

Hinsichtlich der Methode der Anwendung der Moralprinzipien wird diskutiert, ob es besser ist, von einem ethischen Prinzip ausgehend Einzelfälle zu beurteilen, vom Einzelfall ausgehend neue Prinzipien zu konstruieren oder alle relevanten Aspekte in einer Art Überlegungsgleichgewicht abzuwägen.

Diese Auseinandersetzungen um das richtige Vorgehen in der Angewandten Ethik sind Ausdruck der Unklarheit über das Verhältnis zwischen klassischer und Angewandter Ethik. Ich werde in meinem Vortrag dieses Verhältnis weiter aufklären und dafür plädieren, die Angewandte Ethik als Fortentwicklung der klassischen ethischen Theoriebildung zu verstehen. Weiter werde ich aufzeigen, dass die Angewandte Ethik auf die klassische Ethik angewiesen ist, um "Prinzipien mittlerer Reichweite" überhaupt entwickeln zu können; aber auch, um eine Methode zu entwickeln, um diese Prinzipien "anzuwenden". Dies alles muss zusammen kommen, um ethische Fragen nachvollziehbar und transparent beantworten zu können.

Section: Ethics
Language: German
Chair: Albert J.J. Anglberger
Date: 10:45-11:15, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: HS 304




Norbert Paulo (University of Hamburg, Germany)

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The University, Knowledge and Wisdom

Sonia Pavlenko

he paper will raise the question of the relationship between the university on one hand and knowledge and wisdom on the other, within the larger context of globalisation, competition for resources, students, position in rankings and knowledge society.

Nowadays, the academic investigation within the university is oriented towards acquiring as much knowledge as possible, with the purpose of applying it for the purpose of solving social problems. We find the thesis suggested by Nicholas Maxwell to be very suitable for today's context. More specifically, he argues that the attempt to acquire more knowledge is inefficient, and it must be imperiously replaced with the search for and the promotion of wisdom.

The paper will seek to explore what is the relationship between the university and knowledge. Is there a shift from individual production of knowledge within the university towards institutional production of knowledge, maybe even Mode 2 knowledge, that might end in the transformation of knowledge in wisdom?

After presenting briefly the way in which university has related to knowledge in the previous centuries, we will identify the manner in which the relationship between these two actors is built nowadays and offer predictions for future developments.

Section: Practical Philosophy: Philosophy of Education
Language: English
Chair: Sebastian Becker
Date: 14:45-15:15, September 10th, 2011 (Saturday)
Location: HS 304




Sonia Pavlenko (Babes-Bolyai University, Romania)

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Lorentzian Presentism: Epistemically Confused As Well?

Thorben Petersen

he special theory of relativity poses a major threat to presentism: Upon assuming non-uniqueness - what is real for an inertial observer O is what is simultaneous for O - the relativity of simultaneity demands that different temporal entities be real for different inertial observers. Some "presentists" (such as Callender, Craig, Crisp and Zimmerman) suggest that one may circumvent this relativistic fragmentizing of reality by embracing some variety of the Lorentzian ether compensatory theory, which recognizes a privileged frame of reference and thus a possible home to absolute temporal becoming. However, others (such as Balashov and Janssen) have argued that a Lorentzian interpretation of relativistic effects does not come to the presentist's rescue, since (i) Lorentz's theory is explanatory deficient and (ii) involves an unpleasant asymmetry not turning up in Einstein's. In my view such amalgam of presentism and Lorentzianism additionally is to be avoided for reasons metaphysical and epistemological. The metaphysical smashup, in a nutshell, is that the Lorentzian presentist needs to drop non-uniqueness for all frames but the privileged one, which seems entirely unmotivated for someone clinging to a privileged frame. It is most mysterious, moreover, how to synchronize clocks in a moving frame without these clocks being real.

In this talk I add some epistemological problems to these unwelcome concessions and remarkably strange consequences. They are built around the highly probable circumstance that a Lorentzian presentist (LP) actually is in an inertial state of motion against the ether, in case of which it holds that (i) certain events are real for LP which are not real according to his theory, while (ii) certain events that are real according to his theory are not considered real by LP, who - just as a remainder - is a presentist, for whom - one might assume - it holds that what is real is what exists "now" is what is simultaneous with "his thinking thus" (here square brackets are used in order to indicate reflexive usage). The aim of this talk accordingly is to explore this mismatch between indexical and referential interpretations of LP's now-beliefs (and corresponding attitudes).

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Gebharter
Date: 17:30-18:00, September 8th, 2011 (Thursday)
Location: HS 303



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Spielarten des Realismus

Bastian Reichardt

Die Realismusdebatte vollzieht sich in der Philosophie auf unterschiedlichsten Ebenen und in unterschiedlichsten Disziplinen. So lassen sich scheinbar voneinander unabhängige strittige Diskurse ausmachen, in denen sich realistische und anti-realistische Meinungen gegenüberstehen, wie bspw. die Debatten zwischen wissenschaftlichen, semantischen, moralischen oder modalen Realisten und Anti-Realisten.

Die zentrale Frage der Realismusdebatte ist dabei in jedem Fall die Frage nach der Wahrheitsfähigkeit unserer Äußerungen, die in den jeweiligen strittigen Diskursen gemacht werden. Kann also bspw. ein moralischer Satz einen Wahrheitswert besitzen? Unmittelbar mit dieser Frage sind ontologische Überlegungen verknüpft: Wenn eine Aussage in einem der strittigen Diskurse wahr oder falsch sein kann, was ist es dann, das diesen Wahrheitswert festlegt? Korrespondieren den wahren Aussagen im Falle der Moral also so etwas wie moralische Tatsachen?

In diesem Vortrag sollen strukturelle Überlegungen zur Realismusdebatte gemacht werden. Unabhängig von einer Entscheidung, ob Realisten oder Anti-Realisten Recht haben, lassen sich Abhängigkeitsverhältnisse zwischen verschiedenen Spielarten des Realismus ausmachen. Dies soll anhand des wissenschaftlichen und moralischen Realismus gezeigt werden.

Es stellt sich heraus, dass die plausiblen Varianten der realistischen Metaethik, wie sie z.B. von J. McDowell, M. Platts oder D. Brink entwickelt wurden, derart sind, dass ihre Geltung von der Geltung des wissenschaftlichen Realismus abhängig ist. Der Grund für diese Abhängigkeit liegt darin, dass solche Ansätze bei dem Versuch, moralische Tatsachen als Bestandteile der Struktur unserer Welt auszuweisen, gerechtfertigter Weise einem naturalistischen Programm Rechnung tragen. Moderne moralische Realisten verfolgen also keine "Verdopplung" der Ontologie im Sinne Platons, sondern setzen moralische Tatsachen in eine klare Beziehung zu natürlichen Tatsachen - so sieht bspw. McDowell die Erfahrung von moralischen Tatsachen analog zur Erfahrung von sekundären Qualitäten, während Platts annimmt, moralische Tatsachen supervenierten über den natürlichen Tatsachen.

Die Abhängigkeit des moralischen Realismus vom wissenschaftlichen Realismus wird dadurch evident, dass natürliche Tatsachen durch die Sprache der Wissenschaft beschrieben werden. Daraus folgt, dass nur

eine garantierte Objektivität unserer wissenschaftlichen Urteile ein sicheres Fundament für die Objektivität der Moral bietet. Das Hauptziel dieses Vortrags besteht somit darin, die scheinbare Verschiedenheit und Unabhängigkeit der strittigen Diskurse anzuzweifeln.

Section: Metaphysics & Ontology
Language: German
Chair: Vera Flocke
Date: 17:30-18:00, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: SE Phil




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Zum Zusammenhang zwischen Regeln und Recht-auf-etwas-Aussagen in Regelwerken

Karl Christoph Reinmuth

 In Regelwerken finden sich neben Aussagen, die sich als Regeln auffassen lassen, auch solche Aussagen, die zwar Normen, aber nicht Regeln sind. Zu diesen zählen Recht-auf-etwas-Aussagen. In dem geplanten Referat soll der Zusammenhang zwischen Regeln und Recht-auf-etwas-Aussagen thematisiert werden. Insbesondere gilt die Aufmerksamkeit der Gewinnung von Regeln aus Recht-auf-etwas-Aussagen. Dabei wird das Vorgehen von Stig Kanger, welches durch Edgar Morscher auf- und ausgearbeitet worden ist, mit Überlegungen zur Abwägung von Rechten von Robert Alexy verbunden.

In einem zweiten Abschnitt sollen einige mit diesem Vorgehen verbundenen Konsequenzen in Bezug auf den Regelwerksbegriff und die Analyse von Regelwerken angesprochen werden. Die vorgestellte Gewinnungsmethode wirft Fragen hinsichtlich des Umfangs von Regelwerken auf, da sich aus Recht-auf-etwas-Aussagen je nach Rechtsparteien und Rechtsinhalt viele Regelcluster gewinnen lassen. Weiterhin ist auf den interpretatorischen Aspekt bei der Gewinnung von Regeln einzugehen und die Rolle von regelwerksspezifischen Anwendungsgrundsätzen zu erörtern.


Section: Ethics
Language: German
Chair: Norbert Paulo
Date: 16:45-17:15, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: HS 304



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Das Non-Identity Problem und die Rechte zukünftig Lebender

Claudia Reitinger

 or every theory of intergenerational justice the question arises of how to deal with the problem that our actions not only affect the well being of future people but also their identity. If we decide not to care about the depletion of resources, the consequences of climate change or other long term effects, can future people claim that they were wronged although their existence depends upon these actions as well? If we had chosen a seemingly better policy the earth would be a nicer place to live but the persons living in this world would be different ones. In short, this puzzle known as the Non-Identity problem can be summarised in the following question: why is an action wrong if it makes no one worse off?

The background for the (alleged) paradox can be reconstructed in the following way:

- (1) An action or a social policy can be morally wrong only if it harms a person.
- (2) An action or a social policy harms a person only if this person is worse off than she would have been in the case of inaction.
- (3) Various actions or adoptions of social policies have the effect that other people will live in the future than there would have lived in case of inaction.
- (4) Most of the people who live or will live in the future live a life that is worth living.

Because of the believes (1) & (2) an action or a social policy is not morally wrong (under the assumption that her live is still worth living) although it leads to considerable negative consequences if this action or social policy is a necessary condition for the existence of that person.

This paper deals with two different proposals for addressing the Non-Identity Problem, namely the redefinition of harm in terms of a threshold conception and the appeal to the rights of future people. I will show that the appeal to rights can give a sound solution to the Non-Identity Problem and argue, that this solution is advantageous to a redefinition of harm because it is neutral with regard to different theories of justice.

Section: Ethics
Language: German
Chair: Norbert Paulo
Date: 15:30-16:00, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: HS 304




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Skepticism, rules and grammar

Nicola Claudio Salvatore

 In this paper, drawing on Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty', (1969, henceforth OC), I argue that Cartesian skeptical arguments rests on a number of *prima facie* compelling, still completely misleading, assumptions; thus, Cartesian-style skepticism should be dismissed as a *categorical mistake*.

My paper will go as follows. I first present Cartesian skepticism and his implications; as Wittgenstein's remarks on 'hinge propositions' are directly influenced by G. E. Moore 'A defence of Commonsense' (1925) and 'Proof of the external world' (1939) I will then briefly sketch G.E. Moore's anti-skeptical strategy and Wittgenstein's main criticisms against Moore's use of the expression "I know", along with a distinction between proper doubts and the Cartesian philosophical "doubt". This will allow me to present some uncontentious aspects of Wittgenstein's reflections on hinges.

In the rest of the paper, I will present and discuss two influential anti-skeptical strategies, namely Wright's 'rational entitlement' and Williams's 'Wittgensteinian contextualism', which are directly influenced by Wittgenstein's remarks on hinge propositions. I aim to show how these proposals, both as viable interpretations of Wittgenstein's thought and especially as anti-skeptical strategies, are ultimately unconvincing.

Then, drawing on Moyal-Sharrock's (2005, 2010) 'non-epistemic' reading of OC, I present and defend a 'non-propositional' account of hinges, on which we should consider them as 'rules of grammar', and thus as non-propositional 'ways of acting'. This leads to a dissolution of the Cartesian problem; for the skeptic mistakenly treats our 'hinge commitments' as beliefs, while on the contrary they are the expression of a non-propositional know-how; thus, they will not be in the market for propositional knowledge.

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Section: Epistemology
 Language: English
 Chair: Merel Lefevere
 Date: 14:45-15:15, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
 Location: HS 303




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Nicola is born in Bari, Apulia, Italy on the 23th of November 1982. She started studying philosophy at the age of 16, while still at High School (Liceo Classico 'Socrate', Bari, Italy). During her Academic Career, she has been trained in both Continental and Analytic Philosophy. In 2008, she moved to the United Kingdom, to study for her second Ma in Philosophy (Birkbeck College, London) and her PhD (University of Edinburgh), under the supervision of Professor Duncan Pritchard FRSE. E-mail: N.C.Salvatore@sms.ed.ac.uk

Der kontextualistische Fehlschluss

Alexander Samans

as Ziel des epistemischen Kontextualismus ist es, den Widerspruch zwischen, (i) der im alltäglichen Sprachgebrauch zunächst scheinbar unproblematischen Verwendung von Wissenszuschreibungen und (ii) der parallel dazu auftretenden intuitiven Zustimmung gegenüber skeptischer Hypothesen, durch eine Analyse der Verwendung des Begriffes "Wissen" aufzuheben.

Das Ergebnis dieser Analyse ist die These, dass es sich bei dem Verb "Wissen" um einen indexikalischen Begriff handelt. Was zur Folge hat, dass nicht nur durch eine Änderung externer Faktoren (wie z.B. dem Zeitpunkt einer Wissenszuschreibung) sondern auch durch eine Änderung interner Faktoren (wie z.B. der Aufmerksamkeit auf bestimmte Irrtumsmöglichkeiten des Wissenszuschreibers) der Wahrheitswert von Wissenszuschreibungen variiert. Die Lösung, die der Kontextualismus anbietet, lässt sich, also grob folgendermaßen formulieren:

Für Satzkonstruktion von Wissenszuschreibungen in Bezug auf propositionale Gehalte gilt, dass sich der Begriff "Wissen" auf einen durch den Sprecher bestimmten, Kontextabhängigen, Standard -1 bezieht, welcher nicht im Widerspruch zu einem davon verschiedenen Standard

-2 stehen kann.

Trotz der zutreffenden Analyse, die den verschiedenen Wissensbegriffen im Sprachgebrauch Rechnung trägt, wird hier ein entscheidender Aspekt übersehen. Denn in den Fällen, in denen der Wissenszuschreiber über einen klaren Begriff von "Wissen" verfügt, den er auf der Basis von Gründen gebildet hat. Also insbesondere im philosophischen Diskurs beinhalten Wissensansprüche eine normative Komponente, die fordert, dass der Standard-x den der Wissenszuschreiber verwendet der gebotene Standard für alle Wissenszuschreibungen ist.

Die Diskrepanz zwischen z.B. empiristischen und rationalistischen Ansätzen lässt sich nicht durch eine kontextualistische Analyse aufheben, da es hier primär um die Sicherheit von Annahmen geht, die ab einem bestimmten Grad mit "Wissen" bezeichnet wird.

Anhand von Beispielen lässt sich dieser Sachverhalt darstellen und es kann gezeigt werden, dass insbesondere die inkonsistente Triade:

- 1) $K(S, p \rightarrow \neg H)$
- 2) $K(S, p)$
- 3) $\neg K(S, \neg H)$

kontextualistisch nicht aufgelöst werden kann.

Section: Logic & Philosophy of Language
Language: German
Chair: Moritz Cordes
Date: 14:45-15:15, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: HS 111



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Wittgenstein's Two Notions of Interpretation

Sebastian Sanhueza

Ludwig Wittgenstein summarizes his remarks on the phenomenon of 'following a rule' or rule-following as follows:

(α) This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because any course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if *any* action can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.

(β) It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is *not* an *interpretation*, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases. [*PI*§201; my Greek letters]

This essay is mainly concerned with a point of exegesis. According to Saul Kripke, the core of *PI*§201 is (α): here, Wittgenstein introduces a 'skeptical paradox' about meaning. In turn, John McDowell challenges Kripke's reading and relocates the gist of *PI*§201 to (β): this bit contains the positive point that to understand a rule is not always an interpretation. The goal of this essay is to argue against McDowell's point: by assessing *PI*§201 - with special emphasis on Wittgenstein's notion of interpretation -, I intend to show that (β) may be seen as elaborating on the crucial point which Kripke takes to see in (α). By developing this proposal, this piece's main contribution is to suggest that *PI*§201 displays two different notions of interpretation - an uncontroversial one which Wittgenstein endorses and a controversial one which he expects to undermine.

I divide the previous task into four parts. In section 1, I sketch Wittgenstein's intuitions on rule-following. In section 2, I briefly survey the Kripke-McDowell controversy on *PI*§201. In section 3, I examine Wittgenstein's notion of interpretation in the context of *PI*§201. In section 4, building on the previous exam, I challenge McDowell's reading by contending that (β) and (γ) only expand on (α).

Section: Logic & Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Hans Rott
Date: 14:00-14:30, September 10th, 2011 (Saturday)
Location: HS 111




Sebastian Sanhueza (University College London, United Kingdom) Sebastian is a post-graduate student enrolled in the Philosophy MPhil/PhD program at University College London. He earned a Bachelor in Philosophy (2003-2009) at the Universidad de los Andes (Santiago, Chile), where he wrote a thesis on David Hume's perceptual assumptions and skepticism concerning the senses; then, he completed a Specialist MLitt in Philosophy of Mind and Metaphysics (2009-2010) at the University of Glasgow, where he wrote a dissertation on Charles Travis' "objection from looks" against an intentionalist account of visual experiences. He currently research on the notion of visual experiences: specifically, he tries to explore an intelligible notion of visual experiences which allowed us understanding whether visual awareness is intentional. As suggested by this brief description, the areas in which he is specializing are the philosophy of mind (especially, philosophy of perception) and metaphysics (especially, ontological issues regarding perception and problems concerning personal identity).

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Zwei kontextuelle Reformulierungen des verstärkten Lügnerargumentes

Christine Schurz

o begin with, I present a formal reconstruction of the strengthened liar argument. To this end I assume a formal language of first order predicate logic L and a model M for L , such that the interpreted language (L, M) has the ability to express its own syntax (see e.g. McGee (1991) for an explication of 'to express its own syntax'). Furthermore, I assume that there is a one-place predicate Tr in L that I use to represent 'is true'. This can be accomplished by assuming that Tr meets one of the currently existing semantic or axiomatic theories of truth (e.g. Halbach and Horton (2004) give a brief summary of the most important semantic and axiomatic theories of truth). In consequence of these assumptions, we can construct a strengthened liar sentence, i.e. a sentence λ of L such that $M \models \lambda' = \neg Tr(' \lambda)'$ or $M \models \lambda \leftrightarrow \neg Tr(' \lambda)'$, respectively.

The strengthened liar problem consists in the fact that the semantical diagnosis $\neg Tr(' \lambda)'$ about the strengthened liar sentence and the sentence $Tr(' \neg Tr(' \lambda)')$, which expresses the truth of this semantical diagnosis, cannot both be true in our model M . In other words, assuming the following three premises

- (1) $M \models \lambda' = \neg Tr(' \lambda)'$
- (2) $M \models \neg Tr(' \lambda)'$
- (3) $M \models Tr(' \neg Tr(' \lambda)')$

leads to a contradiction, as we obtain

- (4) $M \models Tr(' \lambda)' \& \neg Tr(' \lambda)'$

by premise (2) and by applying the rule of substitution of identities to premise (3). The same problem arises in case of other semantical diagnoses about λ . It is not possible that the semantical diagnosis together with a sentence that expresses the truth of this semantical diagnosis can be true in M .

Contextual approaches to the strengthened liar problem (see e.g. Parsons (1974), Burge (1979), Barwise and Etchemendy (1987), Koons (1992), Simmons (1993) or Glanzberg (2004)) try to avoid and solve this problem by assuming that the concept of truth is context-dependent.

Contextual approaches argue that there is a context-shift in the course of the strengthened liar argument (1)-(4), which induces a change from one initial concept of truth to another concept of truth. A fundamental question for any contextual approach to the strengthened liar problem is to find out at which position of the strengthened liar argument the interpretation of the truth predicate changes due to a context-shift. The most currently existing contextual approaches agree on this question. The resulting contextual reformulation of (1)-(3), which I shall denote 'CR1', can be formally represented as follows:

$$P1_{CR1} \quad M^1 \models \lambda^1 = ' \neg Tr^1(' \lambda^1 ')'$$

$$P2_{CR1} \quad M^1 \models \neg Tr^1(' \lambda^1 ')$$

$$P3_{CR1} \quad M^2 \models Tr^2(' \neg Tr^1(' \lambda^1 ')')$$

I shall state some instances of models M^1 and M^2 that meet CR1. Furthermore, I propose the following alternative contextual reformulation of the formal strengthened liar argument, which I shall denote 'CR2':

$$P1_{CR2} \quad M^1 \models \lambda^1 = ' \neg Tr^1(' \lambda^1 ')'$$

$$P2_{CR2} \quad M^2 \models \neg Tr^2(' \lambda^1 ')$$

$$P3_{CR2} \quad M^2 \models Tr^2(' \neg Tr^2(' \lambda^1 ')')$$

In addition, I shall state some instances of models M^1 and M^2 that meet CR2 and I shall briefly go into the essential differences between CR1 and CR2.

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Section: Logic & Philosophy of Language
Language: German
Chair: Moritz Cordes
Date: 15:30-16:00, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: HS 111



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Mein Gehirn, mein Geist, mein Gedanke – Autorenschaft vs. Ownership

Max A. Seeger

 Personen, die an Gedankeneingebung leiden, berichten, dass sie Gedanken in ihrem Bewusstsein haben, die nicht ihre eigenen Gedanken sind. Doch wie kann man einen Gedanken haben, der nicht ein eigener Gedanke ist? Die Frage lässt sich beantworten, indem man zwischen zwei Sinnen unterscheidet, in denen ein Gedanke der eigene Gedanke sein kann. Im Sinn von ownership ist ein Gedanke genau dann mein Gedanke, wenn ich ihn in meinem Bewusstsein erlebe oder wenn ich introspektiven Zugang zu ihm habe. Im Sinn von Autorenschaft ist ein Gedanke genau dann mein Gedanke, wenn ich der Autor oder kausale Urheber dieses Gedankens bin. Das heißt im Fall von Gedankeneingebungen, dass Personen sich zwar ownership zuschreiben (sie erleben den Gedanken in ihrem Bewusstsein), dass sie

aber irrtümlicherweise die Autorenschaft einer fremden Instanz zuschreiben (sie glauben, dass eine fremde Instanz ihren Gedanken verursacht hat).

Die Unterscheidung zwischen Autorenschaft und ownership spielt nicht nur in pathologischen Fällen eine Rolle. Alltägliche Fälle von ownership ohne Autorenschaft sind etwa kommunizierte Gedanken. Wenngleich die Unterscheidung an vielen Beispielen plausibel gemacht werden kann, stellt es sich als äußerst kompliziert dar, genaue Kriterien für Autorenschaft anzugeben.

Der simple Versuch, Autorenschaft mit kausaler Urheberschaft gleichzusetzen, kann nicht gelingen, da sich viele Gegenbeispiele finden lassen - etwa Missverständnisse in der Kommunikation. Der Versuch, Autorenschaft nur für diejenigen Gedanken zuzuschreiben, die man 'absichtlich' denkt, handelt sich die Schwierigkeit ein erklären zu müssen, wie man die Absicht haben kann, einen Gedanken p zu denken, ohne p bereits zu denken. Hier stellt sich die Frage, wie weit die häufig bemühte Analogie zwischen Handlungen und Gedanken tragen kann. Im Vortrag werden diese und weitere Kriterien diskutiert und deren philosophische Implikationen aufgezeigt.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: German
Chair: Nora Heinzelmann
Date: 16:00-16:30, September 8th, 2011 (Thursday)
Location: SE Phil




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Conceptual mental content. A critique of four Fregean principles against the background of embodied cognition

Michael Sienhold

 In the following argumentation I am going to criticize four Fregean principles that are constitutive of conceptual content. In doing so the theoretical resource is Barsalou's experimentally justified theory of perceptual symbol systems. The principles to be criticized are the ones of force independence, compositionality, reference determinacy and cognitive significance.

Barsalou's main idea is that concepts are re-enactments of multimodal experiences. To have a concept of a chair, for example, amounts to being able to simulate embodied experiences with chairs. In line with this, conceptual "contents" are linguistic and non-linguistic simulations context-specifically occurring in psychological systems. Thus the "contents" themselves are context-specific non-linguistic simulations and therefore they coincide with the psychological process itself.

In my view the central weakness of the principle of force independence is its false separation of thought process and thought content. Correspondingly, the intelligible components of dynamically unfolding mental processes are wrongly statified as intersubjectively stable "contents".

The pivotal problem with the principle of compositionality consists in the fact that it assumes a quasi-linguistic view of concepts. This view faces the symbol grounding problem.

The principle of reference determinacy suffers from the point that conceptual processes do not have non-psychological referents. Moreover, if concepts are multimodal simulations contextually occurring, then nothing needs to be determined or interpreted. The cognitive process itself does not require a determination.

Finally, the principle of cognitive significance makes wrong implicit assumptions. It presupposes, for example, that a concept can be an object of a belief. If one proceeds on the assumption, however, that a concept and the process of thinking are one and the same, then concepts cannot be objects of beliefs.


Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Georg Mirnig
Date: 15:30-16:00, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: SE Phil



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Michael has a Magister Artium in philosophy since May 2010. He studied at the Goethe University Frankfurt. In his Magister thesis he was concerned with mental content against the backdrop of embodied cognition. He published a paper on nonconceptual content.
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The real problem of egoism

Michael-John Turp

he spectre of the egoist has haunted moral philosophy, from Plato's Republic, through Nietzsche's sophisticated defence of immoralism and up to recent socio-biology and game theoretic approaches to rationality. I propose to look at responses to the problem of egoism, and to argue that they frequently rest on a radically mistaken presupposition. The normative force of prudential reasons, by contrast to moral reasons, is generally regarded as non-mysterious. This thought is bolstered by certain features of neo-Humean belief-desire moral psychology and suggests the strategy of rejecting the moral phenomenology and explaining moral reasons in terms of prudential reasons. For example, the crux of Socrates' response to the egoist is that there is a lack of harmony, a kind of sickness in his soul, which will prevent him from flourishing. So, the egoist will in fact be worse off. We find similar strategies in Hobbes, Sidgwick, Gauthier and Rawls, as well as in game theoretic analyses and evolutionary accounts of altruism. However, I argue that this strategy is wrong-headed for at least three reasons. First, prudential reasons and moral reasons can always come apart. Second, to provide prudential reasons for a moral action is to provide the wrong category of reason. Third, and most importantly for current purposes, I argue that the normative force of prudential reasons is itself deeply mysterious. Addressing the problem of egoism by reducing moral reasons to prudential reasons leaves us with an equally difficult problem; what I call the full-time altruist. The full-time altruist is an agent who remains wholly unmoved by prudential reasons. I argue that the problem of the altruist is fully analogous to the problem of egoism, that the character of the altruist is no less coherent than the character of the egoist, and that the problem of the altruist is no less pressing for moral philosophers interested in understanding the normative force of reasons.


Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Norbert Paulo
Date: 17:30-18:00, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: HS 304



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Single-case probabilities and their impact on statistical methods

Christian Wallmann

 here seems to be a conceptual difference between the probability, that my neighbor Sarah smokes and the probability, that an arbitrary Austrian smokes. Sarah smokes or she doesn't and probability statements about Sarah are consequently subjective and depend on the available background knowledge about Sarah. In contrast a probability statement about an arbitrary Austrian doesn't depend on any available background knowledge about this Austrian, otherwise this Austrian would not be arbitrary.

In order to satisfy this intuition, in more formal works about the reference class problem single-case probabilities, which refer to a concrete event and statistical probabilities, which refer to an arbitrary event of a certain type, have been distinguished. To put it in terms of logic: the first refers to closed formulas of predicate logics, which have a truth value, while the second refers to open formulas of predicate logics. But this distinction is far too simple to capture the variety of probability statements and other distinctions are more appropriate. The possibility of probability attributions to single-cases has often been neglected by philosophers and classical statisticians.

It is argued, that single-events either happen or don't happen and that consequently a probability attribution is either meaningless or has only the values 1 or 0. This has great impact on the methods of point estimation and interval estimation and many useful Bayesian techniques cannot be applied. For example no use of priori distributions about unknown parameters can be made, because an unknown parameter has a certain value and a probability statement about this value is hence a single-case probability. In contrast Bayesians interpret single-case probabilities as a degree of belief, that a certain event happens, which is perfectly compatible with the fact, that this event happens or doesn't happen and that statements, which describe them are consequently either true or false.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Sebastian Lutz
Date: 14:00-14:30, September 10th, 2011 (Saturday)
Location: HS 303




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Sellars' Erbe - Zur Kontroverse zwischen Brandom und McDowell

Arne Martin Weber

 random und McDowell präsentieren mit *Making it Explicit* (1994) und *Mind and World* (1996) Werke, mit denen sich beide in Sellars' philosophische Tradition einreihen möchten. Jedoch haben beide Projekte kaum eine konzeptionelle Schnittmenge und beanspruchen, ohne den theoretischen Bestand des jeweils anderen auszukommen. Diese Differenzen führten zu einer kontroversen Debatte, in der bisher nur die Fronten geklärt wurden (vgl. Brandom 1995, 2000, 2003 und McDowell 1996, 2000, 2002). Beide Vorschläge zur Möglichkeit der Rechtfertigung und Reliabilität von Beobachtungsberichten haben nicht nur interne Probleme. Es ist auch fraglich, ob Brandom und McDowell überhaupt die Tradition Sellars' fortführen.

Als "myth of the given" kritisiert Sellars (1956) Sinnesdatentheorien, die den positiven epistemischen Status von sinnlich oder unmittelbar gegebenem Wissens postulieren. Auf der These der Existenz von inneren Wahrnehmungsepisoden aufbauend entwickelt er die Grundzüge einer Philosophie des Geistes wie die Idee der autorisierenden Rechtfertigungsbedingungen von Beobachtungsberichten und der normativen Dimension einer Sprachpraxis, in der Wissensansprüche adäquat artikuliert werden.

Brandom möchte die in der Sprachpraxis impliziten Normen explizieren, die darauf verweisen, wie Ausdrücke richtig verwendet werden, und so die begrifflichen Gehalte unserer Sprache rekonstruieren. McDowell möchte zeigen, wie eine Vermittlung zwischen Geist und Welt durch begrifflich strukturierte Erfahrung möglich ist, und einen Dualismus von begrifflichem Gehalt und kausaler Einwirkung der externen Realität vermeiden; man erwerbe durch die Erfahrung Begriffe und dank ihrer normativen Beziehungen eine internalistisch verstandene, verlässliche Urteilskraft. Brandom umgeht jeglichen Empirismus und kritisiert McDowells internalistische Form der Reliabilität von Urteilen, weil hier die Normen der Sprachpraxis ignoriert werden.

Mit Sellars' Einsichten selbst lassen sich nicht nur die Probleme beider Konzeptionen zeigen, sondern auch ihre Berufung auf sie anzweifeln: Brandom übergeht die Bedeutung der inneren Episoden, die sich ein Wahrnehmender selbst attestiert und ihre kausale Rolle, während McDowell die Geltung von Beobachtungsberichten innerhalb der Sprachpraxis unterschlägt.

Section: Epistemology
Language: German
Chair: Max A. Seeger
Date: 10:45-11:15, September 9th, 2011 (Friday)
Location: HS 303



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Freie Logik, Quantoren und existentieller Gehalt

Christian Wimmer

 ine Logik F wird gewöhnlich als eine Freie Logik (Free Logic) definiert gdw.

(B1) F frei von Existenzannahmen bezüglich der singulären Terme von F ist und

(B2) F frei von Existenzannahmen bezüglich der generellen Terme von F ist und

(B3) die Quantoren von F existentiellen Gehalt haben.

Thema dieses Vortrags ist die Besprechung von (B3), welche in der Literatur zur Freien Logik bisher nur tangiert wurde.

Bereits 1965 bemerkte Alonzo Church in einer Rezension von Karel Lamberts Aufsatz "Existential Import Revisited" (1963), dass im Rahmen einer Freien Logik eine andere Interpretation der Quantoren als die übliche prädikatenlogische möglich wäre. Wenn S eine nicht-leere Teilmenge vom Gegenstandsbereich D ist, dann könnten die Quantoren laut Church als 'für jedes x aus S' und 'einige x aus S' verstanden werden. Der Vortrag wird unter anderem an diese Anregung anschließen.

Dafür wird zuerst mithilfe Quines Theorie der Ontologischen Verpflichtung erörtert, was 'existentieller Gehalt' bedeutet. Nach einer darauf folgenden, kurzen Darstellung der Idee der Freien Logik wird die Kernfrage des Vortrags behandelt, nämlich ob (B3) tatsächlich notwendig ist für eine Freie Logik.

Darauf aufbauend ergeben sich weitere Fragen zu Teilaspekten, wie etwa: Welche alternativen Quantoreninterpretationen (z.B. à la Leśniewski oder Church) sind im Rahmen einer Freien Logik sinnvoll und was verliert eine Freie Logik, wenn sie an (B3) festhält?

Abschließend wird ein Ausblick gegeben, ob eine alternative Freie Logik ohne (B3) hinsichtlich der Anwendung auf konkrete Probleme brauchbar ist und ob damit neue Ergebnisse erzielt werden können.

Section: Logic & Philosophy of Language
Language: German
Chair: Hans Rott
Date: 15:30-16:00, September 10th, 2011 (Saturday)
Location: HS 111



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